Heke (aka Stanton) v Nelson City Council
[2020] NZHC 1241
•5 June 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NELSON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHAKATŪ ROHE
CIV-2017-442-000004
[2020] NZHC 1241
BETWEEN HONE MA HEKE (also known as LEWIS REGINALD STANTON)
PlaintiffAND
NELSON CITY COUNCIL
First Defendant
AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Second Defendant
Hearing: 14 May 2020 by AVL Appearances:
Plaintiff in person
J C Ironside for First Defendant
J M Webber for Second DefendantJudgment:
5 June 2020
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN
This judgment was delivered by me on 5 June 2020 at 11.30 am pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
HEKE v NELSON CITY COUNCIL [2020] NZHC 1241 [5 June 2020]
The issues
[1] Mr Heke (also known as Lewis Stanton) is self-represented. He leads a roving lifestyle. This has led to conflict with authorities. He considers the Nelson City Council and the Police pursued campaigns against him causing disruption to his chosen lifestyle, his imprisonment, loss of property and suffering. He seeks damages.
[2] In his amended statement of claim, Mr Heke pleads seven causes of action for alleged breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights), misfeasance in public office and/or malicious prosecution.1
[3]This judgment is concerned with:
(a)whether the court should appoint counsel to assist Mr Heke;
(b)whether Mr Heke has adequately particularised his claims; and
(c)how Mr Heke should be required to remedy deficiencies in his pleadings.
Background
[4] Mr Heke identifies three campaigns he says were waged against him. First, the issue of trespass notices by the Nelson City Council in 2011 preventing him from entering upon most of Nelson’s public land. Second, his removal from a footpath vigil at Trafalgar Street, Nelson in 2012 and a criminal prosecution against him for obstruction of the footpath. Third, his repeated ticketing for parking offences while his horse and cart were located in different locations in Nelson during 2014. Apart from this proceeding, there have been many other proceedings dealing with broadly the same matters in different contexts.2
1 An eighth cause of action against the Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc as third defendant has been struck out.
2 Police v Heke DC Nelson CRI-2011-042-435, 7 September 2011; Stanton aka Heke v Police [2012] NZHC 70; Stanton aka Heke v Police [2012] NZHC 1878; Stanton v Police [2012] NZHC 3223, [2013] NZAR 24; Stanton v Nelson City Council [2014] NZHC 3117, [2015] NZAR 146; Nelson City Council v Stanton [2015] NZHC 395; Stanton v R [2015] NZHC 958; Police v Stanton aka Heke DC Nelson CRI-2015-042-1152, 13 November 2015; Department of Corrections v Stanton [2016] NZDC 1284; Stanton v Police [2016] NZHC 993; Stanton v New Zealand Police [2016] NZCA 561; Stanton v Police [2017] NZHC 1939.
[5] Mr Heke does not currently have a lawyer but has had legal representation at times and had assistance to draft both his statement of claim and the amended statement of claim that is now in issue. This proceeding has had a circuitous procedural path that can be put to one-side, but for the following.
[6] At a telephone conference on 21 June 2017, it was agreed that Mr Heke’s original statement of claim needed amendment to provide appropriate particulars of his claim. A draft amended statement of claim had already been circulated to the defendants’ counsel who were not satisfied it provided the required particulars.
[7] On 28 March 2018, Mr Heke was directed to file an amended statement of claim within 15 working days. He did not comply with the direction. The second defendant responded with an application to strike out the claim. Mr Heke opposed the application and with his notice of opposition filed a draft amended statement of claim. It was identical in content to the draft earlier circulated.
[8] Following a hearing on 20 February 2019, Associate Judge Bell accepted the draft amended statement of claim as Mr Heke’s amended pleading. To address the defendants’ concern that the amended statement of claim was inadequate he made directions that:
(a)by 1 March 2019, the defendants were to file memoranda setting out the particulars they required Mr Heke to give;
(b)by 15 March 2019, Mr Heke was to respond to the requests for particulars; and
(c)the file was to be referred back to Associate Judge Bell to rule on what particulars Mr Heke would be required to give.
