IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV 2010-404-2868 [2014] NZHC 1766
BETWEEN EVGENY ORLOV Plaintiff AND
NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY First Respondent
AUCKLAND LAWYERS STANDARDS COMMITTEE (APPOINTED UNDER SECTION 356 OF LAWYERS AND CONVEYANCERS ACT 2006)
Second Respondent
AUCKLAND LAWYERS STANDARDS COMMITTEE NO. 1
Third Respondent
CIV 2010-404-5778 BETWEEN
EVGENY ORLOV Plaintiff
AND
NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY AND OTHERS
Respondents
Hearing: (on the papers) Counsel:
E Orlov, in person, Plaintiff
P J Morgan QC, for New Zealand Law Society and OthersJudgment:
29 July 2014
JUDGMENT (NO. 9) OF HEATH J
This judgment was delivered by me on 29 July 2014 at 2.00pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the
High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
EVGENY ORLOV v NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2014] NZHC 1766 [29 July 2014]
The application
[1] Mr Orlov applies for an extension of time to file a notice of opposition and affidavits in opposition to claims for costs made by the New Zealand Law Society and Standards Committees appointed under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Law Society interests), in respect of a determined judicial review application. He seeks a similar order in respect of an application by the Law Society interests for security for costs, in relation to parts of the proceeding that were severed from the
judicial review application and which are yet to be heard.1 In respect of each, there
is also an implicit application to adjourn.2
Background
[2] In February and March 2012, I heard an application for judicial review brought by Mr Orlov against the Law Society interests. Mr Orlov contended that decisions made by Standard Committees to refer a total of 24 charges to the New Zealand Lawyers’ and Conveyancers’ Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) for determination should be quashed. In a judgment given on 24 August 2012, while finding in favour of Mr Orlov on some issues (which I held did not meet an implicit threshold test), the application for judicial review failed in relation to a significant
number of charges.3
[3] On 14 June 2013, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Orlov’s appeal against my decision, but allowed a cross appeal by the Law Society interests. In allowing the cross appeal, the Court of Appeal took the view that there was no “threshold” test of the type I had applied, meaning that all charges should go to the Tribunal.4 Mr Orlov sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the “threshold” issue, but, on
8 October 2013, that application was refused.5 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did
leave open the possibility that the issue could be reconsidered, if any appeal were to be brought following any adverse determination of the disciplinary proceeding.6
1 See para [5] below.
2 See para [10] below.
3 Orlov v New Zealand Law Society [2013] 1 NZLR 390 (HC).
4 Orlov v New Zealand Law Society [2013] 3 NZLR 562 (CA).
5 Orlov v New Zealand Law Society [2013] NZSC 94.
6 Ibid, at para [7].
[4] Subsequently, a…
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- Case
- [2014] NZHC 1766
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The issues before the court were whether to grant the extension of time, whether to disqualify the judge from hearing the matter, and whether the "bad faith" issue had been dealt with. The court considered the nature of the judge's relationship with counsel for the Law Society interests and whether it was sufficient to require recusal. The court also considered whether it had already determined the "bad faith" issue. The court concluded that the judge's relationship with counsel was not sufficient to require recusal and that the "bad faith" issue had already been determined. The court granted the extension of time and fixed the hearing of the two applications for 25 August 2014. The court declined to disqualify itself from hearing the two applications for hearing on 25 August 2014 and the remaining Bill of Rights and malicious prosecution proceedings. The court also stated that it had already dealt with the "bad faith" issue. The court reserved all questions of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi