Harrison v Christchurch District Court

[2025] NZHC 1391

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2024-409-479 [2025] NZHC 1391

BETWEEN

ANGELA JANICE HARRISON

Applicant

AND

CHRISTCHURCH DISTRICT COURT

First Respondent

AND

THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE

Second Respondent

Hearing:

5 May 2025

Appearances:

No appearance of A J Harrison (Applicant) in person No appearance for First Respondent (abiding)

Z M McCoy and R M McConnell for Second Respondent

Judgment:

30 May 2025

JUDGMENT OF OSBORNE J

[1]    The applicant, Angela Janice Harrison, was bankrupted on a creditor’s petition in November 2016 (Adjudication Judgment).1 As a result of her bankruptcy her property, including her residence in Christchurch (the Property), vested in the Official Assignee.2 Miss Harrison remains an undischarged bankrupt, having failed to file a statement of affairs under the Insolvency Act 2006.3 The Assignee, in March 2023, required Miss Harrison to vacate the Property by April 2023,4 but she failed to do so. The Assignee then applied to the District Court for possession of the Property.5 The application was opposed by Miss Harrison. Miss Harrison’s central grounds of

1      Harrison v Harrison [2016] NZHC 2854 [Adjudication Judgment].

2      Insolvency Act 2006 [the Act], s 101(1)(a).

3      The Act, s 290(1).

4      Pursuant to s 152 of the Act.

5      Pursuant to s 152(2) of the Act.

HARRISON v CHRISTCHURCH DISTRICT COURT [2025] NZHC 1391 [30 May 2025]

opposition were that she was “unfairly railroaded into the situation by being deprived of a fair hearing and others’ fraudulent representation”, being a reference to the way in which the judgment creditors obtained the judgment debt against her.6 Judge Kelly identified the same argument had previously been raised and rejected in this Court.7 Judge Kelly granted the Assignee summary judgment on 12 August 2024 (the Possession Judgment).8

[2]    In this proceeding, Miss Harrison seeks judicial review of the Possession Judgment. The District Court, as the first respondent, abides this Court’s decision.

[3]    The Assignee has applied for Miss Harrison’s statement of claim to be struck out or alternatively for an  order  that  Miss  Harrison  gives  security  for  costs.  Miss Harrison opposes the interlocutory application.

Background—the relevant insolvency regime

[4]    As noted, when a person is adjudicated bankrupt, their property vests in the Assignee.

[5]    The role and general powers of the Assignee are identified in ss 217–230 of the Act. Collectively, those powers enable the Assignee to identify the bankrupt’s assets and provable debts, to get in the bankrupt’s property and to realise it in the course of administering the bankrupt estate, and to effect distributions to creditors.

[6]    The bankrupt, under s 67 of the Act, has a duty after adjudication to file with the Assignee a statement of the bankrupt’s affairs in the prescribed form (unless the bankrupt has already filed a  statement  under s 46 of the Act).  Under s 290(1) of  the Act, the bankrupt (unless they have successfully applied to be discharged earlier), is automatically discharged from bankruptcy three years after they file their required statement of affairs (subject to certain exceptions under s 290(2) of the Act).

6      Official Assignee v Harrison [2024] NZDC 18779 [the Possession Judgment] at [32]–[33].

7 At [34].

8 At [69].

[7]    The  Court has a  discretion to annul an adjudication in situations defined in   s 309 of the Act.

Miss Harrison’s bankruptcy

[8]    On the petition of her judgment creditors, Miss Harrison was bankrupted by the Adjudication Judgment in November 2016. I was the Associate Judge who heard the application. Miss Harrison’s grounds of opposition to adjudication (and her grounds on earlier applying to set aside the preceding bankruptcy notice) centrally focused on her proposition that the costs judgment in favour of her judgment creditors had been obtained “fraudulently and improperly”.9 The Adjudication Judgment was sealed and stands as a final judgment. There was no successful appeal or review of the judgment or of the Court’s previous refusal to set aside the creditors’ bankruptcy notice.

[9]Section 61 of the Act relevantly provides:

Adjudication final and binding

Unless an adjudication is appealed under this Act,—

(a)no one can later assert that the adjudication was not valid or that a prerequisite for adjudication was absent; and

(b)the adjudication is binding on all persons.

[10]   Through Miss Harrison’s adjudication, the Property vested in the Assignee. The Assignee the following day lodged a caveat against the Property. On the application of Miss Harrison, that caveat became the subject of the caveat-lapsing procedures under the Land Transfer Act 2017 in 2020. Associate Judge Lester sustained the caveat (Caveat Judgment).10

[11]   In an affidavit of the Assignee’s Lead Insolvency Officer, Mary-Lynne Paice, the history of the administration of Miss Harrison’s bankrupt estate has been set out.

9      See Adjudication Judgment, above n 1, at [27]. See also Harrison v Harrison [2016] NZHC 574 at [7]–[10].

10     Official Assignee v Harrison [2020] NZHC 1548.

[12]   Since adjudication, Miss Harrison has failed to file her statement of affairs. As a result, the three years before she would automatically be discharged under s 290(1) of the Act has not begun to run.

[13]   Miss Harrison, while filing a notice of opposition, has not filed any evidence in opposition. I take the uncontradicted evidence of Ms Paice as a reliable history of the estate administration. This is a proper case in which to receive the affidavit evidence. The matters of estate administration Ms Paice refers to are generally in the nature of matters of record with some connecting details and expanded explanations, which remain uncontradicted by evidence from Miss Harrison.

[14]   Following Miss Harrison’s unsuccessful challenge to the Assignee’s caveat, she repeatedly indicated she would be applying for the annulment of her bankruptcy. She failed to apply for such annulment. There is nothing to indicate, if she were to make an application for annulment today, that she would be able to establish any of the statutory grounds.

The Possession Judgment

[15]   In the Possession Judgment, the Judge held there was no jurisdiction to look behind the Adjudication Judgment as it was an order of the High Court and the adjudication had not been annulled.11

[16]   Judge Kelly also considered other grounds  advanced  in  opposition  by  Miss Harrison and rejected each of them, including that:

(a)the Assignee should have examined the claims against Miss Harrison and applied for the annulment of her adjudication;12

(b)the Assignee’s attempt to take possession of the property occupied by Miss Harrison and her elderly mother was an excessive use of discretionary power;13

11     Possession Judgment, above n 6, at [37]–[38].

12     Possession Judgment, above n 6, at [39].

13     At [40]–[43].

(c)the Assignee had inordinately delayed the application in an “unprincipled and legally immoral and unconscionable” way and that the doctrine of laches applied;14 and

(d)the Assignee’s application is pursued in a “personal capacity” in a way that victimises Miss Harrison.15

[17]   Judge Kelly, as well as rejecting the more specific grounds of opposition, rejected Miss Harrison’s more generalised submissions based on fraud and breaches of natural justice, deprivation of liberty and a breach of entitlement to adequate housing.16

[18]   Accordingly, Judge Kelly granted the Assignee’s summary judgment application and dismissed Miss Harrison’s cross-application.

Miss Harrison’s judicial review application

[19]   The statement of claim with which Miss Harrison commenced this proceeding is lengthy (96 paragraphs). Far beyond pleading the material allegations required under r 5.26 of the High Court Rules 2016, the claim presents a discursive criticism of the findings in the Possession Judgment and is replete with submissions. Arguably, the most informative summary of causes of action is in paragraph [8], which reads:17

The Official Assignee Office’s intended forced eviction and displacement of the applicant and her mother from their home and community caused by Adrienne Harrison and her spouse Graeme Harrison’s own unlawful actions which caused this situation, constitutes unconscionable circumstances and a serious gross violation of human rights which is not fully justified or compliant with international violation of human rights which is not fully justified or compliant with international human rights and humanitarian law and is subject to recourse.

[20]   These complaints, together with a further complaint that the application for possession was time-barred, were again effectively summarised in paragraph [93] of the statement of claim which reads:

14     At [46]–[60].

15 At [61].

16     At [62]–[68].

17     Footnotes omitted.

Because of the oppressive disproportionately unreasonable events that have been directed against her by State interference with her fundamental rights and serious miscarriage of justice, Miss Harrison is compelled to file proceedings for annulment of the ultra vires adjudication that was improperly obtained and should never have been made which make it a nullity, and it is a cowardly unconscionable thing for the State and the District Court to try to shift blame onto Miss Harrison for the Official Assignee Office breaching their statutory obligation to examine claims, breaching the Limitation Act 2010 and violating proportionate, reasonable and fair standards of the law and the rule of law, to unconscionably capitalise on serious miscarriage of justice and privation of due process.

[21]   The allegations in the statement of claim conclude with Miss Harrison returning to her complaint that the judgment debt which gave rise to the Adjudication Judgment was obtained by fraud, paragraph [94] of the statement of claim reading:

The adjudication decision which has infected these proceedings that was induced and affected by fraud is contrary to the public policy and laws of New Zealand and violates the rule of law, in breach of Miss Harrison’s legal and human fundamental rights.

[22]   The prayer for relief at the conclusion of the statement  of  claim  at  paragraph [95] reads:

WHEREFORE, in the interests of justice the actions of the Official Assignee are found wanting, and the involved summary judgment application CIV- 2023-009-2205 should be denied, which is unfit for the summary judgment procedure, and the [2024] NZDC 18779 decision of the District Court should be reversed in the interests of justice.

