James Hardie New Zealand Ltd v White

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA69/2020
 [2020] NZCA 142

BETWEEN

JAMES HARDIE NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
First Appellant 

STUDORP LIMITED
Second Appellant

JAMES HARDIE NZ HOLDINGS LIMITED
Third Appellant

RCI HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
Fourth Appellant

JAMES HARDIE AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
Fifth Appellant

JAMES HARDIE RESEARCH PTY LIMITED
Sixth Appellant

JAMES HARDIE INDUSTRIES PLC
Seventh Appellant

AND

K L WHITE AND THE PERSONS LISTED IN SCHEDULE 1
First Respondent

WAITAKERE GROUP LIMITED
Second Respondent

METLIFECARE PINESONG LIMITED
Third Respondent

FOREST LAKE GARDENS LIMITED
Fourth Respondent



VISION (DANNEMORA) LIMITED
Fifth Respondent

METLIFECARE COASTAL VILLAS LIMITED
Sixth Respondent

Hearing:

21 April 2020

Court:

Cooper, Brown and Goddard JJ

Counsel:

J E Hodder QC, J A McKay and W M Cheyne for Appellants
C M Meechan QC, C L Gordon and S M Sharma for Waitakere Respondents
B D Gray QC, A J Thorn and R A Havelock for White Respondents

Judgment:

5 May 2020 at 11.00 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application to adduce further evidence is declined. 

BThe appeal is allowed.

CThe JH companies are entitled to one set of costs for a standard appeal on a band A basis, with usual disbursements.  We certify for second counsel.

DCosts in the High Court are to be determined in that Court.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Goddard J)

Introduction and summary

  1. The respondents (the claimants) are the past or present owners of buildings which were constructed using exterior cladding products designed, manufactured and sold by the James Hardie Group (James Hardie products).  The claimants allege that the James Hardie products were defective.  They claim damages in respect of weathertightness problems which they say were caused by those defects. 

  2. The claim is brought against seven companies in the James Hardie Group (the JH companies):

    (a)Four operating companies — Studorp Ltd, James Hardie New Zealand Ltd, James Hardie Australia Pty Ltd and James Hardie Research Pty Ltd;

    (b)Three holding companies — James Hardie Industries Plc (JHI: the ultimate parent company of the Group), RCI Holdings Pty Ltd (the immediate parent company of Studorp Ltd), and James Hardie NZ Holdings Ltd (the immediate parent company of James Hardie New Zealand Ltd).

  3. The High Court made a number of orders providing for discovery in these proceedings.  In November 2019 the JH companies filed and served an affidavit of documents.  The affidavit listed some 28,000 documents in the format prescribed in the High Court Rules 2016 (Rules).  The affidavit was affirmed by Mr Alexander Petrie, who is employed by James Hardie Australia Pty Ltd as “Legal Counsel – APAC”.  The affidavit records that he is authorised to make the affidavit on behalf of the JH companies. 

  4. The claimants say that the JH companies’ list of documents fails to comply with the Rules in a number of respects.  This appeal is concerned with the claimants’ complaint that the JH companies have not filed and served separate affidavits of documents listing documents that each company has in its…

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Details
Case
[2020] NZCA 142
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In James Hardie New Zealand Ltd v White, the plaintiffs brought an action against several defendants, including James Hardie New Zealand Ltd and others, for damages arising from the alleged defective manufacture of cement products. The dispute centred around the discovery of documents required by the defendants to be produced as part of the litigation process. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an order that each defendant swear an affidavit of documents in their control in accordance with rules 8.15 and 8.24 of the relevant court rules. The defendants argued that they had collectively complied with the discovery rules by producing an affidavit of documents in the collective control of all defendants, rather than separate affidavits for each defendant.

The court was required to determine whether the defendants could satisfy their discovery obligations through a collective affidavit of documents or whether each defendant was required to swear a separate affidavit. The key legal issues were the interpretation of rules 8.15 and 8.24, and the extent to which a collective affidavit could be sufficient when the possession of documentation was directly relevant to a key issue in dispute. The court also considered the principle of avoiding unnecessary duplication and cost in the litigation process.

The court held that the rules must be interpreted in a way that ensures transparent and clear discovery of relevant documents. The court found that the defendants' argument that collective discovery was sufficient was discordant with the evident object of the rules, which is to secure discovery by "each" party. The court emphasised that the integrity and efficacy of the discovery process would be damaged if collective discovery were allowed in this case, given the specific issues raised in the pleadings and the extensive litigation history. The court concluded that the defendants needed to provide separate affidavits for each defendant, as required by the rules, and that a bare assertion of impossibility was insufficient to avoid this obligation. The court also noted that better evidence was needed to substantiate the claim of impossibility, such as evidence showing how the documents were catalogued or an expert opinion on the ability to identify the source of the documents.