[9] The defendants served their requests for further particulars on 26 February 2019. On 15 March 2019, Mr Heke provided a response. The case was then overlooked. On 7 October 2019, Associate Judge Bell directed it be put before a South Island Associate Judge. It was placed in a list on 12 December 2019. The defendants
maintained that Mr Heke had still not provided adequate particulars of his claim. Mr Heke requested a hearing. This was delayed until 14 May 2020 due to the COVID- 19 pandemic. At the hearing, Mr Heke requested the court appoint counsel to assist him.
Mr Heke’s request for counsel
[10] Associate Judge Bell has remarked that Mr Heke has little understanding of the law, no idea how to run a proceeding and has chosen causes of action which are difficult to both plead and prove.3 Mr Heke says he cannot represent himself and his case will not go to trial unless counsel is appointed to assist him. It will be difficult for Mr Heke to present his own case, but the difficulties faced by self-represented litigants are not insurmountable. The court has already offered assistance and extended indulgences to Mr Heke. It was disappointing that Mr Heke made no attempt to prepare for this hearing and, despite requesting the hearing, had no relevant submissions to make.
[11] The principles relating to the appointment of counsel to assist in court proceedings were discussed in Erwood v Holmes.4 The core nature of the role and its primary purpose is to assist the court rather than the parties to the litigation.5
[12]The categories of case in which counsel may be appointed are not closed.
Counsel to assist has been appointed where:6
(a)important issues arise for determination but a party to the proceeding has chosen not to participate (thereby ensuring an effective contradictor);
(b)the case raises issues likely to significantly affect the interests of a sector of society which is not represented in the proceeding;
3 Heke v Nelson City Council [2019] NZHC 433 at [2].
4 Erwood v Holmes [2017] NZHC 1278, [2017] NZAR 971.
5 At [39].
6 At [39].
(c)the case involves complex issues of human rights or international law; and
(d)the case involves confidential information which cannot be disclosed to a defendant, or his or her counsel.
[13] An appointment should not be made where the primary purpose is to assist a party in the presentation of their case in circumstances where legal aid has been refused or a party is otherwise unable or unwilling to access a lawyer.7 The court will not appoint counsel to assist to remedy any perceived deficiency in the legal aid regime.8
[14] Mr Heke has been refused legal aid. The reason for the refusal is explained in a decision of the Legal Aid Tribunal that is attached to Mr Heke’s affidavit of 26 July 2018. He was refused legal aid because his lawyer has not provided an opinion regarding his prospects of success. The Tribunal concluded:9
There is no opinion as to the applicant’s prospects of success, as required by the Commissioner and for which funding was made available. I concur with the Commissioner that the applicant has not shown that the prospects of success justify aid. It has not been established that the Commissioner erred in concluding a reasonable person would not self-fund the proposed proceedings.
[15] Here, it is not appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to appoint counsel to assist Mr Heke for the following reasons:
(a)This case does not fall within any of the recognised categories where the court appoints counsel to assist.
(b)This case does not raise any important issue of public importance. It has not been suggested that it has any significance beyond Mr Heke’s personal interest in righting what, he considers, were wrongs done to him.
7 At [40].
8 At [25].
9 Lewis Reginal Stanton [2017] NZLAT 37 at [70].
(c)Mr Heke’s grievances have been well-aired in other proceedings. As shall be explained later in this judgment, in some respects Mr Heke appears to be seeking to relitigate issues that have already been determined against him in those other proceedings.
(d)It appears that Mr Heke has previously reached agreement with the defendants to withdraw this action and then not done so. The Crown cannot be expected to pay legal costs to run an action Mr Heke had indicated he would withdraw.
(e)If appointed, counsel would be expected to do more than assist the court but to effectively run the entirety of Mr Heke’s case. That is not consistent with the role of such counsel.
(f)Mr Heke has applied for and been refused legal aid because his lawyer has not provided an adequate opinion as to the prospects of success. If this is a failing of his lawyer, Mr Heke can remedy the matter by getting another lawyer to act. In so far as the opinion has not been provided because Mr Heke’s lawyer is unable to provide such an opinion there can be no justification for the court to appoint counsel.
[16] Mr Heke’s request for counsel to be appointed by the court to assist him is refused.
The amended statement of claim
[17] Mr Heke’s amended statement of claim purports to contain seven causes of action against the defendants. All seven causes of action are against the Nelson City Council. Two of the causes of action are against the Police. In summary the causes of action are:
(a)The first cause of action alleges breaches by the Nelson City Council of rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Bill of Rights through the issuing of trespass notices to Mr Heke. There is also embedded in the
pleading an allegation of conversion of Mr Heke’s horse and cart. The sum of $150,000 is sought as damages.
(b)The second cause of action alleges misfeasance in public office by an unknown official or officials of the Nelson City Council in issuing the trespass notices and conversion of Mr Heke’s horse and cart. The sum of $150,000 is sought as damages against the Nelson City Council and “as yet unknown individuals”.
(c)The third cause of action is against the Nelson City Council and the Police and alleges breaches of the Bill of Rights arising from a prosecution taken against Mr Heke in 2012 for obstruction of the footpath. The sum of $125,000 is sought as damages.
(d)The fourth cause of action is against the Nelson City Council and the Police and combines claims for misfeasance in public office and malicious prosecution by unnamed officials in bringing a prosecution against Mr Heke for obstruction of the footpath. The sum of $125,000 is sought as damages against the Nelson City Council, the Police and as “yet unknown individuals”.
(e)The fifth cause of action against the Nelson City Council alleges breaches of the Bill of Rights in issuing parking tickets to Mr Heke and seeking an injunction in October 2014 to enforce parking by-laws to prevent him parking his horse and cart in Lower Bridge Street, Nelson. The sum of $125,000 is sought as damages.
(f)The sixth cause of action against the Nelson City Council alleges malicious prosecution of civil proceedings by unknown officials. It is not stated what civil proceedings are relied upon. The sum of $125,000 is sought as damages against the Nelson City Council and “as yet unknown individuals”.
(g)The seventh cause of action against the Nelson City Council alleges misfeasance in public office by unknown officials but does not identify the conduct that is the subject of complaint. The sum of $125,000 is sought as damages against the Nelson City Council and “as yet unknown individuals”.
The purpose and scope of particulars
[18]Relevantly, High Court Rule 5.26 provides:
5.26 Statement of claim to show nature of claim
The statement of claim –
(a)must show the general nature of the plaintiff’s claim to the relief sought; and
(b)must give sufficient particulars of time, place, amounts, names of persons, nature and dates of instruments, and other circumstances to inform the court and the party or parties against whom relief is sought of the plaintiff’s cause of action;
…
[19]Pertinent in this case is High Court Rule 5.17 which provides:
5.17 Distinct matters to be stated separately
(1)Distinct causes of action and distinct grounds of defence, founded on separate and distinct facts, must if possible be stated separately and clearly.
(2)If a party alleges a state of mind of a person, that party must give particulars of the facts relied on in alleging that state of mind.
(3)A state of mind includes a mental disorder or disability, malice, or fraudulent intention but does not include mere knowledge.
[20] The purpose and scope of particulars was discussed in Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Limited as follows:10
Pleadings which are properly drawn and particularised are, in a case of any complexity, if not in all cases, an essential road map for the Court and the parties. They are the documents against which the briefs of evidence are or
10 Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd CA179/98, 30 November 1998 at 17-19.
should be prepared. They are the documents which establish parameters of the case, not the briefs of evidence.
…
What we are saying is that both the Court and opposite parties are entitled to be advised of the essential basis of a claim or defence, and all necessary ingredients of it, so that subsequent processes and the trial itself can be conducted against recognisable boundaries. Neither the Court nor opposite parties should be placed in the position of having to deal with a proposition of whose substance adequate notice has not been given in the pleadings.
…
The object of a Statement of Claim is to “state” the “claim”, so that the Court knows what it is to rule upon, and the Defendant knows the case which it must meet. As a matter of practicalities, this initial “statement” is not at the level of a full disclosure of all evidence and documentation. It is of course an abbreviated summary “statement” of the basic facts said to give rise to the claim, and of the relief which is sought.
…
In marginal cases, it is better to avoid generalities and rules of thumb, and to return to principle. The pleader and Court simply ask “in the circumstances of this claim, is that statement sufficiently detailed to state a clear issue and inform the opposite party of the case to be met?”. This is not, under modern practice, simply some minimum which a Defendant needs so as to be able to plead. It is intended to supply an outline of the case advanced, sufficient to enable a reasonable degree of pre-trial briefing and preparation. Discovery and interrogatories are only an adjunct, not a substitute for pleading.