Recusal

[23]   The hearing of the Assignee’s strike-out application was scheduled before me by the Judicial Resource Manager very recently. On Friday,  2 May 2025,  when  Miss Harrison became aware the hearing was scheduled before me, she addressed a memorandum to the “Duty Judge” as a “legal demand for [her] rights to an impartial judge and fair hearing”. The memorandum contained an extended range of allegations. The gist of the allegations was that I had deprived Miss Harrison of a fair hearing in 2016 and had acted on “presuppositions”. Miss Harrison asserted I had a conflict of interest in now hearing the strike-out application. Miss Harrison’s memorandum contained a number of scandalous allegations which I do not repeat here.

[24]   In her memorandum Miss Harrison stated she would “not appear before a partial judge”.

[25]   When the proceeding was called in Court as scheduled at 10.00 am, Monday 4 May 2025, Miss Harrison did not appear. That was her entitlement. She had filed a second memorandum on the evening of Friday, 2 May 2025 having that day ascertained I was Duty Judge and asserting the ignoring of her memorandum “by the Duty Judge” on the Friday had added to the clear appearance of my partiality and confirmation bias. In this second memorandum, Miss Harrison recorded that she, “like a molested child”, declined to appear before me.

[26]   At the hearing, counsel for the Assignee were present. Ms McCoy confirmed she had been served with Miss Harrison’s two memoranda. I announced in Court I was not recusing myself, and that I would include my explanation in this judgment.

[27]   The Chief High Court Judge’s recusal guidelines, published pursuant to s 171 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, assist Judges to decide if they should recuse themselves from a proceeding.18 In terms of the guidelines, a Judge should recuse themself if, in the circumstances, a fair-minded and fully informed observer would have a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the Judge is required to decide. The standard for recusal is one of a real and not remote possibility.

[28]   The Adjudication Judgment is a final judgment that has not been challenged on appeal. In the Adjudication Judgment, I considered and rejected essentially the same arguments—as to the judgment creditors’ judgment debt being obtained fraudulently—as Miss Harrison relied on in seeking my recusal. She asserted that, in adjudicating her bankrupt, I acted outside the Court’s jurisdiction and I deprived her of a fair hearing. Any fair-minded, fully informed observer, reading the Adjudication Judgment and the bankruptcy notice judgment which preceded it would understand the judgment creditors, with their judgment debt, were entitled to seek Miss Harrison’s adjudication and the hearing of that application involved an impartial assessment.

18     Justice G J Venning “High Court recusal guidelines” (12 June 2017) < Miss Harrison therefore did not establish any basis upon which it was appropriate for me to recuse myself.

Strike out—the procedural regime

[30]   Rule 15.1(1) of the High Court Rules 2016 permits the court to strike out all or part of a pleading in four defined circumstances. Those circumstances are where the pleading discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action; where the pleading is likely to cause prejudice or delay; where the pleading is frivolous or vexatious; or where the proceeding is an abuse of process.

[31]   Principles applying to the exercise of this jurisdiction include that the cause of action to be struck out must be clearly untenable and that the jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases.19

The strike out application

[32]The second respondent invokes the grounds identified at [30] above.

No reasonably arguable cause of action

[33]   Ms McCoy submits the statement of claim contains a mix of assertions, submissions and commentary, with largely unintelligible pleadings. Ms McCoy submits that, to the extent Miss Harrison alleges the Possession Judgment was wrong, the claim is untenable because the District Court applied the correct legal test and correctly found Miss Harrison had no defence, as supported by evidence before the District Court.

[34]   In terms of the  relief  sought  in  the  statement  of  claim  (above  at  [22]) Ms McCoy submits that  nothing  there  claimed  is  an  available  remedy  in  judicial review proceedings—implicitly the prayer for relief is seeking orders that summary judgment be “denied” or “reversed”, remedies for which there is no pleaded basis.

19     Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 [31]–[33] per Elias CJ and Anderson J.

[35]   Ms McCoy submits Miss Harrison’s proceeding will cause prejudice or delay through relitigating matters already the subject of and determined in numerous proceedings. Ms McCoy submits, for similar reasons, the pleading is frivolous and vexatious through continuing to assert grievances that have long since been addressed and finally decided.

[36]   Miss Harrison filed a notice of opposition. It was again a lengthy document, setting out grounds of opposition over 48 paragraphs. The tone is set in an early paragraph which reads:

The nature of the Assignee’s decision-making is mercenary and unconscionable in the particular circumstances of this case. [The] evidence proves that the Assignee has arbitrarily overridden his/her statutory obligations and has skewed the law and that is unlawful.

