Hawke's Bay Trustee Co Ltd (Trustees) v Judd

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA45/2015
[2016] NZCA 397

BETWEEN

HAWKE'S BAY TRUSTEE COMPANY LIMITED AND RICHARD WILLIAM HODGKINSON AS TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD HODGKINSON TRUST
Appellants

AND

MICHELLE KERRIAN JUDD
Respondent

Hearing:

28 April 2016

Court:

Ellen France P, Harrison and Kós JJ

Counsel:

M E J Macfarlane for Appellants
J L Bates for Respondent

Judgment:

17 August 2016 at 11 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal is dismissed.  The judgment of the High Court awarding Ms Judd $65,000 stands.

BCosts are reserved pending the filing of memoranda referred to in [52] below.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Ellen France P)

Table of Contents

Introduction  [1]
Background  [3]
         The facts  [3]
         The High Court judgment  [13]
The applicable principles  [17]
Contributions to the property  [19]
         The $50,000 payment  [20]
         Contributions to the household  [24]
         Our assessment  [27]
Reasonable expectation  [34]
Impact of Trust ownership  [38]
Conclusion  [51]

Introduction

  1. Richard Hodgkinson and Michelle Judd were married for six and a half years.  Over that period they lived in a property in Lane Road, Havelock North, which was owned by the Richard Hodgkinson Trust (the Trust).  After the couple separated, Ms Judd made a claim that the Trust held a share in the property on constructive trust for her, reflecting her contributions to the property.  After trial, Williams J found Ms Judd had established a beneficial interest in the property and awarded her $65,000 to reflect her contributions.[1]  The appellants, the trustees of the Trust, appeal against that award.

  2. The appeal raises three main issues.  First, whether Ms Judd’s contributions to the property owned by the Trust qualified as contributions under Lankow v Rose.[2]  Secondly, whether Ms Judd had a reasonable expectation of a share in the property.  Finally, what was the impact of the Trust’s ownership of the property on her claim?  We deal with each issue in turn after setting out the background. 

Background

The facts

[2]Lankow v Rose [1995] 1 NZLR 277 (CA). Lankow v Rose is applicable because the Lane Road property is the property of the Trust and so the claim is not subject to the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. 

  1. We adopt the Judge’s description of the key events in the narrative.[3]

    [3]High Court judgment, above n 1, at [2]–[17].

  2. Ms Judd and Mr Hodgkinson married in November 2005.  Both had children from prior relationships, some of whom lived with the couple at various times.

  3. Mr Hodgkinson was a “successful businessman, first as an orchardist and then as a fruit retailer”.[4]  The Judge described him as “in a relatively comfortable position financially” over the time the couple were married.[5] 

    [4]At [4].

    [5]At [4].

  4. Prior to the marriage, Ms Judd had what the Judge referred to as a “modest property”.[6]  She had worked as a beauty therapist for 25 to 30 hours a week.

    [6]At [5].

  5. The couple separated on 11 June 2012 and have…

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Details
Case
[2016] NZCA 397
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hawke's Bay Trustee Co Ltd (Trustees) v Judd is a case where the New Zealand Court of Appeal upheld a High Court decision that awarded Ms Judd $65,000 for her contributions to the matrimonial home, which was held in a discretionary family trust. The trustees of the trust, Hawke's Bay Trustee Co Ltd, appealed the decision, arguing that they should not be liable for Ms Judd's contributions as they were not aware of them at the time they were made, and that they could not be held liable for the actions of one trustee, Mr Hodgkinson, who had allowed the contributions to occur. The Court of Appeal found that the trustees were liable for Ms Judd's contributions as they had encouraged or permitted them, and that the requirement for unanimity among trustees could not be used as a shield in this situation. The Court also found that the trustees could have taken steps to preserve their position, such as seeking legal advice or entering into a relationship property agreement with Ms Judd.

The legal issues in this case were whether the trustees of a discretionary family trust could be held liable for contributions made to the trust property by a third party, and whether the requirement for unanimity among trustees could be used as a shield in this situation. The Court of Appeal found that the trustees could be held liable for the contributions as they had encouraged or permitted them, and that the requirement for unanimity could not be used as a shield. The Court also found that the reasonableness of a third party's expectation of an interest in the property and the reasonableness of requiring the legal owners to yield an interest or to pay compensation in lieu were the relevant considerations, rather than whether a party's action was in breach of their trustee duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court decision that awarded Ms Judd $65,000 for her contributions to the matrimonial home. The Court found that the approach taken by Williams J was careful and appropriately reflected the contributions made by both parties over the course of the marriage. The Court also found that the trustees could have taken steps to preserve their position, such as seeking legal advice or entering into a relationship property agreement with Ms Judd. The Court did not consider the ground of appeal that the decision impacted on the property rights that form a key part of the trust concept, as it found that Ms Judd's successful claim simply reversed or disgorged the benefit of the defendants' enrichment.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal found that the trustees of a discretionary family trust could be held liable for contributions made to the trust property by a third party, and that the requirement for unanimity among trustees could not be used as a shield in this situation. The Court also found that the reasonableness of a third party's expectation of an interest in the property and the reasonableness of requiring the legal owners to yield an interest or to pay compensation in lieu were the relevant considerations. The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the High Court awarding Ms Judd $65,000 stands.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The Court saw Prime v Hardie, Glass v Hughey, Marshall v Bourneville and Murrell v Hamilton as the “application of established Lankow v Rose principles” to the reality of the New Zealand trust landscape where it is likely a good proportion of property is held in discretionary family trusts and trustees are more often than not the beneficiaries of those trusts and in control of them.[41] We agree. [41]At [63]–[64] and [70]. In its review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 the Law Commission has indicated it will consider legislative provisions in the relationship property area as they relate to trusts: Law Commission “Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976” (May 2016) <>Reflecting the reality recognised in Vervoort, Mr Hodgkinson treated the property as his own. He was the controlling trustee and as one among a number of family beneficiaries he enjoyed the benefit of an apparently indefinite right to occupy the trust property rent-free. This arrangement was inconsistent with a conventional arm's-length transaction between trustees and a third party to invest or rent trust property to secure an economic return for the beneficiaries. The trustees owned and operated the property for Mr Hodgkinson's primary benefit. We consider it can be said that in the present case the conscience of both trustees is affected. Mr Hodgkinson obviously had direct knowledge of the contributions being made by Ms Judd but, as the Judge found, Mr Dine had effectively given Mr Hodgkinson “carte blanche” to do as he wished with the assets of the Trust.[42] The requirement for unanimity cannot be used as a shield in this situation where one trustee has abdicated responsibility and so enabled trust property to be improved without first resolving the basis of receipt. Further, although Mr Dine may not have known of these contributions earlier, he did at the time of trial. In all these circumstances, it would be unconscionable not to recognise the benefits freely accepted by the Trust. [42]High Court judgment, above n 1, at [67]; and Vervoort v Forrest, above n 37, at [65].The concern about the impact of this approach on the property rights that form a key part of the trust concept is understandable.[43] We make three points on this aspect. First, we agree with Mr Bates’ submission that Ms Judd’s successful claim simply reverses or disgorges the benefit of the defendants’ enrichment. This Court in Murrell made the same point.[44]As the Court put it, the claim means “a part of the value of the Trust’s property which should not accrue to the Trust does not accrue to it”.[45] [43]See the discussion in Vervoort v Forrest, above n 37, at [66].[44]Murrell v Hamilton, above n 11, at [30].[45]At [30].Secondly, it was open to the trustees to take steps to preserve the position they now seek to maintain. They could have taken advice on the issue at the time of the marriage. Further, Mr Hodgkinson could have entered into a relationship property agreement with Ms Judd. Absent such an adjustment of her expectations, where the contributions are to the matrimonial home and the trustees have encouraged or permitted these contributions, it would be wrong to treat a contributor like Ms Judd as a volunteer. Finally, as Mr Bates also submits, the question is not whether a party’s action is in breach of their trustee duties but, rather, the focus is on the reasonableness of a third party’s expectation of an interest in the property and the reasonableness of requiring the legal owners to yield an interest or to pay compensation in lieu. Accordingly, we do not consider this ground of appeal succeeds.ConclusionFor these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment of the High Court awarding Ms Judd $65,000 stands. The approach taken by Williams J was careful and appropriately reflected the contributions made by both parties over the course of the marriage. We agree with it. If the parties are unable to agree on costs, brief memoranda (no more than three pages) are to be filed as to why costs should not follow the event. The appellants’ memorandum is to be filed by Friday 19 August 2016 and the respondent’s memorandum by Friday 26 August 2016.Solicitors: Sainsbury Logan & Williams, Napier for AppellantBrown & Bates Ltd, Napier for Respondent

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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