Reay v Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand Incorporated
[2023] NZHC 2750
•2 October 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2023-485-199
[2023] NZHC 2750
UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2010 and Part 30 of the High Court Rules IN THE MATTER
of an application for review of powers exercised by the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand Incorporated under its membership contract with Alan Michael Reay dated 27 November 1970
BETWEEN
ALAN MICHAEL REAY
Applicant
AND
INSTITUTION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED
Respondent
Hearing: 4 September 2023 Counsel:
K P McDonald KC and A-M Kraack for Applicant L Clark and L W D Kibblewhite for Respondent
Judgment:
2 October 2023
JUDGMENT OF RADICH J
Table of Contents
Paragraph
Introduction [1]
Factual background[10]
The design and the collapse of the CTV Building[10] Inquiries and proceedings resulting from the CTV Building’s collapse [12] The ongoing disciplinary process[13]
REAY v INSTITUTION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED [2023] NZHC 2750 [2 October 2023]
The Institution and its rules, codes and regulations [23]
The positions of the parties [40]
Legal principles [43]
Amenability of the Institution’s decisions to judicial review [43]
Grounds for review [46]
The provision of particulars of the complaint [56]
Discussion [63]
The complaint, the ethical standards and the legal tests [64]
Information that has been provided to Dr Reay [73]
Information that has been provided by Dr Reay [78]
Has there been undue delay in the disciplinary process? [85]
Discussion [92]
Result [104]
Introduction
[1] The Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand Incorporated (the Institution)1 is part way through a disciplinary process relating to Dr Reay’s involvement in the design of the Canterbury Television Building (the CTV Building) in Christchurch.
[2] One hundred and fifteen people lost their lives when the CTV Building collapsed following the devastating earthquake that struck Canterbury on 22 February 2011.2
[3] The CTV Building was designed by Dr Reay’s firm, Alan M Reay Consulting Engineer, in 1986. Its principal designer was an employee of Dr Reay’s, David Harding. The complaint to which the disciplinary process relates is concerned with Dr Reay’s supervision of Mr Harding.
1 The Institution has been operating under the trading name “Engineering New Zealand Te Ao Rangahau” since 2017.
2 The 22 February 2011 earthquake was one of a number of significant aftershocks that followed the magnitude 7.1 earthquake which struck Canterbury on 4 September 2010.
[4] The complaint was received in 2012 but the investigation process was stopped in 2014 with Dr Reay’s resignation as a member of the Institution. In proceedings commenced by the Attorney-General in 2015 (and in a subsequent appeal) it was found that the Institution did in fact have jurisdiction to investigate, hear and determine the complaint, despite Dr Reay’s resignation. It is doing that now and its Disciplinary Committee is due to hold a hearing to determine the complaint in December this year.
[5] In this judicial review proceeding, Dr Reay says, in broad terms for the purposes of this introduction, that the proceeding before the Disciplinary Committee should be stayed or dismissed on the grounds that:
(a)he has not been provided with adequate particulars of the complaint; and
(b)there has been undue delay in the disciplinary process.
[6] It is said that these flaws are such that there has been a breach of natural justice, a breach of s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA),3 an error of law4 and procedural unfairness.
[7] For the reasons I come on to give I have declined the application for judicial review because, in essence:
(a)Dr Reay has sufficient information about the complaint to enable him to respond fairly and meaningfully. The details that have been provided of the complaint enable a process before the Disciplinary Committee that is fair, not in breach of the principles of natural justice, the NZBORA or the Institution’s disciplinary regulations.
(b)The passage of time since the complaint was first made is not such as to mean that the proceeding cannot continue fairly. Dr Reay is not
3 Which, amongst other things, relates to a person’s right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by a tribunal or public authority.
4 By reference to the provisions in the relevant disciplinary regulations that provide for particulars of a claim, for natural justice and for steps in the disciplinary process to be taken “as soon as practicable”.
prejudiced in his ability to respond to such an extent as to make it unfair for the process to continue. The effect of the passage of time on the assessment the Disciplinary Committee must make of Dr Reay’s conduct – measured against professional standards as they were in 1986
– is a matter for the Committee. It is not such as to warrant intervention by the Court under the principles of natural justice, the NZBORA or under the Institution’s disciplinary regulations.
[8] Dr Reay holds the view that, in circumstances in which the Royal Commission of Inquiry has examined the responsibility of those involved, in which Mr Harding was found guilty of breaching professional standards some years ago, in which 37 years have elapsed since the building was designed and in which 11 years have elapsed since the complaint against him was made, there could be no ongoing need for public accountability. It is said that the disciplinary proceeding is stale, that it is futile, that it is no longer relevant and, moreover, that it is simply punitive.
[9] In my view – as with those of the High Court and the Court of Appeal when the continuation of the proceeding was raised before them in 2018 and 2019 – there is a genuine public interest element in having the Disciplinary Committee determine the underlying issues. The disciplinary process is able to proceed fairly.
Factual background
The design and the collapse of the CTV Building
[10] The CTV Building was designed by Dr Reay’s firm in 1986. Dr Reay was the firm’s sole principal. He is a particularly experienced engineer. He began practice as a structural engineer in 1970, establishing his own firm in the early 1970s. He was a member of the Institution from 1970 until the time of his resignation in 2014. He was appointed as a fellow of the Institution, recognising his considerable contribution to the engineering profession. His firm employed Mr Harding in 1985.
[11] Most of the structural design work for the CTV Building was done by Mr Harding. Dr Reay did not himself undertake any significant work in the building’s design. The essential question for the Disciplinary Committee relates to whether or
not there was a failure on Dr Reay’s part in adequately supervising Mr Harding, having regard to Mr Harding’s experience, that would warrant a disciplinary response.
