Wakefield v Network Waitaki Limited
[2025] NZHC 656
•26 March 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2023-476-9
[2025] NZHC 656
BETWEEN GARRY JOHN WAKEFIELD and FIONA JEAN WAKEFIELD
First Plaintiffs
OTHER PLAINTIFFS
Second to One Hundred and Seventeenth Plaintiffs (detailed in Schedule A)
AND
NETWORK WAITAKI LIMITED
Defendant
Hearing: 6 March 2025 Appearances:
B Cuff and K Weekly for Plaintiffs
C Walker KC, W J Hamilton and A F N Larkin for Defendant
Judgment:
26 March 2025
Reissued:
27 March 2025
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER
(Discovery)
WAKEFIELD v NETWORK WAITAKI LIMITED [2025] NZHC 656 [26 March 2025]
Introduction
[1] This proceeding concerns a fire that started on 4 October 2020 between 2.10am and 3.00am that devastated the Lake Ōhau Village. That there are 117 plaintiffs says something of the scale of the damage that occurred as does the quantum of damages claimed ($52,792,651. 87).
[2] The plaintiffs say the fire started at power pole number 35693, part of the Lake Ōhau Feeder Line operated by Network Waitaki Limited (Waitaki), which runs through vacant land outside of the Ōhau township.
[3] In this application the plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of discovery provided by Waitaki and seek orders setting aside a claim for litigation privilege by Waitaki in respect of documents created from the time it learnt of the fire to when a “hold liable” letter was sent on behalf of the plaintiffs on 7 October 2020 — after that letter the plaintiffs accept litigation privilege exists.
The application for further and better discovery
[4] This part of the plaintiffs’ application brings to the fore the tension between two principles.
[5] The first is the well-known principle that in an application for further and better discovery, the respondent enjoys a presumption that the affidavits of documents filed are conclusive.1 The onus is on an applicant to establish the documents they seek are relevant, that there are grounds for belief the documents exist, and requiring disclosure is proportionate and appropriate.2
[6] The second and perhaps lesser-known principle is that an affidavit of discovery documents is not intended to serve any broader evidential function.3 A list of
1 Jessica Gorman and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR9.19.03].
2 Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (New Zealand) Ltd [2015] NZHC 2760, [2018] NZAR 600 at [14].
3 James Hardie New Zealand Ltd v White [2020] NZCA 142 at [72]: and White v James Hardie New Zealand Ltd [2020] NZHC 2202 at [130].
documents is only intended to facilitate production of discoverable documents which are not privileged and the disclosure of the existence of potentially other undiscoverable documents not in the control of the party giving discovery.
[7] Mr Cuff, counsel for the plaintiffs, explained the plaintiffs have been ordered to provide particulars of their negligence claim against Waitaki once discovery has been completed. The plaintiffs say the defendant’s discovery is inadequate in respect of the maintenance of the power pole in question and generally in respect of maintenance records, staff training records and further matters I expand on below. Accordingly, from the plaintiffs’ point of view, certainty as to what is not in the discovered documents is important.
The discovery exercise undertaken by Waitaki
[8] Waitaki has filed two affidavits of documents. Waitaki’s second affidavit was the result of it discovering there had been an error in a data extraction application used in its initial discovery exercise which resulted in a large number of files being incorrectly dated and not caught by the initial key word search. Mr Andrew, the Chief Executive Officer of Waitaki, explains the electronic and physical searches for documents which were undertaken were intended to cover a 10-year period from 4 October 2011 to 4 October 2021. The defendant provided its solicitors with 268 zip files and pst containers, containing over 2,600,000 files.
[9] The solicitors ran key word searches and a de-duplication software, resulting in 138,250 documents (the original population) which were then reviewed by a solicitor at Chapman Tripp for relevance. The review set was also reviewed by a continuous active learning algorithm to prioritise potentially relevant documents within the search term responsive set.
[10] The first affidavit of documents is dated 27 June 2024. The plaintiffs’ solicitors in correspondence of 15 August 2024 and 22 October 2024 raised a number of deficiencies in the list.
[11] As mentioned at [8], a second affidavit of documents was sworn by Mr Andrews on 20 December 2024. That affidavit explains the dating error noted
above which resulted in a further population of 127,369 documents being identified to be reviewed for relevance (the further population). Mr Andrews explains that to meet the enquiries made by the plaintiffs, additional search terms were applied to the entire group of documents. This resulted in some 265,619 being searched using the expanded range of search terms to address the queries raised in the plaintiffs’ requests. This produced a second list of documents from Waitaki which discovered approximately a further 10,425 documents, giving a total of nearly 17,500 documents discovered by Waitaki.
[12] Mr Andrews’ evidence describes, as I have said, a continuous active learning algorithm which assists the manual review process through a statistical machine learning algorithm which estimates the likely relevance of each document that is not being reviewed. The machine learning algorithm is based on documents manually reviewed by a lawyer which are coded as ‘relevant’ and ‘not relevant’. It is said the manual review trains software on what documents are potentially relevant or not. However, at the end of the day, relevance was determined by a solicitor not a computer and I was told that all of the potentially relevant documents were reviewed by a senior solicitor.
[13] No evidence was raised by the plaintiffs to suggest the methodology used for reviewing the bulk of documents was inadequate. Mr Cuff expressly had no issue with the search terms used, albeit he had residual concerns about the relevance review.
[14] The plaintiffs sought further discovery documents in their application dated 1 November 2024. Following the filing of Waitaki’s supplementary list on 20 December 2024 the plaintiffs’ application was pursued in respect of 15 categories of documents. I do not intend to address each category as Waitaki’s response to each was the same.
[15] At the risk of over-simplification, the theme of Mr Walker KC’s, counsel for the defendant, opposition was to ask what else can Waitaki do by way of discovery? Mr Walker submits there is no criticism from the plaintiffs of the search terms used, no evidence that the computer system used to apply those search terms was not
appropriate, and in those cases where a document does refer to another document that has not been disclosed despite the search undertaken, such have not been located.
[16] That reality begs the question of what exactly it is the plaintiffs expect the defendant to do further? There is no evidence that a re-run of the search would result in further documents being produced. Had there been evidence that the technique used to trawl the bulk of files was prone to error or somehow unreliable, such may have been called for.
[17] I note the expanded range of search terms prompted by the plaintiffs’ letters of 15 August and 22 October 2024 were not applied to the entire 2,600,000 files, but only to the original population and the further population.
[18] It seems that the relevance review by the solicitor was, as far as I understand it, subject to an electronic cross-check.
[19] One option which was not discussed would be for the plaintiffs to fund an independent lawyer to review the relevance exercise manually carried out by Waitaki’s solicitor. With appropriate confidentiality undertakings in place, and with Waitaki being confident as to the accuracy of its relevance review and with all expenses borne by the plaintiffs, it is hard to see how such a request could reasonably be resisted. Leave is reserved to apply further if the plaintiffs want to pursue this possible outcome.
[20] Waitaki considered the issues raised with its discovery warranted expanding its range of search terms used against the two populations already described. The possibility of searching the remaining nearly 2,600,000 files using the expanded range of search terms was not discussed with counsel.
[21]We come back to the tension between the two principles referred to at [5] and
[6] above. The plaintiffs seek evidentiary certainty in respect of Waitaki’s documents in order to frame their pleading around what an absence of material may mean. Given Waitaki’s position is that it has searched for and found no further documents, there is no reason for it not to provide an evidentiary affidavit to that effect. In the event further documents are found in the future then they will have to be disclosed in the
usual way. However, it would not lie well with Waitaki to resist this application on the basis that its disclosure is complete and an order for further discovery would achieve nothing, yet not be prepared to formally confirm that position in an affidavit.
[22] There is leave to the plaintiffs to seek a telephone conference in respect of whether the expanded range of search terms should be applied to the full 2,600,000 files. The assumption adopted by Waitaki in expanding its search terms is that the discovery queries raised by the plaintiffs would be addressed by only searching the original and further populations. There may be a legitimate reason for that. If counsel cannot resolve that matter directly, as I have said, leave is reserved.
[23] The affidavit required at paragraph [21] is to be provided by Waitaki within 15 working days unless counsel consider that searching the original 2,600,000 files as discussed above, warrants a deferral of that timeframe, in which case counsel are to advise. Leave is reserved accordingly.
Plaintiffs’ challenge to privilege claims by Waitaki
[24] As noted in the introduction to this judgment, the plaintiffs challenge to the litigation privilege claimed by Waitaki relates to essentially two days, that is, between the date of the fire and the “hold liable” letter sent to Waitaki on 7 October 2020.
[25] Waitaki’s initial affidavit of documents claimed legal advice privilege for all communications between it, Chapman Tripp and Waitaki’s “other legal advisers” from 4 October 2020 through to the date of the affidavit, 27 June 2024.
