O'Neill v Bridgman
[2019] NZHC 944
•1 May 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2018-485-502
[2019] NZHC 944
BETWEEN CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH O’NEILL
Applicant
AND
ANDREW BRIDGMAN
First Respondent
TANIA OTT
Second RespondentCARL CRAFAR
Third Respondent
Hearing: 21 March 2019 Counsel:
Applicant in Person (via AVL from Auckland) A F Todd and J B Watson for Respondents
Judgment:
1 May 2019
JUDGMENT OF THOMAS J
Introduction
[1] Christopher O’Neill can fairly be described as a serial litigant. Representing himself, he has been involved in numerous proceedings in a range of judicial bodies, including the Human Rights Tribunal, Disputes Tribunal, District Court, High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.1
1 In Attorney-General v O’Neill [2008] NZAR 93 (HC) [Vexatious litigant decision] the Court noted, at [96], that, as of late 2007, “Mr O’Neill’s cases equated to approximately 57 per cent of the Human Rights Review Tribunal’s then live active case load”. See also: O’Neill v The Privacy Commissioner HC Auckland CIV-2007-404-007412, 15 May 2008; O’Neill v Accident Compensation Corporation HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-8482, 25 June 2009; O’Neill v Accident Compensation Corporation HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-8482, 14 December 2009; O’Neill v Accident Compensation Corporation HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-8482, 31 March 2010; O’Neill
O’NEILL v BRIDGMAN [2019] NZHC 944 [1 May 2019]
[2] Mr O’Neill is the subject of a vexatious litigant order in the Human Rights Tribunal.2
[3] At issue in this decision is whether Mr O’Neill’s application for judicial review against the former Secretary for Justice and two senior civil servants should be struck out. Mr O’Neill alleges the respondents have failed in their duty to implement the Ministry of Justice disciplinary process policy against various Ministry employees, primarily registrars, in the High Court. He alleges the three respondents have conspired to pervert the course of justice as a result.
Background
[4] The statement of claim in this proceeding is two and a quarter pages long and provides as follows:
Statement of claim.
That – first respondent, Andrew Bridgman, failed to fulfil his duty, and legal obligations as secretary for justice, and chief executive
That – as a result of the actions of the first respondent I was denied justice, and justice was perverted
That – the first respondent failed to implement, or cause to be implemented the “disciplinary process policy” decreed by his employers the ministry of justice
That – the first respondent failed to acknowledge complaint laid with him, nor communicate his intention re its investigation, that i know of the process
That – the second respondent Tania Ott, acting allegedly on the instruction belittled me and my most serious complaints re the perversion of justice
That – she bullied me with her position and station, claimed my complaints groundless and failed to implement the “disciplinary process policy” decreed by her employers the ministry for justice
v Accident Compensation Corporation HC Auckland, 22 December 2010; O’Neill v Accident Compensation Corporation HC Auckland, CIV-2008-404-8482, 1 April 2011; O’Neill v Accident Compensation Corporation [2015] NZHC 2823; O’Neill v Disputes Tribunal [2016] NZHC 2385; O’Neill v Toogood [2017] NZHC 795; O’Neill v Toogood [2018] NZCA 505; O’Neill v Attorney- General [2017] NZHC 1491; O’Neill v Accident Compensation Corporation [2017] NZHC 2713; O’Neill v Accident Compensation Corporation [2017] NZHC 2373; O’Neill v Attorney-General [2018] NZHC 1073; O’Neill v Attorney-General (No 2) [2018] NZHC 1917; O’Neill v Minister
of Justice [2018] NZSC 80.
2 Judicature Act 1908, s 88B; Vexatious litigant decision, above n 1, at [107].
That – third respondent Carl Crafar acted criminally in support of the actions of second respondent Tania Ott, and on the instructions of the first respondent to pervert justice, and conspire with the first and second respondents to defeat same
That– he, advised of interference with cases filed in the high-court, and court of appeal claimed it not necessary to conduct a disciplinary investigation when ministry of justice policy decrees such be conducted
That – all these respondents perverted justice and conspired to defeat same by ill-using their position and station to bully a complainant.
