| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 68/2013 [2013] NZSC 94 |
| BETWEEN | EVGENY ORLOV |
| AND | NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY AUCKLAND LAWYERS STANDARDS COMMITTEE AUCKLAND LAWYERS STANDARDS COMMITTEE NO. 1 NATIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE |
| Court: | McGrath, William Young and Arnold JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant (In Person) |
Judgment: | 8 October 2013 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs
to the Respondents of $2,500.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
The applicant, Mr Orlov, faces disciplinary proceedings brought by the respondents who are the New Zealand Law Society and certain of its Standards Committees constituted under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a Court of Appeal judgment in judicial review proceedings that challenged procedural decisions of the respondent Standards Committees not to deal with complaints themselves, but to lay charges against him before the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal.[1]
[1]Orlov v New Zealand Law Society [2013] NZCA 230 [Orlov (CA)].
In the High Court, Heath J held that a number of matters, the subject of complaint did not meet a standard of sufficient seriousness to warrant their reference to and determination by the Tribunal. [2] On appeal by the applicant, and cross-appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeal rejected the view that there is such an implicit threshold of seriousness standard which must be met before Standards Committees may determine matters to be addressed by the Tribunal.[3] Such a threshold test was an unwarranted gloss on the terms of s 152(2)(a) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act.[4] The Court also held that conduct of counsel in Court could be the subject of disciplinary proceedings. In particular, excessively aggressive or scandalous conduct in breach of professional statutory obligations was not protected from disciplinary proceedings under Bill of Rights guarantees.[5] The applicant’s appeal was dismissed. The cross-appeal by the Standards Committees was allowed and their decisions confirmed.
[3]Orlov (CA), above n 1.
[4]See [51]–[53].
[5]At [77].
In his submissions to this Court the applicant makes a number of criticisms of the Court of Appeal’s judgment. He submits that a general question of law arises from it on which we should give leave to appeal:
What is the extent of the reviewability of Complaints Committee hearings resulting in a decision to charge a lawyer before the Tribunal?
In our view, the only legal question arising from the judgment that might meet the requirements under s 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003 for a second appeal, is whether there is a seriousness threshold that must be met before powers under s 152(2)(a) may be exercised by a Standards Committee. Accordingly we turn to whether it is necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine an appeal on that ground.
The policy of the Supreme Court…
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- Case
- [2013] NZSC 94
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court found that the policy of the Supreme Court Act does not favour appeals on preliminary points that can be raised at the conclusion of the process. The Court held that procedural issues concerning the respondents' decisions that complaints should be considered by Disciplinary Tribunal could have been raised before the Disciplinary Tribunal and thereafter on an appeal to the High Court by way of rehearing and a further appeal to the Court of Appeal, with leave, on a question of law. The Court found that it was not in the interests of justice for the Supreme Court to hear and determine an appeal against the Court of Appeal judgment prior to the Tribunal's decision on the charges, and the determination by lower Courts of any appeals against that decision. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
The Court found that there is no settled basis of fact on which this Court could decide whether the way the Committees proceeded, and laid charges, was lawful and fair. The statutory process would probably provide helpful factual context and facilitate the Court's determination of the issue. Importantly, in the Court's view, there is no prejudice to the applicant in requiring him to go through the disciplinary hearing process before seeking to raise his objections to the respondents' process on an application for leave to appeal in this Court. It is a straightforward application of the statutory procedure. The Court also refused an application from Mr Deliu, another barrister who faces disciplinary proceedings, to intervene in this matter.
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