Lagolago v Wellington Standards Committee 2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA263/2018
 [2018] NZCA 406

BETWEEN

PAPALI’I TOTI LAGOLAGO
Applicant

AND

WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE 2
Respondent

Hearing:

17 September 2018

Court:

Miller, Gilbert and Williams JJ

Counsel:

A C Beck for Applicant
D R La Hood and R M A Kós for Respondent

Judgment:

5 October 2018 at 3.00 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is declined.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Williams J)

  1. The applicant, Ms Lagolago, is a lawyer.  The New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) found her:[1]

    (a)guilty of negligence or incompetence in her professional capacity to such a degree as to reflect on her fitness to practice or as to bring her profession into disrepute;[2] or

    (b)in the alternative, guilty of unsatisfactory conduct, that is conduct that fell short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent lawyer.[3]

Some relevant background

[1]Wellington Standards Committee 2 v Lagolago [2015] NZLCDT 25 at [92]–[93].

[2]Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 241(c).

[3]Section 12(a).

  1. In November 2009, Ms Lagolago filed proceedings in the District Court on behalf of Mr and Mrs F (the Fs).  They challenged the lawfulness of a credit contract they had entered into with a firm called Finance Now Ltd.  In addition to challenging the legitimacy of the contract, they claimed $100,000 in compensation for emotional stress and anxiety.  The claim failed.  In a costs judgment following the event, Judge Tuohy in the District Court at Porirua awarded increased costs.  A short extract from the judgment gives a sense of that Judge’s concern over the way in which the case had been handled:[4]

    [40]     The whole conduct of the litigation on behalf of the [Fs] has been seriously ill-judged, lacking in proper legal analysis and commercial commonsense.  It is disturbing that what should have been a dispute about the amount owing under a loan contract (not exceeding $12,000), which could have been satisfactorily resolved in the Disputes Tribunal without legal fees, has been escalated into a two day hearing in the District Court, necessitating a 107 paragraph judgment which has cost the successful parties a total of over $75,000 in legal fees and disbursements and leaves the [Fs] now facing judgment, not just for the balance of the loan contract, but for far greater sums in costs, apart altogether from their own legal costs — all this despite some clear warnings from the defendants.

    [4]F and F v Finance Now Ltd DC Porirua CIV-2009-091-639 and CIV-2009-091-527, 7 September 2012.

  2. As Clifford J noted in his subsequent substantive judgment on appeal from the Tribunal, the Fs subsequently lost their house in a mortgagee sale.[5]

  3. A dispute then arose between Ms Lagolago and her clients over payment of her legal fees.  The Fs complained to the New Zealand…

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Details
Case
[2018] NZCA 406
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Ms Lagolago, sought leave to appeal against a decision of the High Court declining her application for costs in disciplinary proceedings. Ms Lagolago, a lawyer, was found guilty by the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal of negligence or incompetence and unsatisfactory conduct in relation to her handling of litigation on behalf of her clients. This resulted in a costs order against her. The High Court allowed her appeal against the finding of negligence or incompetence and unsatisfactory conduct but declined her application for costs. Ms Lagolago sought leave to appeal against the costs ruling, contending that the principles governing costs in the Tribunal were not well established and that there was a need for clarification. The questions proposed for appeal were whether the general approach to costs in civil litigation was the starting point for determination of costs in Tribunal proceedings, whether the principles relating to Calderbank letters were applicable in disciplinary proceedings, and whether the High Court failed to take all relevant matters into account or took irrelevant matters into account in making its decision.

The Court of Appeal found that the High Court had correctly applied the law. The authorities established that the ordinary High Court Rules on costs applied in the High Court on appeal from a professional conduct tribunal. The Court of Appeal emphasised the wide discretion available to the Tribunal on the question of costs, a discretion that includes the power to award costs against the practitioner even if acquitted. Section 249 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 empowered the Tribunal to order the practitioner to pay the out-of-pocket expenses and overheads of the Law Society even where the proceeding has resulted in an acquittal, provided the Tribunal was satisfied the proceedings "were justified" and such order was "just". Ms Lagolago had no realistic prospect of convincing either forum that she was entitled to costs even if, as Mr Beck proposed, the High Court Rules provided the "starting point". As to the applicability of the Calderbank rules, the Judge concluded that Calderbank letters would be relevant in the exercise of the Tribunal’s costs discretion, but, unlike the approach of the High Court Rules, not determinative. The Calderbank rules are a corollary of the standard costs follows the event approach and so are of limited assistance in assessing costs on these facts. The final question related to the High Court’s finding that the way in which the hearing before the Tribunal was conducted produced a confused factual narrative in that forum, and the way in which Ms Lagolago conducted her client’s case in the District Court produced a similar impression. Clifford J found that both contributed to the unfavourable decision in the Tribunal. These were factual issues refitted as irrelevant considerations. There was no merit in this aspect of Ms Lagolago’s argument and it raised no issue of general or public importance.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

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