IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2015-485-000061 [2015] NZHC 2634
UNDER the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 BETWEEN
CHRISTOPHER KNUTE SKAGEN Appellant
AND
WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF THE NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY
Respondent
Hearing: 27 October 2015 Counsel:
Appellant in person
T J Mackenzie for RespondentJudgment:
27 October 2015
JUDGMENT OF COLLINS J
Introduction
[1] This judgment sets out my decisions following an interlocutory hearing in relation to Mr Skagen’s appeal from a decision of the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) delivered on 9 December 2014.
[2] In its decision, the Tribunal found Mr Skagen guilty of 11 charges of misconduct pursuant to s 241(a) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act). The Tribunal ordered the removal of Mr Skagen’s name from the Roll of Barristers and Solicitors of New Zealand and also ordered him to pay $2,533 in
costs.
SKAGEN v WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF THE NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2015] NZHC 2634 [27 October 2015]
Background
[3] Mr Skagen practised as an attorney in Oregon. In 2010 he obtained a practising certificate from the New Zealand Law Society (the Law Society). He practised as a barrister in Wellington.
[4] In June 2011, the Law Society declined to renew Mr Skagen’s practising certificate because of issues following from disciplinary proceedings against Mr Skagen in Oregon in 2006. I understand the Oregon Supreme Court had suspended Mr Skagen from practising as an attorney for 12 months and ordered him to pay $8,000 in costs. Those costs had not been paid at the time the Law Society decided not to renew Mr Skagen’s practising certificate.
[5] There were three categories of disciplinary charges considered by the
Tribunal. They were summarised by the Tribunal in the following way: (1) The “Edmeades Charges”:
(i) Accepting instructions directly; (ii) Accepting fees in advance;
(iii) Failure to pay monies received into a trust account; (iv) Failing to act in a timely or competent manner;
(v) Failing to repay monies. (2) The “Wolvetang Charges”:
(i) Accepting a fee in advance;
(ii) Failure to pay money received into a trust account; (iii) Failing to act in a timely or competent manner;
(iv) Failing to repay monies, and in the alternative;
(v)Charging a grossly excessive fee. (This charge was abandoned at the hearing).
(3) The “Investigation Charges”:
(i) Failing to permit an investigator to examine accounts; (ii) Failing to produce records to an investigator.
[6] After the Tribunal found Mr Skagen guilty, it immediately proceeded to the penalty phase of its deliberations and struck Mr Skagen’s name from the Roll of Barristers and Solicitors.
[7] Mr Skagen has appealed both the liability and penalty aspects of the Tribunal’s decision. This Court hears the appeal as a rehearing.1 On hearing an appeal the Court may confirm, reverse or modify the order or decision appealed from.2
Interlocutory applications
Security for costs order
[8] On 9 April 2015, Williams J ordered Mr Skagen to pay $995 as security for costs. Mr Skagen initially sought to review that decision in this Court. Notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction, this issue is no longer relevant because Mr Skagen has paid the security for costs ordered by Williams J.
Discovery
[9] Mr Skagen has sought discovery. It is highly questionable whether there is any basis for this Court to order discovery in this type of proceeding. On
questioning Mr Skagen it became apparent he was particularly interested to see
1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 253(3).
2 Section 253(4).
correspondence between the Law Society and the Oregon State Bar. Those documents may not be relevant to Mr Skagen’s appeal but in the unusual circumstances of this case I urge the Law Society, through Mr Mackenzie, to voluntarily disclose copies of its communications with the State Bar Authorities in Oregon.
Further affidavits
[10] Mr Skagen has sought leave to file two affidavits, one dated 26 May 2015 and the other dated 21 October 2015.
[11] Mr Mackenzie takes no issue with the second affidavit.
[12] I have carefully reviewed Mr Skagen’s first affidavit. It contains a lot of material that could be classified as legal submissions. After questioning Mr Skagen, I have concluded Mr Skagen can file an affidavit in substitution for his affidavit of
26 May 2015, which addresses the following two points:
(1) First, Mr Skagen’s lack of appreciation in July 2011 that the Law
Society had not renewed his practising certificate.
(2)Second, matters relating to Mr Skagen’s state of health at the time of the events giving rise to the charges and at the time the Tribunal decided Mr Skagen’s name should be removed from the Roll of Barristers and Solicitors. The evidence relating to Mr Skagen’s state of health at the relevant times may be important and would be verified by medical reports.
Second amended notice of appeal
[13] On 21 October 2015, Mr Skagen filed a second amended notice of appeal. No issue is taken with him having done so. I grant Mr Skagen leave to file that amended notice of appeal.
Hearing time
[14] Mr Mackenzie estimates a half day hearing is required. That is a realistic estimate. The registrar will arrange a half day hearing for this appeal to be heard as
promptly as possible.
D B Collins J
Solicitors:
Wynn Williams, Christchurch for Respondent
- AGLC
- Skagen v Wellington Standards Committee of the New Zealand Law Society [2015] NZHC 2634
- Case
- [2015] NZHC 2634
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were related to several interlocutory applications made by Mr. Skagen during the appeal process. These included the security for costs order previously imposed, requests for discovery of documents, the filing of further affidavits, and the allowance of a second amended notice of appeal. The court needed to determine whether the applications were permissible and warranted under the circumstances.
The court addressed each application in turn. Regarding the security for costs, the court noted that Mr. Skagen had already complied with the previous order, thus rendering the issue moot. For the discovery request, the court found it highly questionable whether such an order was appropriate in this type of proceeding but encouraged the voluntary disclosure of relevant documents. Concerning the affidavits, the court allowed Mr. Skagen to file a substituted affidavit focusing on specific points related to his awareness and state of health at relevant times. Finally, the court granted leave for Mr. Skagen to file a second amended notice of appeal, deeming it reasonable under the circumstances.
The court also directed that a half-day hearing be scheduled for the appeal to proceed as promptly as possible. This judgment thus sets the stage for a more comprehensive review of the merits of Mr. Skagen's appeal against the Tribunal's decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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