Reekie v Legal Services Commissioner
[2023] NZHC 1832
•13 July 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2021-404-15
[2023] NZHC 1832
UNDER the Legal Services Act 2011 and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 IN THE MATTER
of an appeal under the Legal Services Act 2011
BETWEEN
NICHOLAS PAUL ALFRED REEKIE
Appellant
AND
LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER
Respondent
Hearing: 21 June 2023 Appearances:
A Hart for the Appellant
L Hansen for the Respondent
Judgment:
13 July 2023
JUDGMENT OF WOOLFORD J
This judgment was delivered by me on Thursday, 13 July 2023 at 2:30 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Hart & Associates (A Hart), Auckland
D Stephens for Legal Services Commissioner (Ministry of Justice), Wellington Counsel: L Hansen, Wellington
REEKIE v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER [2023] NZHC 1832 [13 July 2023]
[1] Nicholas Paul Alfred Reekie is a serving prisoner. In 2017, he commenced proceedings against the Attorney-General arising out of a decision by the Department of Corrections (Corrections) to transfer him from one prison to another in July 2011. He sought declarations concerning alleged negligence and breaches of various rights, as well as damages. On 19 July 2019, the High Court dismissed his claim.1 Costs were later awarded against Mr Reekie in favour of the Attorney-General.2
[2] Mr Reekie represented himself in the High Court claim. He then sought legal aid to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the High Court merit and costs judgments. The Legal Services Commissioner (Commissioner) granted interim aid to enable opinions to be obtained from two counsel about the prospects of success. Having obtained their opinions, the Commissioner declined to grant further aid to Mr Reekie to enable him to retain counsel for the purpose of an appeal.
[3] Mr Reekie then sought a review of the Commissioner’s decision by the Legal Aid Tribunal (Tribunal). In a decision dated 1 December 2020, the Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Commissioner. 3 It concluded that Mr Reekie had not shown that the Commissioner’s decision to decline aid on the ground that the appeal lacked sufficient merit, was manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law.
[4] Mr Reekie now appeals against the decision of the Tribunal. He was initially not aided, and the appeal was adjourned a number of times to enable him to instruct counsel. He is now represented on legal aid by Ms A Hart.
Right of appeal
[5] A right of appeal against a decision of the Legal Tribunal is provided by s 59 of the Legal Services Act 2011 (LSA), but only on a question of law. Section 59 provides:
59 Appeal on question of law
If the Commissioner or an applicant considers that the Tribunal’s determination is wrong in law, the Commissioner or the applicant (as
1 Reekie v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 1679.
2 Reekie v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 2578.
3 Reekie v Legal Services Commissioner [2020] NZLAT 024.
the case may be) may appeal to the High Court on the question of law, and the appeal must be dealt with in accordance with the rules of court.
Background
Application for legal aid
[6] On 18 September 2019, counsel D A Ewen filed an application by Mr Reekie for legal aid. Mr Ewen sought an interim grant of legal aid to obtain and review the notes of evidence from the High Court trial for the purpose of advising as to the merits of an appeal against the High Court judgments. An interim grant of legal aid was made.
[7] By letter dated 3 March 2020, Mr Ewen advised the Commissioner that further legal aid was “not warranted, as there are insufficient prospects of success.” At the outset of his opinion, he reviewed the key findings of fact made by the High Court Judge and determined that the prospects of the Court of Appeal reversing the findings were remote.
[8] Mr Ewen stated that the high watermark of the appeal would be a finding that the decision to transfer Mr Reekie was, in part, motivated by Mr Reekie’s complaints against his residential manager, Mr Sweet. This, he said, gave rise to a number of questions relevant to remedy. First, this was an area where the fundamental issues are decisions of prison management. Second, the breakdown in the relationship between the two can be seen in more ways than one. Third, Mr Reekie sought a discretionary remedy.
[9] Mr Ewen then reviewed the first two causes of action in the statement of claim drafted by Mr Reekie. He said the third and fourth causes of action were misconceived from the inception. The first two causes of action alleged a breach of the right of freedom of expression as contained in s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and a breach of the right to humane and respectful treatment as contained in s 23(5) of NZBORA.
[10] Mr Ewen thought it was reasonably clear that Mr Reekie’s complaints were not dealt with in a timely and adequate manner. However, he thought it unlikely the Court
of Appeal would interfere with the result for two main reasons. First, the appropriate remedy for a failure to investigate is for a proper investigation to be held. This was not a pleaded remedy. Secondly, the passage of time could not be ignored.
[11]Mr Ewen concluded:
In summary I do not believe there is sufficient prospect of Mr Reekie obtaining meaningful relief as a result of his appeal to the Court of Appeal. On that basis I cannot recommend the appeal ought to be the subject of a grant of legal aid.
[12]On 17 March 2020, the Commissioner advised Mr Reekie:
We have closed this file as your lawyer has indicated that there may be nothing to be gained in taking this matter to the Court of Appeal. We are prepared to relook at this however, if we are given a compelling argument that would mean legal aid should continue.
[13] By letter dated 26 March 2020, Mr Reekie wrote to the Commissioner expressing disappointment at Mr Ewen’s opinion and seeking a reconsideration of the Commissioner’s decision.
[14] On 23 April 2020, the Commissioner replied stating that without a lawyer, she was unable to consider re-opening the interim grant. Mr Reekie was invited to seek a reconsideration once he had a new lawyer. The Commissioner also noted Mr Reekie could resubmit a fresh application with a civil lawyer with their justification as to why the proceeding had a prospect of success.
[15] Whether it was a reconsideration or a fresh application, on 18 June 2020 counsel Ms Nicolette Levy KC applied on Mr Reekie’s behalf for an interim grant of legal aid to provide a second opinion on the likely prospects of success of an appeal. Another interim grant of legal aid was made.
[16]By letter dated 17 September 2020, Ms Levy advised the Commissioner:
In my opinion the real difficulty with the application for legal aid in this matter is not that there are no issues with the evidence and the judgment – there are. The real difficulty is that this is an application for damages where the alleged damage (a) cannot be quantified; and (b) would be minimal in any event, and so much time has passed as to make any other remedy pointless.
[17] Ms Levy referred to ss 10(3) and (4) of the LSA, noting that the Commissioner had an unrestrained power to refuse legal aid. However, in her opinion the grounds for refusing legal aid for original proceedings in s 10(3) provided a starting point for consideration of Mr Reekie’s application. The leading case was JMM v Legal Services Agency.4 Ms Levy noted that in JMM, the Court of Appeal said that one consideration was the cost of bringing the claim compared with the potential benefits. Where financial benefits were sought, it would be necessary to assess the prospects of achieving a successful financial outcome. A reassessment of the costs and benefits would ordinarily be essential, including the likelihood of settlement. Non-monetary outcomes may also need to be assessed, the novelty of the claim, its precedent effects, and whether it was a new or developing area of the law may need to be considered.
[18] Ms Levy said that applying these matters to Mr Reekie’s appeal, it could be seen that the prospect of achieving a successful financial outcome were very slim. In saying so, Ms Levy said she did not ignore the argument that the Supreme Court had previously refused to order significant costs against Mr Reekie because he had little or no means. Ms Levy contrasted Mr Reekie’s case to that of Mr Taylor in Taylor v North Shore District Court (No 2),5 where Mr Taylor was successful in establishing the issue raised as one of substantial public importance and was not required to pay costs even though he was unsuccessful in obtaining a declaration in that particular case.
[19] Ms Levy also said that in respect of non-monetary outcomes there were no real remedies available, beyond vindication of Mr Reekie’s position. Ms Levy concluded:
For the above reasons, my opinion is that Mr Reekie’s appeal has poor prospects of success, giving that phrase its broadest interpretation.
[20] On 21 September 2020, the Commissioner wrote to Mr Reekie noting that Ms Levy had now advised that his “prospects of success” were too low. The Commissioner said that “prospects of success” meant the chances of getting what he wanted from his case. The Commissioner then advised Mr Reekie he would no longer receive legal aid from 25 September 2020.
4 JMM v Legal Services Agency [2012] NZCA 573, [2013] 1 NZLR 517.
5 Taylor v North Shore District Court (No 2), HC Auckland, CIV-2009-404-2350, 13 October 2010.
[21] Mr Reekie then sought further time to respond to Ms Levy’s opinion by letter dated 22 September 2020. On 29 September 2020, the Commissioner declined Mr Reekie’s request for more time and confirmed that legal aid had been ceased.