Grounds:
1)that justice has been perverted and denied, and this must be rectified
2)that the ministry cannot be seen to be in bed with the judiciary via corrupt unsuperintended registrars
3)that complaint re registrars and other court staff must be heard they must be superintended for the public to have faith in our justice system
4)that the correct process to deal with complaint was not followed
5)that sans any investigation, and in the face of damning evidence of corruption and perversion, those responsible for court staff exonerated same to protect their own positions.
[5] Counsel for the respondents wrote to Mr O’Neill, pointing out that the statement of claim did not fairly inform the respondents of the issues they had to meet and did not comply with the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules).3 Counsel invited Mr O’Neill to replead.
[6] In any event, the respondents filed a statement of defence. They referred to nine complaints made by Mr O’Neill regarding the conduct of a deputy registrar in the Auckland High Court. The respondents denied the claims on the basis no disciplinary action was warranted or appropriate in relation to the deputy registrar.
[7] Following a direction to clarify his claim, Mr O’Neill filed an addendum to his statement of claim on 29 October 2018. The addendum listed 29 complaints, with a 30th described as “pending” (the Complaints).4 It also referred to a letter dated 6 April
3 Rules 5.26 and 5.27.
4 A number of the Complaints have sub-complaints. For example complaint 5 includes complaints (a)–(j).
2018 to him from the second respondent as the “decision” but also observed that there were decisions not to acknowledge his other complaints. The addendum listed 11 “Issues for the Court” as follows:5
1)Do the respondents accept I laid complaints?
2)Are they the persons responsible for the investigation of these complaints?
3)Is there a process to be followed in such matters?
4)Did the respondents initiate this procedure?
5)Do the respondents accept I have proven my case already and the court merely need to issue a directive?
6)Do the respondents have a defence to offer re their admitted inaction?
7)Should the court order the respondents to indicate what if any they intend to offer in defence, and if due to such I need file with the court copies of all 29 complaints, with their evincement?
8)If the court accepts that I had right of expectation that my complaints be heard how will this now occur given the respondents lack all credence?
9)Should the court entertain the suggestion of counsel for the respondence in his of 16 - 10 - 2018 (last paragraph) that this case be moved to the high-court Auckland?
10)Should the court recognise that to move the case to Auckland would be to place me in the lions den given the vast majority of my complaints are re that court and its staff who would make this case disappear as they did that of complaint one, etc, etc, etc.
11)Can the court hear any evidence / defence from the respondents re any of the complaints save those mentioned in respondent Ott’s letter of 16th April 2018 given they have not denoted them as not warranting investigation and now (in good faith) cannot.
[8] On 30 November 2018 the respondents filed the application to strike out the statement of claim and dismiss the proceeding.6 In support of the application was an affidavit from a senior solicitor with the Ministry who exhibited what she understood to be the complaints relevant to the claim. Mr O’Neill filed a notice of opposition in December 2018.7 He subsequently filed a bundle of documents which was over
5 Mr O’Neill’s bracketed remarks have been removed as they were extraneous.
6 High Court Rules 2016, r 15.1.
7 Together with a memorandum “seeking recusement of certain judicial officers”.
250 pages. He says it contains the material relevant to his claim. It included much of the information referred to in the applicant’s memorandum but with substantially more material.
The Complaints
[9] The Complaints are detailed in Mr O’Neill’s bundle and were addressed at length by Mr O’Neill at the strike-out hearing. Mr O’Neill criticises the respondents’ attempt to categorise the Complaints and objects, in particular, to some of the complaints being described as difficult to comprehend.
[10] In my view the Complaints can be described as falling into the following categories:
(a)Cases interfered with, for example by being lost or by documents not being provided to the Judge – complaints 1, 3, 7, 7(a), 9 and 13.
