TECHNOPAK LIMITED AND MONZEAL LIMITED JAMES PETER GARRICK SCOTT EDWARD LEANING

Case

[2024] NZHC 2748

23 September 2024

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV 2018-404-002346

[2024] NZHC 2748

UNDER the Copyright Act 1994

BETWEEN

TECHNOPAK LIMITED

Plaintiff

AND

MONZEAL LIMITED

First Defendant

JAMES PETER GARRICK
Second Defendant

SCOTT EDWARD LEANING

Third Defendant

On the papers

Counsel:

G C Williams & D Scott-Jones for the Plaintiff E St John & S P Maloney for the Defendants

Judgment:

23 September 2024


JUDGMENT OF TAHANA J

[Costs]


This judgment was delivered by me on 23 September 2024 at 4.00pm Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

…………………………

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors/Counsel:

Richmond Chambers, Auckland A J Park, Auckland

E St John, Barrister, Auckland

S P Maloney, Barrister, Auckland Price Baker Berridge, Auckland

TECHNOPAK LIMITED v MONZEAL LIMITED [Costs] [2024] NZHC 2748 [23 September 2024]

Introduction

[1]                 In a judgment delivered on 31 May 2024,1 I dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants. The parties have been unable to agree costs and counsel have exchanged memoranda.

[2]                 The defendants seek 2B costs of $172,080.00 plus a 25 per cent uplift, being costs of $215,100.00 plus disbursements of $177,394.66.

[3]                 The plaintiff disputes the quantum of costs claimed and disputes that any uplift should be applied. The plaintiff argues that 2B costs of no more than $151,525.00 are appropriate.

[4]                 The plaintiff also disputes the amount claimed for disbursements, arguing that the expert’s costs should be reduced by 30 per cent and e-discovery costs should be reduced by $4,748.25 (being a total of $127,541.47 for disbursements). There is a total difference of approximately $113,000 between the parties.

[5]I therefore need to determine the following issues:

(a)In calculating scale costs:

(i)should the Court allow recovery for preparation time based on scheduled or actual hearing time?

(ii)where costs were reserved, are the defendants entitled to claim scale costs for successful interlocutory applications?

(b)Should a 25 per cent uplift on scale costs be applied?

(c)Should the Court approve the full amounts claimed for the expert and e-discovery disbursements?

(d)Should the defendants be awarded costs on costs?


1      Technopak Ltd v Monzeal Ltd [2024] NZHC 1420.

Calculation of scale costs

Preparation for hearing

[6]                 The defendants claim 2B costs of $53,776.00 for preparation time based on a hearing scheduled for 15 days. The plaintiff argues that the correct calculation should be based on 12 days ($46,605.00) being the actual hearing time.

[7]                 While sch 3 of the High Court Rules 2016 (the HCR) indicates that preparation time is to be based on actual hearing time, the Court has a discretion to award costs for preparation time based on scheduled hearing time:2

Unlike the previous scale of costs, there is no percentage basis or other relationship between the costs awarded and the amount of the claim. As to the hearing itself, the time allocation is according to the actual hearing time. Preparation time, where the case proceeds to hearing, is twice the actual hearing time:sch 3, item 8.

If the hearing time is short and the allowance for preparation is less than if the case had not gone to hearing, the court can exercise its general discretion to increase costs to avoid this anomaly: Tram Lease Ltd v Croad HC Auckland CL16/02, 26 September 2003.

[8]                 In Tram Lease Ltd v Croad, Salmon J observed that such a result “can hardly have been intended” and that the Court should use its “general discretion in relation to costs” to avoid such anomalies.3

[9]                 The defendants say that, by definition, preparation for a hearing is a separate step from the hearing itself and is done based on the number of days allocated for the hearing. They say it would not make sense for the costs of preparation to be reduced retrospectively because the hearing did not last as long as expected.

[10]             The defendants also refer to Dunningham J’s decision in Young v Attorney- General where the Court held that the defendant anticipated that the level of work required was that for the full hearing, and that the successful party should not be punished because of efficiencies that led to the hearing taking less time than anticipated.4 The plaintiff notes that in Young v Attorney-General, the trial did in fact


2      Mathew Casey (ed) Sim’s Court Practice (online ed, LexisNexis) at [HCR 14.5.4].

3      Tram Lease Ltd v Croad HC Auckland CL16/02, 26 September 2003 at [6]–[7].

4      Young v Attorney-General [2021] NZHC 1359 at [16].

go into the fifth day of the scheduled five days and, therefore, the Court’s use of five days to calculate the relevant costs was appropriate.5

[11]             I agree with the defendants that it is appropriate that the Court exercise its discretion and allow preparation time based on the time scheduled for the hearing and not actual hearing time. Given the nature of the proceeding involving alleged copyright infringement of multiple components of machinery, the time required for preparation would more closely approximate scheduled hearing time than actual hearing time. I therefore, award costs for preparation time based on scheduled hearing time.

Reserved costs for discovery applications

[12]             The defendants seek $7,648.00 as 2B costs on their application for further discovery and for their costs in defending the plaintiff’s application for further discovery. The plaintiff submits costs should lie where they fell.

[13]             On 24 August 2021, Campbell J determined separate applications by the plaintiff and the defendants for further and better discovery from the other party.6 Both applications were opposed, and both sets of parties were ordered to provide further discovery. In reserving costs, Campbell J noted that Technopak had asked that costs be reserved, and the defendants’ application was silent as to costs.7

[14]             In asking for costs to be reserved, Technopak therefore was aware that ultimate success at trial would be relevant to whether costs would be awarded. By remaining silent as to costs, the defendants avoided a determination of costs at the time of the interlocutory applications.

[15]             I consider that in circumstances where both parties were successful in their respective applications, it is appropriate that costs should lie where they fell. The defendants’ costs of defending the application could have been avoided. Further, the decision of Campbell J indicates that he declined to make a costs order because the


5 At [16].

6      Technopak Ltd v Monzeal Ltd [2021] NZHC 2181.

7      At [35]-[36].

defendants had been silent as to costs, and not because he necessarily considered that costs should not lie where they fall. In these circumstances, given both sets of parties were successful, it is appropriate that the costs of those interlocutory applications lie where they fell.

Reserved costs for application to adjourn

[16]             The defendants seek $5,736.00 as 2B costs on their application to adjourn the trial. The plaintiff submits costs should lie where they fell because the defendants did not check with the plaintiff before filing the application.

[17]             On 28 June 2021, Harland J granted the defendants’ application to adjourn, concluding:8

[4] It is abundantly clear that the trial is not ready to proceed for the three weeks allocated beginning in the week of 13 September 2021. There are clearly issues to do with the pleadings and discovery.

[18]             The plaintiff filed a notice of opposition dated 25 June 2021 opposing one aspect of the defendants’ application.

[19]             The objective of the HCR is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of proceedings.9 Parties are therefore encouraged to resolve issues before seeking court intervention so as to limit costs. No explanation was given for failing to engage with the plaintiff prior to filing the application so there is some merit in the plaintiff’s position.

[20]             Against that, the plaintiff did file a notice of opposition and did not agree with all aspects of the defendants’ application. The application was granted. As the successful parties, the defendants are therefore entitled to scale costs for this application in the usual way.


8      Technopak Ltd v Monzeal Ltd HC Auckland, CIV-2018-404-2346 (Minute of Harland J) at [4].

9      High Court Rules 2016, r 1.2.

Certification of second counsel

[21]             Schedule 3 of the HCR provides that costs may only be awarded for second counsel where that is allowed by the Court.

[22]             The parties agree that second counsel should be certified. I agree that the complexity of the claim warrants certification of second counsel and I certify accordingly.

Should a 25 per cent uplift be applied?

