IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2015-485-001049 [2016] NZHC 3170
BETWEEN MICHAEL JOHN MCGOUGAN AND
BRIAN FREDERICK DINGLE First Plaintiffs
BEVAN MALCOLM SANSON Second Plaintiff
AND
DEPUY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED Defendant
Hearing: 12 December 2016 Counsel:
D J Goddard QC and L Theron for Plaintiffs
C A McLachlan QC with J L W Wass, D A Campbell and O J Welsh for Defendant
Judgment:
20 December 2016
JUDGMENT OF COLLINS J
Introduction
[1] This judgment answers the following question:
Are 25 of the plaintiffs1 in this proceeding estopped from suing the defendant (DePuy) in New Zealand for compensatory damages in circumstances where:
(1)they commenced proceedings in England seeking compensatory damages against DePuy in relation to conduct that forms the basis of their claim in New Zealand; and
(2)a court of competent jurisdiction in England has determined that a sample of the New Zealand claimants
1 In this judgment the term “plaintiffs” is used in reference to proceedings commenced in New Zealand and the term “claimants” is used in reference to proceedings commenced in England.
MCGOUGAN v DEPUY INTERNATIONAL LTD (No. 2) [2016] NZHC 3170 [20 December 2016]
were barred by the law of New Zealand from seeking compensatory damages against DePuy?
[2] In the context of this case, the question posed in paragraph [1] raises the following two sub-questions:
(1)Were the 25 plaintiffs parties to, or privies of the claimants in, the sample proceedings determined by the court in England?
(2)If not, is it nevertheless an abuse of process for the 25 plaintiffs to continue their claim for compensatory damages in New Zealand?
[3] This judgment explains why the 25 plaintiffs are estopped from bringing their claim for compensatory damages in New Zealand because they were privies to the sample claimants in the proceedings determined by the High Court of Justice in England. This judgment also explains why, in the alternative, it would be an abuse of process to permit the 25 plaintiffs to continue their claim for compensatory damages in New Zealand.
[4] To assist readers this judgment is divided into two parts. Part I sets out the background and explains the issues in further detail. Part II explains the conclusions summarised in [3].
PART I BACKGROUND
[5] In an earlier judgment (ACC bar judgment)2 I answered the following
question posed by the plaintiffs:3
May claims for compensatory damages be brought by the plaintiffs in New Zealand for personal injury they have suffered in this country, and for which they have cover under the Accident Compensation Act 2001 … in circumstances where the conduct giving rise to their claims occurred in a foreign jurisdiction?
2 McGougan v DePuy International Ltd [2016] NZHC 2511.
3 At [1].
[6] In concluding the answer to that question was “no”, I reasoned that s 317(1) of the Accident Compensation Act 20014 prevented the plaintiffs from bringing their claims for compensatory damages in New Zealand because they had cover under that Act, even though the conduct giving rise to their claims…
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- Case
- [2016] NZHC 3170
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court concluded that the plaintiffs were estopped from claiming damages in New Zealand because they were privies to the parties in the English proceedings. The court found that the plaintiffs had an interest in the outcome of the English proceedings, had agreed to a procedure that would determine the issue of whether the Accident Compensation Act barred their claims, and had voluntarily stood aside while the New Zealand sample claimants argued the case. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims constituted an abuse of process because they had agreed to a procedure that would determine the outcome of their claims and had chosen to pursue a similar strategy to one that had been previously struck out as an abuse of process.
The court reserved leave to the parties to file further memoranda if they could not agree on costs and to return to the court for the formulation of any orders that flowed from the decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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