(b)Prejudicial treatment of Mr O’Neill, including delay in providing transcripts; failure to action his case/requests in a timely manner – complaints 2, 4, 7(b), 8, 9(a), 19, 24, 27 and 28.
(c)Improperly using the Rules against Mr O’Neill by refusing to accept documents for filing – complaints 5(a), 5(b), 5(d), 5(h) and 5(i).
(d)Interference with documents, forgeries – complaints 5, 5(f), 5(g), 5(j), 6, 6(a), 22, 22(a),8 25 and 29.
(e)First respondent’s failure to take action on Mr O’Neill’s complaints – complaints 5(c), 7(c),9 16, 17, 18, 21 and 29(a).10
8 There is no complaint 23.
9 This complaint was detailed in the applicant’s bundle of documents but was not noted in his “addendum to statement of claim”. For completeness sake, I have included this complaint.
10 As above at n 9.
(f)Registrar’s refusal to excuse himself from dealing with Mr O’Neill and failure to advise judges of potential conflicts of interest – complaints 5(e) and 26.
(g)Failure of Court management to respond to Mr O’Neill’s complaints – complaints 10 and 11.
(h)False claims made against Mr O’Neill – complaints 12, 15 and 29(b).11
(i)Second respondent’s interference with the role of the Secretary for Justice – complaints 14 and 20.
[11] Mr O’Neill expresses the Complaints in colourful and often abusive language. He maintains that there is a vendetta against him, a failure to protect him from a rogue registrar or registrars, and a failure to respond to the Complaints. All of this, he says, amounts to a deliberate attempt to abuse him and deny him justice.
[12] Mr O’Neill’s scandalous allegations include corruption and perversion of justice;12 a High Court Judge lying; and forgery of a High Court Judge’s signature.
Responses to the Complaints
[13]The second and third respondents have both responded to the Complaints.
[14] The second respondent, as Acting Chief Operating Officer, wrote to Mr O’Neill on 6 April 2018 addressing 11 of the Complaints. She began by explaining the importance of the separation of powers which she said required court proceedings and judicial decisions, including those of registrars, to be undertaken independently from Ministers and Government officials. She was satisfied there were no grounds for taking disciplinary action against any registrars, suggested any allegations of criminal behaviour should be referred to the police and provided Mr O’Neill with information as to how to complain about judicial conduct, police conduct and lawyers’ conduct.
11 As above at n 9.
12 For example, a reference to “money or other favour” changing hands.
[15] The third respondent then wrote to Mr O’Neill in response to his letter to the first respondent about the second respondent’s response. He noted Mr O’Neill’s request for a disciplinary investigation into various registrars’ behaviour and advised he did not consider it necessary to conduct a disciplinary investigation.
[16] The second respondent wrote in a similar vein to Mr O’Neill on two other occasions in respect of some of the other Complaints.
[17] One of the registrars complained of wrote on three occasions to Mr O’Neill, explaining why his documents had been rejected and referring him to the requirements of the Rules for commencing proceedings and filing documents.13 He drew Mr O’Neill’s attention to r 2.11 and the ability to seek a review of the actions of a registrar.
[18] Woodhouse J issued a Minute on 4 July 2018 following Mr O’Neill’s fourth attempt to refile documents or similar documents which had been rejected for non-compliance.14 He said:
[3] I confirm the Registrar’s decision and confirm that the documents most recently presented do not comply and are properly rejected. If any further documents are presented which do not comply the Registrar is directed to reject them.
[4] The repeated filing of documents without attempting to comply with High Court Rules which have been explained is vexatious. This is compounded by the fact that in an earlier proceeding Mr O’Neill repeatedly sought to file documents which did not comply with the Rules: O’Neill v Registrar of the High Court CIV-2016-404-002914.
[19] Mr O’Neill maintains the Minute is a forgery or a product of corruption or laziness.