[23]Rule 14.6(3) of the HCR provides that the Court may order increased costs if:

(a)the nature of the proceeding or the step in it is such that the time required by the party claiming costs would substantially exceed the time allocated under band C; or

(b)the party opposing costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding or step in it by—

(i)failing to comply with these rules or with a direction of the court; or

(ii)taking or pursuing an unnecessary step or an argument that lacks merit; or

(iii)failing, without reasonable justification, to admit facts, evidence, documents, or accept a legal argument; or

(iv)failing, without reasonable justification, to comply with an order for discovery, a notice for further particulars, a notice for interrogatories, or other similar requirement under these rules; or

(v)failing, without reasonable justification, to accept an offer of settlement whether in the form of an offer under rule 14.10 or some other offer to settle or dispose of the proceeding; or

(c)the proceeding is of general importance to persons other than just the parties and it was reasonably necessary for the party claiming costs to bring it or participate in it in the interests of those affected; or

(d)some other reason exists which justifies the court making an order for increased costs despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.

[24]The defendants claim that an uplift is justified because:

(a)the plaintiff pursued causes of action that were unnecessary and/or lacked merit;

(b)the plaintiff failed, without reasonable justification, to properly particularise and refine its claim;

(c)the cost of discovery was unnecessarily increased by the plaintiff’s refusal to properly particularise its case and refine its claim; and

(d)the plaintiff failed to comply with discovery and timetable orders.

[25]             The defendants argue that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by amending its statement of claim four times.10 The original claim alleged infringement of copyright in 21 artistic works. At trial, the plaintiff only pursued alleged infringement of 12 artistic works. The original claim included a cause of action for alleged breach of the Fair Trading Act 1986, which was subsequently abandoned because it was time barred.

[26]             The defendants also argue that the scope of discovery could have been reduced if the plaintiff had properly particularised its claim at an earlier stage. The plaintiff prepared eight affidavits of documents.

[27]             The plaintiff submits it should not be penalised for ensuring compliance with the ongoing obligations of discovery, particularly when the defendants have not pointed to any increased costs they faced as a result. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendants failed to properly comply with their own discovery obligations, and it had to apply to the Court requiring them to comply. Similarly, it submits the plaintiff cannot be criticised for claiming that certain portions of its discovered documents were confidential and seeking to impose conditions upon access to them. The plaintiff maintains the adjournment was required because both parties considered that the other was in default of its disclosure obligations, and each wished to make necessary interlocutory applications.


10  The original statement of claim was filed on 17 October 2018.  An amended statement of claim  was filed on 31 May 2019. A second amended statement of claim was filed on 31 January 2020. A third amended statement of claim was filed on 1 June 2021. A fourth amended statement of claim was filed on 21 June 2021.

[28]             In Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation, the Court of Appeal explained the difference between scale costs, increased costs and indemnity costs:11

[27] The distinction among our three broad approaches – standard scale costs, increased costs and indemnity costs – may be summarised broadly:

(a)standard scale applies by default where cause is not shown to depart from it;

(b)increased costs may be ordered where there is failure by the paying party to act reasonably; and

(c)indemnity costs may be ordered where that party has behaved either badly or very unreasonably.

[29]             The Court in Bradbury noted that the abandonment of a cause of action is not of itself a pointer of increased or indemnity costs.12 The Court considered that indemnity costs were justified because the appellant’s case was hopeless and by pursuing it, their misconduct was flagrant.13

[30]             I must therefore be satisfied that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in amending its claim four times and in not complying with discovery orders. In Jarden v Lumley General Insurance (NZ) Ltd the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s decision to impose a 25 per cent uplift on costs.14 The Court considered that the claim was misconceived and the Jardens had exposed themselves to the risk of an increased costs award by pursuing it.15 In finding that a 25 per cent uplift was justified, the Associate Judge considered that:16

[31]               Those who bring cases which fall short of establishing allegations almost invariably bear an adverse award of costs in accordance with the principle that costs should follow the event. It is not an automatic step up from that that increased costs should be awarded. Here the grounds for doing so are made out, because early in the piece, at the point where their own expert found himself unable to support their position, they could and should have reviewed their case and scaled it down to a less assailable position. Instead their response was to seek other expert advice but even then the independent evidence fell well short.


11     Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation [2009] NZCA 234, [2009] 3 NZLR 400 at [27] [Bradbury].

12 At [78].

13 At [80].

14     Jarden v Lumley General Insurance (NZ) Ltd [2018] NZCA 6.

15 At [21].

16     Jarden v Lumley General Insurance (NZ) Ltd [2016] NZHC 2820.

[31]   I do not accept that the plaintiff’s conduct here justifies an uplift. The plaintiff adjusted its claim to reflect its expert evidence. It did not seek to pursue claims that were misconceived. The fact that there were multiple amendments to the claim is unsurprising given the nature of the claim which involved alleged copyright infringement of artistic works for components of complex machinery. The plaintiff did seek to limit its claim in response to expert evidence.

[32]   It is also unsurprising the discovery was drawn out and complicated given the alleged infringement related to components of machinery designed with specialised software. The defendants have been awarded costs for discovery, so a further 25 per cent uplift is not justified. I therefore, do not consider that an overall uplift of 25 per cent is justified in the circumstances.

Should the Court approve the amounts claimed for disbursements?

Relevant law

[33]   Rule 14.12 of the HCR prescribes the applicable rules when claiming disbursements:

14.12   Disbursements

(1)In this rule,—

disbursement, in relation to a proceeding,—

(a)means an expense paid or incurred for the purposes of the proceeding that would ordinarily be charged for separately from legal professional services in a solicitor’s bill of costs; and

(b)includes—

(i)fees of court for the proceeding:

(ii)expenses of serving documents for the purposes of the proceeding:

(iii)expenses of photocopying documents required by these rules or by a direction of the court:

(iv)expenses of conducting a conference by telephone or video link; but

(c)does not include counsel’s fee.

(2)A disbursement must, if claimed and verified, be included in the costs awarded for a proceeding to the extent that it is—

(a)of a class that is either—

(i)approved by the court for the purposes of the proceeding; or

(ii)specified in paragraph (b) of subclause (1); and

(b)specific to the conduct of the proceeding; and

(c)reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceeding; and

(d)reasonable in amount.

(3)Despite subclause (2), a disbursement may be disallowed or reduced if it is disproportionate in the circumstances of the proceeding.

[34]   If the disbursements claimed do not  fall  within any of the categories within  r 14.12(1)(b), they need to be approved by the Court under r 14.2(2)(a)(i). The Court has a discretion to grant approval if the following criteria are met:

(a)the disbursement is specific to the conduct of the proceeding;

(b)the disbursement is reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceeding; and

(c)the disbursement is reasonable in amount.

Expert witness fees

[35]   The defendants claim $150,352.11 for Dr Shayne Gooch’s fees and expenses. The plaintiff argued that the fees are unreasonable and should be reduced by 30 per cent.

[36]The plaintiff asks the Court to adopt Katz J’s “pragmatic approach” in

Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Ltd v Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd17 and


17     Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Ltd v Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd [2015] NZHC 470 [Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Ltd].

reduce the amount claimed. In that case, Katz J set out the following broad approach when considering whether expert costs are reasonable:18

(a)Determine whether a particular attendance (or category of attendances) was reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceeding. This requires a sufficient description of the particular work undertaken. A supporting affidavit from an independent expert practising in the same field may be necessary or appropriate when the quantum claimed is significant.

(b)Consider the amount of time claimed for the relevant attendance (or category of attendances) and whether it is reasonable, allowing for the significance and complexity of the particular work. A table showing the various steps taken and the costs associated with each step may assist.

(c)Consider the hourly rate charged for each author and whether that is reasonable, relative to the experience of that author and the complexity of the work undertaken.

(d)Consider any additional evidence which is relied upon to show that the rate charged is a reasonable one (or that the overall costs are reasonable). Again, in some cases (such as where the quantum claimed is particularly large) it may be necessary to file a supporting affidavit from an independent person practising in the same field as the relevant expert(s), deposing that the hourly rates claimed are appropriate and in accordance with industry standards.

