Johnson v Barry Park Investments Limited

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2018-404-455

[2019] NZHC 1213

IN THE MATTER OF an application under section 323 of the Property Law Act 2007

BETWEEN

XANTHE ANNA JOHNSON AND MARK ANDREW GRAHAM

Plaintiffs

AND

BARRY PARK INVESTMENTS LIMITED

Defendant

Hearing: On the papers

Counsel:

K Quinn and C Pearce for the Plaintiffs

G J Kohler QC and S J Neville for the Defendant

Judgment:

31 May 2019


COSTS JUDGMENT OF MUIR J


This judgment was delivered by me on Friday 31 May 2019 at 11.30 am pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:…………………………

Counsel:

K Quinn Barrister, Auckland C Pearce, Barrister, Auckland

G Kohler QC, Barrister, Auckland

Solicitors:

Heimsath Alexander, Auckland Ellis Gould, Auckland

JOHNSON v BARRY PARK INVESTMENTS LIMITED [2019] NZHC 1213 [31 May 2019]

Introduction

[1]                 In my judgment dated 27 March 2019, I stated that the plaintiffs were entitled to costs and provisionally indicated that I considered these appropriately assessed on a 2B basis. I further indicated that it was my expectation quantum could be settled by the parties. Regrettably, this has not been the case and a further judgment is therefore required.

[2]                 Neither party takes issue with my provisional 2B categorisation. The areas of dispute relate largely to:

(a)the incidence of costs on the plaintiffs’ withdrawn application for leave to commence by way of originating application;

(b)whether there should be an uplift to or deduction from the plaintiffs’ base line entitlement; and

(c)what disbursements are recoverable, particularly in relation to experts.

The application for leave

[3]                 Initially, the plaintiffs sought to commence their proceedings by way of originating application. They applied for leave accordingly. To provide context to the leave application they simultaneously filed their substantive evidence (including expert evidence).

[4]                 The application was opposed by the defendant and heard by me. The principal ground of opposition, reflected in paragraph [6] of my Minute dated 15 February 2018, was that the defendant intended to file a counterclaim to advance rights of natural support for the defendant’s house. Mr Kohler QC submitted that this could not be dealt with efficiently in the context of a claim against the defendant, which had been brought under Part 19 of the High Court Rules.

[5]                 During the course of exchanges with counsel, Mr Kohler persuaded me that, despite my initial assessment that the Part 19 procedure might provide a satisfactory

vehicle for disposition of the dispute, the prospect of such counterclaim significantly undermined the utility of that approach. It appeared to me that the Court would likely be faced with parallel ordinary proceedings at the behest of the defendant and an application to consolidate such proceedings with the plaintiffs’ originating application. If that were the case I could see little advantage in the whole dispute not moving forward as an ordinary proceeding.

[6]                 I discussed these provisional views at length with counsel during the course of the hearing. I advised that…

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Details
Case
[2019] NZHC 1213
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Johnson and Graham sought to challenge the placement of a wall on property they owned in Auckland. Barry Park Investments Limited opposed the claim and filed a counterclaim. The plaintiffs initially sought leave to commence the proceeding by way of an originating application, but this was declined. The matter proceeded as an ordinary proceeding, and at trial the plaintiffs were successful in establishing that the wall was an encroachment and that it should be removed. However, the plaintiffs were not successful in persuading the Court to order that the wall be removed in accordance with their expert’s proposed methodology. The plaintiffs now sought an order for costs on a 2B basis, and the defendant opposed this application. The court held that the costs of the withdrawn application for leave should lie where they fell, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to an uplift of 25% of their scale costs, reduced by 15% because the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in relation to one of their causes of action. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ expert’s costs were reasonable, but that the plaintiffs’ costs in preparing their costs submissions should be reduced by 50%. The court ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiffs’ costs and disbursements in the amount of $133,716.70.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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