Cox v Taylor

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Taylor, Windeyer and Owen JJ.

COX v. TAYLOR

(1966) 114 CLR 629

24 March 1966

Limitation of Actions

Limitation of Actions—Action against public officers—Time for commencement "in case of a continuance of injury or damage"—Continuance of act causing damage not of continuing effects thereof—Public Officers Protection Act 1934 (Tas.), s. 4 (b)*.

Decisions


March 24.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
TAYLOR J. I agree with my brother Owen, whose reasons I have had the opportunity of considering, that the line of authority extending over a period of more than sixty years is too strong to permit us to accede to the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff. To the cases to which his Honour refers I add Hague v. Doncaster Rural District Council (1908) 100 LT 121 and Rawlins v. Gillingham Corporation (1932) 146 LT 486 . Further, the construction placed upon s. 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act in Carey v. Metropolitan Borough of Bermondsey (1903) 20 TLR 2 seems to have been implicity adopted in Williams v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (1905) 1 KB 804 , a case which, in turn, was expressly approved by the Judicial Committee in British Electric Railway Company Ltd. v. Gentile (1914) AC 1034, at p 1042 . I add for myself that I see no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision in Carey's Case (3). No doubt that decision may be productive of anomalies but not, as I see it, to any greater extent than would be produced by acceptance of the plaintiff's contentions. (at p630)

WINDEYER J. I agree. (at p630)

2. When the appellant brought his action in the Supreme Court of Tasmania the Public Officers Protection Act 1934 (Tas.), s. 4 (b), was in force. It has since been repealed, but this appeal admittedly turns only on whether the action was brought within the time that the Act prescribed. I do not myself regard s. 4 (b) as clear. It has been made clear for courts in England by what in Carey v. Metropolitan Borough of Bermondsey (1903) 20 TLR 2 Lord Halsbury said was its meaning. His construction has been consistently followed in England - not, as I read what was said in the various judgments, from a conviction that it was correct, but rather because it was regarded by the courts as binding upon them. It was urged for the appellant that it is not binding upon us and that we should not follow what has been said in England. If it appeared to me that what was there said was mistaken and that another more probable view was open, I would not think we should be deterred by the mass of the authorities. Their mass adds little or nothing in weight to that of Carey's Case itself, because from it the courts in later cases did not think they were at liberty to depart. Nor do I think that the re-enactment of the section in…
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Details
Case
[1966] HCA 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this appeal were Cox, the appellant, and Taylor, the respondent. The dispute concerned the respondent's claim for damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by failing to direct the jury on the issue of contributory negligence on the part of the respondent. This involved considering whether there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant such a direction.

The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the trial judge had indeed erred in law. Their Honours reasoned that the evidence presented, particularly concerning the respondent's speed and the circumstances of the collision, was capable of supporting a finding of contributory negligence. Therefore, the jury should have been given the opportunity to consider this defence. The legal principle applied was that where there is evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer contributory negligence, the judge is obliged to direct them accordingly.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the verdict and judgment of the trial court and ordered a new trial.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

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