[37]   In Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Ltd, Katz J considered that there were a number of issues with the expert’s fees including that fees appeared to have been marked up at 150 per cent rates without explanation; the timesheets had no total recording of the hours worked by the expert witnesses; there were inconsistencies in the hourly rates; the court had no evidence as to normal charge out rates; and fees for some individuals appeared high (up to $800 per hour). Katz J noted that the costs claim dwarfed the quantum of many substantive claims and the Court had not had the benefit of hearing or reading the relevant evidence. In those circumstances, the Court considered a 30 per cent reduction was appropriate:

[54] I am satisfied that a reduction of 30 per cent of the total expert costs claimed would ensure that Mobil is only reimbursed for its necessarily incurred and reasonable expert costs. To the extent that there may be inefficiencies, duplication, charge out rates that are at the high end of industry norms, or unjustified uplifts (including those attendances charged at 50 per cent above normal rates) an overall reduction of 30 per cent should account for all those factors. Indeed a 30 per cent reduction is possibly on the high side. It is appropriate to err on the side of caution, however, given that Mobil


18 At [44].

carries    the    burden  of   proving    the   reasonableness   of   its expert disbursements, on the balance of probabilities.

[38]   Here, the plaintiff argued that Dr Gooch’s narrations are insufficient to determine reasonableness and the defendants have not provided the Court with an affidavit from an independent expert practising in the same field to outline whether the attendances undertaken were reasonably necessary.

[39]   Dr Gooch’s invoices include a breakdown of his time by date and hours. One invoice covers 289 hours of time from 18 May 2023 to 7 August 2023 and the other covers 58.5 hours of time from 10 to 22 August 2023. The narrations include a description of:

(a)the documents Dr Gooch reviewed including pleadings, briefs of evidence and literature;

(b)the time Dr Gooch spent in evolving “system descriptions” and a function structure (which were the subject of his brief of evidence);

(c)the time spent inspecting machinery at two different processing plants;

(d)the time spent preparing his brief of evidence, including meeting with counsel; and

(e)the time spent during the hearing reviewing documents and notes of evidence, preparing for his testimony, and giving evidence.

[40]   The defendants refer to the decision in Sealegs International Ltd v Zhang19 where the Court accepted the costs of Dr Gooch. In that case, the Court noted that no issue had been taken with the disbursements.

[41]   There is no question that Dr Gooch’s evidence was relevant. The proceeding concerned alleged copyright infringement and Dr Gooch opined as to whether the defendants had designed their machinery independently of the plaintiff. Dr Gooch’s


19     Sealegs International Ltd v Zhang [2020] NZHC 785.

evidence explained the design process for machinery of this type and how function influences the design options available. His brief of evidence was over 100 pages.

[42]   Here, there are none of the issues identified by Katz J in Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Ltd. Dr Gooch’s charge out rate remained the same throughout the engagement. It is not excessive given his expertise and he has provided a detailed breakdown of how he has spent his time. There does not appear to be duplication or inefficiencies and the plaintiff has not pointed to any issue other than the total hours worked.

[43]   I do not consider that an independent affidavit verifying the reasonableness of Dr Gooch’s fees was necessary. Katz J in Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Ltd noted that an independent affidavit may be necessary or appropriate when the quantum claimed is significant.20 In that case, the expert fees exceeded $800,000 and involved the work of several different people. Here, Dr Gooch has provided the narrations for his time and provided an extensive brief of evidence.

[44]   I am satisfied that the expert fees of Dr Gooch are reasonable having regard to the nature of the proceeding, the nature of his evidence and his charge out rate. I therefore, approve the disbursement under r 14.12(2)(a)(i).

Electronic discovery support services fees

[45]   The defendants claim $22,579.75 in disbursements for the fees of Streamlined Litigation Support (SLS), an external discovery support service. The plaintiff argues that the amount should be reduced by $4,748.25 to avoid “double dipping” because the defendants have also claimed scale costs (2.5 days) for preparation of lists of documents. Those costs relate to what is described as “Coding, 5 fields @ .30c per field.”

[46]   The defendants rely on Todd Pohokura Ltd v Shell Exploration Ltd21 where the Court allowed both 2B scale costs and disbursements for external litigation support.


20     At Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Ltd, above n 18, at [44(a)].

21     Todd Pohokura Ltd v Shell Exploration NZ Ltd HC Gisborne CIV-2006-485-1600, 1 July 2011.

The Court considered that it was fair to allow the external costs if the alternative (a solicitor doing all the work) would be a claim for increased costs for that step.22

[47]   The defendants submit that the plaintiff insisted on running a case involving tens of thousands of documents in dozens of formats that could only be viewed using specialised software. They submit that specific, technical expertise from SLS was required to properly organise, list and present documents, and to create and manage a platform for accessing and managing the documents.

[48]   The defendants also submit this is not “double dipping” because solicitors were still required to review documents for relevance and privilege, to prepare the affidavits, and to list the documents in compliance with the HCR. The SLS costs related to the technical aspects of capturing and numbering the documents.

[49]   I accept that the defendants’ solicitors were still required to undertake work separate to the work by SLS. I also accept that if SLS did not perform the work, it is likely that costs would have been increased because the solicitors would have undertaken those tasks. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that the defendants recover both the SLS costs and 2B scale costs.

Costs on costs

[50]The defendants seek 2B costs of $956.00 for filing a memorandum on costs.

[51]   The defendants accept there is a presumption that costs on costs should be awarded rarely. However, they claim the plaintiff acted unreasonably in attempting to “chip down” the defendants’ costs, which then required the defendants to incur further costs.

[52]   The circumstances in which costs on costs will be awarded have been helpfully summarised in The Law of Costs in New Zealand:23


22 At [66].

23     David Bullock and Tim Mullins The Law of Costs in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2022) at [4.23].

… the courts will usually only award costs on costs in one of three circumstances: first, where a party is shown to be wholly successful in its costs claim, or an unsuccessful party has advanced a clearly unmeritorious argument; second, where there is some complexity or genuine dispute as to the availability of costs or their quantum, and the successful party has gone to considerable time and expense addressing that ambiguity over the unsuccessful party’s reasonable opposition; and third, where a party fails to accept or engage with a reasonable offer to agree or settle costs issues without the determination of the court. Where, the parties are seen to both have had some measure of success or to have both contributed to the inability to resolve costs issues without the assistance of the court, there will usually be no costs order in respect of steps concerning costs.

(footnotes omitted)

[53]   Here, the defendants were unsuccessful in seeking a 25 per cent uplift on their costs and were successful in claiming disbursements. Both parties have been partially successful in claiming or challenging scale costs. It is therefore not appropriate to award costs on costs and I decline to do so.

Result

[54]   For the reasons set out above, I award costs as set out in the Schedule annexed to this judgment. In summary, I order that:

(a)the plaintiff pay costs of $163,477.00 to the defendants; and

(b)the plaintiff pay disbursements of $177,394.66 to the defendants.

[55]I decline to award costs on costs.


Tahana J

Cost schedule

Date/Description Rate Units Total Uplift of 25% Amount awarded
Commencement of defence by defendant $2,390.00 2 $4,780.00 $5,975.00 $4,780.00
Preparation for first case management conference $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Filing memorandum dated 21 January 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Filing memorandum dated 1 February 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Filing memorandum dated 7 May 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Appearance at first case management conference on 21 May 2019 $2,390.00 0.3 $717.00 $896.25 $717.00
Filing memorandum dated 14 June 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Filing memorandum dated 27 June 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Appearance at case management conference on 28 June 2019 $2,390.00 0.3 $717.00 $896.25 $717.00
Filing memorandum dated 12 July 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Filing memorandum dated 18 July 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Filing statement of defence in response to amended statement of claim dated 31 May 2019 $2,390.00 0.6 $1,434.00 $1,792.50 $1,434.00
Filing memorandum dated 27 August 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Filing memorandum dated 9 October 2019 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
List of documents on discovery $2,390.00 2.5 $5,975.00 $7,468.75 $5,975.00
Inspection of documents $2,390.00 1.5 $3,585.00 $4,481.25 $3,585.00
Filing statement of defence in response to second amended statement of claim dated 31 January 2020 $2,390.00 0.6 $1,434.00 $1,792.50 $1,434.00
Filing memorandum dated 4 February 2020 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Appearance at case management conference on 4 February 2020 $2,390.00 0.3 $717.00 $896.25 $717.00
Filing memorandum dated 17 March 2020 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Filing memorandum dated 26 May 2020 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Inspection of amended discovery in November 2020 $2,390.00 1.5 $3,585.00 $4,481.25 $3,585.00
Filing memorandum dated 29 April 2021 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Appearance at case management conference on 29 April 2021 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Inspection of supplementary discovery dated 28 May 2021 $2,390.00 1.5 $3,585.00 $4,481.25 $3,585.00
Filing statement of defence in response to third amended statement of claim dated 1 June 2021 $2,390.00 0.6 $1,434.00 $1,792.50 $1,434.00