[20] Venning J then issued a Minute on 31 July 2018, which referred to Woodhouse J’s Minute and subsequent attempts by Mr O’Neill to file documents.15
13 High Court Rules 2016, pt 5.
14 O’Neill v Attorney-General HC Auckland CIV-2016-404-2475, 4 July 2018.
15 O’Neill v Attorney-General HC Auckland CIV-2016-404-2475, 31 July 2018.
He concluded the registrar was correct to reject Mr O’Neill’s documents and dismissed Mr O’Neill’s purported application for review of the registrar’s decision.16
Strike-out application
[21] The respondents apply to strike out the statement of claim and for the Court to dismiss the proceeding in its entirety. The application is on the grounds of abuse of process and that the statement of claim discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action.
[22] The respondents say the claim is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process for the following reasons:
(a)It does not inform the respondents of the case they are to meet. It fails to state the facts upon which the applicant relies; isolate the decisions under challenge; and articulate the grounds upon which any alleged decisions are being reviewed. The respondents say they cannot respond without suffering prejudice and it therefore follows that the statement of claim is abusive.
(b)The claim regarding the first respondent’s failure to discipline deputy registrars is an abuse of process, given these decisions are judicial in nature and can be reviewed by a judge.17 In any event, some, if not all, of the documents initially rejected for filing were subsequently accepted.
(c)The statement of claim makes scandalous allegations of corruption and criminal conspiracy on the part of various public servants without any evidential foundation.
16 On 20 November 2017, Venning J, the Chief High Court Judge, had written to Mr O’Neill, saying the “usual threatening tone and abusive language” Mr O’Neill used in his correspondence and papers addressed to judges and registry staff was unacceptable. He reminded Mr O’Neill of his rights of review and appeal from decisions of the High Court; and the right to complain to the Judicial Complaints Commissioner. He informed Mr O’Neill he had directed the registry not to accept any further such abusive, offensive or scandalous communications.
17 High Court Rules 2016, r 2.11; Court of Appeal Rules 2005, r 5A(3)(a).
(d)Mr O’Neill continually complains about deputy registrars and other court staff, often in abusive terms. The proceedings are a further attempt to impugn the staff and respondents.
[23] The respondents say the claim does not disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action in that:
(a)The actions of deputy registrars were discharged as part of their judicial functions independent of the executive. It would offend the principle of judicial independence if the respondents disciplined the registrars as Mr O’Neill seeks.
(b)Mr O’Neill cannot have a substantive legitimate expectation his complaints would lead to those about whom he complains being disciplined or punished or that, every time he complains, every stage outlined in the “discipline process policy” of the Ministry of Justice would be followed.
[24] The respondents say any failure to respond to the Complaints cannot be a reviewable error and in any event Mr O’Neill’s assertions are contradicted by the correspondence he himself supplies.
[25] The respondents conclude that the proceeding is not capable of being reformulated so that it complies with the Rules and ought to be dismissed in its entirety. Even if pleaded in a more comprehensive manner, it would still be fundamentally misconceived and not disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action.
Mr O’Neill’s submissions
[26] Mr O’Neill says his complaint essentially is that the first respondent failed to do his job as the Secretary for Justice which is to investigate complaints laid with him regarding court staff. He says only a few registrars’ decisions can be reviewed by a judge; the majority cannot.
[27] Mr O’Neill says that the first respondent is both the Chief Executive of the Ministry and the Secretary for Justice. The proceedings involve the first respondent as Secretary for Justice, the office and officer responsible for the Ministry. He says the powers or lack thereof of the first respondent as Chief Executive are irrelevant, given no Complaints were lodged with him. He asks whether the second and third respondents, as Acting Chief Operating Officer and Chief Operating Officer respectively, are underlings of the first respondent in his role as Chief Executive or in his role as Secretary for Justice. He questions the Secretary for Justice’s power to delegate, saying he may be able to do so as Chief Executive but not as Secretary for Justice. He contends that the Secretary for Justice is not a member of the executive and, therefore, the separation of powers does not impact his ability to investigate and punish the behaviour of registrars. This extends, he says, to the delegated powers of Chief Operating Officer and Acting Chief Operating Officer.