Tribunal decision
[22] Mr Reekie then sought a review by the Tribunal of the Commissioner’s decision to cease legal aid. As noted, the Tribunal confirmed the Commissioner’s decision in a written decision dated 1 December 2020.
[23] After setting out the background, the Tribunal noted the appellate aid sought and the opinions of both Mr Ewen and Ms Levy as to the appeal’s prospects of success. The Tribunal then summarised the submissions of both Mr Reekie and the Commissioner.
[24] Before arriving at its assessment, the Tribunal noted the jurisdiction and criteria of the Tribunal as follows:6
[27] The grounds for reviewing a decision of the Commissioner are set out in s 52(1) of the Legal Services Act 2011 (the Act):
An aided person or an applicant for legal aid may apply to the Tribunal for a review of the Commissioner’s reconsideration of a decision … on the grounds that it is—
(a) manifestly unreasonable; or
(b) wrong in law.
[28] A decision is manifestly unreasonable where “it is shown, clearly and unmistakably, that the decision made by the [Commissioner] went beyond what was reasonable or was irrational or logically flawed”. Manifestly unreasonable requires “not only that the decision be found to be unreasonable, but that [the Tribunal] forms the view that the decision is so clearly unreasonable that the intervention of the [Tribunal] is called for”. The threshold for intervention is a high one and it is necessary for the Tribunal to exercise restraint.
[29] A decision may be wrong in law “if it derives from an incorrect application or interpretation of the statute; or if it is wrong in principle; or if the decision-maker has failed to take into account some relevant matter; or has taken account of an irrelevant matter; or if it depends upon findings which are unsupported by the evidence”, approved by the Court of Appeal in Meredith.
[30] The Tribunal is required to conduct reviews on the papers and to provide a brief summary of the reasons.
6 Above n 3.
[footnotes omitted]
[25] In its assessment, the Tribunal noted that the Commissioner may refuse to grant appellate legal aid in civil proceedings where the Commissioner considers that for any reason the grant of legal aid or further legal aid is not justified.7 In assessing whether aid is justified, the Commissioner is entitled to review the merits of the appeal.8
[26] The Tribunal further noted that the Commissioner’s decision also relied on s 10(4)(d)(i) of the Act in declining legal aid, which permits aid to be refused if the prospects of success are not sufficient to justify a grant. The Tribunal stated:
[33] …This provision is not strictly relevant as it is applicable to original proceedings only. Nonetheless, the general principle of granting civil aid only where the merits or prospects of success outweigh the cost of aid is accepted as applicable to appeal proceedings.
[27] The Tribunal noted Mr Reekie’s passionate belief that he had been wronged by Corrections, but that his complaints were considered at length by the High Court in a careful and thorough decision. Mr Reekie’s criticism of the two judgments was then considered by two experienced counsel who both concluded that there were insufficient or even poor prospects of success on appeal. The Tribunal said it had reviewed Mr Reekie’s argument on review in full, but concluded he had not shown that either counsel erred. As to Ms Levy, the Tribunal stated:
[35] Ms Levy QC points out that on the basis of Meredith, the Commissioner makes an overall assessment by looking at the prospects in the round, one consideration being the cost of bringing the claim compared to the potential benefits. On that basis, the applicant’s prospects of a successful financial outcome are very slim according to Ms Levy QC. His non-financial remedies are, in senior counsel’s view, pointless.
[36] The applicant is critical of Ms Levy QC as she did not seek the file and did not discuss the case with him. Neither criticism affects the validity of her conclusion. She is an experienced counsel, particularly in criminal appeals, and can assess whether she needs the primary evidence (which, it is noted, Mr Ewen had reviewed). Similarly, she can assess whether she needs any discussion with him, in addition to his submissions to her of 16 pages in length.
7 Legal Services Act 2011, s 10(4)(e).
8 Legal Services Agency v A (2008) 19 PRNZ 1 (HC) at [42]–[43].
[28] The Tribunal concluded that the Commissioner’s officers were entitled to rely on the opinions of two experienced counsel. Mr Reekie had not shown that the Commissioner’s decision to decline aid, on the ground that the appeal lacks sufficient merit, was manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law.
Mr Reekie’s submissions
[29] Counsel for Mr Reekie filed comprehensive submissions on his behalf. They were, however, too broad in their scope. At the outset, counsel stated that the present proceeding comprised of an appeal against the decisions of the “Legal Aid Commissioner” and Tribunal declining legal aid. The appeal is, however, just against the Legal Aid Tribunal’s decision to confirm the decision of the Legal Services Commissioner declining legal aid.
[30] Furthermore, counsel directs a large part of her submissions to alleged factual errors in the High Court judgment, which are said to “go to the heart of the merits of Mr Reekie’s proposed appeal”. The present proceeding is, however, an appeal on a question of law only. It is not the function of this Court on an appeal on a question of law to undertake a detailed analysis of the evidence given in the High Court trial over three days (20 – 23 May 2019, with further submissions received 28 June, 12 and 17 July 2019) to ascertain whether “a completely different narrative emerges”, as counsel submits.
[31] Counsel also addresses the merits of the proposed substantive appeal in some detail. This appeal is, however, not a general appeal on the basis that, notwithstanding two opinions from experienced counsel, Mr Reekie’s proposed substantive appeal has sufficient merit to warrant a grant of legal aid.
Grounds of appeal
[32] The grounds of appeal listed in Mr Reekie’s written submissions and confirmed in counsel’s oral submissions are directed at both the Commissioner and the Tribunal. Counsel submits that they both erred by:
(a)Holding that “The Commissioner’s officers are entitled to rely (solely) on the opinions of two experienced counsel.” The Commissioner should have come to his/her own decision;
(b)Interpreting the opinion of Mr Ewen as concluding that the proposed appeal lacked sufficient prospects of success;
(c)Adopting the opinion of Ms Levy KC that “the alleged damage
(a) cannot be quantified; and (b) would be minimal in any event; and so much time has passed as to make any other remedy pointless.”
(d)Relying on opinions that were incorrect and contrary to the interests of the appellant, without his knowledge or consent, and without inviting further submissions from the appellant before making its decision;
(e)Not coming to its own view regarding legal aid by applying the ‘ordinary person privately funded’ test;
(f)Failing to make a decision on the appellant’s application for legal aid to appeal the adverse costs decision, or failing to distinguish between the two issues;
(g)Failing to recognise that the appeal raises issues of public importance, including the interests of the public in being assured that the Corrections system operates within the law, and that it operates fairly and humanely;
(h)Failing to recognise that Mr Ewen’s opinion was incorrect in respect of:
(i)The Limitation Act and whether the actions were statute-barred (Mr Reekie appears to have lodged his claim within six years);
(ii)The lack of a pleading seeking an investigation as a remedy;
(iii)Opining that “present conduct is going to be far greater a determinant than events that occurred over eight years ago”.
Discussion
[33] The starting point is s 10 of the LSA, which sets out when legal aid may be granted for civil matters. Section 10(4)(e) provides that the Commissioner may refuse to grant legal aid to an applicant in the case of an appeal if the Commissioner considers that for any reason the grant of legal aid is not justified.
[34] In Legal Services Agency v MA,9 Wylie J stated with regard to s 9(4)(e) of the Legal Services Act 2000, an earlier version of s 10(4)(e):
In my view s 9(4)(e) is quite clear. In the case of an appeal, the Agency may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to grant legal aid if it considers that “for any reason” a grant of legal aid is not justified. It is difficult to see that the grounds for the exercise of the discretion could have been expressed more widely. The expression “for any reason” is open ended. Obviously the exercise of the discretion must be confined by its statutory context and it should not result in a decision which is manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law. Subject to these restrictions, the discretion can be exercised “for any reason” and this could embrace any of the factors identified in s 9(4)(a) to (d), or indeed other factors. In my view, the words permit consideration of whether the applicant’s prospects of success are sufficient to justify the grant of legal aid. That will require that some account be taken of the merits of the decision it is so sought to challenge with a grant of legal aid. It could be appropriate in appropriate cases to consider whether the arguments the applicant wishes to advance on appeal are technical and devoid of substantive merit.
[35] The applicant’s prospects of success are referred to in s 10(4)(d)(i), which provides that the Commissioner may refuse to grant legal aid to an applicant in the case of original proceedings if the applicant’s prospects of success are not sufficient to justify the grant of legal aid.
[36]The meaning of the phrase “prospects of success” was considered by Wild J in
Timmins v Legal Aid Review Panel:10
“Prospects of success", in my view, refers to the prospects of achieving a successful outcome. Those prospects need to be assessed in a pragmatic way
9 Legal Services Agency v MA, HC Auckland, CIV-2008-404-001838, 4 July 2008, (2008) PRNZ 1 at [42].
10 Timmins v Legal Aid Review Panel [2004] 1 NZLR 708 (HC), at [33] – [35].
and, somewhat obviously, in the circumstances of the particular case. After all, no two cases are the same. The assessment invited by the words in s 9(4)(d)(i) "sufficient to justify the grant of aid", involves weighing the likely benefits against the likely costs. Whilst the benefits in some cases will be measurable mainly, and perhaps even wholly, in dollar terms, in other situations that will not be so. Examples might include obtaining an injunction restraining the destruction of an area of native bush, or the closing of a road or access track or some other facility, or a judgment upholding the reputation of a person or a product (even if unaccompanied by significant damages), or vindicating some important point of principle.
Because assessing "prospects of success" may involve assessing non- pecuniary benefits, the assessment for a particular plaintiff or claimant can obviously be difficult.
I agree with Mr Taylor's suggestion that inquiring what a person funding him or herself would do may be helpful. The question might be framed thus: What, if any, legal action would the applicant (assuming they were a reasonable individual) take in the circumstances if paying their own legal costs?
[37] The Court of Appeal further discussed the relevant principles in JMM v Legal Services Agency:11
We consider that the words “prospects of success” should speak for themselves. As we will discuss later, various considerations may be relevant to the evaluation of the phrase in a particular case. The reasonable private litigant approach may assist in this evaluative exercise but it is really part of the policy rationale and not a test. It is certainly not a test to be applied in a rigid manner.
...
Furthermore, we see force in Mr Cooke’s argument that Parliament provided for the Agency to make these decisions – and on an evaluative basis. This is clear from the use of the word “sufficient” in s 9(4)(d)(i). Legal aid may be withdrawn if the aided person’s “prospects of success are not sufficient to justify the grant of legal aid”. The word “sufficient” must be given some meaning in this context. We consider that it underscores the need for the Agency to make an overall assessment by standing back and looking at the litigation prospects in the round.
[38]The Court further stated:12
One consideration is likely to be the cost of bringing the claim compared with the potential benefits. Where damages and/or other financial benefits are sought, it will be necessary to assess the prospects of achieving a successful financial outcome in order to determine whether they are sufficient to justify proceeding. A re-assessment of the costs and benefits, including the costs incurred to date and those likely to be incurred in the future, will ordinarily be
11 JMM v Legal Services Agency [2012] NZCA 573, [2013] 1 NZLR 517, at [51] and [53].
12 At [64] – [65].
essential. Part of the analysis could include an assessment of the likelihood or otherwise of an out-of-court settlement rather than proceeding to trial. In that respect, any settlement offers will be relevant.
Non-monetary outcomes, and similar types of relief sought, may also need to be assessed as a relevant consideration depending on the nature of the case. In this context, we agree that the novelty of the claim, its precedent effects and whether it is a new or developing area of the law may need to be considered.
[39] The Commissioner’s decision to decline legal aid for the appeal by Mr Reekie was made utilising the test that Mr Reekie’s prospects of success were not sufficient to justify the grant of legal aid:
Legal aid approved 10 hours for your lawyer, Ms Levy to advise on the prospects of success of your appeal succeeding.
Ms Levy has now advised that your prospects of success are too low. Prospects of success means the chance of getting what you want from your case.
Therefore you will no longer get legal aid for 25/09/2020.