[26] From 5 October 2020 to the date of the affidavit, privilege was claimed for “Communications exchanged between [Waitaki], Chapman Tripp and/or third parties for the dominant purpose of preparing for active or apprehended proceedings brought by the plaintiffs” (emphasis added). The plaintiffs challenge Waitaki’s claim to litigation privilege and to confidentiality over documents dated from 5 October 2020 up to and including 7 October 2020, that is up until the “hold liable” letter was sent.
[27] The challenge is on the basis that the documents were not prepared for the dominant purpose of proceedings and that Waitaki did not reasonably apprehend proceedings at the time the documents were created.
[28] It is unhelpful that the litigation privilege section of the affidavit does not identify the particular documents for which privilege is claimed, rather, it describes the documents by way of category. I note that discovery in terms of groups of documents is permitted,4 but when there is a challenge to privilege the Court would be assisted by more detail as to the identity of parties to correspondence or the nature of the documents when considering a claim for privilege.
Assessing claims for privilege
[29] Waitaki relies on s 56(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2006 (the Act) which provides:
56 Privilege for preparatory materials for proceedings
(1)Subsection (2) applies to a communication or information only if the communication or information is made, received, compiled, or prepared for the dominant purpose of preparing for a proceeding or an apprehended proceeding (the proceeding).
(2)A person (the party) who is, or on reasonable grounds contemplates becoming, a party to the proceeding has a privilege in respect of—
(a)a communication between the party and any other person:
(b)a communication between the party’s legal adviser and any other person:
(c)information compiled or prepared by the party or the party’s legal adviser:
(d)information compiled or prepared at the request of the party, or the party’s legal adviser, by any other person.
[30] The plaintiffs challenge both the reasonable contemplation requirement (s 56(2)) and the dominant purpose requirement (s 56(1)).
4 See High Court Rules 2016, rr 8.15(2)(e) and 8.16(2) and pt 2 of sch 9.
Reasonable contemplation
[31]The learned authors of Cross on Evidence state:5
The Act requires that the privilege holder either be or “reasonably contemplate becoming” a party to a proceeding or an anticipated proceeding. This is a “qualification” that the person who is making the claim must satisfy. The question is one of fact, to be determined on the evidence offered as to the actual contemplation of the party concerned, and on the reasonableness of that contemplation. The onus is on the party claiming the privilege.
(footnotes omitted)
[32] One of the footnotes cited in Cross on Evidence is Attorney-General v Seven Electrical Ltd.6 In that case, Master Thomson said:7
In deciding what the dominant purpose of preparation of documents was, the Court should look at the intention of the composer of the document and the intention of the composer of the documents and the intention of the person or authority under whose direction they have been produced or brought into existence.
(footnotes omitted)
[33]Master Thomson also noted that:8
A party setting up a claim for privilege has an onus to establish its entitlement to the benefit of the privilege. That entitlement must be established clearly and unequivocally.
(citation omitted)
[34] I note these authorities pre-date the passing of the Act, but Cross on Evidence notes that: “Section 56 was intended to restate the existing law in relation to “litigation privilege””.9
5 Mathew Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA56.5(a)].
6 Attorney-General v Seven Electrical Ltd HC Wellington CP251/00, 14 November 2001.
7 At [8].
8 At [10].
9 Above n 5 at [EVA56.3].
[35] Carlton Cranes Ltd v Consolidated Hotels Ltd,10 relied on by Master Thomson in the Seven Electrical Ltd case,11 has been referred to in recent decisions, without criticism of this principle.12
[36] I have focused on this issue as there is no evidence from Waitaki as to what the members of the Board actually apprehended at the time it is asserted privilege arose. Mr Walker suggested the Court would have been critical of evidence of what individual Board members apprehended but in fact that was required. One has to first consider the actual contemplation of the party concerned and second, the reasonableness of that contemplation.
The evidence relied on by Waitaki
[37] Ms Merrick, a solicitor with Chapman Tripp, has filed an affidavit to produce material said to support the proposition that litigation was reasonably contemplated. However, it is not enough that litigation could have been contemplated, that is, with the benefit of hindsight the likelihood of litigation is revealed. The question is, was litigation actually contemplated and if it was, was that belief reasonable? There is no evidence on this issue from anyone at Waitaki.
[38] The evidence relied on by Waitaki to show a reasonable likelihood of litigation is as follows.