Inquiries and proceedings resulting from the CTV Building’s collapse
[12] A number of inquiries have taken place since the collapse of the CTV Building. They have included consideration of the design of the CTV Building and Dr Reay’s involvement in the process. They have included:
(a)A Department of Building and Housing investigation.5
(b)The Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission of Inquiry.6
(c)A police investigation.7 and
(d)Two investigations and/or disciplinary proceedings by the Institution (excluding this one) since 2012.
The ongoing disciplinary process
[13] The Institution’s disciplinary process began on 10 December 2012 when Mr Mike Stannard, who was then Chief Engineer with the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE),8 made two complaints about Dr Reay. The complaint that remains active is in the following terms:
Dr Alan Reay’s company provided the structural design for the CTV Building, which collapsed in the February 2011 Canterbury earthquake, killing 115 people. The Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission found that the structural design of the building was seriously deficient in multiple ways. The employee engaged by Dr Reay to perform the design work (Mr David Harding) lacked the necessary experience to design buildings of this type. Dr Reay knew this, but failed to adequately supervise Mr Harding.
5 From April 2011 to February 2012.
6 From April 2011 to November 2012.
7 From February 2012 to November 2017.
8 Then called the Department of Building and Housing.
[14] Mr Stannard’s second complaint – that Dr Reay placed inappropriate pressure on the Christchurch City Council to approve the CTV Building – has since been dismissed by the Institution.
[15] From April 2013 to April 2014, the Institution investigated the complaint through an Investigating Committee under its rules. The investigation came to an end in April 2014 after the Investigating Committee and the Institution decided that they no longer had jurisdiction to investigate, hear or determine the complaint after Dr Reay had resigned as a member of the Institution in February 2014.
[16] In March 2015, the Attorney-General began a judicial review proceeding in relation to the Institution’s decision that it did not have jurisdiction to proceed. Collins J, in a judgment of 7 December 2018, decided that the Institution had jurisdiction over a person who was a member at the time the disciplinary proceedings were instituted and that the considerable public interest in the proceeding was such as to warrant the Attorney-General bringing the proceeding (the High Court decision).9 The Institution’s decision – that it lacked jurisdiction to continue – was set aside.
[17] In January 2019, Dr Reay brought an appeal from the High Court decision. In a decision of 2 October 2019, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that Collins J was right to hold that public interest in the maintenance of professional standards was a relevant consideration in interpreting whether or not the Institution’s rules should extend to former members, that it was right to find that the Institution had jurisdiction to continue to consider the complaint and that delay was not in itself a reason to deny relief. It was found that Dr Reay would not suffer material prejudice from the delay (the Court of Appeal decision).10
[18] In October 2019, the Institution appointed a new Investigating Committee (the Investigating Committee). The investigation was delayed for a short time following exchanges which saw a member step down from the committee. The Investigating
9 Attorney-General v Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand Inc [2018] NZHC 3211, [2019] 2 NZLR 731.
10 Reay v Attorney-General [2019] NZCA 475.
Committee conducted its investigation from April 2020 until December 2021 when it released a preliminary decision to the parties and sought submissions.
[19] On 9 May 2022, having considered submissions from Dr Reay and the Institution, the Investigating Committee released a final decision in which it determined that the complaint should be referred to a Disciplinary Committee under the relevant regulations (the Disciplinary Committee).
[20] The Institution appointed the Disciplinary Committee in June 2022. Correspondence between Dr Reay’s solicitors, the Institution and the Disciplinary Committee chair over procedural matters were exchanged between August 2022 and February 2023.
[21] On 7 March 2023, the Disciplinary Committee provided the parties with a document entitled “Disciplinary Hearing Procedure” which identified the complaint, dealt with procedural matters and referred to documents the Disciplinary Committee considered to be relevant.
[22] It set a hearing date for August 2023 which has since been adjourned to a date in December 2023 in order to accommodate this proceeding.
The Institution and its rules, codes and regulations
[23] The Institution was founded in 1912 to, amongst other objectives, promote and uphold the professional standards of its members. It is registered under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908. Membership is voluntary. It is not necessary for a practising engineer to join a professional organisation such as the Institution. Equally, it has never been necessary for a practising engineer to register as an engineer, although an engineer may do so under the Chartered Professional Engineers of New Zealand Act 2002 (the Act). Engineers registered under the Act are known as chartered engineers. There are restrictions in the Building Act 2004 that require certain professional functions in relation to the construction of buildings to be completed by a chartered engineer.
[24] The Act sets out a process for receiving and considering complaints against, and disciplining, chartered engineers. Therefore, there are two disciplinary processes that could apply to an engineer who is both a member of the Institution and registered under the Act. However, because Dr Reay did not register as a chartered engineer under the Act until 2011, the disciplinary proceeding against him, relating to events in 1986, can be brought under the Institution’s Rules alone.
[25]Members of the Institution are bound by its rules, regulations and codes.
[26] It is against the versions of the Code of Ethics and Rules of the Institution that were in force in 1986 (when the CTV Building was designed) that Dr Reay’s conduct is to be measured.
[27] The Institution’s 1986 Rules make provision, in r 18, for professional conduct and discipline.
[28]Rule 18.2 provided:
Each member shall so conduct [themselves] as to uphold the dignity, standing and reputation of the Institution and of the profession and with due regard to the public interest, especially in matters of health and safety. Each member, at [their] level of engineering activity, shall exercise [their] professional or technical skill and judgment at least according to the normally accepted standards of the profession and to the best of [their] ability, and shall discharge [their] professional and technical responsibilities with integrity.
