Wright v Commissioner of Police

Link copied
Case Copied 21 min read

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA456/2024
 [2025] NZCA 419

BETWEEN

MARK ANDREW WRIGHT
Appellant

AND

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent

Hearing:

16 June 2025

Court:

Ellis, Peters and Walker JJ

Counsel:

M T Lennard for Appellant
K South and C C White for Respondent

Judgment:

21 August 2025 at 11.00 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Ellis J)

  1. On 22 June 2024, Dunningham J made an assets forfeiture order under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (the CPRA) over a flat in Austin Street, Christchurch, belonging to Mr Mark Wright.[1]  She found Mr Wright had benefitted from significant criminal activity (the importation and supply of methamphetamine), that the property was “tainted” and so, was eligible for forfeiture.[2]  She declined to exclude the property from forfeiture on the grounds of undue hardship under s 51 of the CPRA.[3]

    [2]At [22], referring to Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (CPRA), s 5 definition of “tainted property”.

    [3]At [66]–[72].

  2. Mr Wright now appeals the forfeiture order.  In essence, he says the Judge erred in relying on inadmissible evidence.[4]    More specifically, he says the Commissioner of Police may not rely on hearsay and/or non-expert opinion evidence to prove that Mr Wright had unlawfully benefitted from significant criminal activity and that the Austin Street flat was tainted.[5]  He says r 7.30 of the High Court Rules 2016 does not apply in a forfeiture context, noting there is conflicting High Court authority on this point.[6]  Mr Wright advances the same argument (if necessary) in relation to the decision declining him relief from forfeiture.

    [4]A further ground of appeal, alleging trial counsel error, was not ultimately pursued. 

    [5]Although there were ancillary admissibility challenges raised on appeal (such as challenges to the evidence of certain text messages, Mr Wright’s prior convictions and certain National Intelligence Application records), none of these were pursued with any vigour before us.  That is no doubt because it was Mr Hugill’s evidence that was central to the High Court Judge’s key forfeiture findings.

    [6]Rule 7.30 provides that statements of belief may be included in affidavits filed in support of interlocutory applications.  The extent to which r 19.10(1) applies in relation to originating applications (such as an application under the CPRA) is the subject of debate  While there is no dispute that the rule does apply to an affidavit filed in support of an application for a restraining order (see Vincent v Commissioner of Police [2013] NZCA 412 ) the position is less clear where the affidavit is filed in support of an application having substantive or final effect: Commissioner of Police v Doyle [2024] NZHC 2392; and Commissioner of Police v Cheng [2023] NZHC 606, [2024] NZAR 234.

  3. In response, the Commissioner says not only that r 7.30 is applicable in forfeiture cases but also that there are more fundamental objections to…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Wright v Commissioner of Police and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] NZCA 419
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wright v Commissioner of Police is an appeal against a forfeiture order made by Dunningham J in the High Court. The order was made under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (CPRA) in respect of a flat in Austin Street, Christchurch, belonging to Mark Wright. Dunningham J found that the flat was "tainted" because it had been funded by significant criminal activity and, accordingly, ordered that it be forfeited. Mr Wright appeals the order on the basis that the Judge should not have admitted evidence from Mr Hugill, an investigator employed by the Southern Asset Recovery Unit of the New Zealand Police, which he says was hearsay and/or non-expert opinion evidence. The appeal raises two important issues: the first, whether the Court can admit evidence on the basis of implied consent; the second, whether certain rules governing admissibility apply in a forfeiture context. The Court concluded that Mr Hugill's evidence was admitted by implied consent. That conclusion was based on a number of factors, including the fact that Mr Wright's counsel had not objected to the evidence; that the bank records underlying Mr Hugill's evidence had been provided to Mr Wright; and that Mr Wright could have challenged the evidence, had he wished to do so. The Court also found that the appeal was barred by the principle of finality. The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mark Andrew Wright has a criminal history involving the importation and supply of illicit substances, including ephedrine and gamma-butyrolactone (GBL). In 2017, he was found guilty of importing three packages of methamphetamine totaling 396.4g and was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison. Following his convictions, the Commissioner of Police applied for and was granted restraining orders over a flat in Austin Street, Christchurch, which belonged to Mr Wright. Subsequently, the Commissioner applied for an asset forfeiture order over the Austin Street flat under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009, arguing that the property was tainted by funds derived from significant criminal activity. The Commissioner's evidence, primarily from forensic accountant Andrew Hugill, focused on unexplained cash deposits into Mr Wright's accounts, which were central to establishing the property's taint. Mr Wright opposed the application, offering alternative explanations for the deposits. The High Court judge found the property to be tainted and ordered its forfeiture, a decision Mr Wright now appeals.

The matter under appeal originated in the High Court of New Zealand where Dunningham J made an assets forfeiture order over the Austin Street flat, Christchurch, belonging to Mr Mark Wright. The order was made under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (the CPRA). Mr Wright appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the Judge erred in relying on inadmissible evidence. The appeal hearing took place on 16 June 2025, before Ellis, Peters, and Walker JJ. The judgment dismissing the appeal was handed down on 21 August 2025.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Judge err in relying on inadmissible evidence to make the forfeiture order?
2. Was the property tainted by funds derived from significant criminal activity?
3. Did the Judge err in declining to exclude the property from forfeiture on the grounds of undue hardship?

Held
1. The Court held that the Judge did not err in relying on the inadmissible evidence to make the forfeiture order. The Court found that the evidence was admitted by implied agreement, and no unfairness to the appellant resulted from this.
2. The Court held that the property was tainted by funds derived from significant criminal activity. The Court found the Judge's conclusion that the Austin Street property was tainted was supported by the evidence of unexplained cash deposits, methamphetamine importation, and other factors.
3. The Court held that the Judge did not err in declining to exclude the property from forfeiture on the grounds of undue hardship. The Court found the Judge's assessment of undue hardship was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal considered the appeal brought by Mark Andrew Wright against the forfeiture order made by Dunningham J. The key issues were whether the Judge erred in relying on inadmissible evidence, whether the property was tainted by funds derived from significant criminal activity, and whether the Judge erred in declining to exclude the property from forfeiture on the grounds of undue hardship.

Regarding the first issue, the Court found that Mr Hugill’s evidence about unexplained cash deposits was admitted by implied consent. The Court noted that there was no obvious reason for Mr Wright’s counsel to have objected to the admission of Mr Hugill’s evidence, as Mr Wright had been provided with all the bank statements, and Mr Hugill’s evidence contained sufficient detail to enable easy cross-checking. The Court concluded that there was no possibility of unfairness in this case.

As for the second issue, the Court found that the Judge's conclusion that the Austin Street property was tainted was supported by the evidence. The Court noted that the unexplained cash deposits, methamphetamine importation, and other factors were sufficient to establish that funds derived from criminal activity had been used to meet mortgage payments.

Lastly, regarding the third issue, the Court found that the Judge's assessment of undue hardship was reasonable and supported by the evidence. The Court noted that Mr Wright's claim of undue hardship was not accepted by the Judge, and the Court found no basis to interfere with this decision.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the forfeiture order made by Dunningham J. The Court did not express any view on the applicability of r 7.30 in a forfeiture context or whether Mr Wright should have been able to advance his admissibility challenge for the first time on appeal.