4 October 2020
[39] The first is an email from Mr Underhill, a member of the Waitaki Board, circulated to Board members at 5.09pm on 4 October 2020, noting the seriousness of the fire and it reads:
If people are making the arcing powerline claim then it would be important to find the evidence, otherwise we could be incorrectly blamed as arcing powerlines often are incorrectly blamed. I apologise for the following which is telling you to suck eggs.
10 Carlton Cranes Ltd v Consolidated Hotels Ltd [1998] 2 NZLR 555.
11 Attorney-General v Seven Electrical Ltd, above n 6.
12 See Minister of Education v James Hardie New Zealand [2020] NZAR 641; Public Trust v Hotchilly Ltd [2010] BCL 344; and Telecom New Zealand v AMP New Zealand Property Commercial Ltd [2006] BCL 295.
[40] Mr Underhill then referred to the issue of whether there were trees close to the high voltage lines. He referred to the possibility of “phase to phase arcing” of power lines causing molten metal to hit the undergrowth. His email concluded: “Absent the evidence then probably there is no basis for the claim.”
The next email is from Mr Douch, the former Chief Executive of Waitaki, described as being a quick update for members of the Board. He says: “There are reports of damage to lines and poles but it is too early to speculate on cause.” The email carries on to say:
The Mayor has started telling media “it is suspected it was caused by arcing powerlines” which isn’t helpful at the point in time. … I expect we will come into the firing line as things move from the initial shock and response to finger pointing.
[41] Mr Douch goes on to record that they were checking their “sequence of events as well as compiling our records on maintenance, defects and tree surveys.”
[42] A member of the Board who was a solicitor replied to all later that day recommending: “we give precautionary notification to our Insurers. They may want to pre-approve statements we issue.” Mr Walker submitted the insurer referred to can only be the public liability insurer as one does not give precautionary notification to a material damage insurer.
[43] Then there is reference to Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) notes from a meeting with Waitaki representatives on 4 October 2020. That material was obtained under the Official Information Act 1982, and it is not suggested it was known to the Board at the time. It does not assist.
[44] Next is a further email from Mr Douch at 9.41 pm on 4 October 2020 which refers to Waitaki’s liaison with FENZ, the extent of the damage and notes “Our insurers were advised this morning and they have appointed legal (Garth Galloway of Chapman Tripp) so we will discuss that first thing in the morning”. The balance of the email is redacted.
[45]The 9.41 pm email concluded:
There are three key workstreams for us this [coming] week. These will be our priorities.
1.Legal/Insurance
2.PR and Stakeholder comms
3.Operational response/recovery
[46] Ms Merrick’s affidavit then refers to material from the Radio New Zealand website about the fire which included a reference to the Mayor’s suspicions that the fire was caused by power lines arcing in the wind. This adds nothing to the previous reference to what the Mayor was reportedly saying. In any event, there is no evidence that the Board was aware of this Radio New Zealand article.
5 October 2020
[47] On the morning of 5 October, Mr Wood, also a member of the Board, emailed the Board noting the extent of the disaster, saying:
Unfortunately I expect lines companies could become an easy target especially now after the Orion settlement. As Mike suggested we need to undertake our own thorough inspection of both the Ohau & Livingstone lines outages & tree management history.
Good to get the insurers notified early.
[48] There was an email at 9.47 am on 5 October sent to what appears to be Waitaki’s standard email address, from a reporter saying: “I just wanted to check in with you and see if there was any more information about the suggestion power lines arcing caused the fire in Lake [Ō]hau”. There are other enquiries from the media at
10.05 am on 5 October with similar enquiries. Again, I am not told that this information was known to the Board on 5 October.
[49] Finally, there is a further FENZ diary note dated 5 October timed at 15:30 hrs recording a discussion with someone from Waitaki, whose name is redacted in the diary note, referring to an agreement between FENZ and Waitaki for it to supply photographs of the cross-arm Waitaki repaired. (The plaintiffs assert the fire started at the pole with this cross-arm). Mr Walker suggested this showed that FENZ’s
concerns were starting to coalesce around the cross-arm issue. However, again, there is no evidence that the Board was aware of this discussion.
[50] The thrust of Mr Walker’s submission is that these factors, particularly the notification of the public liability insurer and the involvement of solicitors, objectively showed that litigation was likely. Support for that can be found in comments made in the Seven Electrical Ltd decision that lodging a claim with an insurer is a strong indicator that an insured reasonably apprehended they were likely to be sued.13 Against that here is that the notification was expressly described as “precautionary”, that is, “just in case” and the reality that the holder of a public liability policy is obliged to notify their insurer as soon as they have reason to believe a claim might arise, lest the insurer claim late notification.
[51] However, there remains the requirement that the party claiming litigation privilege must have themselves apprehended that litigation was likely. A mere apprehension of litigation is not sufficient. There must be a bona fide belief that litigation will probably ensue. Litigation must be “more than a possibility”, it must be “pending or contemplated” or reasonably anticipated or in reasonable prospect.14
[52] I have already referred to Mr Walker’s suggestion that the Court would have been critical of evidence being led as to the subjective belief of members of the Board. However, such evidence was required. As I have already said, Waitaki, that is, its Board, must have actually contemplated that litigation was probable, that is, more than a possibility. The high point for Waitaki is the notification of its public liability insurer but as I have said, that seems to have been on a “just in case” basis rather than because of an actual belief litigation was likely. Mr Cuff’s written submissions referred to the fact Waitaki produced the Board communications on 4 and 5 October 2020, addressed above, along with the media reports and FENZ material by way of a solicitor’s affidavit meaning, that Waitaki had not provided any evidence of fact which could be used to assess whether the twin requirements of s 56, mainly reasonable apprehension and dominant purpose, had been met.
13 Attorney-General v Seven Electrical Ltd, above n 6 at [15].
14 See the authorities provided in Hendra v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd HC Palmerston North CP23589, 26 July 1990 at 7(g).
Dominant purpose
[53] Again, Mr Cuff submitted that Waitaki had not produced any evidence to demonstrate the documents for which privilege is claimed were created for the dominant purpose of litigation. I accept that submission. Mr Cuff notes that the authorities provide the test involves a question of fact to be applied with some rigour.15
[54]Other than the broadest of descriptions of the documents which refer to:
Notes, memoranda, research material, working papers, briefs of evidence, drafts and other documents prepared by or obtained by any of the defendant; [their] solicitors [or] other legal advisers; the employees or agents of the defendant; or third parties”
said to be made after the proceeding was in contemplation, I am not given any detail as to what the documents are.
[55] Mr Cuff notes that the relevant timeframe is the two days after the fire. He submits that even if litigation was reasonably apprehended, it is highly likely that any documents prepared at this time were dual purpose documents which do not meet the dominant purpose test. Nor does the fact that a document may later be used for the purposes of litigation mean that it meets the dominant purpose test where the original purpose behind the creation of the document was different.16
Decision
[56] I find that Waitaki has failed to meet its onus in respect of both limbs of s 56 of the Evidence Act 2006.
[57] Accordingly, I make an order in terms of paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the plaintiffs’ application dated 1 November 2024. The order applies to documents up until the time Waitaki received the hold liable letter on 7 October 2020. The order sought at paragraph 1.1 is declined and the orders made at [22] and [23] above are made in its stead.
15 Eli Lilly and Company (NZ) Ltd v DHL Supply Chain Ltd [2021] NZHC 3163 at [29]; and
White v James Hardie New Zealand, above n 3 at [144].
16 Minister of Education v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 3487 at [24].
Costs
[58] Costs are reserved. Memoranda may be filed within 10 working days to be not more than five pages if costs cannot be agreed.
Associate Judge Lester
Solicitors:
Wotton Kearney, Wellington (for Plaintiffs) Chapman Tripp, Christchurch (for Defendant)
SCHEDULE A
GARRY JOHN WAKEFIELD, FIONA JEAN WAKEFIELD and ELEANOR MARY SMART, as
trustees of the WAKEFIELD FAMILY TRUST Second Plaintiffs
FJ AND GJ WAKEFIELD FOREST PARTNERSHIP
Third Plaintiff
ERIC FREDERICK HENDRIK BREETVELT, MICHELLE PATRICIA BREETVELT, ABRAHAM KRIS BREETVELT and STANLEY KURT
BREETVELT
Fourth Plaintiffs
CAMPBELL ROBERT DYKES and LYNDA ELIZABETH GRAY
Fifth Plaintiffs
LYNDA ELIZABETH GRAY and I & C TRUSTEES
LIMITED, as trustees of the EVORA TRUST Sixth Plaintiffs
SALLY BRIGET HOLLOWAY and JEFFREY IRVIN HOLLOWAY
Seventh Plaintiffs
SALLY BRIGET HOLLOWAY, JEFFREY IRVIN HOLLOWAY and DOWNIE STEWART
TRUSTEE LIMITED, as trustees of the JEFF AND SALLY HOLLOWAY FAMILY TRUST
Eighth Plaintiffs
DAVID NEIL HONEYFIELD and JANETTE LOUISE WHELAN
Ninth Plaintiffs
MOLLY NAUGHTON
Tenth Plaintiff
ANNE ELIZABETH DENNIS, FRANK
EDGERTON DENNIS and MARINUS ANTONIUSBAKX, as trustees of the LINDISBURN TRUST Eleventh Plaintiffs
BARBARA JOAN MACKAY and NORMAN PANTON McKAY
Twelfth Plaintiffs
MALCOLM DAVID McMILLAN
Thirteenth Plaintiff
PERPETUAL TRUST LIMITED and MALCOLM
DAVID McMILLAN, as trustees of the E. A. McMILLAN FAMILY TRUST
Fourteenth Plaintiffs
DAVID McMILLAN
Fifteenth Plaintiff
OHAU SNOW HOLDINGS LIMITED
Sixteenth Plaintiff
ANTHONY JOSEPH RYAN
Seventeenth Plaintiff
ANTHONY JOSEPH RYAN, JUDITH CATHERINE RYAN and A J & J C RYAN
TRUSTEES LIMITED, as trustees of the AJ & JC RYAN FAMILY TRUST
Eighteenth Plaintiffs
WILLEM ALEID CORNELIS SANDBERG and NAPIER INDEPENDENT TRUSTEES LIMITED, as
trustees of the SANDBERG TRUST, and TRACEY KELLY
Nineteenth Plaintiffs
WILLEM ALEID CORNELIS SANDBERG
Twentieth Plaintiff
STEPHEN CARL JOHN SIMMONS
Twenty-First Plaintiff
STEPHEN CARL JOHN SIMMONS and LINDA
SIMMONS, as trustees of THE BLUE GOLD TRUST
Twenty-Second Plaintiffs
DETECTION SERVICES LIMITED
Twenty-Third Plaintiff
VIVIENNE MARY SMITH-CAMPBELL
Twenty-Fourth Plaintiffs
VIVIENNE MARY SMITH-CAMPBELL and JOHN
LOUIS CAMPBELL, as trustees of the OHAU FAMILY TRUST
Twenty-Fifth Plaintiffs
VIVIENNE MARY SMITH-CAMPBELL and JOHN
LOUIS CAMPBELL, as trustees of THE INLANDS TRUST
Twenty-Sixth Plaintiffs
ROWENA SMITHIES and SIMON JOHN SMITHIES
Twenty-Seventh Plaintiffs
HUGH AYSON SPIERS and DWAYNE ARTHUR RENNIE
Twenty-Eighth Plaintiffs
CHRISTOPHER CHARLES SPIERS
Twenty-Ninth Plaintiff
CHRISTOPHER CHARLES SPIERS, LENA RAE SPIERS, HUGH AYSON SPIERS, JACQUELINE HELEN BANCROFT and GUY DOUGLAS
BANCROFT, as trustees of the SPIERS FAMILY TRUST
Thirtieth Plaintiffs
STANLEY JOHN DOWNEY SPIERS
Thirty-First Plaintiff
KARLA SCHMIDT
Thirty-Second Plaintiff
BRIAN WILLIAM TREVATHAN, LOIS TREVATHAN
Thirty-Third Plaintiffs
BRIAN WILLIAM TREVATHAN, LOIS
TREVATHAN and NEW ZEALAND TRUSTEE
SERVICE LIMITED, as trustees of the MARYBRAE TRUST
Third-Fourth Plaintiffs
BERNARD PIERRE WICHT and HELEN ELIZABETH McMAHON
Thirty-Fifth Plaintiffs
BERNARD PIERRE WICHT, EVAN JAMES
TAYLOR, as trustees of the B WICHT FAMILY
TRUST, and HELEN ELIZABETH McMAHON andEVAN JAMES TAYLOR, as trustees of the H McMAHON FAMILY TRUST
Thirty-Sixth Plaintiffs
JOANNA RANDALL
Thirty-Seventh Plaintiff
LEWES JOHN BUTLER and ROBERT GLENDENNING BUTLER
Thirty-Eighth Plaintiffs
DESMOND ALLAN JELLYMAN and JUNE FOONG NGOR JELLYMAN
Thirty-Ninth Plaintiffs
JELLYMAN FAMILY TRUSTEE COMPANY LIMITED
Fortieth Plaintiff
IAN JOHN ADAMSON and NICOLA SARAH ADAMSON
Forty-First Plaintiffs
IAN JOHN ADAMSON, NICOLA
SARAH ADAMSON and BANCO TRUSTEESLIMITED, as trustees of the ADAMSON FAMILY TRUST
Forty-Second Plaintiffs
LINDA MARIE ANDERSON and RENIER PASTORIZA FIGURACION
Forty-Third Plaintiffs
WARREN ANDERS BAKER and RACHEL ANNE BAKER
Forty-Fourth Plaintiffs
WARREN ANDERS BAKER and RACHEL ANNE
BAKER, as trustees of the WA & RA BAKER FAMILY TRUST
Forty-Fifth Plaintiffs
WILLIAM DANIEL BENNETT and SUSAN
MARGARET BENNETT, as trustees of the BENNETT FAMILY TRUST
Forty-Sixth Plaintiffs
CATHERINE MARY BOYLE
Forty-Seventh Plaintiff
BRYAN FREDERICK DAVIES
Forty-Eighth Plaintiff
BRENDAN MARTIN DURCAN, JACQUELINE MARGARET DURCAN and AORAKI TRUSTEES
CO (2013) LIMITED, as trustees of THE BALLYMOTE TRUST
Forty-Ninth Plaintiffs
ESTELLE LOUISE EASTON and ALAN GEORGE EASTON
Fiftieth Plaintiffs
PAUL JAMES EDMONDSTON
Fifty-First Plaintiff
GLEN MARY SKI CLUB INCORPORATED
Fifty-Second Plaintiff
VICTORIA KELLAND
Fifth-third Plaintiff
RODNEY BRIAN McLELLAN and RACHEL ANNE McLELLAN
Fifth-Fourth Plaintiffs
JANET MITCHELL
Fifty-Fifth Plaintiffs
ROOPALI JOHRI
Fifty-Sixth Plaintiff
ANDREW LONIE
Fifty-Seventh Plaintiff
STUART ROSS PATERSON and MICHELLE JANE PATERSON
Fifty-Eighth Plaintiffs
KATHERINE MARGARET POULSEN
Fifty-Ninth Plaintiff
WILLIAM HENRY SUTHERLAND
Sixtieth Plaintiff
JANE FRANCES SIMPSON and DAVID CRAIG OVENDEN
Sixty-First Plaintiffs
NATALIE MARTHA GOULD, SIMON GEORGE GOULD and BENJAMIN JAMES TAYLOR, as
trustees of the RED TREE TRUST
Sixty-Second Plaintiff
JOHN FRASER
Sixty-Third Plaintiff
MARCUS WELLS
Sixty-Fourth Plaintiff
TARBIT BUILDING LIMITED
Sixty-Fifth Plaintiff
DAVID GREEN
Sixty-Sixth Plaintiff
PAUL WHEARTY and NICHOLA JANE WHEARTY
Sixty-Seventh Plaintiffs
NYREE JEAN SCHAAR and PIETER STEFANUS JOHANNES SCHAAR
Sixty-Eighth Plaintiffs
JOSHUA SCHAAR
Sixty-Ninth Plaintiff
GARY JOHN STICHBURY
Seventieth Plaintiff
GARY JOHN STICHBURY, JUDITH FRANCES STICHBURY and NAPIER INDEPENDENT
TRUSTEES LIMITED, as trustees of the GJ & JF STICHBURY FAMILY TRUST
Seventy-First Plaintiffs
CLARE WILLIAMS
Seventy-Second Plaintiff
VOODOO PROPERTY HOLDINGS LIMITED
Seventy-Third Plaintiff
ROSS GEORGE YEAGER
Seventy-Fourth Plaintiff
DAVID TALBOT HOWEY and JENNIFER CHRISTINE HOWEY
Seventy-Fifth Plaintiffs
JAMES ANTHONY MANSFIELD and ELIZABETH KATE MANSFIELD
Seventy-Sixth Plaintiffs
NEVILLE MAURICE LEWIS and LINDA JUNE LEWIS
Seventy-Seventh Plaintiffs
NEVILLE MAURICE LEWIS, LINDA JUNE LEWIS and RUSSELL TURNER LEWIS
TRUSTEES LIMITED, as trustees of the TOTARA-BEECH TRUST