Filing interlocutory application for adjournment of trial dated 18 June

2021 due to plaintiff's failure to comply with timetable orders

$2,390.00 0.6 $1,434.00 $1,792.50 $1,434.00
Preparation of written submissions in support $2,390.00 1.5 $3,585.00 $4,481.25 $3,585.00
Appearance at case management conference on 28 June 2021 $2,390.00 0.3 $717.00 $896.25 $717.00
Filing interlocutory application dated 9 July 2021 for further and better discovery and particulars of statement of claim $2,390.00 0.6 $1,434.00 $1,792.50 $0.00

Filing opposition to plaintiff's interlocutory application for further

and better discovery dated 21 June 2021

$2,390.00 0.6 $1,434.00 $1,792.50 $0.00
Preparation of written submissions in support $2,390.00 1.5 $3,585.00 $4,481.25 $0.00
Appearance at hearing on 16 August 2021 $2,390.00 0.5 $1,195.00 $1,493.75 $0.00
Filing joint memorandum dated 30 September 2021 (half claimed) $2,390.00 0.2 $478.00 $597.50 $478.00
Filing joint memorandum dated 11 November 2021 (half claimed) $2,390.00 0.2 $478.00 $597.50 $478.00
Filing statement of defence in response to fourth amended statement of claim dated 21 June 2021 $2,390.00 0.6 $1,434.00 $1,792.50 $1,434.00
Inspection of further discovery dated 11 Nov 2021 $2,390.00 1.5 $3,585.00 $4,481.25 $3,585.00
Filing memorandum dated 2 May 2023 $2,390.00 0.4 $956.00 $1,195.00 $956.00
Further list of documents on discovery dated 16 June 2023 $2,390.00 2.5 $5,975.00 $7,468.75 $5,975.00
Inspection of supplementary discovery dated 4 July 2023 $2,390.00 1.5 $3,585.00 $4,481.25 $3,585.00
Preparation for and appearance at pre-trial conference on 25 July 2023 $2,390.00 0.5 $1,195.00 $1,493.75 $1,195.00
Filing joint memorandum dated 2 August 2023 (half claimed) $2,390.00 0.2 $478.00 $597.50 $478.00
Preparation of briefs, list of issues, authorities, and agreeing common bundle (for three-week witness hearing) $2,390.00 11.25 $26,888.00 $33,609.38 $26,888.00
Preparation for three-week witness hearing $2,390.00 11.25 $26,888.00 $33,609.38 $26,888.00
Appearance at hearing for principal counsel $2,390.00 12 $28,680 $35,850.00 $28,680.00
Appearance by subsequent counsel $2,390.00 6 $14,340.00 $17,925.00 $14,340.000
Sealing order $2,390.00 0.2 $478.00 $597.50 $478.00
TOTAL 71.60 $171,124.00 $213,905.00 $163,477.00
DISBURSEMENTS $177,394.66 $177,394.66 $177,394.66
TOTAL PLUS DISBURSEMENTS $348,518.66 $391,299.66 $340,871.66
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Cases Citing This Decision

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Cases Cited

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Statutory Material Cited

1

Young v Attorney-General [2021] NZHC 1359