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| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 40/2015 [2016] NZSC 53 |
| BETWEEN | SPORTZONE MOTORCYCLES LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) MOTOR TRADE FINANCES LIMITED |
| AND | COMMERCE COMMISSION |
| Hearing: | 10 and 11 November 2015 |
Court: | Elias CJ, William Young, Glazebrook, Arnold and O'Regan JJ |
Counsel: | D J Goddard QC, I J Thain and C M Moody for Appellants |
Judgment: | 12 May 2016 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The appeal is dismissed.
BThe appellants must pay the respondent costs of $25,000 plus reasonable disbursements (to be determined by the Registrar in the absence of agreement between the parties). We certify for two counsel.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
(Given by O’Regan J)
This appeal addresses the provisions of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003 (the 2003 Act) regulating fees charged by financiers to consumers under consumer credit contracts.
The appellants, Sportzone Motorcycles Limited (in liquidation) (Sportzone) and Motor Trade Finances Limited (MTF), provided finance to consumers in connection with the purchase of motorcycles from Sportzone. Sportzone assigned each consumer credit contract to MTF under an arrangement between Sportzone and MTF. MTF then became the creditor under the assigned contracts.
The respondent (the Commission) alleged that the fees provided for in these consumer credit contracts were unreasonable for the purposes of the 2003 Act. After an eleven day hearing in the High Court, Toogood J delivered a judgment in which he found that the fees were, in some respects, unreasonable (the HC liability judgment).[1] In a subsequent judgment (the HC quantum judgment), Toogood J quantified the extent to which the fees were unreasonable.[2]
[1]Commerce Commission v Sportzone Motorcycles Ltd (in liq) [2013] NZHC 2531, [2014] 3 NZLR 355 [HC liability judgment].
[2]Commerce Commission v Sportzone Motorcycles Ltd (in liq) [2014] NZHC 2486 [HC quantum judgment].
Sportzone and MTF appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal against both the HC liability judgment and the HC quantum judgment.[3]
[3]Sportzone Motorcycles Ltd (in liq) v Commerce Commission [2015] NZCA 78, [2015] 3 NZLR 191 (Harrison, Stevens and Simon France JJ) [Sportzone (CA)].
This Court gave Sportzone and MTF leave to appeal on the following question:[4]
Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the fees charged by [Sportzone and MTF] were unreasonable for the purposes of s 41 of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003?
Sportzone and MTF also sought leave to appeal on a second question. However, leave to appeal on that question was declined.[5]
The financing arrangements and the fees charged
[5]The second question was: “Did the Court of Appeal err in finding it had been established that the debtors had suffered loss or damage for the purposes of s 94 of [the 2003 Act]?”
As its name suggests, MTF provides funding…
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- Case
- [2016] NZSC 53
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated in the High Court, where Toogood J ruled in two judgments that the fees charged by Sportzone and MTF were unreasonable, leading to an appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's findings. Sportzone and MTF sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted on one specific question regarding the interpretation of the reasonableness of fees under the 2003 Act. The Supreme Court heard the appeal and dismissed it, upholding the decisions of the lower courts.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What are the relevant purposes of the 2003 Act? In particular, is one of the purposes of the 2003 Act flexibility in pricing models and the encouragement of innovation by creditors?
2. What approach to the assessment of the reasonableness of fees provides the best basis for comparing credit offerings by competing credit providers?
3. Should fees be assessed on a per transaction basis or by reference to the activities undertaken by the creditor?
4. What measure of costs should be adopted? The possibilities canvassed in argument were (short term) variable costs, variable costs plus some allowance for fixed costs as found by the High Court, avoidable costs or any cost beneficially related to the activity for which the fee is charged.
5. Whether the Court should consider the fallback argument advocating an avoidable costs measure, given that it has not been raised in the lower Courts.
6. Whether the assessment of the reasonableness of fees should be based on cost only, or on a broader consideration as advocated by MTF.
7. Whether the fact that averaging is permitted affects the method of determining the reasonableness of fees.
8. Whether the approach of the lower Courts leads to absurd outcomes and, if so, whether this should lead us to adopt a different measure in an effort to avoid those outcomes.
Held
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellants must pay the respondent costs of $25,000 plus reasonable disbursements.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court examined the purposes of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003 (2003 Act), concluding that the primary objectives of the legislation are consumer protection and the comparability of credit arrangements, as outlined in section 3 of the Act. While the promotion of efficiency and innovation by credit providers was a factor driving the reform, these were not mentioned in section 3 and therefore were deemed less important than the express purposes stated by Parliament. The Court found that the approach of the lower Courts in assessing the reasonableness of fees under sections 42 and 44 of the Act was consistent with these purposes, focusing on transaction-specific costs that are sufficiently close and relevant to the activity for which the fee is charged. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that all costs beneficially related to the activity should be recoverable in fees, emphasizing the need to limit fees to those that are reasonable in nature and extent. The Court also held that while factors other than cost may be relevant in determining reasonableness, they are unlikely to render a fee reasonable if it exceeds the level required to recover the reasonable costs associated with the activity. The Court concluded that the approach of the lower Courts did not lead to absurd outcomes and that there was no error in the Court of Appeal's analysis, which essentially adopted the approach of the High Court. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs.