Harrison v District Court at Christchurch

[2025] NZHC 1754

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2024-409-479

[2025] NZHC 1754

UNDER

Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, Declaratory Judgments Act 1908,
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and other relevant law

IN THE MATTER

of an application for judicial review and extraordinary remedy involving improper way an order was made and obtained under s 152 of the Insolvency Act 2006

BETWEEN

ANGELA JANICE HARRISON

Plaintiff

AND

DISTRICT COURT AT CHRISTCHURCH

First Defendant

AND

OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE

Second Defendant

Hearing:	On the papers
Judgment:	30 June 2025

JUDGMENT OF EATON J

(review of deputy registrar’s decision)

This judgment was delivered by me on …….. at ……… pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

HARRISON v DISTRICT COURT AND ANOTHER [2025] NZHC 1754 [30 June 2025]

[1]                 Angela Harrison makes application to review a decision of a deputy registrar to decline a fee waiver on her application to recall the judgment of Osborne J striking out Ms Harrison’s judicial review application.1 In declining a fee waiver, the deputy registrar considered that the recall application lacked merit.

[2]                 Ms Harrison’s application is made with reliance on r 2.11 of the High Court Rules 2016.2 The application is appropriately  considered  under  s 160  of  the  Senior Courts Act 2016. A review under s 160 is conducted by way of rehearing and is dealt with on the papers.3 A Judge or Associate Judge may confirm, modify or reverse a decision of the deputy registrar.4

Legal principles

[3]                 Rule 11.9 provides that a Judge may recall a judgment. The leading authority dealing with an application for recall is Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2). Three circumstances were identified by Wild CJ that might give rise to a successful recall application:5

(a)where since the hearing there has been an amendment to a relevant statute or regulation, or a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority;

(b)where counsel have failed to direct the Court’s attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plain relevance; and

(c)where for some other very special reason justice requires that the judgment be recalled.

[4]The Court of Appeal in Ideal Investments Ltd v Earthquake Commission

identified situations for which recall is unavailable:6

1      Harrison v District Court at Christchurch [2025] NZHC 1391.

2      Woolf v Kaye [2018] NZHC 1250, (2018) 24 PRNZ 192.

3      Senior Courts Act 2016, s 160(4).

4      Section 160(5).

5      Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC).

6      Ideal Investments Ltd v Earthquake Commission [2023] NZCA 388 at [5] (footnotes omitted).

A recall application cannot be used to relitigate the reasons provided in a leave decision. Nor can it be a means of collateral attack on a decision. A judgment should not be recalled in order to consider a challenge to substantive findings of fact or law, nor to allow a party to recast arguments previously made or advance arguments that could have been raised earlier but were not.

[5]                 As was observed by the Court of Appeal in Ngahui Reihana Whanau Trust v Flight:7

It is becoming a matter of concern not just to this Court but to others in the western common law system that disaffected litigants, usually appearing in person, repeatedly make application for recall of judgments which they steadfastly refuse to accept. It is timely to characterise plainly unmeritorious applications of that sort as an abuse of the Court’s process and to reaffirm the rarity of legal justification for recalling judgments.

[6]                 Finally, I observe that the need for caution in considering recall applications is well-established. A recall application is not a substitute for an appeal8 or an opportunity to re-open substantive matters already determined.9

The review proceedings

[7]                 Ms Harrison is an undischarged bankrupt. The Official Assignee (OA) required her to vacate her Christchurch property, but she failed to do so. The OA applied to the District Court and was granted a possession order. The District Court considered there was no jurisdiction to look behind the adjudication judgment. In this Court she sought to review that decision.

The application to strike out

[8]                 The OA applied to strike out the review proceeding. Ms Harrison had failed to appear in opposition to an application brought by the OA to strike out her statement of claim but had filed a notice of opposition and lengthy submissions.

7      Ngahui Reihana Whanau Trust v Flight CA23/03, 26 July 2004 at [3].

8      Faloon v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) 22 NZTC 19,832 (HC) at [13], approved in

Erwood v Maxted [2010] NZCA 93, (2010) 20 PRNZ 466 at [5].

9      Nottingham v Real Estate Agents Authority [2017] NZCA 145 at [11].

The strike out decision

[9]                 The Judge observed that Ms Harrison had applied for an order that he be recused on the grounds of a conflict of interest with reference to a 2016 hearing. Osborne J dealt with the recusal application, observing that his adjudication judgment is a final judgment that had not been challenged on appeal.

[10]             The Judge considered Ms Harrison’s notice of opposition to the strike out application, observing that at the core of Ms Harrison’s opposition is her view that she should not have been adjudicated in the first place and that she had failed to acknowledge that she is a bankrupt and that her property has vested in the OA by reason of her adjudication. Osborne J considered that Ms Harrison was returning to her original complaint—that the judgment debt that gave rise to her adjudication was obtained by fraud.

[11]             The Judge rejected her sweeping allegations of fraud and arguments that the OA’s requirement that she vacate the property were time-barred or otherwise tainted were devoid of merit. The Judge was satisfied that Ms Harrison’s pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was likely to cause prejudice or delay and was frivolous or vexatious.

The recall application

[12]             Ms Harrison’s application for recall of that judgment seeks to advance multiple grounds including:

(a)manifest    injustice,    excess    jurisdiction,    error    of    national    and international law, access to civil justice;

(b)that the Judge ignored her synopsis of argument and the decision is legally erroneous;

(c)the Court lack legal jurisdiction to adjudicate the application; and

(d)conflict of interest.

Discussion

[13]             I find myself in agreement with the deputy registrar that the application for recall is devoid of merit. I am satisfied it is an attempt to relitigate the issues that were considered by Osborne J. It does not fit within any of the established categories for recall. It is unclear why Ms Harrison has applied for a recall rather than appeal the decision.

[14]             The application to review the deputy registrar’s decision is declined. I confirm the decision of the deputy registrar declining to waive the payment of the filing fee on the proposed interlocutory application to recall the judgment.

...................................................

Eaton J

Copy to:

A J Harrison