[29] Rule 18.3 required the Institution’s Council to prescribe a Code of Ethics for the observance of the professional standards described in r 18.2.
[30] The Institution’s 1986 Code of Ethics prescribed a set of provisions “in furtherance” of the terms of r 18.2. Two of its provisions are relevant here:
1.Each member shall exercise [their] professional and technical skill and judgement to the best of [their] ability and shall discharge [their] professional and technical responsibilities with integrity.
…
8. However engaged, [they] shall at all times recognise [their] responsibilities to [their] employer or client, others associated with [their] work, the public interest and [their] profession.
[31] The parties have referred also to the Institution’s 1996 and 2016 Code of Ethics. They do so against the backdrop of a submission for the plaintiff that the terms of cls 1 and 8 of the 1986 Code do not refer to supervision standards. By contrast, the 1996 Code includes a provision in which a member is required to:
… accept personal responsibility for work done by you or under your supervision or direction and take reasonable steps to ensure that anyone working under your authority is both competent to carry out the assigned tasks and accepts a like personal responsibility.
[32] The relevant provision in the 2016 Code is expressed differently again, requiring that a member must not:
knowingly permit other engineers for whose engineering activities you are responsible to: undertake engineering activities that are outside their competence; undertake engineering activities in a manner that is not careful and competent; misrepresent, or permit others to misrepresent, their competence.
[33] The applicant says that, because specific supervision standards such as those contained in the 1996 and 2016 Code are not present in the 1986 Code, it is not possible for Dr Reay, in the absence of further information, to know what the particular standards against which he is to be assessed are.
[34] It is the Institution’s current rules and regulations that govern the way in which the disciplinary process to determine the complaint that has been made against Dr Reay will proceed.
[35] Rule 3 of the Institution’s 2010 Rules (the Rules) provides that the object of the Institution is “the advancement of the professions of engineering” by means that include representing the engineering professions, contributing to the development and recognition of good engineering practice, and contributing to meeting the needs of the community.11
[36] The Rules require the Institution’s board to prescribe Disciplinary Regulations and they set out the orders the Disciplinary Committee may make if it finds a member
11 Institution Rules March 2010, r 3.
to have acted in breach of r 4.12 Rule 4 identifies members’ ethical, competence and good character obligations.
[37] Relevant provisions in the Institution’s 2012 Disciplinary Regulations (the Disciplinary Regulations) include those that are set out below. In relation to the first four of them, the relevant regulation requires the Institution, the Investigating Committee or the Disciplinary Committee, as the case may be, to undertake the prescribed step “as soon as practicable”.
(a)Under cl 5, the Institution is to either refer a complaint of a certain type (which is not relevant here) directly to a Disciplinary Committee or investigate the complaint.
(b)Under cl 7, following an initial investigation, the Institution is to either dismiss the complaint or refer it to an Investigating Committee. A complaint may be dismissed under cl 8 at this stage in the process for a number of reasons. One of them, in cl 8(g), is that:
An investigation of the complaint is no longer practicable or desirable given the time elapsed since the matter giving rise to the complaint.
(c)Under cl 11, an Investigating Committee to which a complaint has been referred must determine whether or not to refer the complaint to a Disciplinary Committee or whether to dismiss it. If the complaint is to be dismissed, then the grounds set out in cl 8 are, again, to be used – which include cl 8(g) as mentioned above.
(d)Under cl 17, if a matter is referred to a Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Committee is to “hear the matter and decide whether or not there are grounds for disciplining the Member complained about under Rule 11 of the Institution”. If the Disciplinary Committee decides that there are no grounds for disciplining the member, then the Institution is to dismiss the complaint.
12 Rule 11. Orders that a Disciplinary Committee may make include expelling or suspending a member from membership, issuing a fine, reprimanding or admonishing the member, requiring the member to pay an amount towards costs and publication.
(e)Under cl 18, a Disciplinary Committee may receive any evidence it thinks fit.
(f)Under cl 19, before making a decision under cl 17, the Disciplinary Committee must “send details of the complaint” to the member, invite him or her to respond in writing, give the complainant and the member (and any other person alleged to be aggrieved) at least 28 days’ notice of the time and place for hearing and of the right for those persons to be heard, represented and present evidence.
[38] Clause 20 describes the way in which the Disciplinary Committee’s decision is to be made. It is central both to the Committee’s task itself and to aid an understanding on the part of members of what the Disciplinary Committee will be looking at. Two of the relevant provisions within the clause are these:
(c)As appropriate in considering a complaint in regard to an alleged breach of the ethical obligation, the Disciplinary Committee may evaluate the diligence in applying the Code of Ethics by the Member; the degree to which account was taken of each clause of the Code and the extent of explicit disregard of the Code;
(d)As appropriate in considering a complaint in regard to an alleged breach of the competence obligation the Disciplinary Committee may evaluate the actions of the Member having regard to the competence expected of Members holding the same membership class of the Institution as the Member complained of;
[39] Under cl 38 of the Disciplinary Regulations, everybody or person appointed under them is to observe the rules of natural justice.
The positions of the parties
[40]Dr Reay alleges that:
(a)The Disciplinary Committee has not provided him with adequate particulars of the complaint that is to be heard and, as a result, he is prejudiced unfairly in his ability to prepare for, and to respond to, the complaint at the hearing.
(b)There has been undue delay in the time that has been taken through the investigation process such that there can no longer be a fair hearing. It is said that it is no longer tenable for the Disciplinary Committee to hear the complaint.
[41] As mentioned earlier, judicial review is sought on the basis that these flaws are such as to amount to a breach of natural justice and a breach of s 27 of the NZBORA, to be procedurally unfair and to be an error of law under the Disciplinary Regulations which require the Disciplinary Committee to observe the rules of natural justice,13 to provide “details” of the complaint to Dr Reay14 and to take relevant steps “as soon as practicable”.15
[42] The position of the Institution is that it has provided Dr Reay with adequate “details” of the complaint, that Dr Reay is able to respond to the complaint and to participate in the hearing in a manner that is fair and satisfactory. It says that delays to this point have been unavoidable and have not in any event prejudiced Dr Reay.
Legal principles
Amenability of the Institution’s decisions to judicial review
[43] The relationship between an incorporated society and its members is founded largely in contract.16 However, a public dimension to the activities of many incorporated societies, such as the Institution here, may make them susceptible to judicial review.17 And, because an incorporated society’s rules will customarily incorporate express objectives and standards, the Court is able to adopt a purposive approach in giving effect to those objectives and standards.18
[44] While there is no doubt about the Court’s ability to entertain this proceeding, a note of caution is needed. The Court will not normally permit judicial review proceedings to be heard before a complaint process is complete, other than in
13 Clause 38(1)(b).
14 Clause 19(1)(a).
15 Clauses 5, 7, 11 and 17.
16 Hopper v North Shore Aero Club Inc [2007] NZAR 354 (CA) at [11].
17 Stratford Racing Club Inc v Adlam [2008] NZCA 92, [2008] NZAR 329 at [53]–[55].
18 Reay v Attorney-General, n 10, at [38] and Hopper v North Shore Aero Club Inc, above, n 16.
exceptional cases.19 It is generally in the public interest that disciplinary proceedings are dealt with promptly.20
[45] Exceptional cases in which judicial review may be appropriate before a disciplinary proceeding is complete may include cases in which there is a serious issue as to whether a charge is in order, where there has been non-compliance with statutory prerequisites (such as failing to conduct a hearing) or where there has been bad faith.21 Ms McDonald KC submits that this is one of those cases – that the lack of particulars and the delay are such that the case has miscarried in significant ways and can no longer properly be heard.
Grounds for review
[46] The heads of review pleaded by the plaintiff overlap. Essentially, they each provide a jurisdictional basis for the Court to intervene in a decision-making process if there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice. The principles require a decision-maker to inform a person sufficiently to allow his or her case to be made out and to entertain their case with an open mind. It is an opportunity to be heard fairly; to be able to make an appropriate presentation of one’s case.
[47] As relevant here, it will involve a decision-maker providing details of the allegations that are made against a person and the evidence in support.22 It will involve enabling a reasonable opportunity for those involved to express their views or make submissions23 and enabling a fair and appropriate hearing.24
[48] In discussing the level of detail that is to be provided of allegations, Elias J said, in Ali v Deportation Review Tribunal, that details of an allegation should be such
19 Orlov v New Zealand Law Society [2013] NZSC 94 at [6], citing Tannadyce Investments v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 158; [2012] 2 NZLR 153 at [5]–[6].
20 Deliu v National Standards Committee (No. 1) [2013] NZCA 76 at [14].
21 Deliu v The New Zealand Law Society [2015] NZCA 12 at [24]–[25] citing Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1 NZLR 513 at 539.
22 R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 (CA) at 108 and
Akaroa Marine Protection Society Inc v Minister of Conservation [2012] NZHC 933 at [65].
23 Diagnostic Medlab Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2007] 2 NZLR 832 (HC) at [290].
24 R v Taito [2003] 3 NZLR 577.
that the substance of the allegation is known so that there are no surprises.25 She put it this way:
If, therefore, there is no surprise in an allegation or if, even if there is surprise, there could be no prejudice because further notice would not have assisted the person affected to meet the allegation, then there is no unfairness in process.
[49] In a disciplinary setting, Randerson J held that disclosure was required of the “basic particulars” of the charges such that the plaintiff was “properly informed of the case he is to answer and so he may take appropriate steps to prepare any opposition” because “without them” the allegations are too general in nature and are likely to lead an unfocused and unfair hearing”.26
[50] “Fairness” is the outcome achieved through the application of the principles of natural justice to the extent necessary on any given set of facts. As was said in an early fairness case, fairness and natural justice are not different concepts. Rather, fairness terminology was adopted to prevent lawyers trying to “put those who hold inquiries into legal strait jackets”.27 As Graham Taylor has put it:28
The resulting pattern that emerges is that where the Court is concerned with procedural requirements, judges have not distinguished fairness from natural justice but have used “fairness” as a shorthand for the legally required level of process, or have simply used “fairness” as a substitute for “natural justice” to describe what process is required, or both together.
[51] Equally, the NZBORA enshrines the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice.29
[52] These principles are expressed in the Disciplinary Regulations through the requirement in cl 19 to “send details of the complaint” to the member.
25 Ali v Deportation Review Tribunal [1997] NZAR 208 at 220.
26 A v Council of the Auckland District Law Society [2005] 3 NZLR 552 (HC), at [95].
27 Maxwell v Department of Trade and Industry [1974] QB 523 (CA) at 539.
28 Graham Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2018) at 13.12, citing, amongst other authorities, Isak v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2010] NZAR 535.
29 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 27(a).
[53] In natural justice terms, delay in and of itself does not constitute a breach of natural justice. To be actionable, it must cause prejudice to the applicant.30 Moreover, a Court will consider the extent to which any such prejudice was self-created.31
[54] Timeliness is a feature of the regulations. As mentioned in [37], key steps in the disciplinary process are to be undertaken “as soon as practicable”.
[55] It is with these principles in mind that the Court proceeds to consider the allegations in this case.
