| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| [2014] NZSC 31 |
| BETWEEN | MAREE HOWARD |
| AND | ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION |
| Court: | Elias CJ, McGrath, William Young, Glazebrook and Arnold JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 1 April 2014 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application to revoke the decision of the Registrar, confirmed by McGrath J, not to accept her application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
The applicant’s application for leave to appeal to this Court was rejected by the Registrar, for want of jurisdiction. The registrar was acting under s 28(1) of the Supreme Court Act 2003. His decision was confirmed by McGrath J (under s 28(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003). She has now made a further application to revoke the Registrar’s decision and has invoked s 28(3).
Section 28 of the Supreme Court Act is in these terms:
28Interlocutory orders and directions may be made and given by one Judge
(1)In a proceeding before the Supreme Court, any permanent Judge of the Court may make any interlocutory orders and give any interlocutory directions the Judge thinks fit (other than an order or direction that determines the proceeding or disposes of a question or issue that is before the Court in the proceeding).
(2)Any permanent Judge of the Supreme Court may review a decision of the Registrar made within the civil jurisdiction of the Court under a power conferred on the Registrar by a rule of Court, and may confirm, modify, or revoke that decision as the Judge thinks fit.
(3)The Judges of the Supreme Court who together have jurisdiction to hear and determine a proceeding may—
(a)discharge or vary an order or direction made or given under subsection (1); or
(b)confirm, modify, or revoke a decision confirmed or modified under subsection (2).
A decision under s 28(3) is to be made by the “Judges of the Supreme Court who together have jurisdiction to hear and determine a proceeding”. The subsection has obvious application to decisions made by a single Judge under s 28(1) or (2) being reviewed at the subsequent hearing of the substantive appeal. In such circumstances, the Judge who made the decision would probably be involved in the exercise (which is why McGrath J has participated in this decision). We are addressing the applicant’s application on the assumption, but without deciding, that s 28(3) is available in the present, and rather different, circumstances.
The applicant challenged in the District Court a decision made by the Accident Compensation Corporation and confirmed on review by a reviewer that she had unreasonably refused to permit examination and assessment by an occupational medicine specialist.[1] That appeal was dismissed. An application to the District Court for leave to appeal to the High Court was dismissed.[2] She then applied to the High Court for special leave under s 162(3) of the Accident Compensation Act 2001. This was refused by Williams J.[3]
[1]Howard v Accident Compensation Corporation [2012] NZACC 218 (DC).
[2]Howard v…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Howard v Accident Compensation Corporation and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] NZSC 31
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the jurisdictional issues surrounding Howard's application. Firstly, Williams J did not grant leave to appeal, so the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal was not engaged. Secondly, the Accident Compensation Act 2001 stipulates that the decision of the Court of Appeal on any application for leave to appeal is final. Thirdly, the Supreme Court Act 2003 does not provide for appeals from decisions refusing leave or special leave to appeal to either the High Court or the Court of Appeal. Despite these jurisdictional barriers, the court also found that the proposed appeal did not raise any question of law of sufficient importance to warrant an appeal. The court concluded that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed as there was no jurisdiction to hear it.
The court dismissed the application to revoke the Registrar's decision, which confirmed the denial of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The court found that the application did not meet the jurisdictional criteria required for such an appeal, and further, that the proposed appeal did not raise any question of law of sufficient importance. The final orders of the court were to dismiss the application to revoke the decision of the Registrar.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.