[28] Mr O’Neill refers to the Ministry’s policy in respect of a formal disciplinary process when misconduct or serious misconduct is alleged against a Ministry employee. He says that court staff answer to the Secretary for Justice and that he has put before the Court evidence of gross misconduct, gross under-performance and conspiracy to pervert justice. Mr O’Neill describes court staff as “rogue”. He refers to “corrupt registrars” engaged in “a complete forgery”. He says he did not, as the respondents allege, request “disciplinary action”, rather he requested an investigation.
[29] In Mr O’Neill’s submission, these matters are fundamental points which need to be considered at a substantive hearing.
[30] Mr O’Neill maintains his statement of claim shows the general nature of his claim as required by the Rules and that all his filings meet the various criteria. He contends his claim is clear and says, in any event, he has always offered to provide any further clarification which is requested. He objects to the Complaints being grouped and disputes they are difficult to comprehend. He also objects to what he describes as “fully evidenced ‘facts’” being labelled as allegations.
[31] Mr O’Neill’s position is that the Court must allow the case to progress to hear the evidence and rule on the actions of court staff. He points to an irony that many of
his complaints regarding the actions of staff are on the basis they have prevented his access to judges in order to obtain redress against the actions of those same staff. Mr O’Neill says he therefore has no adequate remedy because he cannot get his applications to a judge because of the actions of a “rogue registrar” who is the subject of many of the Complaints.
[32] Mr O’Neill emphasises his rights as a citizen and that he has a right to be heard. He disputes that his allegations can be described as “scandalous”. He says he feels abused and bullied.
[33] Mr O’Neill’s oral submissions emphasised his approach. Amongst other scandalous allegations, he referred to criminality and corruption on the part of judges, referred to a person “buying a judge”, and said the door of the court registry was where money changed hands.
Principles relating to strike-out
[34]Rule 15.1 of the Rules provides:
15.1 Dismissing or staying all or part of proceeding
(1)The court may strike out all or part of a pleading if it—
(a)discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or
(b)is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or
(c)is frivolous or vexatious; or
(d)is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
(2)If the court strikes out a statement of claim or a counterclaim under subclause (1), it may by the same or a subsequent order dismiss the proceeding or the counterclaim.
(3)Instead of striking out all or part of a pleading under subclause (1), the court may stay all or part of the proceeding on such conditions as are considered just.
(4)This rule does not affect the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
[35] The principles relating to the criteria for strike out are well established. Pleaded facts, whether or not admitted, are assumed to be true.18 This does not extend to pleaded allegations which are entirely speculative and without foundation.19 The court will not strike out a claim summarily unless it can be sure that it cannot succeed.20
[36] In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd, the Court of Appeal said:21
[89] The grounds of strike out listed in r 15.1(1)(b)–(d) concern the misuse of the court’s processes. Rule 15.1(1)(b), which deals with pleadings that are likely to cause prejudice or delay, requires an element of impropriety and abuse of the court’s processes. Pleadings which can cause delay include those that are prolix; are scandalous and irrelevant; plead purely evidential matters; or are unintelligible. …
[37] The courts have emphasised that the jurisdiction is sparingly utilised. If the defect in the pleadings can be cured, the court would normally order an amendment of the statement of claim.
Analysis
Abuse of process
[38] The Court of Appeal has summarised the procedural requirements for statements of claim under rr 5.17, 5.26 and 5.27 of the Rules as follows:22
·The pleading must be accurate, clear and intelligible.
·Sufficient particulars must be given to enable the defendant to be fairly informed of the case to be met.
·While adequate particulars are required, the statement of claim must not stray into setting out the evidence relied upon.
·Separate causes of action must be separately stated.
18 Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267.