[21] In Platt v Porirua City Council, Kós J noted the fundamental functions of the particularisation of pleadings is to:11
(a)inform defendants as to the case they have to meet;
(b)limit the scope of matters the plaintiff may put in issue at trial (or in pre-trial settlement discussion);
(c)enable the defendants to know what witnesses need to be retained and to start preparing evidence ahead of the formal exchange of evidence; and
11 Platt v Porirua City Council [2012] NZHC 2445 at [19].
(d)provide an opportunity for defendants to seek determination on the basis that the claim as pleaded is untenable.
The lack of particulars
[22] Associate Judge Bell has noted that Mr Heke’s amended statement of claim lacks particulars and provided direction to Mr Heke as to what he must provide. He said:12
While Judge Osborne held that Hone had pleaded recognisable causes of action, Hone has made general assertions with only some supporting particulars. General allegations are not adequate. Defendants may require a plaintiff to provide enough detail for the defendants to understand the case against them. That applies especially to the causes of action for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office. The requirements for pleading fraud also apply to those causes of action. In Schmidt v Pepper New Zealand (Custodians) Ltd, the Court of Appeal set out the requirements for pleading and proving fraud:
[15]Allegations of fraud or dishonesty are very serious. They must be pleaded with care and particularity. As the authors of Bullen & Leake & Jacobs in Precedents of Pleadings emphasise, counsel must not draft any originating process or pleading containing an allegation of fraud unless they have reasonably credible material which, as it stands, establishes a prima facie case of fraud – that is, material of such a character which would lead to the conclusion that serious allegations could properly be based upon it. Fraud cannot be left to be inferred from the facts
– fraudulent conduct must be distinctly alleged and as distinctly proved. General allegations, however strong the words may appear to be, are insufficient to amount to a proper allegation of fraud.
[16]While these principles have been articulated in authoritative discussions of duties imposed upon counsel, they apply with equal rigour to those who represent themselves. Those who seek to portray themselves as well acquainted with the law and its processes cannot shelter behind the barrier of unfamiliarity when it suits. They must satisfy the same exacting standard when preparing their own pleadings. The obligation exists for the benefit of defendants – to allow them to be fully aware of, and able to address, the serious allegation – and for the Court which will be called upon to decide it.
I add that the requirement to give proper particulars has another purpose. It requires a plaintiff to articulate their case. If a plaintiff can do no more than make general allegations, without giving details to show fraudulent conduct, malicious prosecution or misfeasance in public office, the court may infer that
12 Heke v Nelson City Council, above n 3, at [22] and [23].
they do not have a case, and if they do not have a case, it may be struck out. (citations omitted)
[23] The defendants sought a range of particulars and, in some instances, Mr Heke has provided adequate responses. Major deficiencies remain. It will be finicky to consider the deficiencies on a paragraph by paragraph basis. Most can be described under two heads.
[24] The first matter concerns Mr Heke’s allegations of misfeasance in public office in his second, fourth and, seventh causes of action. The key elements of this cause of action are that an identified public official acted deliberately and unlawfully in the exercise or purported exercise of his or her office with malice towards the plaintiff, or with knowledge or reckless indifference that his or her conduct was unlawful and was likely to injure the plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff must prove that actual loss was suffered.13
[25] It is not sufficient for allegations of misfeasance to be made against unknown individuals, or yet to be determined true actors. Not only must the identity of the public official be known but it must be pleaded how it is said they conducted themselves unlawfully in the exercise or purported exercise of their office. The basis upon which the plaintiff says they acted with the requisite malice or engaged in a course of conduct involving a deliberate abuse of powers also must be identified.
[26] Mr Heke has failed to identify the public officials he alleges abused their office. He responded to the defendants’ requests for particulars by stating he does not know the identity of the officials against whom the claims are directed and can provide no factual circumstances with regard to those officials’ knowledge or reckless indifference to the illegality of their actions.
[27] Generally, Mr Heke fails to provide adequate particulars of these causes of action in the following respects:
13 Garrett v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 322 at 344; Currie v Clayton [2014] NZCA 511, [2015] 2 NZLR 195 at [40].
(a)the identity of public officials alleged to have engaged in the misfeasance;
(b)what it is alleged the particular public officials did;
(c)why the acts complained of were unlawful;
(d)what the public officials’ states of mind were at the time that they did the acts complained of; and
(e)what Mr Heke’s loss was as a result.
[28] The second cause of action against the first defendant illustrates this point. Paragraph 11 of the amended statement of claim reads:
The actions of the first defendant in issuing the blanket trespass notice and converting Barney, the plaintiff’s cart and possessions constituted misfeasance in public office by an unknown official/s within the first defendant who were acting in the purported exercise of their public power of authority. The public officer/s were aware that their conduct was unlawful and that it was likely to injure the plaintiff, or were, at least, recklessly indifferent to the illegality of their actions and the probability of causing injury to the plaintiff. The trespass
notice of 4 February 2011 was signed by Paul McArthur, the manager of Parks
and Facilities at the time and a further trespass notice of 8 February 2011 was
signed by one Mathew Williams, apparently, an employee with Armourguard.
Other names who featured at the time were Viesturs Altments, the first
defendant’s senior legal advisor, and Alec Louverdis, executive manager of
networks services for the first defendant. Reference is made in the first
defendant’s initial disclosure documents to one Lindsay Barber and one
Alistair Papps. A report authored by Lindsay Barber produced on or about 24
July 2011 sets out some of the facts from 3 February 2011 to 8 March 2011
from the first defendant’s point of view, but the plaintiff will be dependent
upon further discovery to ascertain the true actors involved in constricting his
movements and lifestyle for the period from 4 February 2011 to 7 September
2011.
[29] Mr Heke’s pleading in relation to this cause of action is deficient because it does not contain at least the following particulars:
(a)the names of the officials and/or the position of such officials who are said to have been responsible for:
(i)the issue of the trespass notice; and
(ii)the conversion of Barney and the cart;
(b)how it is said that the issue of the trespass notice was unlawful;
(c)how it is said Barney and the cart were converted;
(d)the facts and matters relied on to support the allegation that such unknown officials were aware their conduct was unlawful; and
(e)the facts and matters relied on to support the allegation that such unknown officials were recklessly indifferent to the illegality of their actions.
[30] The same lack of particularity infects Mr Heke’s fourth and seventh causes of action.
[31] The second matter concerns Mr Heke’s third and fourth causes of action. These relate to Mr Heke’s footpath vigil and the laying of charges for obstruction against him. The causes of action are against both defendants, but Mr Heke does not know that the Nelson City Council had any involvement in the subject matter of his complaints.
[32] I set out below the relevant pleadings at [14], [15], [18] and [19] of the amended statement of claim which relate to Mr Heke’s third cause of action. They read as follows:
[14]The first defendant either initiated the second defendant to act or the second defendant chose to do so unilaterally, with the precise
mechanism presently unknown to the plaintiff, and the second defendant prosecuted the plaintiff for a number of charges of obstruction of the footpath under section 22 of the Summary Offences Act 1981.
[15]The plaintiff continued to maintain his vigil each time he was charged and given bail until a bail condition arose that was required by the second defendant, either of itself or acting on the instigation of the first defendant (presently not apparent to the plaintiff) …
…
[18]The actions of the first defendant and/or the second defendant (depending on whether the first defendant was involved or not, but
certainly involving the second defendant) were actions which breached the plaintiff’s rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and specifically the sections referred to in paragraph 10 above.
Specifically, the policy of repeated arrests and moving on of the
plaintiff from his location in Trafalgar Street interfered with his rights
…
[19]The regular prosecution, harassment and unreasonable requirements of the first and/or second defendants (as referred to in this cause of
action, and depending on whether the first defendant was involved or
not, but clearly against the second defendant), as pleaded above, led to the plaintiff being inconvenienced and, at times, incarcerated as a result of its or their actions …
[33] It is not sufficient or proper for Mr Heke to make serious allegations of misfeasance in public office on the basis the first defendant may only have been potentially involved and even then, in a manner that is unknown. He is alleging a potentially unlawful conspiracy by the defendants to prosecute him without any basis. Such conduct must be distinctly alleged.
[34] Looking at the matter only through the paradigm of particulars, as Mr Heke’s pleading stands the defendants cannot possibly know what is actually being alleged against them. They are entitled to particulars in relation to:
(a)how is it said that the first defendant may have initiated the second defendant to prosecute Mr Heke;
(b)how is said that the second defendant may have been “acting on the instigation of the first defendant” when it sought conditions of bail; and
(c)how is it alleged the actions of the second defendant and/or first defendant breached Mr Heke’s rights.
[35]The same criticism applies equally to Mr Heke’s fourth cause of action.
How to remedy deficiencies in the amended statement of claim
[36] Where the court considers a pleading is defective or does not provide particulars properly required it may order a more explicit pleading to be filed.14 The court may also order a more explicit pleading to be filed and served on its own initiative.15
[37] The problems with Mr Heke’s amended statement of claim go well beyond the absence of particulars. Further objections can be made to it as set out below.
[38] Many paragraphs are long vague narratives of often irrelevant matter to which the defendants cannot possibly be expected to meaningfully plead (examples are [5], [9] and [10]).
[39] Distinct causes of action are not separately stated.16 The first and second causes of action alleging breach of the Bill of Rights and misfeasance in public office include embedded claims of conversion. The fourth cause of action pleads misfeasance in public office and malicious prosecution without distinguishing between the separate torts.
[40] Mr Heke purportedly seeks damages against unknown persons not party to the proceeding.
[41] There is failure to identify and plead to the elements of each cause of action. Complex causes of action for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office are, in the sixth and seventh causes of action, condensed into just one paragraph containing multiple general allegations yet do not identify the particular conduct complained of or, in the case of the sixth cause of action, any relevant criminal proceeding.
[42] Finally, Mr Heke appears to be relitigating issues that have been determined against him in previous proceedings involving the defendants. For instance, the fifth,
14 High Court Rules 2016, r 5.21(3).
15 Rule 5.21(4).
16 Ruler 5.17(1).
sixth and seventh causes of action relate to actions taken by the Nelson City Council to ticket Mr Heke for parking offences. To succeed Mr Heke must establish that the Nelson City Council acted unlawfully. It has been held in other proceedings that it did not. In Stanton v Nelson City Council, Goddard J held that findings of a District Court Judge that the parking by-laws were fully enforceable against Mr Heke and that there had been no breach of his rights under the Bill of Rights were unassailable.17
[43] The deficiencies in Mr Heke’s amended statement will not be remedied by ordering him to provide particulars. Before he may progress his claim Mr Heke must file a further amended statement of claim. It should provide adequate particulars and address the other matters set out above.
[44] Making an order requiring Mr Heke file an amended pleading may well be futile. It is highly unlikely he will respond to the court’s order unless he instructs a lawyer and there is little prospect of that. Mr Webber submits the defendants should not be put to the cost of having to make further application to strike out the proceeding when Mr Heke fails to comply with an order he replead his claim. He argues the court should make an unless order that Mr Heke’s claim shall be struck out if he does not file his further amended statement of claim within the time directed by the court.
[45] Before making any order the practical effect of which may be to bring an end to Mr Heke’s claim, the court must be satisfied that it is necessary to do justice between the parties.18 Due to the delays in the proceeding to date, Mr Heke’s advice that he cannot represent himself and the improbability that he will instruct a lawyer, this is an appropriate case to do so. I propose to extend to Mr Heke generous time within which to file his further amended statement of claim, so he has every opportunity to salvage his position.
Result
[46] The defendants’ application for further particulars of Mr Heke’s amended statement of claim is successful.
17 Stanton v Nelson City Council [2014] NZHC 3117; [2015] NZAR 146 at [11]-[13].
18 SM v LFDB [2014] NZCA 326, [2014] 3 NZLR 494.
[47] Mr Heke shall file and serve by no later than 7 August 2020 a further amended statement of claim providing the particulars of his causes of action identified in this judgment. Such further amended statement of claim is to also address the issues set out in paragraphs [37] to [41] above.
[48] Unless Mr Heke complies strictly with this order his claim against the defendants is struck out and the defendants shall have the costs of the proceeding on a 2B basis plus disbursements to be fixed by the Registrar.
[49] The defendants are entitled to costs on this application on a 2B basis plus reasonable disbursements and I so order.
O G Paulsen Associate Judge
Solicitors:
Zindels, Nelson, for Plaintiff
Nelson City Council, Nelson, for First Defendant
O’Donoghue Webber (J M Webber), Nelson, for Second Defendant
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