The court ordered each defendant to swear an affidavit of documents in their control, in accordance with rules 8.15 and 8.24, and directed that each defendant provide an affidavit of documents in their control within a specified timeframe.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Rule 8.24 specifies who can swear an affidavit of documents. The Judge who makes the discovery order can specify who must make the affidavit of documents. If the Judge does not specify the person or the group or class of persons to make the affidavit, then if the person required to make discovery is a corporation, the affidavit must be sworn by a person who meets the requirements of r 9.82. Rule 9.82 provides:9.82 Affidavits made on behalf of corporationA person may make an affidavit on behalf of a corporation or body of persons empowered by law to sue or to be sued (whether in the name of the body or in the name of the holder of an office) if the person—(a) knows the relevant facts; and(b) is authorised to make the affidavit. The Judge considered that “the starting point for the analysis is the plain words of r 8.15”, which provides that each party must produce an affidavit of documents.[6] Under r 8.24, if that person is a corporation, only a person who knows the relevant facts and is authorised to make the affidavit may do so. So, the Judge said:[7]The logical implication of this clear scheme is that each defendant is required to file and serve an affidavit of documents and that affidavit has to be sworn by someone who knows the relevant facts and is authorised to do so. [6]High Court judgment, above n 1, at [30].[7]At [30]. As the Judge acknowledged, these rules must be applied in a way that avoids unnecessary duplication and cost. For that reason, a single affidavit may be filed on behalf of several defendants with a common interest, where no useful purpose would be served by requiring each of them to produce the same or a similar affidavit.[8][8]At [31]. The Judge set out his conclusions as follows:[32] But here, where possession of documentation is itself directly relevant to a key issue in dispute, a party is entitled to the literal enforcement of rules 8.15 and 8.24, assuming for that purpose it is reasonably possible to do so. In this regard, the defendants have always maintained that the third, fourth and seventh defendants have no connection whatsoever to the manufacture of the allegedly defective products. That being the case, the principle of common interest stated by Associate Judge Bell is not obviously applicable. Illustrative perhaps of that separation, the defendants’ proposed timetable for discovery referred to each of the defendants.[33] As noted, Mr McKay’s secondary argument is that the documents are now in the collective control of the defendants, because each of the defendants consents to that collective possession. This is then said to mean that the defendants are complying with rule 8.15 because they are literally in control of all documents. Further disaggregation by defendant is therefore not required.[34] For my part I find that approach to be at best discordant with the evident object of rule 8.15 to secure discovery by “each” party. At worst, in a case like the present involving claims of knowledge of defects by all defendants, such an approach could be said to be a device to avoid transparent discovery. While I make no finding that that is the defendants’ purpose here, I prefer a construction of rule 8.15 and 8.16 which secures the clear and transparent discovery by a party to litigation of relevant documents in their control or documents that have been in their control.[35] Turning then to reasonableness, it is necessary to acknowledge the very large discovery task undertaken by the defendants and the vast pools of documents that they have had to discover. Had this been a case where there was no pleaded issue as to the responsibility of specified defendants, I would not have been minded to require each defendant to provide an affidavit of documents in their control. But not only is the issue pleaded, it has already been subject to substantial litigation before this Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. To my mind, against that background, it would do serious damage to the integrity and efficacy of the discovery process to permit collective discovery, the effect of which is to then require the plaintiffs to embark on a process of identification and attribution by defendant of those documents. [36] In this regard Mr Petrie’s opinion that identification of the documents by each defendant is “totally impractical and probably impossible” is not substantially helpful to me. While it is not for me to set out the type of evidence that a party should produce in order to avoid its ordinary discovery obligations, evidence as to how the hard copy or electronic documents were originally catalogued for storage purposes should be adduced. That evidence would need to clearly show that no such cataloguing by defendant took place in order to sustain the impossibility claim. Similarly, insofar as concerns documents stored on servers, clear evidence from a suitably qualified expert as to the ability to identify which of the defendants is the source or otherwise in control of the document, is to be expected if the claim to impossibility is to be sustained. Moreover, Mr McKay accepted, unsurprisingly, that each of the defendants has a pool of documents over which they have control. It would be remarkable if that were not the case. Therefore, better evidence than a bare assertion of impossibility is required before this Court can reasonably accept that identification of documents by defendant is not reasonably possible. Nor is Mr Petrie’s evidence to be accepted at face value when it appears no attempt has, in fact, been made to identify the documents in the control or possession of each defendant, because the defendants believed only collective discovery was required. (Footnotes omitted).