19 Kim Dotcom v District Court at North Shore [2018] NZCA 442. [2018] NZAR 1859 at [15].
20 Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 at [33] per Elias CJ and Anderson J.
21 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2 NZLR 679 (footnote omitted).
22 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd at [84].
·The pleading should set out all the elements of the cause of action.
·The relief sought must be clearly pleaded in respect of each cause of action and, where there is more than one plaintiff and multiple defendants, the relief sought by each plaintiff against each defendant must be clearly stated.
[39] The function of pleadings is to clarify and define the issues for the court, as well as to inform the opposite party in preparation for trial.23
[40] Although a degree of latitude is extended to lay litigants, this does not entitle them to ignore the Rules completely.
[41] I agree with the respondents’ submission that the statement of claim is defective. It mixes allegations of fact and law; does not identify a legal basis for the claims or identify the central facts upon which Mr O’Neill relies. The over 250 page document provided by Mr O’Neill not only contains a large quantity of irrelevant (and objectionable) material but it is unreasonable to expect the respondents to sift through it in order to understand Mr O’Neill’s claim.
[42] Mr O’Neill has had the opportunity to refine his pleadings. They are no clearer. I therefore accept the respondents’ submission that the statement of claim is unlikely to improve.
[43] As the respondents point out (and as Mr O’Neill is clearly aware given he has followed the process in the past), decisions of deputy registrars can be reviewed pursuant to r 2.11 of the Rules, which provides:
2.11 Review of Registrar’s decision
(1)An affected party to a proceeding or an intended proceeding may apply to a Judge by interlocutory application for a review of any of the following:
(a)a Registrar’s exercise of jurisdiction:
23 See generally Thomson v Westpac Banking Corporation (1986) 2 PRNZ 505 (HC); Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd CA179/98, 30 November 1998 at 17: “pleadings are an essential road map for the Court and the parties… They are documents which establish parameters of the case, not the briefs of evidence.”; Hopper Group Ltd v Parker (1987) 1 PRNZ 363 (CA) at 366 where it was stated that if the plaintiff has not clearly defined the issues which the defendant has to meet, “it is difficult for a defendant to prepare for trial…”
(b)a Registrar’s refusal to file a document tendered for filing:
(c)a Registrar’s refusal to perform a duty placed on him or her under these rules.
(2)The Judge may, on review, make any orders he or she thinks just.
(3)It is not necessary to apply for an order for an extraordinary remedy under Part 30 or to make an application for review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 when seeking a review under subclause (1)(b) or (c).
[44] Furthermore, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to direct and supervise registrars in relation to the business of the Court.24
[45] To the extent that Mr O’Neill has already sought review of certain decisions, these proceedings constitute a collateral attack on the decisions of High Court Judges which have upheld the decisions of the deputy registrars.
[46] Mr O’Neill makes allegations of corruption, perversion of justice and criminality on the part of judges, registrars and court staff. Despite his contention that he is simply stating fact, there is no evidential basis for the assertions.
[47]The statement of claim is therefore an abuse of process.
No reasonably arguable cause of action
[48] In any event, the statement of claim is fundamentally flawed. Mr O’Neill seeks a review of the actions of the Secretary for Justice (which is how the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Justice is to be known)25 and two senior employees of the Ministry of Justice in respect of the failure to carry out an investigation into actions of judges, deputy registrars and other court staff. I note that the position of Secretary for Justice is part of the executive, rather than judicial, arm of government.
24 As noted in McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR2.11.01] “[a] Judge has inherent power to direct and supervise Registrars in relation to the business of the Court: Re Tupou [2018] NZHC 637 at [12], including to review a Registrar’s decision to accept a document for filing: Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2017] NZHC 2082, (2017) 28 NZTC 23-029 at [14], [15]”.
25 Department of Justice (Restructuring) Act 1995, s 5(3).
[49] The Complaints involve the Court process as opposed to the types of disciplinary breaches in respect of which the Ministry would be entitled to discipline staff as an employer without infringing the separation of powers. Whether the decisions are those of judges or court staff, the constitutional principle of the separation of powers means that the respondents have no power, either express or implied, to carry out any investigations in respect of the decisions complained of.
