| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI |
| SC 5/2020 [2021] NZSC 30 |
| BETWEEN | LESLIE NORMAN AUSTIN |
| AND | ROCHE PRODUCTS (NEW ZEALAND) LIMITED |
| Hearing: Further submissions: | 10 September 2020 |
Court: | Glazebrook, O’Regan, Ellen France, Williams and Arnold JJ |
Counsel: | G J Thwaite and Y S Kim for Appellant |
Judgment: | 31 March 2021 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe appeal will be dismissed one month from the date of this judgment unless the appellant makes an application under s 135 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 together with an application to this Court for a stay of this proceeding pending completion of that process.
BThere is no order as to costs.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
(Given by Williams J)
Introduction
A person who suffers a “treatment injury” has cover under the Accident Compensation Act 2001. A treatment injury is an injury that is not an “ordinary consequence” of treatment. Three issues arose in this appeal: what is treatment; what is an ordinary consequence of treatment; and who has the jurisdiction to decide those questions?
Background
The background to this case is unusual. The appellant, Mr Austin, suffers from excessive bone growth in his spine. It causes him pain and stiffness in his neck and back. Mr Austin claims that these health problems were caused by the prescription drug, Roaccutane,[1] which he took at various times between 1984 (when he was 32) and 2005 at the latest.
[1]Roaccutane is the brand name for isotretinoin.
In March 2015, by which time he was 63 years old, Mr Austin claimed cover under the Accident Compensation Act (the AC Act) for his condition, which clinicians described as diffuse idiopathic skeletal hyperostosis (DISH), secondary to Roaccutane use. The Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) accepted Mr Austin’s claim in December 2015. In addition to covering his surgery, physiotherapy and consultation costs, ACC paid Mr Austin weekly compensation (including back payments) covering a period of about two years from April 2014. Mr Austin accepted the clinical treatment and the compensation. He did not pursue any of the review options under the AC Act to challenge ACC’s acceptance of his claim. That was unsurprising, because he had succeeded in obtaining the entitlements he claimed.
In 2016, Mr Austin changed his position on his ACC cover. He commenced proceedings in the High Court against the respondent, Roche Products (New Zealand) Ltd (Roche NZ). Roche NZ is the New Zealand distributor of Roaccutane. Mr Austin claimed that Roche NZ had negligently provided him with Roaccutane for which he sought compensatory and exemplary damages. He says Roche NZ breached a duty of care it owed to him in that it failed to disclose the risks associated with Roaccutane, failed to communicate recommendations about its use, and failed to arrange for the cessation of the distribution of Roaccutane in New Zealand. He says his medical…
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- Case
- [2020] NZSC 30
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues were whether the claimant's prior claim to coverage under the AC Act barred him from bringing proceedings in the ordinary courts, whether the pharmaceutical company's failure to obtain the claimant's prior informed consent to the risks of Roaccutane meant he received treatment when he took it, and if DISH was an ordinary consequence of Roaccutane treatment. The Court first addressed the jurisdictional issue of whether s 133(5) of the AC Act applied to bar the proceedings. The Court concluded that s 133(5) applied, and thus, the appeal could not proceed in the ordinary courts.
The Court examined the meaning and effect of s 133(5) of the AC Act, which provides that if a person has a claim under the Act and has a right of review or appeal in relation to that claim, no court may consider or grant remedies in relation to that matter if it is covered by the Act. The Court found that once a claimant lodges a claim under the Act, they are locked into its procedures, and no court may consider or grant remedies in relation to the matter if it is covered by the Act. The Court also noted that the procedures for review and appeal are contained in Part 5 of the AC Act and that there is nothing in the language of Part 5 that suggests the claimant's challenge could not be appropriately addressed within its procedures.
The Court held that the claimant's challenge was one that could have been made under the prescribed procedure in the AC Act, and therefore, the appeal was caught by the s 133(5) bar. The Court rejected the claimant's submission that the fact he is out of time to apply for a review makes a difference, as it would allow claimants in his position to obtain the benefit of cover under the Act and then sue in the ordinary courts at the same time.
In light of the fact that there remains a potential pathway for the claimant to bring a review application out of time under s 135 of the AC Act, the appeal was dismissed, and the proceeding will be struck out one month from the date of this judgment unless the appellant makes an application under s 135 together with an application to this Court for a stay of this proceeding pending completion of that process. Costs will lie where they fall.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi