Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society

[2021] NZHC 107

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV 2015-485-61

[2021] NZHC 107

UNDER

the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006

IN THE MATTER OF

discipline under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal

BETWEEN

CHRISTOPHER KNUTE SKAGEN

Appellant

AND

WELLINGTON STANDARDS

COMMITTEE OF THE NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY

Respondent

On the papers
Judgment:	9 February 2021

JUDGMENT OF MALLON J

[1]    Mr Skagen was the subject of a decision of the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal given on 9 December 2014. He brought proceedings in this Court following that decision. Proceedings in this Court have resulted in the following judgments:

(a)Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2015] NZHC 2634 (the interlocutory judgment);

(b)Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2016] NZHC 1772 (the substantive judgment);

SKAGEN v WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF THE NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2021]

NZHC 107 [9 February 2021]

(c)Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2016] NZHC 2799 (the first recall judgment); and

(d)Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2020] NZHC 762 (the second recall judgment).

[2]    In the second recall judgment Mr Skagen asked me to treat the applications that were then before me as an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal out of time. I did so but declined to grant leave because the application for leave was made very late, no question of law was articulated and no seriously arguable point of law was apparent.1

[3]    Mr Skagen then sought the leave of the Court of Appeal to appeal the four judgments referred to above. The Court of Appeal accepted the respondent’s submission that leave had been declined by this Court on the substantive judgment only and that, if Mr Skagen wished to seek leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal the other three judgments, he first needed to apply to this Court for that leave.2

[4]    Mr Skagen has now filed a notice of interlocutory application in this Court which seeks leave to appeal the other three judgments and other ancillary applications. These applications are all opposed by the respondent. Both parties are content for the applications to be determined on the papers.

[5]    The applications for leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment, the first recall judgment and the second recall judgment are declined because:

(a)The application for leave to appeal the interlocutory judgment has been made very late. Further, the only matter on which Mr Skagen did not entirely succeed in this judgment was his request for discovery. However, despite the Judge’s doubt about whether there was any basis for the discovery Mr Skagen sought, he urged the respondent to provide

1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 254.

2      Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society CA267/2020, 16 June 2020.

the documents sought on a voluntary basis. No seriously arguable point of law is apparent in the application to appeal this judgment.

(b)The application for leave to appeal the first recall judgment is also very late. Moreover, for the reasons stated in the first and second recall judgments, Mr Skagen was seeking recall for reasons that fell outside the narrow grounds on which recall is appropriate. No seriously arguable point of law is apparent in the applications to appeal the first and second recall judgments.

[6]    The ancillary applications are also declined. They mirror previous applications which have been declined and there remains no jurisdiction to consider them.

Mallon J