Paul v Mead - [2020] NZHC 666

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2019-404-001129

[2020] NZHC 666

BETWEEN
LILACH PAUL

Applicant

AND

FIONA MEAD

First Respondent

BRETT PAUL

Second Respondent

Hearing:
19 September 2019

Further submissions October-November 2019

Appearances:

N Taefi and J Grimmer for the Applicant

P Fuscic and E M Burke for the First Respondent J Duckworth for the Second Respondent

Judgment:

31 March 2020

JUDGMENT OF HINTON J

This judgment was delivered by me on 31 March 2020 at 3.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

…………………………………………………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Counsel/Solicitors:
Nura Taefi, Barrister, Auckland Jordan Grimmer, Barrister, Auckland McVeagh Fleming, Auckland
Jennifer G Connell & Associates, Auckland

PAUL v MEAD [2020] NZHC 666 [31 March 2020]

[1] This case raises an interesting and contentious issue over whether the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 applies to a “polyamorous relationship”.

[2] The point arises as a question of law referred to this Court by way of case stated by Judge Pidwell sitting in the Family Court at Waitakere as follows:1

Does the Family Court have jurisdiction to determine the property rights of three persons in a contemporaneous polyamorous relationship under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976?2

[3] The two effective claimants appear to accept that the Property Relationships Act 1976 (the Act) does not provide for polyamorous relationships as such. They do not claim jurisdiction on that basis. Rather, they seek to break their three-way relationship down into contemporaneous qualifying relationships. I have therefore restated the question slightly as follows:

Does the Family Court have jurisdiction under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 to determine the property rights of three persons in a polyamorous relationship, either on the basis of that relationship or by dividing that relationship into dyadic parts?

Background

[4] The parties accept the following excellent summary of the facts by Judge Pidwell, to which I have added only in small part and where uncontentious.

[5] Lilach and Brett Paul were legally married in New Zealand on 28 February 1993. They have no children.

[6]In 1999, Lilach met Fiona Mead.

[7]In 2002, the three parties formed a polyamorous relationship.

[8] In November 20023 the parties moved into a four-hectare property in Kumeu which had just been purchased in Fiona’s name for $533,000. She paid the deposit of

1      Pursuant to s 13 of the Family Court Act 1980 and pt 21 of the High Court Rules 2016.
2      The phrase “polyamorous relationship” is not defined in the case stated. It has a potentially wider meaning, but given the facts of the case, I treat it as a relationship between three persons or more.
3      The Judge noted a date of March 2003 but the parties agree it was November 2002. Nothing turns on the date for present purposes.

$40,000. The parties describe the property as a farm. It had a QV of $2,175,000 in 2017. This is the property in dispute.

[9] For the next 15 years, the parties lived together…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Paul v Mead

Details

AGLC: Paul v Mead [2020] NZHC 666
Case: [2020] NZHC 666
Decision Date: 31 March 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Paul v Mead, heard in the High Court of New Zealand, addresses whether the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (the Act) applies to a polyamorous relationship. Lilach Paul sought a one-third share of the Kumeu property, which she, her husband Brett, and Fiona Mead, had occupied for 15 years. The court had to determine if it had jurisdiction to resolve the property rights under the Act in a polyamorous relationship or by dividing the relationship into dyadic parts. The court held that the Act does not apply to polyamorous relationships as the definitions of marriage, civil union, and de facto relationship are limited to two people. The court also found that while the Act recognises multiple contemporaneous relationships, it only applies to two discrete relationships and does not provide for three concurrent claims. The court concluded that the Act’s scheme is premised on the notion of coupledom and that reform of the Act to encompass polyamorous relationships is a matter for Parliament, not the courts.

The court’s reasoning was grounded in the statutory language and scheme of the Act, which does not explicitly provide for polyamorous relationships. The court noted that while the Act has been amended to include a broader range of qualifying relationships, it remains premised on the concept of coupledom. The court also considered the practical difficulties of applying the Act to a polyamorous relationship, including the potential for unequal outcomes that would conflict with the Act’s policy of equal division. The court found that the Act’s application to such a case would be unworkable and contrary to its purpose.

In conclusion, the court held that the Family Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the property rights of three persons in a polyamorous relationship under the Act, nor does it have jurisdiction to do so by dividing the relationship into dyadic parts. The court suggested that the issues between the parties could be addressed at equity, where the principles expressed in the Act could guide the development of judge-made law. The court reserved costs, noting that the case involved novel issues and might serve as a test case.

Orders