[50] Deputy registrars are appointed by the Secretary for Justice.26 The Ministry of Justice’s responsibilities in relation to staff are in accordance with the State Sector Act 1988. However, administrative tasks performed by registrars and court staff in connection with proceedings are part of the judicial function of the court:27
The administrative tasks performed by a registrar in the preparation of a proceeding for adjudication; and the administrative tasks similarly performed by a registrar in post adjudication, such as the issuing of judgment, are part of the judicial function of the court in which that proceeding was commenced and determined.
[51] The following are principles observed by the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice in the administration of courts:28
1.1 The constitutional principle of separation of powers requires that the courts be independent of the Executive to ensure impartiality in judicial decisions. As well as requiring freedom from interference in individual judicial decisions, the constitutional principle also depends on institutional independence in organising and managing the work of the courts.
…
2.1 The Secretary for Justice, as Chief Executive of the Ministry of Justice, is responsible to the Minister for Courts. The Minister is responsible to Parliament for the proper use of the public resources used to support and run the courts, and for ensuring that sufficient resources are available to provide an accessible and effective justice system. The Secretary for Justice is formally responsible under the State Sector Act 1988 for employing staff who support the judiciary, including the Registry staff of the courts. Registrars, Deputy Registrars and other officers may be appointed under the State Sector
26 Senior Courts Act 2016, ss 33, 63 and 87; District Courts Act 2016, s 62.
27 Ministry of Justice v S (2006) 8 HRNZ 328 (HC) at [28].
28 Principles Observed by Judiciary and Ministry of Justice in the Administration of the Courts, 29 November 2018. This document is publicly available from the Courts of New Zealand link titled “Memorandum of Understanding”: “Our court system” (April 2019) Courts of New Zealand
< 1988 to support the conduct of the business of each court, but act under judicial direction in doing so.
…
3.1The judiciary’s responsibilities in relation to conducting the business of the courts include:
…
(c)the direction and supervision of Registry staff in relation to the business of the courts;
(d)the selection and supervision of immediate judicial support staff such as personal assistants, clerks and other similar staff (subject to paragraph 4.1(d));
…
[52] These provisions demonstrate that the claim has no prospect of success. It is understandable that a lay person might not fully understand the separation of powers and how that concept applies to registry staff. There have, however, been several attempts to explain this to Mr O’Neill. The behaviours complained of are reviewable under the Rules or the Court’s inherent powers to direct and supervise registrars in relation to the business of the Court.29 They are not, however, capable of review by any one of the respondents. This approach reflects that taken in other cases.30
[53] The respondents’ failure to embark upon an investigation in respect of the Complaints does not therefore constitute a reviewable error.
[54] What this means is that the validity or otherwise of the Complaints is irrelevant to these proceedings. This decision is not about the merits of the Complaints. A party is entitled to raise concerns about the conduct of those involved in the justice system in the appropriate manner and to the appropriate party or forum. These proceedings are not expressed in the appropriate manner, either in form or substance, and are not brought against the appropriate party.
29 Greer v Smith [2015] NZSC 196, (2015) 22 PRNZ 785 at [6] and Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 24, at [21] and [22]. The relationship between independent statutory officers and department Chief Executives is discussed in Archives and Records Association of New Zea1and v Blakeley [2000] 1 NZLR 607 (CA).
30 Reid v Ministry of Justice HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-1617, 30 March 2009; Crispin v Registrar of the District Court [1986] 2 NZLR 246 (HC); Greer v Smith, above n 29; Ministry of Justice v S, above n 27; and Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 24.
Result
[55] For the reasons given, the statement of claim is struck out and Mr O’Neill’s application for judicial review is dismissed in its entirety.
[56]The respondents are awarded costs on a 2B basis.
Thomas J
Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington for Respondents
5
14
0