O'Neill v Judicial Conduct Commissioner

[2025] NZHC 972

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2025-485-181

[2025] NZHC 972

UNDER

the Constitution of New Zealand,

the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016

BETWEEN

CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH O’NEILL

Applicant

AND

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER

First Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Second Respondent

DAVID PARKER

Third Respondent

CIV-2025-485-182

BETWEEN

CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH O’NEILL
Applicant

AND

PRIVACY COMMISSIONER

First Respondent

DEPUTY PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
Second Respondent

X
Third Respondent

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE
Fourth Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Fifth Respondent

THE PRIVACY COMMISSION

Sixth Respondent

O’NEILL v JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER & ORS AND O’NEILL v PRIVACY COMMISSIONER & ORS [2025] NZHC 972 [28 April 2025]

Hearing:	On the Papers
Counsel:	Applicant in Person
Judgment:	28 April 2025

JUDGMENT OF McQUEEN J

[1]    On 27 March 2025, Mr O’Neill filed two proceedings, naming several respondents in each proceeding. A Registrar has referred the proceedings to me under r 5.35A of the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules) on the basis of a belief that, on the face of the proceedings, they are plainly an abuse of the process of the Court.1 The two proceedings are conveniently dealt with together as they raise overlapping matters.

[2]    The documents filed by Mr O’Neill are confused. He combines material described as statements of claim, submissions, a list of issues for the Court, notices of proceeding, case management memoranda and some letters from third parties. The statements of claim are brief and do not comply with the formal requirements of the Rules, including failing to show adequately the nature of the claims or inform the Court or the respondents as to the causes of action. Nonetheless, in considering the proceedings in terms  of  the  referrals  under  r 5.35A,  I  have  taken  account  of  Mr O’Neill’s accompanying materials, which purport to explain the basis for his claims.

The first application for judicial review

[3]    The statement of claim in CIV-2025-485-181 (the –181 proceeding) names as respondents  the  Judicial  Conduct  Commissioner,  the   Attorney-General   and   Mr David Parker, a Member of Parliament.

[4]    Mr O’Neill says he has made several complaints about court staff with the heads of bench of the Court responsible for the relevant staff based on what he

1      There is an extensive history of proceedings commenced by Mr O’Neill having been struck out. See, for example, O’Neill  v  Privacy  Commissioner  [2024]  NZHC  3731  at  [7]  citing  O’Neill v Privacy Commissioner [2024] NZHC 1523 at [6]–[11]. See also O’Neill v MacPherson [2025] NZHC 306; and O’Neill v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2025] NZHC 319.

describes as the ruling that “the Secretary of Justice had no mandate, that all lay with the Judiciary”.2 It seems that Mr O’Neill was not satisfied with the outcome of his complaints about court staff (these outcomes appear to be judgments or minutes following review of Registrars’ decisions and r 5.35A referrals) and so has filed complaints against the Judges involved to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner.

[5]    Mr O’Neill has provided a letter from the Judicial Conduct Commissioner to him dated 5 March 2025. The letter explains the outcome of eight complaints against Judges, namely that they were either dismissed or no further action was being taken to investigate the complaints. It appears from the Commissioner’s letter that there was a delay in delivery (by surface mail) of Mr O’Neill’s correspondence relating to these complaints. Seemingly in response to that letter, Mr O’Neill now says that the mail was withheld for 161 days by New Zealand Post (NZ Post) so that a Judge could escape prosecution for criminal activity.3 Mr O’Neill says the Commissioner also incorrectly “claims he cannot act regarding Judges who do not address complaints to them re court staff”.

[6]    Mr O’Neill says that the actions of the Judges and the Judicial Conduct Commissioner illustrate that court staff can act in a criminal manner on the instructions of a judge or the Attorney-General and escape investigation or prosecution, thus resulting in a “‘menage a trois’ of corruption”. Mr O’Neill further asserts the Judicial Conduct Commissioner lies constantly to the public and perverts the course of justice, while the Attorney-General does nothing about it. No allegations are made in relation to Mr Parker.

[7]    Mr O’Neill seeks a “judicial ruling re the validity and legal correctness of various decisions and actions of the respondents”.

2      See O’Neill v Bridgman [2019] NZHC 944; O’Neill v Bridgman [2020] NZCA 460; and

O’Neill v Bridgman [2020] NZSC 148.

3      A further proceeding filed by Mr O’Neill alleging a delay by New Zealand Post of his delivery of correspondence to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner has recently been struck out under r 5.35B of the High Court Rules 2016: O’Neill v Walsh [2025] NZHC 956.

The second application for judicial review

[8]    The statement of claim in CIV-2025-485-182 (the –182 proceeding) names as respondents the Privacy Commissioner, the Deputy Privacy Commissioner, a person unknown (X), the Minister for Justice, the Attorney-General and “the entirety of the Privacy Commission”.

[9]    This claim also appears to attack NZ Post for the asserted 161-day delay in delivering Mr O’Neill’s letter containing complaints about certain Judges to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner. Mr O’Neill says the actions of all the respondents assisted “a corrupt judge, one so corrupt that he had to be criminally assisted to do a runner”.

[10]   Mr O’Neill also says he made a request under the Privacy Act 2020 to NZ Post asking how his mail containing legal documents can disappear for 161 days, but that request was ignored. It appears Mr O’Neill then made a complaint to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) about NZ Post’s failure to reply to him. On 11 March 2025, in a letter signed only with “X”, the OPC notified Mr O’Neill that it was not able to open an investigation without evidence that an interference with privacy had occurred. The OPC indicated that as it had explained this previously to Mr O’Neill it would now take steps under its Managing Unreasonable Conduct policy. The OPC stated that due to Mr O’Neill repeatedly refusing to comply with reasonable requests for information and the disproportionate effect on their limited resources, it would not respond to any further correspondence from him that does not raise issues which can be addressed under the Privacy Act.

[11]   Mr O’Neill says the OPC was required to respond within 20 working days to his request and has failed to do so. Mr O’Neill also claims that only proof of a request to NZ Post is required, which he says he provided to the OPC. He takes further issue with the fact that the person signing off the letter from the OPC used the initial X as he says this shows they are hiding from challenge which is contrary to the law.

[12]   Again, Mr O’Neill seeks a “judicial ruling re the validity and legal correctness of various decisions and actions of the respondents”.

Relevant law

[13]   If I consider that the statement of claim does plainly amount to an abuse of process, under r 5.35B of the Rules, I may make orders or give directions to ensure the proceeding is disposed of or proceeds in a manner that complies with the Rules, including striking out or staying the proceeding under r 15.1 of the Rules.

[14]   In Mathiesen v Slevin this Court explained that deciding whether to strike out a proceeding under these rules involved determining the following questions:4

(a)Whether it would be manifestly unfair to the respondents that they be required to respond; and

(b)Whether right thinking people would regard this Court as exercising very poor control of its processes if it were to allow the applicants’ document to be regarded as a proper document.

[15]   In O’Neill v Judicial Conduct Commissioner, the Court of Appeal reworded the second limb slightly to ask whether right thinking people would regard the Court as exercising very poor control over its processes if it permitted the matter to proceed further.5 That was because the expression of the second limb in Mathiesen was inapt in a case not focused on obvious irregularities on the face of a document.

[16]   The power under r 5.35B must be exercised sparingly, and only in the clearest of cases, given that the rule contemplates a litigant being denied the fundamental right of access to the courts, with the possibility of the proceeding being halted before it is even served.6

Discussion

[17]   Having considered the documents filed by Mr O’Neill, I am satisfied both proceedings are plainly an abuse of process.

4      Mathiesen v Slevin [2018] NZHC 1032, (2018) 25 PRNZ 116 at [6] citing Mathiesen v Fildes

[2017] NZHC 2258 at [4].

5      O’Neill v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2023] NZCA 152 at [30].

6      Te Wakaminenga o Nga Hapu ki Waitangi v Waitangi National Trust Board [2023] NZCA 63 at [15].

[18]   At best, it appears there are two central challenges raised in the –181 proceeding. First, the length of time it took the Judicial Conduct Commissioner to deal with Mr O’Neill’s complaint. Under s 14(4) of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004 (JCCJCP Act), the Commissioner is required to deal with a complaint as soon as practicable after receiving it. Further (and leaving aside the improper allegations of criminal or corrupt conduct for which there is no factual basis pleaded) judicial review is available in principle in relation to the decisions of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner.7

