| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA505/2018 [2019] NZCA 660 |
| BETWEEN | ROCHE PRODUCTS (NEW ZEALAND) LIMITED |
| AND | LESLIE NORMAN AUSTIN |
| Hearing: | 19 September 2019 |
Court: | Kós P, Brown and Goddard JJ |
Counsel: | J A MacGillivray for Appellant |
Judgment: | 18 December 2019 at 3.00 pm |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The appeal is allowed in part.
BThe claim for compensatory damages is struck out.
CLeave is reserved for Mr Austin to file an amended pleading seeking compensatory damages in respect of self-administration of Roaccutane (prescribed for other persons) which was not prescribed for him by a registered health professional from whom he sought treatment.
DCosts lie where they fall.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Brown J)
Introduction
For many years the respondent (Mr Austin) took for the treatment of acne the prescription-only drug Roaccutane, distributed in New Zealand by the appellant, Roche Products (New Zealand) Limited (Roche NZ). He claimed that such use caused a range of medical problems relating to the ossification of his spine for which he received medical treatment, including surgery, from 1993 to 2016. On 11 December 2015 the Accident Compensation Corporation (the Corporation) granted his claim for cover for diffuse idiopathic skeletal hyperostosis (DISH) of his cervical spine secondary to his use of Roaccutane. He received payment from the Corporation for 80 per cent of his lost income for two years until turning 65 on 11 January 2017.
On 23 December 2016 he commenced a proceeding against Roche NZ alleging negligence in connection with the distribution of Roaccutane in New Zealand and seeking both compensatory and exemplary damages. Application was made to strike out the entire claim as being time barred and, in the alternative, the compensatory damages claim as barred by s 317 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (the Act). The strike out application was dismissed in a judgment of Associate Judge Christiansen who considered that the issues raised were incapable of proper consideration without full evidence being heard.[1] Roche NZ’s application for review of that decision, transferred to this Court by consent,[2] is the subject of this judgment.
[1]Austin v Roche Products (New Zealand) Ltd [2018] NZHC 208 at [45], [48] and [54].
[2]Under s 64 of the Judicature Act 1908: Austin v Roche Products (New Zealand) Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2016-404-3299, 6 August 2018 (Minute of Muir J). A notice of appeal was not required: r 31(5) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005; and Roche Products (New Zealand) Ltd v Austin CA505/2018, 12 September 2018 (Minute of Clifford J).
The agreed issues for determination are:[3]
1Did the Associate Judge err in refusing to strike out [Mr Austin’s] claim for compensatory damages as barred under s 317 of [the Act] on the basis that [he] has cover under that Act?
2Does the case of G D Searle & Co v Gunn[4] apply…
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- Case
- [2019] NZCA 660
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal examined the definition of "ordinary consequence" as it appears in section 32(1)(c) of the Act, considering the ordinary and usual meanings of the term. The Court noted that the adjective "ordinary" generally means regular or usual, while "ordinarily" implies something done in an ordinary or unexceptional way. The Court found that the ailments in question were indeed ordinary consequences of the treatment with Roaccutane. This meant that they were not accidental but rather predictable outcomes of the treatment, thereby qualifying as treatment injuries under the Act. The Court concluded that the phrase "ordinary consequence" referred to outcomes that are usual or expected as a result of the treatment, not necessarily the sole or exclusive consequence. The Court did not find the argument that the consequences were "inherent" in the pharmaceutical to be particularly useful in defining the term "ordinary consequence". The Court of Appeal ultimately upheld the earlier decision of the High Court, affirming that Mr Austin's ailments were treatment injuries covered under the Act.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Austin's appeal, affirming that his ailments resulting from the use of Roaccutane were indeed treatment injuries as defined by the Accident Compensation Act 2001. The Court's decision clarified that the term "ordinary consequence" should be interpreted in its common sense meaning, referring to outcomes that are regular or usual results of the treatment. The Court found that Mr Austin's argument that his ailments were not accidental but ordinary consequences of the treatment did not negate their status as treatment injuries. The Court's ruling ensured that the definition of "treatment injury" would be consistent with the statutory intent of providing coverage for predictable and usual outcomes of medical treatments.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
With reference to Mr Austin’s new argument it is also necessary to note cl 3(1) of sch 1:3When Corporation is liable to pay or contribute to cost of ancillary services related to treatment(1)The Corporation is liable to pay or contribute to the cost of any service if the service facilitates the treatment and the service is reasonably required as an ancillary service related to treatment, such as—(a) accommodation:(b) escort for transport for treatment:(c) pharmaceuticals prescribed by a treatment provider who has statutory authority to prescribe pharmaceuticals:(d) laboratory tests requested by a registered health professional:(e) transport (whether emergency or otherwise). Mr Austin’s second amended statement of claim asserted that a claim for non‑exemplary damages in respect to an ailment is not barred by s 317 to the extent that such ailment is not a “treatment injury” in terms of ss 20(2) and 32(1)(c). Roche NZ’s request for further particulars sought the identification of Mr Austin’s alleged ailments or medical problems caused by his taking Roaccutane and the basis on which they were contended not to be a treatment injury. Mr Austin’s reply stated that no response was required. However, as in the High Court, Mr Austin’s argument, that his DISH diagnosis was not a treatment injury the subject of cover under the Act, was based on the contention that his injury was an ordinary consequence of treatment with Roaccutane. Hence the third element in the definition of treatment injury as set out in s 32(1)(c) was not satisfied. Mr Thwaite submitted that sufficient evidence exists that Mr Austin’s DISH ailment was “inherent” in Roaccutane. As he expressed it:Just like a poison, which will ordinarily produce a predictable result. Hence the ailments are not ‘accidental’, but an ordinary consequence of the treatment with Roaccutane. The ailments do not need to be the [sole] ordinary consequence. The structure of s 32(1) provides for the presence of two elements followed by a carve out excluding two categories of personal injury, namely:· personal injury that is not a necessary part of the treatment; and· personal injury that is not an ordinary consequence of the treatment. The second exclusion, the focus of argument in this case, contemplates outcomes or effects of two types: ordinary or non-ordinary. However both instances will be the consequence of the treatment. In order for a product, like a pharmaceutical, to have a consequence, there must be some aspect of the pharmaceutical that causes or contributes to the personal injury. In that sense the defect or operative cause can be said to be inherent in the product. But we do not find Mr Thwaite’s proposition that the outcome was “inherent” in the pharmaceutical advances the analysis as to the meaning of the adjective in the phrase “ordinary consequence”. The meaning of the phrase “ordinary consequence” in s 32 will need to be considered by this Court in another appeal due to be heard in 2020.[34] However we do not consider that the present case raises any significant issues about the boundaries of that concept. The adjective “ordinary” is commonly defined to mean regular or usual.[35] Likewise the adverb “ordinarily”, which features in a variety of statutory expressions, means in an ordinary or unexceptional way. Similarly the phrase “out of the ordinary” means unusual.[34]The appeal is from Accident Compensation Corporation v Ng [2018] NZHC 2848.[35]Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) vol 2 at 2021.