[37]Assertions contained in the notice of opposition include:

(a)Judge Kelly ignored solid proof of fraud;

(b)New Zealand and international law protects Miss Harrison’s property from fraud;

(c)there are no legitimate enforceable claims against Miss Harrison;

(d)Judge Kelly failed to rigorously consider Miss Harrison’s substantive defences;

(e)the Assignee misled the District Court by omitting critical facts;

(f)the Assignee was guilty of fraud or deliberate concealment or misrepresentation;

(g)Judge Kelly ignored statutory checks and balances against the excessive use of discretionary power;

(h)the District Court took account of irrelevant factors;

(i)Judge Kelly sought to rationalise the indefensible;

(j)Judge Kelly did not follow the rules of natural justice;

(k)Judge Kelly did not consider the distinct heads of proportionality, reasonableness and fairness;

(l)The Assignee incorrectly accepted creditors claims out of time;

(m)fundamental limitation principles under the Limitation Act 2010 and as a matter of rule of  law  were  ignored  by  the Assignee  and  by  Judge Kelly.

Analysis

[38]   Ms McCoy provided a comprehensive common bundle of all the historically relevant documents, including the proceedings that led to the Possession Judgment. I have reviewed those documents.

[39]   The statement of claim by which the Assignee sought an order for possession of the Property was a straightforward document. It reads:

The plaintiff says:

1.The plaintiff is the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy of the property of Angela Janice Harrison.

2.The defendant is Angela Janice Harrison, who was adjudicated bankrupt by the High Court at Christchurch on 29 November 2016.

3.The defendant is the sole registered proprietor  of  the  property at  38 Damien Place, Christchurch, legally described as Lot 22 Deposited Plan 22347, and contained in Computer Freehold Register Identifier CB1D/261 Canterbury Land Registration District (the “Property”).

4.The defendant resides at the Property with her mother, Pauline Janice Harrison, who was adjudicated bankrupt by the High Court at Christchurch on 24 February 2015.

5.Upon her adjudication, the defendant’s interest in the Property vested in the plaintiff  under  section 101  of  the  Insolvency  Act  2006 (the “Act”).

6.On 23 March 2023 the plaintiff served a notice on the defendant requiring her and her mother to vacate the Property by 20 April 2023.

7.The defendant has not responded to that notice, and has failed to vacate the Property.

Wherefore the plaintiff seeks:

(a)An order for possession of the Property under section 152(2) of the Act; and

(b)An order that the defendant and any other occupants of the Property immediately vacate the Property; and

(c)Any other orders the Court thinks fit.

[40]   As recorded, the Assignee, in seeking an order for possession of the Property, invoked s 152 of the Act. That section provides:20

152     Bankrupt must vacate land or buildings if required to do so

(1)The Assignee may require the bankrupt and any of his or her relatives to vacate any land or building that is part of the property vested in the Assignee under the bankruptcy.

(2)If the Assignee’s demand is not complied with, the Assignee may apply to the District Court for an order for possession of the land or building.

[41]   Accordingly, for the Assignee to become entitled to a possession order under s 152(2) of the Act the Assignee was required to establish:

(a)Miss Harrison had been adjudicated bankrupt (which she had been);

(b)the Property was part of the property vested in the Assignee under Miss Harrison’s bankruptcy (which it was);

(c)the Assignee  had required Miss Harrison and her mother to vacate  the Property (which the Assignee had); and

(d)Miss Harrison and her mother had not complied with the Assignee’s demand (which they had not).

20     Insolvency Act 2006.

[42]   In terms of the legislation, the Assignee was therefore entitled to an order for possession.

[43]   At the apparent core of Miss Harrison’s opposition is her view that she should not have been adjudicated bankrupt in the first place. A large part of the material she has filed is directed to that proposition. But the suggestions made, in relation to a final judgment, missed the point that  Miss Harrison is a  “bankrupt”  in terms of s 3 of  the Act, having been adjudicated bankrupt, and her property vested in the Assignee by reason of her adjudication.

[44]   The sweeping allegations of fraud made by Miss Harrison seem to flow from her ignoring the duties  the Assignee  had  in  relation  to  the  administration  of  Miss Harrison’s bankrupt estate. The evidence discloses nothing to justify her allegations of fraud.

[45]   Miss Harrison’s proposition that the Assignee’s requirement that she vacate the Property and seeking of an order for possession were somehow time-barred or otherwise tainted by delay is equally without merit—the evidence unequivocally indicates the relevant delays in relation to the administration of Miss Harrison’s estate were caused by her conduct, and particularly her failure to file her statement of affairs.

[46]   I am satisfied Miss Harrison’s pleading discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, the proceeding is likely to cause prejudice or delay and is frivolous or vexatious.

[47]This is an appropriate case in which to strike out the pleading.

Result

[48]The applicant’s statement of claim is struck out.

[49]   The applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed on a 2B basis, together with the second respondent’s reasonable disbursements, to be fixed by the Deputy Registrar.

Osborne J

Solicitors:

Crown Law, Wellington for First and Second Respondent Copy to: A J Harrison (Applicant in person)