[19]   There is no basis for suggesting the Judicial Conduct Commissioner did not deal with Mr O’Neill’s complaint as soon as practicable after receipt of it. The letter from the Judicial Conduct Commissioner, provided by Mr O’Neill, demonstrates that within several weeks of receipt of his letter, the Commissioner replied to Mr O’Neill about his complaints. The Commissioner is not responsible for delays in delivery of mail. These facts disclose no reasonably arguable cause of action. Further, Mr O’Neill suggests that the purpose of such a delay was to circumvent the need to investigate the former president of the Court of Appeal, who is now retired. It appears Mr O’Neill has formed the view that because he filed a complaint against the former president, the Judge retired to avoid being investigated by the  Judicial Conduct Commissioner.  Mr O’Neill pleads no factual grounds for this allegation, which asserts corrupt or otherwise criminal behaviour. Such a claim is improper and an abuse of process.

[20]   Second, Mr O’Neill challenges the position taken by the Judicial Conduct Commissioner that the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction to address complaints about court staff. It appears Mr O’Neill is unhappy with the conduct or decisions of court staff and has already challenged those decisions through the courts. Mr O’Neill is not satisfied with the outcome of those decisions and has therefore complained to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner about the Judges who have made those decisions. Mr O’Neill is ultimately challenging the decisions of the Judges in his complaints. The Judicial Conduct Commissioner may not deal with such complaints, given 8(2) of the JCCJCP Act, which provides:

7      See for example Aitken v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2025] NZHC 190; Bradbury v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2014] NZCA 441, [2015] NZAR 1 at [43]–[52]; and Wilson v Attorney General [2011] 1 NZLR 399 (HC) at [25]–[52].

It is not a function of the Commissioner to challenge or call into question the legality or correctness of any instruction, direction, order, judgment, or other decision given or made by a Judge in relation to any legal proceedings.

[21]   The Judicial Conduct Commissioner was therefore correct to refuse to investigate the complaints that directly challenge the Judges’ decisions. To advance such challenges again here, under the guise of judicial review, would amount to an abuse of process.

[22]   In addition, Mr O’Neill does not plead any valid cause of action nor relief available in judicial review.

[23]   As for the statement of claim in the –182 proceeding, while Mr O’Neill mentions in his submissions that he considers the OPC has refused to investigate his complaint about NZ Post not answering his letters, there is no pleading of this in the statement of claim. Thus, the pleading does not disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action against the Privacy Commissioner, the Deputy Privacy Commissioner, a person unknown (X), or “the entirety of the Privacy Commission” and is therefore an abuse of process.

[24]   In any event, I observe that the Privacy Commissioner has a discretion to decide not to investigate a complaint under s 74 of the Privacy Act. The OPC’s letter to Mr O’Neill explained that Mr O’Neill did not provide any evidence that an interference with privacy has occurred. Evidence would include, as indicated by the OPC, a copy of a request and follow up letters, a copy of the response from the agency, details of what the request was for, plus any reference number given to him by the agency. The OPC records that the information provided by Mr O’Neill is not sufficient to take any action on his concerns. It is apparent that in accordance with s 74(2), the Privacy Commissioner has decided not to investigate the complaint as, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, an investigation is unnecessary.

[25]   Nor are there any specific allegations against the Minister for Justice or the Attorney-General. All that is pleaded is they “had a hand” in “this vile corruption” which seems to relate to the alleged withholding of mail from the Judicial Conduct

Commissioner, as raised in the –181 proceeding. No reasonably arguable cause of action is pleaded.

[26]   Further, Mr O’Neill does not plead any valid cause of action nor relief available in judicial review.

[27]I am satisfied that the claims asserted in the –181 proceeding and the

–182 proceeding are repetitious, both of each other, and of the claim already struck out in O’Neill v Walsh.8 These claims are therefore fairly regarded as vexatious.

[28]   For all these reasons, I conclude that the statements of claim in both proceedings are an abuse of process of the Court.

[29]   It would be manifestly unfair to require the respondents in either proceeding to respond to these claims through court processes. In addition, if these proceedings were to be allowed to continue, right thinking people would regard the Court as exercising very poor control over its processes.

Result

[30]The pleadings are struck out and the proceedings are dismissed.

[31]   I record that Mr O’Neill has a right to appeal this decision in accordance with r 5.35B(3).

[32]   I direct the Registrar to provide a copy of this decision to the respondents, if practicable, in accordance with r 5.35B(4).

McQueen J

8      O’Neill v Walsh, above n 3.