| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 146/2023 [2024] NZSC 57 |
| BETWEEN | QUENTIN STOBART HAINES |
| AND | ROY WILLIAM BASSETT-BURR |
| Court: | Glazebrook, Ellen France and Kós JJ |
Counsel: | J P Dallas for Applicants |
Judgment: | 14 May 2024 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B The applicants must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.
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REASONS
This application for leave to appeal concerns costs ordered against a non-party. The Court of Appeal concluded they should not have been ordered.[1] The applicants seek leave to appeal.
[1]Bassett-Burr v Haines [2023] NZCA 380 (Miller, Moore and Palmer JJ) [CA judgment].
The essential circumstances are set out at the start of the judgment challenged:[2]
[1] This is an appeal from a High Court decision awarding costs against the [respondent] as a non-party to a proceeding in which statutory demands issued under s 289 of the Companies Act 1993 were set aside.
…
[2] The statutory demands were … issued by the trustees of the Link No 1 Trust. One of the trustees was Harry Memelink, whose family trust it was. The other was Lynx Trustees Ltd, a company owned and directed by the [respondent], Roy Bassett-Burr. He signed all the demands, and immediately after service he emailed a number of parties, including the debtors.
[3] The debtors named in the statutory demands were Quentin Haines, formerly Mr Memelink’s solicitor but no longer practising, the QSH family trust, and the second and third [applicants], both of which are companies associated with Mr Haines. The sums claimed in the demands were sums payable under loan obligations assumed by the Haines interests to financiers which had assigned their interests to the Link No 1 Trust. The loans were secured by a mortgage over a lifestyle property at Manakau, Levin. It appears that Mr Memelink and the Link No 1 Trust had guaranteed the loans and took the assignment after Mr Haines defaulted.
[2]Footnotes omitted.
After correspondence relating to a dispute over the debts underlying the demands, Mr Memelink appeared in person in the High Court and withdrew the demands. He had earlier acknowledged they had never been properly served in the first place, and it seems Mr Bassett-Burr relied on that acknowledgment in not participating further.
The Court of Appeal judgment continues:[3]
[16] Churchman J set the demands aside, noting that the first two had not been issued against a company as required by s 289 of the Companies Act and that the purported debts on which they all were based were clearly disputed. The Judge also rejected as untenable Mr Memelink’s claim that the application had never been opposed. He awarded costs against Mr Bassett-Burr personally, finding that he had improperly issued the demands and had failed to respond to the invitation to withdraw. He noted that Mr Bassett-Burr is…
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- Case
- [2024] NZSC 57
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Supreme Court included whether the Court of Appeal had correctly determined that there was no impropriety on Mr Bassett-Burr's part in issuing the statutory demands and whether the Court of Appeal's reliance on the judgment of Grice J was appropriate under the Evidence Act 2006. The applicants also argued that the Court of Appeal should have recalled its judgment due to the existence of fresh and cogent evidence.
The Supreme Court found that the proposed appeal turned almost wholly on its own facts and did not involve a matter of general commercial significance. The principles relating to non-party costs were considered tolerably clear in the authorities, and there was no need for the Supreme Court to reconsider them. The Court of Appeal's reliance on the judgment of Grice J was not precluded by section 50 of the Evidence Act, as the issue on the costs application and appeal was whether Mr Bassett-Burr had acted improperly. The Supreme Court also found no underlying error in the Court of Appeal's assessment of the immateriality of the further evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court was not satisfied that it was necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the appeal.
The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicants to pay the respondent's costs of $2,500. The applicants were represented by J P Dallas, and the respondent was represented by D G O Livingston.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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