Moeke v South Waikato District Council

Link copied
Case Copied 6 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA

TE ROTORUA-NUI-A-KAHUMATAMOMOE ROHE

CIV-2019-463-000050

[2019] NZHC 3457

BETWEEN

FORD BENJAMIN MOEKE

Plaintiff

AND

SOUTH WAIKATO DISTRICT COUNCIL

Defendant

On the papers: 14 October 2019

Appearances:

K J Patterson for the Plaintiff K Cornegé for the Respondent

Judgment:

20 December 2019


COSTS JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SARGISSON


This judgment was delivered by me on 20 December 2019 at 10.30 am pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

…………………………………

Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Mark Copeland Lawyers, Rotorua K J Patterson, Tauranga

MOEKE v SOUTH WAIKATO DISTRICT COUNCIL [2019] NZHC 3457 [20 December 2019]

[1]        This brief judgment deals with costs issues reserved in a judgment I issued on 12 September 2019 concerning Mr Moeke’s failed application for an order that his caveat not lapse.1   I delayed briefly the coming into effect of my decision to give   Mr Moeke the opportunity to file an appeal and seek a stay if he did not agree with the outcome; and I gave the parties the opportunity to resolve costs issues between themselves.

[2]        Mr Moeke decided not to appeal that judgment. The parties have attempted but been unable to agree on costs, and they have filed costs memoranda.

Approach

[3]        The Court has discretion as to costs, but that discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the rules. The general rule is that costs will follow the event, save for an exceptional circumstance.2 So far as possible, the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.3

[4]        There is some scope for a reduction in an award of costs to a successful party. Rule 14.7 outlines a set of reasons for which the Court may reduce or refuse the costs otherwise payable under the rules. Relevant in this case are:

14.7     Refusal of, or reduction in, costs

Despite rules 14.2 to 14.5, the court may refuse to make an order for costs or may reduce the costs otherwise payable under those rules if—

…

(d) although the party claiming costs has succeeded overall, that party has failed in relation to a cause of action or issue which significantly increased the costs of the party opposing costs; or

…


1      Moeke v South Waikato District Council [2019] NZHC 2282, (2019) 20 NZCPR 385.

2      See High Court Rules 2016, r 14.2(1); and Shirley v Wairarapa District Health Board [2006] NZSC 63, [2006] 3 NZLR 523 at [19].

3      Rule 14.2(1)(g).

(g) some other reason exists which justifies the court refusing costs or reducing costs despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.

Discussion

[5]        The Council succeeded in the proceeding. The application to sustain the caveat failed. It is, on the face of it, entitled to costs.

[6]When I reserved costs I made some brief observations on costs:4

[48] In terms of the statutory costs regime, the presumption is that the successful party is entitled to costs. For a normal case of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Moeke v South Waikato District Council and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] NZHC 3457
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Moeke v South Waikato District Council, the plaintiff, Ford Benjamin Moeke, sought to prevent his caveat from lapsing. The South Waikato District Council, the defendant, opposed this application. The High Court was tasked with determining the costs implications of the proceedings, particularly whether the successful party, the Council, was entitled to costs under the applicable rules and principles. The court also had to consider whether there were exceptional circumstances warranting a deviation from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The primary legal issue was whether the Council was entitled to costs following its successful opposition to the plaintiff's application to prevent the lapse of his caveat. The court had to assess whether the Council's conduct, which included deliberately interfering in an unconditional purchase to defeat the plaintiff's property rights, warranted a reduction or refusal of costs despite the usual principles. The court also considered whether the Council's actions could be penalised through the costs process under the current regime.

The court found that while the Council had admitted to conduct that might traditionally have warranted a reduction or refusal of costs, the current legal framework did not allow for penalising a successful party for conduct that was the subject of the substantive claim. The court emphasised that penalising such conduct would undermine the predictability and expediency of the costs system and could deter potential litigants from bringing cases with significant hurdles. The court ultimately concluded that the Council's conduct was not sufficiently exceptional to warrant a departure from the usual rule that costs follow the event. The court also noted that the Council had provided detailed legal arguments to the plaintiff's counsel, which was consistent with the conduct expected in litigation.

The court ordered that costs be awarded to the Council in accordance with its schedule of costs, amounting to $10,775 plus disbursements of $210, for a total of $10,865. The court stayed the enforcement of these costs until after the determination of the plaintiff's application for summary judgment and the quantum of damages. This decision ensured that the Council would not be financially penalised for conduct that, while arguably improper, did not warrant a departure from the usual principles governing costs in litigation.