The provision of particulars of the complaint
[56] In the Disciplinary Committee’s “Disciplinary Hearing Procedure” document of 17 March 2023, under the heading “Complaint”, the chair of the Disciplinary Committee identified to the complaint made in December 2012 which was referred to an Investigating Committee in 2019 and then, by the Investigating Committee, to the Disciplinary Committee on 9 May 2022. The full complaint, which is reproduced at
[13] above, was then set out in full.
[57] That was the full extent of the complaint documentation. There was nothing more. In many respects it could be said, therefore, that the requirement, in cl 19(a) of the Disciplinary Regulations, that the Disciplinary Committee is to “send details of the complaint … to the member” has been met. However, the submission for Dr Reay is that the Disciplinary Committee needed to provide further detail in order to comply with its natural justice obligations.32
[58] For Dr Reay it is said that the complaint does not specify how it is alleged that Dr Reay failed to meet his professional obligations, only that he failed to “adequately supervise Mr Harding”. It is said that the complaint simply cross-references the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s report which is seven volumes in length. It is said that more is needed:
30 Huia Resorts Ltd v Ashburton District Council [2005] NZRMA 449 (HC) at [18].
31 Puloutele v Minister of Immigration HC Wellington, CIV-2005-485-11, 21 September 2006 at 43; see also Butler v Removal Review Authority [1998] NZAR 409 (HC) at 430–431.
32 Used as a shorthand term here for the allegations under the natural justice, NZBORA, fairness and Disciplinary Regulations grounds.
(a)It is said, with reference to the Code of Ethics and Rules in force in 1986, that Dr Reay “remains in the dark as to what professional obligations it is alleged these rules imposed on him in terms of his oversight of Mr Harding” – given that the 1986 documents do not include an express supervision requirement.
(b)It is said that Dr Reay has repeatedly asked for particulars from the Institution and clarification from the Disciplinary Committee on the allegations that he is facing but that he still does not have them.
[59] Multiple items of correspondence on this point have been exchanged between Dr Reay’s solicitors, the Institution and the chair of the Disciplinary Committee. To take but one example, on 22 August 2022, Dr Reay’s solicitors wrote to the chair of the Disciplinary Committee saying, as had been expressed in earlier exchanges, that “Dr Reay is entitled to be provided with particulars of the ways in which it is alleged he has failed to adequately supervise Mr Harding”. It was said that details in the complaint itself were inadequate and that it is not possible for Dr Reay to brief witnesses, including experts, without having clear particulars of the supervision it is alleged he was required to provide in the circumstances.
[60] In a letter in response of 1 September 2022, the Disciplinary Committee chair referred to the fact that the Institution’s disciplinary process “is inquisitorial in nature, and so there are no formal charges to particularise”. The chair said that, in making its decision as to what constituted adequate supervision, the Disciplinary Committee will be informed by evidence of the supervision that was undertaken by Dr Reay and by evidence of the professional standards that applied at the time. It was said that the evidence may include material in the bundle of documents to be used for the hearing and any additional evidence presented to the Committee at the hearing. The chair said that the Committee considered it unnecessary to further particularise what may or may not constitute adequate supervision in advance of considering the evidence. The chair said that Dr Reay is able to provide evidence and make submissions on what supervision he did provide, why he considered it to be adequate and why he did not agree with the evidence provided in the bundle.
[61] Ongoing exchanges between the parties have not altered their respective positions.
[62] Dr Reay maintains the position that a lack of particulars has prejudiced unfairly his ability to respond to the complaint on the basis that:
(a)He is not able to properly assess which documents are relevant to the supervision complaint;
(b)He is not able to assess properly the issues arising for determination on the complaints; and
(c)He is not able to assess properly the evidence he might brief to present to the Disciplinary Committee.
Discussion
[63] I consider this head of claim from three perspectives. First, I look at the ways in which the issues for consideration by the Disciplinary Committee are framed by the terms of the complaint and by the Code of Ethics alongside the relevant legal tests. I consider whether or not that framework provides a fair basis for Dr Reay to prepare for and present his case at the Disciplinary Committee hearing. Secondly, I consider the information provided to Dr Reay throughout the disciplinary process and, most recently, by the Disciplinary Committee. And, thirdly, I consider submissions that Dr Reay has been able to make already to the Institution and to the Investigating Committee to get a sense of the level of his present understanding of the complaint the Disciplinary Committee is to consider.
The complaint, the ethical standards and the legal tests
[64]The complaint is set out in full in [13] above. It alleges:
· Dr Reay’s company provided the structural design for the CTV Building.
· The Royal Commission of Inquiry found the structural design of the building to be seriously deficient in multiple ways.
· Mr Harding, Dr Reay’s employee, performed the design work.
· Mr Harding lacked the necessary experience to design buildings of this type.
· Dr Reay knew this but failed to adequately supervise Mr Harding.
[65] Clauses 1 and 8 of the 1986 Code of Ethics – reproduced at [30] above – required, in 1986, members to exercise their professional and technical skills and judgment to the best of their ability and to discharge their professional and technical responsibilities with integrity. They required engineers to recognise responsibilities to those associated with their work and in the public interest.
[66] While it is correct that the 1986 Code did not refer directly to supervision as the 1996 Code did, it is in my view implicit in the words of the provisions. A member operating a business that employs other engineers will, if they are to act professionally and with integrity, and if they are to recognise their responsibilities in the public interest and to their profession, supervise those employees.
[67] The 2016 Code does not refer expressly to supervision in a broad sense either but, again, it is implicit in the provision that I mention in [32] above.
