Jin v Konishi
[2014] NZHC 1150
•28 May 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV 2014-404-000049 [2014] NZHC 1150
BETWEEN RUJING JIN
First Appellant
YOON LEE Second Appellant
AND
YASUKI KONISHI and MAKIKO KONISHI
Respondents
Hearing: 30 April 2014 Appearances:
No appearance for the First Appellant
Second Appellant in person
D B Hickson for the RespondentsJudgment:
28 May 2014
JUDGMENT OF GILBERT J
This judgment is delivered by me on 28 May 2014 at 2pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
..................................................... Registrar / Deputy Registrar
JIN v KONISHI [2014] NZHC 1150 [28 May 2014]
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal against an order made in the District Court declining to set aside an earlier order debarring the first appellant from defending the respondents’ claims and requiring her solicitor, the second appellant, to pay costs personally in relation to the application.
[2] The first appellant did not appear at the hearing and her appeal must accordingly be dismissed for want of prosecution.
[3] The second appellant argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to make an order for costs against him personally, as counsel. He further argues that even if the District Court did have jurisdiction to make such an order, his conduct did not involve a breach of duty to the Court and the order should not have been made.
[4] The respondents argue that the District Court does have jurisdiction to make costs orders against solicitors and that this was appropriate in this case. In any event, they contend that the appeals are deemed to have been abandoned because of non- compliance with ‘unless’ orders.
Background
[5] It is necessary to traverse briefly the background to set the context for the issues requiring determination on this appeal.
[6] The respondents, Mr and Mrs Konishi, entered into an agreement in July 2010, to purchase a new house in Auckland from the first appellant, Ms Jin. The agreement was in the form approved by the Auckland District Law Society (Eighth Edition). Mr and Mrs Konishi paid a deposit of $30,000 which is held by the real estate agent as stakeholder. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid on settlement, following issue of a new title.
[7] The agreement contained a term requiring Ms Jin to remedy any defects or other faults notified by Mr and Mrs Konishi during the maintenance period, being
90 days from settlement.
[8] The agreement did not settle. In January 2011, Mr and Mrs Konishi purported to avoid the agreement on the basis that Ms Jin had not complied with her obligations under the maintenance clause. They relied on cl 8.7(5) of the standard terms and conditions of the agreement which enables either party to cancel an agreement which is subject to a condition that is not fulfilled or waived prior to due date. This clause has no application in the present case because the maintenance covenant is not a condition covered by cl 8.
[9] Mr and Mrs Konishi filed a notice of claim against Ms Jin in the District Court at North Shore in February 2011 seeking a declaration that they had validly avoided the agreement relying on cl 8.7(5). They sought an order for return of their deposit with interest. They also sought $5,214.38 being the rent they had paid on the property they were living in and further rent from the date of issue of proceedings to the date of judgment at the rate of $2,607.14 per month. No basis for the rent claim was identified.
[10] A new title to the property issued on 28 March 2011. Notice of this was given to Mr and Mrs Konishi’s solicitors on 11 April 2011. They responded by requisitioning the removal of the cross-lease instruments and associated memorials on the basis that the agreement was for a freehold title. Ms Jin did not comply with this requisition and accordingly, on 21 April 2011, Mr and Mrs Konishi’s solicitors cancelled the agreement pursuant to cl 5.2(3)(c).
[11] Ms Jin accepts that this cancellation was effective and does not oppose the return of the deposit. Mr and Mrs Konishi recognise that they have no entitlement to rent and they have abandoned this part of their claim. The result is that all parties agree that the real estate agent should refund the deposit, with interest. However, this has not yet happened because the parties are locked in battle over the issue of costs. This is the only issue that divides them and that has been the case for over two years.
[12] In summary, this is a straightforward case involving a very modest sum. In the normal course, one would expect a dispute of this nature to be resolved promptly and efficiently. The opposite has occurred in this case. Despite there being no
dispute that Mr and Mrs Konishi are entitled to the return of their deposit, but not rent, the proceedings have an extraordinary history.
[13] In August 2012, Ms Jin sought judicial review of six procedural orders made by various judges in the District Court. That application was dismissed by Wylie J on 19 February 2013.1 His Honour subsequently ordered Ms Jin to pay indemnity costs for those proceedings.2
[14] On 30 April 2013, Judge M-E Sharp struck out Ms Jin’s defence because of
non-compliance with ‘unless’ orders made on 14 August and 19 December 2012.
[15] On 10 October 2013, the Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Jin’s appeal against
Wylie J’s two judgments and ordered Ms Jin to pay indemnity costs on the appeal.3
The Supreme Court dismissed Ms Jin’s application for leave to appeal against this
judgment.4
[16] On 31 October 2013, after the Court of Appeal had released its decision, Ms Jin applied to set aside Judge Sharp’s orders made on 30 April 2013 debarring her from defending the proceeding. That application was plainly misconceived and Judge Sharp dismissed it in a judgment delivered on 9 December 2013.5 The Judge made an order requiring Mr Lee personally to pay indemnity costs on the application. It is from this judgment that the appellants now appeal.
The appeal
[17] Ms Jin filed a notice of appeal against Judge Sharp’s decision on
14 January 2014. On 4 February 2014, Ellis J noted that the issues to be determined on the appeal were accurately summarised in a memorandum filed by Mr Hickson,
who has acted throughout for Mr and Mrs Konishi. These were as follows:
1 Jin v North Shore District Court [2013] NZHC 243.
2 Jin v Konishi & Anor [2013] NZHC 810.
3 Jin v Konishi & Anor [2013] NZCA 475, [2014] NZAR 205 (CA).
4 Jin v Konishi & Anor [2014] NZSC 1.
5 Jin v Konishi & Anor DC North Shore CIV-2011-044-000085, 9 December 2013.
(a) Does the District Court now have jurisdiction to award costs against a solicitor personally.
(b) Did the District Court make any error of fact or law in:
(i) dismissing the appellant’s application to set aside judgment dated
31 October 2013;
(ii) awarding full indemnity costs to the respondents. (c) Did the District Court have jurisdiction to:
(i) debar the appellant from taking any further steps in the proceeding unless and until all extant awards of costs payable by her in related proceedings in the High Court and Court of Appeal have been paid in full;
(ii) debar the solicitor for the appellant from appearing on behalf of the appellant in the District Court on any matter relevant to the proceeding until the costs awarded against him personally have been paid in full.
[18] Ellis J directed that Mr Lee be joined as an appellant. She also made the timetable directions sought by Mr Hickson requiring the appellants to file and serve a list of points on appeal by 19 February 2014, a common bundle by 5 March 2014, and their submissions and a chronology by 12 March 2014.
[19] On 7 March 2014, Mr Lee sought a direction for transcripts of various hearings in the District Court to be prepared and made available for the purposes of the appeal. Mr Lee advised in his memorandum that the appellants sought an extension of time to file the common bundle until after these transcripts were available. On the same day, Mr Lee filed submissions in support of Ms Jin’s appeal and separate submissions in relation to his own appeal. He had not recognised at that stage that there was a disqualifying conflict of interest which precluded him from acting for Ms Jin on the appeal because the essence of his own appeal was that any costs order should have been made against her, not him.
[20] On 21 March 2014, Ellis J declined Mr Lee’s application for the District Court transcript to be produced and ordered the appellants to pay $550 costs to the respondent within five working days.
[21] On 26 March 2014, Mr Lee sought clarification as to the quantum of costs payable by each appellant in terms of the Judge’s order. He proposed that he pay
$92 and Ms Jin the balance of $458. By this time, Mr Lee realised that he could not continue to act for Ms Jin because of the conflict of interest and he advised the Court that he would no longer be acting for her. He proposed that the two appeals be heard separately. He set out in his memorandum the points he intended to raise in support of his appeal as follows:
(a) Whether counsel’s conduct on 9 December 2013 breached his duty to the
court such that it crossed the threshold of the Harley test?
(b) Whether the wasted costs awarded are reasonable and proportionate given that the respondents have discontinued their claim for the refund of the
$30,000 deposit and abandoned the $15,642.84 rental claim against the first appellant?
(c) Whether the District Court has jurisdiction to award wasted costs against counsel?
