Longman v Residual Health Management Unit

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA217/06
[2008] NZCA 363

BETWEENDARREN REX LONGMAN


Appellant

ANDRESIDUAL HEALTH MANAGEMENT UNIT


Respondent

Hearing:9, 10 and 11 June 2008

Court:Glazebrook, Hammond, O'Regan, Robertson and Baragwanath JJ

Counsel:J M Ablett-Kerr QC and M J Phelps for Appellant


U R Jagose and D L Harris for Crown

Judgment:16 September 2008 at 10 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The appeal is dismissed.

BCosts are reserved.  If counsel are unable to agree on that issue, they can file memoranda in the usual way.

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Hammond J)

Introduction

[1]       Mr Longman applied for leave to bring proceedings against the Residual Health Management Unit (RHMU), under s 124 of the Mental Health Act 1969 (MHA 1969).  His claims allege breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in relation to his treatment at Tokanui Hospital at a time when the MHA 1969 was in force.  The appellant seeks compensatory damages in the sum of $250,000, exemplary damages in the sum of $250,000, special damages for pecuniary loss and interest.

[2] In a preliminary hearing, MacKenzie J held that the application for leave to bring proceedings was to be determined prior to any substantive trial: HC WN CIV-2005-485-732 2 September 2005 at [8]. A leave application judgment was subsequently delivered by that Judge, where he refused the appellant leave to bring his claim under the MHA 1969: HC WN CIV-2005-485-732 14 July 2006 at [28]. It is that judgment which is the subject of the present appeal.

[3]       The time-bar in s 124(4) is the focus of the appeal, particularly the interpretation of the phrases, “a continuance of injury or damage” and “ignorant of the facts that constitute the cause of action”.  A further issue is whether MacKenzie J was right to consider that he was unable to find “substantial grounds” for the appellant’s contention that the acts complained of were done in bad faith or without reasonable care.

[4]       Ms Ablett-Kerr QC for the appellant applied for leave to add a further ground of appeal: that leave to bring proceedings under the MHA 1969 was not necessary as a result of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (MHA 1992).  The Crown did not oppose the application and we granted the application for that additional ground of appeal at the hearing.

[5]       However, for the reasons given on the “retrospectivity” issue in Crown Health Financing Agency v P and B [2008] NZCA 362 (at [167]-[207]), a series of appeals which were heard by the same five judge panel of this Court at the same time as this appeal and which similarly concerned s 124 MHA 1969, this Court has resolved that issue in a way which is against the interests of Mr Longman.

Background

[6]        The factual background is conveniently set out by MacKenzie J in his 2 September 2005 judgment (at [4]):

… The plaintiff claims that he received inadequate…

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Details
Case
[2008] NZCA 363
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Longman, the appellant, sought leave to bring proceedings against the Residual Health Management Unit, the respondent, under section 124 of the Mental Health Act 1969 (MHA 1969). Longman claimed that he had been treated negligently and in breach of fiduciary duty at Tokanui Hospital, for which he sought compensatory and exemplary damages. The appeal focused on the interpretation of the time-bar in section 124(4) of the MHA 1969, specifically the phrases "a continuance of injury or damage" and "ignorant of the facts that constitute the cause of action." Additionally, the appeal addressed whether MacKenzie J was correct in finding no "substantial grounds" for Longman's claims of bad faith or lack of reasonable care.

MacKenzie J had found that the acts complained of ended when Longman was discharged from hospital, and thus the six-month time period for filing a claim had expired. The Judge ruled that the phrase "continuance of injury or damage" referred to situations where the cause of injury or damage is ongoing, not where the effects of the damage continue. Furthermore, MacKenzie J found that Longman was not ignorant of the facts that constitute the cause of action and that there was insufficient evidence to establish bad faith or a lack of reasonable care. The Court of Appeal upheld MacKenzie J's findings, agreeing with the interpretation of the time-bar and rejecting the argument that ignorance of the full consequences of the alleged harm should apply.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and Longman's application for leave to bring proceedings was denied. Costs were reserved, and counsel could file memoranda if they could not agree on the issue.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

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