TR v Accident Compensation Corporation

Case [2023] NZHC 3572


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2023-485-320

[2023] NZHC 3572

UNDER the Accident Compensation Act 2001

BETWEEN

TR

Appellant

AND

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

Respondent

On the papers

Counsel:

Appellant in Person

F L Becroft for Respondent

Judgment:

7 December 2023


JUDGMENT OF ISAC J

[Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal]


[1]                 In a judgment of 26 October 2023, I declined TR’s application for special leave to appeal against a judgment of Judge McGuire upholding a decision of the Accident Compensation Corporation in relation to TR’s claim for a personal injury alleged to have been caused by a work-related disease.1

[2]TR now seeks to appeal my decision to the Court of Appeal.

[3]                 Section 163 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 governs a party’s rights of appeal to the Court of Appeal. It provides:


1      TR v ACC [2023] NZHC 2991.

TR v ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION [2023] NZHC 3572 [7 December 2023]

163     Appeal to Court of Appeal on question of law

(1)A party to an appeal before the High Court under section 162 who is dissatisfied with any determination or decision of the Court on the appeal as being wrong in law may, with the leave of the High Court, appeal to the Court of Appeal by way of case stated for the opinion of that court on a question of law only.

(2)If the High Court refuses to grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal may grant special leave to appeal.

(3)An appeal to the Court of Appeal must be dealt with in accordance with the rules of the court.

(4)The decision of the Court of Appeal on any application for leave to appeal, or on an appeal under this section, is final.

[4]                 It is well established that this provision does not confer a right of appeal against a decision of the High Court refusing special leave to appeal from the District Court.2 Section 163(1) only confers a right of appeal in relation to “any determination or decision of the [High Court] on the appeal”. As the Court of Appeal explained in McCafferty v ACC:3

This wording is not apt to catch a refusal to grant special leave to appeal.   To put it another way, the decision of [the High Court Judge] to refuse leave to appeal was not a “determination or decision of [the High Court] on the appeal”.

[5]                 In short, as Ms Becroft submits, the appellant’s rights of appeal have come to an end. I appreciate that this will be a disappointing result for her, but the legislation is clear and leaves no room for discretion.

[6]The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Isac J

Solicitors:
Medico Law Ltd, Auckland for Respondent


2      McCafferty v ACC [2004] NZAR 97 at [7]–[8]; Howard v ACC [2014] NZSC 31; Marsh v ACC

[2016] NZCA 409 at [3]; and Gallagher-Scott v ACC [2022] NZHC 296 at [7]–[13].

3 At [7]. The Court of Appeal was considering the wording of s 166 of the Accident Insurance Act 1998, which is in identical terms to s 163 of the Accident Compensation Act.

Details
AGLC
TR v Accident Compensation Corporation [2023] NZHC 3572
Case
[2023] NZHC 3572
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

TR is the appellant in this case against the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC). The dispute revolves around TR’s application for special leave to appeal against a decision by the High Court, which upheld a decision of ACC regarding TR’s claim for a personal injury allegedly caused by a work-related disease. The matter was heard at the High Court in Wellington and was presided over by Justice Isac.

The central legal issue before the court was whether TR had the right to appeal the High Court's refusal to grant special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, following the initial dismissal of TR’s claim by the District Court. TR argued that the statutory language of Section 163 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 allowed for such an appeal. However, the court examined the precise wording of the statute and concluded that it did not permit an appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant special leave. The statutory provision only allows for appeals against "any determination or decision of the [High Court] on the appeal," and the refusal to grant leave was not such a determination.

The court found that the statutory language clearly indicated that the High Court's refusal to grant special leave was not appealable, as it was not a "determination or decision of the [High Court] on the appeal." The established case law supported this interpretation, with multiple precedents confirming that the High Court's refusal to grant special leave was not subject to further appeal. Consequently, the court dismissed TR's application for leave to appeal, affirming that TR's rights of appeal had concluded with the High Court's decision.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, leaving the decision of the High Court as final.

Orders

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