[22] Mr Hickson responded with a memorandum also dated 26 March 2014. He submitted that the appellants were jointly and severally liable for the costs ordered. He acknowledged the conflict of interest but submitted that Mr Lee should be required to continue to act for Ms Jin and should arrange for someone else to appear on his behalf at the appeal. He opposed separate hearings. He submitted that the points on appeal should be filed in a separate document and that it was unsatisfactory for them to have been included in Mr Lee’s memorandum. He also complained about the appellants’ failure to file the common bundle due on 5 March 2014 and the chronology and submissions due on 12 March 2014. The submissions were in fact filed on 7 March 2014. Mr Hickson sought directions as follows:
7.0 Directions
7.1 In all of the foregoing circumstances, the respondents seek directions that:
(a) The appellants each file and serve their points on appeal, submissions and chronology and also effect payment of the $550.00 costs already awarded to the respondents within 5 working days;
(b) The appellants jointly file and serve the common bundle within 5 working days;
(c) The second appellant, within 5 working days, to instruct another firm of solicitors and counsel to act for him on the appeal;
(d) Should the appellants fail to comply with the directions referred to in paragraph 7(a) to (c) herein, or any part thereof:
(i) the appeal shall be deemed to have been abandoned;
and
(ii) the appellants shall pay to the respondents the costs of the appeal calculated on a full solicitor and client basis, (the respondents to file and serve a memorandum as to the quantum of their costs within
7 days of the appeal being deemed to have been abandoned and the appellants to file and serve their
memorandum as to costs in reply within a further 7
days).
7.2Should Your Honour choose not to make the directions sought in paragraph 7.1(d) herein, the respondents seek, in the alternative, orders that the appellants pay costs to the appellants in the sum in the sum of $1,425.00 in respect of counsel’s attendances on preparation of this memorandum, (being costs calculated on a full solicitor and client basis), and that payment of such costs be effected within
5 working days, (thereby making the total sum payable to the respondents, within 5 working days, $1,975.00).
[23] On 10 April 2014, Ellis J made directions as set out in [7] of Mr Hickson’s memorandum, without indicating whether these directions were in terms of [7.1] or [7.2]. Mr Hickson did not notice the ambiguity implicit in the order and no steps were taken to clarify the issue at that time.
[24] On 16 April 2014, Ms Jin filed a notice advising that she intended to appear in person and providing a new address for service. She also filed her points on appeal and further submissions.
[25] On 17 April 2014, Mr Lee filed a memorandum reiterating that he was not able to continue to act for Ms Jin because of the conflict of interest and stating that she had terminated his retainer. He advised that he was unable to instruct counsel to act for him due to the short notice and his financial position. He also pointed out that he filed and served comprehensive submissions in support of his appeal on
6 March 2014. In these circumstances, he invited Ellis J to recall the directions she made on 10 April 2014.
[26] Mr Hickson responded with a memorandum filed on 23 April 2014. He acknowledged that both appellants had filed and served their submissions and that Ms Jin had filed and served her points on appeal. However, he submitted that the orders made by Ellis J on 10 April 2014 had not been fully complied with because Mr Lee had not filed his points on appeal and had not instructed solicitors and counsel to act for him. He also noted that the appellants had not filed their chronologies or the common bundle, nor had they paid the costs awarded. In these circumstances, he submitted that the appeal was deemed to have been abandoned and he sought an award of indemnity costs in relation to the appeal in the sum of
$13,105.05.
[27] The memoranda filed by Mr Lee and Mr Hickson were referred to Venning J as Duty Judge and Executive Judge. The Judge issued a minute dated 23 April 2014 declining to make the orders sought by either party. He noted that Mr Hickson’s submission that the appeal had been abandoned relied on Ellis J’s endorsement of [7] of his memorandum but pointed out that these orders had been sought in the alternative. The Judge indicated that this issue may need to be clarified but that the parties should be ready to argue the appeal on 30 April 2014.
[28] On 23 April 2014, Mr Lee filed a list setting out the issues to be determined on the appeal and a bundle of documents for the appeal comprising two volumes. The following day, he filed a chronology and a bundle of authorities.
[29] Mr Hickson responded that day with a further memorandum asking Ellis J to clarify whether the orders she made on 10 April 2014 were in terms of [7.1] or [7.2]
of his earlier memorandum. He again sought orders that the appeal had been deemed abandoned. He also sought indemnity costs for filing his memorandum.