[68] Alongside cls 1 and 8 of the Code of Ethics, r 18.2 of the 1986 Rules describes the standard against which the Disciplinary Committee will measure Dr Reay’s conduct. Under that rule, members are to conduct themselves as to uphold the dignity, standing and reputation of the Institution and the profession with due regard to the public interest, especially in matters of health and safety. Equally importantly under that rule, each member is to exercise professional or technical skill and judgment “at least according to the normally accepted standards of the profession and to the best of his ability”.
[69] Describing professional standards at a high level of generality is orthodox. What is acceptable professional practice, in disciplinary proceedings, is typically to be determined by considering the judgment of the practitioner’s peers. As Elias J said in B v Medical Council:33
The structure of the disciplinary processes set up by the Act, which rely in large part upon judgment by a practitioner’s peers, emphasises that the best guide to what is acceptable professional conduct is the standards applied by competent, ethical and responsible practitioners.
[70] In a similar sense, in Williams v Professional Conduct Committee of the Medical Council, it was said that “whether or not there has been a breach of the appropriate [professional] standards is measured against the standards of a reasonable body of the practitioner’s peers”.34
[71] Accordingly, it is for the Disciplinary Committee to determine, based upon evidence of the nature of Dr Reay’s practice in 1986, whether his peers would regard that conduct as being in line with generally accepted standards of the profession at the time in accordance with r 18.2 and the relevant provisions in the Code of Ethics. I do not see there to be any procedural flaw in that approach.
[72] Moreover, the Disciplinary Committee’s process is, as it has said in correspondence with Dr Reay, investigative. Unlike the position with many other professional disciplinary tribunals, a case is not prosecuted as such by the equivalent of the Investigating Committee. Rather, as is set out in the disciplinary hearing procedure document, evidence will be filed, first, by the Disciplinary Committee itself, then by the complainant, then by witnesses for the CTV families group and then by the respondent. In this way, information is received by the Committee on an iterative basis. It is apparent that considerable further detail is yet to come.
33 B v Medical Council of New Zealand [2005] 3 NZLR 810 at 810–811 — where the standard being considered was “conduct unbecoming”.
34 Williams v Professional Conduct Committee of the Medical Council [2018] NZHC 2472 – and cited in XY v Professional Conduct Committee of the Medical Council of New Zealand [2022] NZHC 1498 at [29].
Information that has been provided to Dr Reay
[73] Secondly, I turn to consider the information that has been provided to Dr Reay during the disciplinary process. The report of the Institution’s Complaints Research Officer of 3 April 2013 identified 36 listed documents that were taken into account, drew conclusions and made recommendations. The report includes a bundle of documents considered by the Investigating Committee. Documents in the bundle include material relating to the standard of supervision in practice at the time. One of them is a report from Beca Ltd.35 The Beca report included interviews with engineers who provided their expert view on accepted practice for supervision in 1986.36
[74] Dr Reay received the Investigating Committee’s report of 9 May 2022 which, amongst other things, described Dr Reay and Mr Harding’s relative experience in 1986, the relevant factual background, the reports received since the building’s collapse (including on factors that contributed to it), the report of the Canterbury Earthquake’s Royal Commission of Inquiry and Dr Reay’s evidence to the inquiry. It discussed what, in the view of its authors, a reasonable member of the Institution would have been expected to do, in terms of supervision, in 1986 and determined that the matter should be reviewed by the Disciplinary Committee.
[75] The Disciplinary Committee, through its chair, has engaged in a number of exchanges with Dr Reay’s solicitors. In particular, on 7 March 2023, the chair provided a document outlining its disciplinary hearing procedure, mentioned in [21] above. After dealing with procedural and timetabling matters, it referred to the hearing process, which is to include a presentation of the Investigating Committee’s report. The hearing procedure document was followed, on 28 March 2023, with correspondence to Dr Reay that provided a bundle of key documents, as presented to the Investigating Committee and to be considered by the Disciplinary Committee. While the bundle itself was relatively extensive, certain key documents were identified as the documents that the Investigating Committee had been provided with in the first instance, indicating their particular relevance.
35 The Beca Ltd report was prepared for the Police investigation.
36 It is understood that Dr Reay received a version of the Beca report with the names of five of those engineers unredacted.
[76] In May 2023, Dr Reay was provided with an affidavit from a consultant engineer which gives evidence on standards of practice that applied in 1986.
[77] The information that has been provided to Dr Reay is extensive and in my view is such as to satisfy the Disciplinary Committee’s natural justice obligation to provide details of all of the relevant matters it is likely to take into account in considering the decision it is required to make.
Information that has been provided by Dr Reay
[78] Thirdly, it seems sufficiently clear to me that Dr Reay has felt able to provide substantive responses to the supervision complaint on previous occasions. On 8 March 2013, in a letter from his solicitors to the Institution, Dr Reay referred to the specific elements of the complaint, made arguments to the effect that the provisions of the 1986 Code of Ethics were too broad to give rise to supervisory requirements, made arguments as to why the design of the CTV Building was not flawed, made arguments about Mr Harding having the necessary experience to design the building and made arguments as to why in his view he did not fail to supervise Mr Harding adequately, all things considered.
[79] Dr Reay provided two affidavits in August 2013. The first was from Mr Ramsay, a practising engineer in 1986. In his affidavit, Mr Ramsay said that there was no standard practice for supervision at that time, that engineers registered with the Institution, like Mr Harding, were at a standard at which they could be expected to work independently and that they were expected to self-regulate and ask for guidance if they needed it or if they lacked the necessary knowledge or skill.
[80] The second affidavit was from Mr Coates, a fellow of the Institution in 1986 and who later became its president. Mr Coates gave evidence of his involvement in the mid-1990s in updating the Institution’s ethical framework. He gave evidence that the Code of Ethics, as it applied in 1986, had “serious deficiencies” and that it did not have an explicit supervision requirement which was why, Mr Coates explained, an explicit supervision guideline was added in 1996.
[81] On 14 August 2023, Dr Reay’s counsel, Mr Palmer, appeared on his behalf before the first Investigating Committee and made detailed submissions with reference to a bundle of documents which included the affidavits from Mr Ramsay and Mr Coates.
[82] In Dr Reay’s submissions to the Investigating Committee of 31 August 2020, he identified each aspect of the complaint (while expressing concerns about their imprecision), expressed his concerns again about the scope of the 1986 Code of Ethics, submitted how standard practice at the time was not to directly supervise an engineer of Mr Harding’s seniority unless the engineer asked for help, and referred to Mr Ramsay’s affidavit. He argued that, other than evidence from Mr Ramsay, there was no direct evidence of supervision standards. He argued that Mr Harding was sufficiently senior so as not to need supervision and that he was adequately supervised given the circumstances existing at the time. He argued that Mr Harding would reasonably have been expected to identify any shortcomings in his capability to Dr Reay. He referred to and repeated the submissions made in August 2023 to the first Investigating Committee and to the bundle of documents used for that hearing.
[83] For these reasons, I find that the terms of the complaint and the content of the supporting information provided to Dr Reay to be sufficient such as to comply with the Institution’s obligations of natural justice (viewed through the NZBORA or otherwise) and procedural fairness.
[84] The same conclusion can be drawn when considering the issues in terms of the Rules and the Disciplinary Regulations. It has been argued for Dr Reay that more information is required at the Disciplinary Committee stage because the Disciplinary Regulations require the “general nature” of a complaint to be provided at the Investigating Committee stage,37 while they require “details” to be provided at the disciplinary stage.38 However, the complaint concerns a single issue that has been particularised adequately at both the Investigating Committee and Disciplinary Committee stages, regardless of whether the information provided is described as the “general nature”, or as “details” of the complaint. Accordingly, I do not see there to
37 Disciplinary Regulations, cl 5(2).
38 Clause 19.
be an error of law through a breach of the Rules and the Disciplinary Regulations or that the way in which they have been applied would otherwise amount to a breach of natural justice or to a procedural flaw.
Has there been undue delay in the disciplinary process?
[85] It is said for Dr Reay that the delay in this case has been extraordinary, both in terms of MBIE’s decision to lay the complaint and the Institution’s consideration of it. It is said that the delay has caused unfair prejudice to Dr Reay such that he is not able to adequately respond to and contradict the allegations that are made against him. It is said, given that Dr Reay has long since retired as a structural engineer and is no longer a member of the Institution, no practical purpose will be served by now pursuing the disciplinary proceedings.
[86] Ms McDonald refers to the Disciplinary Regulations which, as observed in [37], require relevant steps in the disciplinary process to be taken “as soon as practicable”. A number of periods of alleged delay are referred to. Salient among them are these:
(a)The Investigating Committee’s decision was not made until over two and a half years after the Institution recommenced the investigation (following the High Court and Court of Appeal decisions).
(b)The Investigating Committee’s report came nine and a half years after the complaint was made.
(c)Nearly 40 years have passed since the alleged conduct giving rise to the complaint that is said to have occurred.
(d)The Disciplinary Committee did not issue the hearing procedure document until eight months after the complaint was referred to it.
[87] It is said that the delays have caused particular prejudice to Dr Reay in the following ways:
(a)He has not been able to find a contemporaneous document (aside from the Code of Ethics) that sets out what the supervision standards were in 1986.
(b)Potential witnesses who might have given helpful information about the issues raised in the complaint died before the complaint was laid and others have died since – including witnesses who had been contacted by Dr Reay previously and had been prepared to give evidence.
(c)Other witnesses who were once able to give evidence are no longer able to do so due to health or other reasons.
[88] It is said that there is no public interest now in determining the complaint. Reference is made to the underlying principle that disciplinary proceedings are not punitive in nature but are, essentially, protective of societal interests such that public interest considerations are important.39 It is said that the process is futile and that there is now nothing to be gained. The point is made that the complainant is not the CTV families, but MBIE which did not, itself, suffer any harm from Dr Reay’s alleged conduct. Any public good that could arise through the disciplinary proceeding has, it is said, already been addressed now through changes to engineering standards which include express obligations about supervision of employees.
[89] Ms McDonald observes that Dr Reay has had to deal with the complaints process for nearly 11 years now which has taken considerable time and caused considerable expense. Dr Reay is now an elderly man with failing health. In evidence provided in the case, Dr Reay’s general practitioner has expressed concerns about Dr Reay’s ability to deal with the complaints process, both physically and mentally.
[90] The Institution says the passage of time does not in itself create a presumption of an unfair process. Prejudice needs to be considered as does, it is said, the extent to which Dr Reay may have contributed to the delay.
39 Chow v Canterbury Law Society [2006] NZAR 160 (CA) at [35].
[91] Delay, it is said, is a factor that has been raised by Dr Reay in the Investigating Committee and was taken into account by the Committee in making its decision. The Institution says that the impact if any of delay and prejudice are now properly matters for the Disciplinary Committee. It is said that delays in the disciplinary process to date have been the result, at least in part, of Dr Reay’s own actions and that any delays in the current disciplinary proceedings have been limited and explained in correspondence.