Seventy-Eighth Plaintiffs
PAUL AUBREY
Seventy-Ninth Plaintiff
OLD STONE HUT FOREST LIMITED
Eightieth Plaintiff
VERITY FARMS NZ LIMITED
Eighty-First Plaintiff
SHARON FAE ENGLISH
Eight-Second Plaintiff
SHARON FAE ENGLISH and CAROLYN SUE
ENGLISH, as trustees of the ENGLISH FAMILY TRUST
Eighty-Third Plaintiffs
STEPHEN DWEIGHT MARK and JULIE MAI MARK
Eighty-Fourth Plaintiffs
STEPHEN DWIGHT MARK, JULIE MAI MARK
and CHRISTINE HELEN DARLING, as trustees of THE OSCAR TRUST
Eighty-Fifth Plaintiffs
BARRY JOHN FRANKLYN BIGGS and WENDY ELIZABETH BIGGS
Eighty-Sixth Plaintiffs
CATHERINE MARY MILLER
Eighty-Seven Plaintiff
ANNE-MARIE MILLER and SARAH LOUISE
MILLER, as trustees of the CM MILLER FAMILY TRUSTEighty-Eighth Plaintiff
OHAU HOLIDAY HOMES LIMITED
Eighty-Nineth Plaintiff
MARIE BERNICE McAUGHTRIE and RICHARD NIGHTINGALE
Ninetieth Plaintiffs
DANIEL WILLIAM JOHNSTON and MJO
TRUSTEE COMPANY LIMITED, as trustees of the DJP SHARE TRUST
Ninety-First Plaintiff
DAVID FRASER RENDALL and MEGAN ELIZABETH JANE RENDALL
Ninety-Second Plaintiffs
JAMES ANTHONY CARNIE and NADIA MARIA
NORTON, as trustees of the OHAU TRUST Ninety-Third Plaintiffs
WILLIAM PATRICK CHISHOLM
Ninety-Fourth Plaintiff
MICHAEL TATTERSALL and PAULETTE TATTERSALL
Ninety-Fifth Plaintiffs
XU XU and YU WU
Ninety-Sixth Plaintiffs
FIVE RIVERS LIMITED
Ninety-Seventh Plaintiff
MAREE CAROLINE HORO, as trustee of the OHAU COMPANY TRUST
Ninety-Eighth Plaintiff
JANET ELIZABETH MUIR and RICHARD HANDLEY BROWN
Ninety-Ninth Plaintiffs
JANET ELIZABETH MUIR and RICHARD HANDLEY BROWN
One Hundredth Plaintiffs
AARON WAYNE GILMORE and SAINT PAULS
ASSET MANAGEMENT LIMITED, as trustees of THE MIGHTY ROCKET TRUST
One Hundred and First Plaintiffs
TIMOTHY HAROLD MUELLER
One Hundred and Second Plaintiff
PHILLIPPA WALTER
One Hundred and Third Plaintiff
KATHLEEN LAWSON and BRIAN GRAEME LAWSON
One Hundred and Fourth Plaintiffs
MARTIN JAMES HEAL
One Hundred and Fifth Plaintiff
ROGER MEE and ANNETTE MEE
One Hundred and Sixth Plaintiffs
ROBERT JAMES HALL, JOY MARGARET
ADELINE HALL, GDT NO.3 LIMITED, as trustees of THE HALL FAMILY TRUST, and ANNA
LOUISE DUNCAN and KATHERINE GAIL
DUNCAN, as trustees of the OHAU TRUST One Hundred and Seventh Plaintiffs
PHILIP DUNCAN
One Hundred and Eighth Plaintiff
EICHARD MICHAEL CONSTANT
One Hundred and Ninth Plaintiff
SARAH JANE LOVIE, NEVILLE SCHEIWE and
MARK JONATHAN TAVENDALE, as trustees of the JAMES SCHEIWE & SARAH LOVIE FAMILY
TRUST
One Hundred and Tenth Plaintiffs
JILLIAN ELIZABETH HEATH STONE and DAVID CHARLES STONE
One Hundred and Eleventh Plaintiffs
JILLIAN ELIZABETH HEATH STONE, DAVID CHARLES STONE and MAINLY TRUSTS
LIMITED, as trustee of the DJ TRUST One Hundred and Twelfth Plaintiff
DEBORAH LETHBRIDGE
One Hundred and Thirteenth Plaintiff
GENEVIEVE FRANCES BECROFT
One Hundred and Fourteenth Plaintiff ROBIN ADRIAN FINNEY
One Hundred and Fifteenth
STEWART NEGUS
One Hundred and Sixteenth Plaintiff
DAVID LITTLETON
One Hundred and Seventeenth Plaintiff
3
5
0