[40] Although the phrase “prospects of success” is not used in s 10(4)(e), the expression “for any reason”, which is used in s 10(4)(e), must embrace any of the factors identified in s 10(4)(a) to (d). I agree with Wylie J in Legal Services Agency v MA that the expression “for any reason” permits consideration of whether an applicant’s prospects of success are sufficient to justify the grant of legal aid.
[41] Counsel for Mr Reekie submits, however, that the prospects of success test is not the correct test. Rather, the test was (and is) whether a privately funded person in the position of the applicant would bring the proceeding. This was referred to by Wild J in Timmins as possibly being useful, but discounted by the Court of Appeal in JMM v Legal Services Agency, in the following terms:
The reasonable private litigant approach may assist in this evaluative exercise but it is really part of the policy rationale and not a test. It is certainly not a test to be applied in a rigid manner.
[42] Counsel for Mr Reekie also refers to Marteley v Legal Services Commissioner,13 a Supreme Court case in which comment was made that the Commissioner was not required to make a close examination of the merits of an appeal
13 Marteley v Legal Services Commissioner [2015] NZSC 127, [2016] 1 NZLR 633.
and, in particular, should recognise that it may be difficult to conclude that an appeal is devoid of merit on the basis of the material available when the grant decision is made. This comment was, however, made in relation to criminal appeals in respect of which a quite different statutory scheme applies. In this context, counsel for Mr Reekie also refers to the reasonable grounds test in s 10(3), which provides that the Commissioner must refuse to grant legal aid if the applicant has not shown that the applicant has reasonable grounds for taking or defending the proceedings. She submits that if that test was applied it would have been a relatively straightforward matter to conclude it was reasonable in the circumstances for Mr Reekie to be granted legal aid for an appeal. In the present case, however, the Commissioner had two opinions from experienced counsel available for her consideration and so was in a good position to assess the merits of an appeal.
[43] In short, I am not satisfied that the Commissioner applied the wrong test in refusing Mr Reekie’s application for legal aid.
[44] Mr Reekie then sought a review of the Commissioner’s decision by the Tribunal. Section 52 of the LSA provides for a review on the grounds that the decision was manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law. This was the test applied by the Tribunal when it concluded that Mr Reekie had not shown that the Commissioner’s decision was manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law. Thus, the Tribunal did not apply the wrong test either. There does not, in fact, appear to be a challenge to the test applied by the Tribunal.
[45] The focus of the grounds of appeal cited earlier (which generally are not questions of law) appear to be a challenge to the correctness of the two opinions by counsel, Mr Ewen and Ms Levy. Those opinions are, however, cogently argued exercises of professional judgment. While Mr Reekie and his counsel may disagree with them, they are not manifestly unreasonable or demonstrably wrong in law. Professional advisers’ opinions can and do differ. That does not make one opinion right and another one wrong.
[46] I am also of the view that the Tribunal (and the Commissioner) were entitled as a matter of law to rely on the opinions as informing its decision on review (and at
first instance by the Commissioner). Counsels’ opinions are often sought and provided to the Commissioner by applicants for legal aid.
[47] The assertion in the listed grounds of appeal that the Tribunal relied on the opinions without Mr Reekie’s knowledge or consent, and without inviting further submissions from Mr Reekie before making its decision, is not correct. Mr Reekie filed 14-page submissions, dated 19 November 2020, with the Tribunal in which he made extensive reference to counsels’ opinions. The Tribunal did not require Mr Reekie’s consent for it to rely on the opinions.
[48] Another of the grounds of appeal refers to the “ordinary person privately funded” test, which I have determined is not necessarily the test to be applied.
[49] As to the assertion that there was a failure to distinguish the adverse costs judgment from the merits judgment, Ms Levy did refer separately to the costs judgment and advised that Mr Reekie’s proceeding did not display any public interest which may warrant a reduction in costs, which would otherwise normally be payable.
[50] Finally, counsel submits as a ground of appeal that the Tribunal failed to recognise that Mr Reekie’s appeal raised issues of public importance in that the public needed assurance that the Corrections system operated fairly and humanely. Even if there is some public interest, that does not make the Commissioner’s decision manifestly unreasonable or wrong in law.
Result
[51] Mr Reekie’s appeal is dismissed. The nominated grounds of appeal are largely not points of law, but in any event are without merit.
Woolford J
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