Discussion
[92] Dr Reay’s concern about delays was a factor that was stressed in submissions made for him in the High Court proceeding to which the High Court decision related. As in this case, factors that were emphasised included the delay that had occurred to that point in time, the impact of the delay on the evidence that Dr Reay would be able to bring and Dr Reay’s age. In response, Collins J said:40
In my judgement, the factor that is overwhelmingly in favour of granting the relief sought by the Attorney-General is the public interest in allowing the Institution to determine whether or not it wishes to proceed with Mr Stannard’s complaint against Dr Reay. Whilst it would not be possible to expel or suspend Dr Reay from the Institution, that is not determinative. There may be valuable lessons to be learnt from an assessment of Dr Reay’s professional responsibilities in relation to the collapse of the CTV Building that can only be resolved through a disciplinary process. That is a factor, however, for the Institution to consider. This judgment is not a direction that the disciplinary proceeding against Dr Reay must continue.
[93] Much the same points were raised by Dr Reay in his appeal from the High Court’s decision. The Court of Appeal accepted the Attorney-General’s submissions on the point and concluded:41
Delay is not in itself a reason to deny relief and we are not persuaded on the information before us that Dr Reay will suffer material prejudice from it. He has been aware of the collapse since 2011 and the complaints since 2012.
[94] Although four years have passed since the Court of Appeal’s decision, I do not see the pendulum – which swings between the public interest in allowing the
40 Attorney-General v Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand Inc, above n 9, at [121].
41 Reay v Attorney-General, above n 10 at [57].
disciplinary proceeding to continue, on the one hand, and prejudice to Dr Reay on the other – to have moved to such an extent as to warrant intervention from the Court.
[95] It is certainly the case that further time has elapsed. However, that has not prejudiced Dr Reay’s ability to respond to the complaint. Substantive responses have already been provided by Dr Reay, on 8 March 2013 and 31 August 2020 (including through the provision of affidavit evidence), as observed already. Further submissions were provided in March 2022.42 Dr Reay has demonstrated through these documents that he is in a position to be able to provide substantive responses on the complaint. Dr Reay has, in addition, said in his evidence in this proceeding that he has engaged with a person who has knowledge of structural engineering supervision practices in Christchurch in the 1980s who is alive and available to assist with the Disciplinary Committee hearing.
[96] Delay is not a factor that should prevent the hearing from proceeding but it is a factor that can be advanced by Dr Reay during the hearing.
[97] For Dr Reay it is said that the Disciplinary Committee has no express power to take delay into account. Reference is made to provisions in the Disciplinary Regulations which enable both the Institution and the Investigating Committee to dismiss a complaint if “an investigation of the complaint is no longer practicable or desirable given the time elapsed since the matter giving rise to the complaint”.43 It is said that no such power is given to the Disciplinary Committee.
[98] However, under cl 17, the Disciplinary Committee is to hear the matter and “decide whether or not there are grounds for disciplining the Member complained about under Rule 11 of the Institution”.44 Equally, the Regulations provide that, if the Disciplining Committee decides that there are no grounds for disciplining the member under r 11 then the Institution must dismiss the complaint.
42 The submissions, which were made to the Investigating Committee, dealt primarily with procedural matters – including the delay issue – but were an opportunity for any relevant matters to be addressed.
43 Disciplinary Regulations, cls 7(b), 8(g) and 11(b).
44 Disciplinary Regulations, cl 17.
[99] These are broad discretions that relate not just to the Disciplinary Committee’s ability to decide whether or not professional and ethical standards have been breached but whether an order under r 11.5 should be made. One of the reasons that a disciplinary body may decline to make a substantive order at the end of the day is delay.
[100] Furthermore, at a more fundamental level, the Disciplinary Committee has the ability to find that it is not satisfied about particular facts if the quality of the evidence is impacted by delay. From whichever angle it is approached, delay is a factor that will feature in the Disciplinary Committee’s work.
[101] Accordingly, the disciplinary process is able to, and should, see itself through. As discussed in [44] above, the Court would not normally permit judicial review proceedings to be heard before a complaint process is complete, other than in exceptional cases. For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that in this case it continues to be in the public interest to enable the Disciplinary Committee to consider the complaints substantively.
[102] For these reasons, I do not see the periods of time that have elapsed since 1986 (when the alleged issues arose), since the complaint was made in 2012, since the first or second Investigating Committees began their work, since the second Investigating Committee released its decision or since the Disciplinary Committee began its work, enable the cause of action under this head to be made out. I do not see the periods of time as causing sufficient prejudice as to amount to – or to otherwise give rise to:
(a)a breach of natural justice, including through s27 of the NZBORA or cl 38 of the Disciplinary Regulations;
(b)an error of law in the form of a breach of the Disciplinary Regulations referred to in [37] above which require prescribed steps in the disciplinary process to be undertaken “as soon as practicable”; or
(c)procedural unfairness of any other kind.
[103] As Elias J said in B v Medical Council, “[T]he disciplinary process in part is one of setting standards”.45 Even although there have been changes to the wording of the Institution’s Code of Ethics over the years, the setting of standards for the profession and for the public lies at the heart of these proceedings and, whatever the outcome may ultimately be, I do not see there to be grounds that are sufficient to prevent an outcome from being reached fairly.
Result
[104]Accordingly, the application for judicial review is declined.
[105] If costs are sought and cannot be resolved between the parties, then the applicant may, within 15 working days from the date of this decision, file a memorandum and the respondent may, within a further 15 working days, file a memorandum in response. Any such memoranda, including schedules, should be limited to five pages in length.
Radich J
Solicitors:
Buddle Findlay, Christchurch for Applicant
Dentons Kensington Swan, Wellington for Respondent
45 B v Medical Council, above n 33 at 811.
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