[30] Ellis J was unable to deal with this memorandum because she was on leave. Accordingly, on 28 April 2014, Mr Hickson filed a further memorandum inviting me to make orders that the appeal was deemed to have been abandoned for the same reasons he had advanced to Venning J. He also submitted that the bundle of documents filed by Mr Lee was not a common bundle because it included only one of the documents requested by the respondents, the list of issues filed by Mr Lee was not points on appeal, and the chronology was defective because it referred to a number of events and documents that Mr Hickson considered were not relevant to the appeal. I declined to make the orders sought by Mr Hickson on the papers and directed that his application be dealt with at the commencement of the hearing of the appeal to enable the appellants to be heard in relation to it.
[31] On 28 April 2014, Mr Hickson filed submissions on behalf of the respondents, a chronology and a bundle of authorities.
[32] On 29 April 2014, the day before the hearing, Mr Lee filed a memorandum outlining the reasons for his submission that the appeal had not been abandoned. He submitted that if the same standard was applied to the respondents, they should be debarred from defending the appeal because their submissions were not filed until
28 April 2014.
[33] Against this background, I now consider the following issues:
(a) Is the appeal deemed to have been abandoned as a result of non-compliance with the orders made by Ellis J on 10 April 2014?
(b)If so, should time for compliance with those orders be extended to allow the appeal to be determined on its merits?
(c) If so, did the District Court have jurisdiction to make a costs order against a solicitor personally?
(d) If so, should such an order have been made in this case?
Is the appeal deemed to have been abandoned?
[34] Courts are always reluctant to strike out a proceeding or debar a party from defending a proceeding for non-compliance with procedural directions because the result is that the proceeding is determined on a basis other than its merits. That will seldom be just. This is why an ‘unless’ order should only be made as a last resort in a case where there has been such persistent default that the interests of justice require it.
[35] Ward LJ explained the philosophy underlying the use of ‘unless’ orders in
Hytec Limited v Coventry City Council:6
In the light of my observations that each case really should be cited upon its own facts, it may be otiose to try and encapsulate what I understand to be the philosophy underlying this approach. It seems to me it is as follows.
(1) An unless order is an order of last resort. It is not made unless there is a history of failure to comply with other orders. It is the party’s last chance to put his case in order. (2) Because that was his last chance, a failure to comply will ordinarily result in the sanction being imposed. (3) This sanction is a necessary forensic weapon which the broader interests of the administration of justice require to be deployed unless the most compelling reason is advanced to exempt his failure. (4) It seems axiomatic that if a party intentionally or deliberately (if the synonym is preferred) flouts the order then he can expect no mercy. (5) A sufficient exoneration will almost inevitably require that he satisfy the court that something beyond his control has caused his failure to comply with the order. (6) The Judge exercises his judicial discretion in deciding whether or not to excuse. A discretion judicially exercised on the facts and circumstances of each case on its own merits depends on the circumstances of that case; at the core is service to justice. (7) The interests of justice require that justice be shown to the injured party for the procedural inefficiencies caused by the twin scourges of delay and wasted costs. The public interest in the administration of justice to contain those two blights upon it also weighs very heavily. Any injustice to the defaulting party, though never to be ignored, comes a long way behind the other two.
[36] Because substantive rights may be lost as a result of non-compliance with an
‘unless’ order, such an order should only be made in appropriate cases and must be clear and unequivocal. The vulnerable party must be left in no doubt about what
must be done, when it must be done, and the consequences of not complying.
6 Hytec Ltd v Coventry City Council [1997] 1 WLR 1666 at 1674 (CA).
[37] I agree with Venning J that the orders made on 10 April 2014 are not clear. Mr Hickson may well be correct when he submits that the appellants are likely to have interpreted the order as having been made in terms of [7.1] of his memorandum, not [7.2]. However, the order referred only to [7] and is therefore ambiguous. Mr Hickson did not seek clarification of the precise terms of the order at the time. Because the order was not clear, I do not consider that the appellants were exposed to having their rights forfeited for non-compliance with it. It follows that neither appeal was deemed to be abandoned.
Should time for compliance be extended?
[38] Even if a clear and unequivocal ‘unless’ order had been made, the interests of justice require that the time for compliance with the orders should be extended in this case. As the above summary shows, there was no history of persistent default by the appellants in complying with directions made in this Court for the disposal of their appeals. The issues requiring determination on the appeal were clearly identified at the outset. Separate submissions were filed in support of both appeals on 7 March 2014, five days before the due date in terms of the original timetable orders. Although the common bundle was not filed on 5 March 2014 as originally directed, this is partly explained by the fact that Mr Lee wanted to include transcripts of three District Court hearings. His application for these transcripts was declined by Judge Sharp on 4 March 2014. Mr Lee then promptly applied to the High Court on 7 March 2014 for an order directing that these transcripts be made available. This application was not dealt with until 21 March 2014. It was reasonable for Mr Lee to delay finalising the bundle until this issue was dealt with.
[39] As soon as Mr Lee recognised the conflict of interest he immediately took steps to address it. He advised that he was no longer acting for Ms Jin, and he proposed that the two appeals be heard separately. He set out clearly and succinctly in his memorandum the three points he intended to raise in support of his appeal. He also sought clarification as to the appropriate apportionment of the costs ordered on
21 March 2014.
[40] Mr Hickson’s response was that Mr Lee should be required to continue to act for Ms Jin, notwithstanding the conflict of interest. That was wrong. Mr Lee had no choice but to relinquish his instructions in view of the conflict. Moreover, Ms Jin had withdrawn her instructions. Despite this, it was not until the hearing that Mr Hickson finally accepted that Mr Lee could not be required to act for Ms Jin and should be given leave to withdraw. He also accepted that Mr Lee was entitled to appear in person at the hearing.
[41] The object of the order made by Ellis J was to ensure that the conflict interest was dealt with appropriately before the hearing. This was done. Ms Jin filed a notice of change of representation and address for service on 16 April 2014, the day before the due date for compliance. In my view, there was no breach of this part of the Judge’s direction because the issue was dealt with appropriately and on time, albeit it in a different way from that contemplated. I can see no proper basis upon which Mr Lee’s appeal rights should be forfeited merely because he exercised his right to appear in person at the hearing, as he was free to do following termination of his retainer to act for Ms Jin. Equally, Ms Jin’s appeal rights were not lost merely because she chose not to instruct another solicitor to act for her.
[42] The bundle of documents for the appeal was filed on 23 April 2014. That was six days after the due date for compliance. However, Mr Lee apologised for this short delay and explained that he was busy at the time attending to various legal aid assignments. While I accept Mr Hickson’s complaint that Mr Lee failed to include in the common bundle all but one of the documents requested by the respondents, this has not prejudiced the respondents and has not delayed the hearing of the appeal.
[43] Mr Hickson also complains that Mr Lee did not pay the costs of $550 by
17 April 2014, as ordered. He accepts that he did not demand payment and that no prejudice has arisen from this. Mr Lee made payment on the morning of the hearing of the appeal.
[44] In all of the circumstances of this case, including the lack of any prejudice to the respondents, I consider that it would be quite unjust to strip the appellants of their appeal rights as a result of their comparatively minor delay in complying with
some aspects of the timetable order. Procedural rules are intended to facilitate the delivery of justice. They are not intended to be used as a means of depriving parties of their substantive rights for minor procedural breaches which have caused no prejudice.
[45] The Court has power to extend the time specified in an ‘unless’ order and to reinstate proceedings that have been dismissed or abandoned in consequence of such an order. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Samuels v Linzi Dresses Ltd,7 a decision which has been followed in New Zealand.8 However, because of the “last chance” nature of an ‘unless’ order, the jurisdiction to extend time is exercised sparingly. Otherwise, the utility of an ‘unless’ order would be undermined, contrary to the public interest.
[46] The importance of enforcing compliance with ‘unless’ orders was emphasised
by Roskill LJ in Samuels:9
To say that there is jurisdiction to extend the time where an ‘unless’ order has been made and not complied with is not to suggest, let this be absolutely plain, that relief should be automatically granted to parties who have failed to comply with the orders of the court otherwise than on stringent terms either as to payment of costs or as to bringing money into court or the like. Orders as to time, and in particular as to the time for delivery of pleadings and particulars, are made not to be ignored but to be complied with.
…
In my judgment, therefore, the law today is that a court has power to extend the time where an ‘unless’ order has been made but not complied with; but that it is a power which should be exercised cautiously and with due regard to the necessity for maintaining the principle that orders are made to be complied with and not to be ignored. Primarily it is a question for the discretion of the master or the judge in chambers whether the necessary relief should be granted or not.
[47] In the unusual circumstances of this case, I consider that even if a valid
‘unless’ order was made, the short extension of time required to allow the appeal to be heard on its merits should be granted. The default was comparatively minor and there has been no prejudice to the respondents. However, I should emphasise that
the indulgence afforded by the Court in this case should not be regarded as a
7 Samuels v Linzi Dresses Ltd [1981] QB 115 (CA).
8 See for example Jarden v Lawlor (1998) 12 PRNZ 516.
9 Fn 6 at 812.
and can safely be ignored in the expectation that extensions of time will readily be granted. That is certainly not the case.
Does the District Court have jurisdiction to make costs awards against solicitors?
[48] Judge Sharp referred to Hammond J’s decision in Hughes v Ratcliffe which confirmed that the High Court’s power to make an award of costs against a solicitor is based on its inherent jurisdiction to supervise the conduct of its officers.10
Hammond J concluded that because the District Court has no inherent jurisdiction, it had no power to make such an order. Judge Sharp stated that she initially thought that this “was the end of the matter”. However, she said that Mr Hickson had persuaded her “that it is now time for this Court to do differently”. She accepted Mr Hickson’s submission that the position had changed with the introduction of r 3.31 of the District Courts Rules 2009, which incorporated r 1.20 of the High Court Rules. This rule provides:
Lawyers’ duties
1.20 (1) The duties imposed by these rules on lawyers do not limit a lawyer’s obligations to a client or another lawyer or the court under the rules of conduct and client care for lawyers in New Zealand or other applicable ethical rules or guidelines.
(2) A lawyer who acts for a party to a proceeding, or is a party to any proceeding, must not, without the leave of the court, act for any other party to the proceeding who does not have the same interest in the subject matter of the proceeding.
(3) In this rule, lawyer includes the partner of a solicitor to whom subclause (1) applies.
(4) In applying these rules, the court may have regard to the obligations referred to in subclause (1).
[49] The Judge reasoned that this rule meant that the Court could have regard to a solicitor’s obligations under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 when assessing costs. On this basis, she considered that the District Court now has an implied power to hold solicitors accountable by way of
personal costs awards for any serious dereliction of their duties to the District Court
10 Hughes v Ratcliffe (2000) 14 PRNZ 690 (HC).
McDonald.11
[50] I do not accept this analysis. The Privy Council made it clear that the power to make a costs award against a client’s solicitor is based on the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise the conduct of its officers. Lord Hope, who delivered the judgment of Their Lordships, stated:12
The undoubted inherent jurisdiction of the Courts in New Zealand to make a costs order against a client’s solicitor rests upon the principle that, as officers of the Court, solicitors owe a duty to the Court, while the Court for its part has a duty to ensure that its officers achieve and maintain an appropriate level of competence and do not abuse the Court’s process. The Court’s duty is founded in the public interest that the procedures of the Court to which litigants and others are subjected are conducted by its officers as economically and efficiently as possible. In New Zealand barristers are also officers of the High Court. This being so, there would seem to be no reason in principle why the Court should not exercise the same jurisdiction over them as it does over solicitors.
[51] The District Court does not have any inherent jurisdiction. It has no power to make any costs award other than those specifically authorised in the District Courts Rules or by statute. Rule 3.31 does not confer any such power. The law remains assess stated by Hammond J in Hughes v Ratcliffe. The District Court had no power to make an award of costs against Mr Lee personally. The award must accordingly be set aside.
[52] Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary for me to consider
whether Mr Lee’s conduct would have justified such an award being made.
Result
[53] The appeal by the first appellant is dismissed for want of prosecution.
[54] The appeal by the second appellant is allowed. The order requiring the second appellant to pay costs is quashed. The issue of party and party costs in the
District Court is to be determined by that Court.
11 Harley v McDonald [2002] 1 NZLR 1 (PC).
12 At [45].
M A Gilbert J
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