Graham, Reeves, Jeffries and Bryant v The Queen

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 59/2013
SC 60/2013
SC 61/2013
SC 62/2013
[2015] NZSC 109
BETWEEN

DOUGLAS ARTHUR MONTROSE GRAHAM, MICHAEL HOWARD REEVES, WILLIAM PATRICK JEFFRIES AND LAWRENCE ROLAND VALPY BRYANT
Applicants

AND

THE QUEEN
Respondent

Court:

Elias CJ, William Young and Glazebrook JJ

Counsel:

D H O’Leary for Applicants
C R Carruthers QC and D R La Hood for Respondent

Judgment:

22 July 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for recall is dismissed.

BCosts are reserved.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

A recall application

  1. The applicants seek a recall of the judgment of this Court delivered on 25 October 2013[1] refusing them leave to appeal against their convictions.[2]  In the same judgment, the applicants were granted leave to appeal against sentence.  Their sentence appeal was subsequently heard and was later allowed in a judgment delivered on 7 May 2014.[3] 

    [1]R v Graham [2013] NZSC 104 [Supreme Court leave judgment].

    [2]R v Graham [2012] NZHC 265, [2012] NZCCLR 6 (Dobson J) [High Court judgment].

  2. The recall application is premised on the assertion that the Court would not have declined the applications for leave to appeal against conviction had it known that: (1) the trial Judge founded the convictions on evidence that had not formally been proved (namely the Peden schedule); (2) defence counsel never entered into an agreement under s 9 Evidence Act 2006 to admit the schedule; (3) the ruling of the trial Judge was that it was for the Crown to apply to recall Ms Peden to prove the schedule if it wished to put it to further witnesses; and (4) appeal counsel did continue to press in the Court of Appeal hearing that there had been procedural flaws at trial, and that the Court of Appeal judgment had misrecorded this.  The submissions in support of the recall application advance further complaints, namely that the Peden schedule involved a deviation from the Crown case as particularised and was wrong and lacking in logic as involving double counting.

The Peden schedule

  1. The Peden schedule consists of a number of spreadsheets, the most material of which is in two parts, one headed “FORE CAST LOAN REPAYMENTS & DRAWDOWNS [Board papers]” and the other “COMPARISON OF FORECAST LOAN CASHFLOWS AGAINST ACTUAL”.  It was prepared by Michelle Peden, who was a Crown expert witness.  It was not, however, produced by her in evidence.  Rather it was prepared, it seems, after the Crown case closed and was made available to the prosecutor, Mr Carruthers QC, for use in his closing address.  The spreadsheet is attached to this judgment as appendix 1.  We have labelled various rows for ease of reference.

  2. Because the period with which we are concerned extended only until December 2007, our analysis focuses on the first five columns of the spreadsheet.  We have, however, included the spreadsheet in full.  We note that Lombard engaged Ferrier Hodgson (who were subsequently rebranded as KordaMentha) to review their books and liquidity…

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Details
Case
[2015] NZSC 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Graham, Reeves, Jeffries, and Bryant v The Queen, the applicants sought a recall of the Supreme Court of New Zealand's 2013 judgment, which had denied them leave to appeal against their convictions while granting leave to appeal against their sentences. The applicants argued that the Court would have declined their leave to appeal against conviction if it had been aware of certain issues related to a document known as the Peden schedule. The recall application was dismissed by the Court, which found that the applicants' arguments were misconceived. The Peden schedule was a spreadsheet prepared by a Crown expert witness but was not formally produced as evidence in the trial. The applicants argued that the schedule contained errors and that the trial judge should not have relied on it without proper proof. However, the Court found that the schedule was merely a summary of evidence already in the record and that the judge's reliance on it did not constitute an injustice. The Court also dismissed other complaints raised by the applicants, finding them to be misconceived or irrelevant.

The Court held that the Peden schedule was not independent evidence but rather a summary of what was already established by the evidence. The applicants' assertion that the schedule involved a departure from the Crown case as particularised was also rejected. The Court found that the schedule was not the basis of the Crown's case and that the applicants' comparison of recoveries for September-December of $33m with what they said were anticipated receipts of $49m was a mischaracterisation of the Crown case. The applicants' double counting complaint was also dismissed, as the Court found that the $71.822m figure was one way of looking at the substantial underperformance of actual as against forecast recoveries over the September to December period.

In light of the Court's findings, the applicants' request for recall was dismissed, and the Crown sought costs against the applicants. The Court considered ordering the applicants to pay costs due to the misconceived nature of the recall application and the applicants' mischaracterisation of the Crown case. The Court invited the applicants to file and serve submissions in opposition to the making of such an order within 10 working days, reserving the decision on costs in the meantime.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves the convictions of four applicants, Douglas Arthur Montrose Graham, Michael Howard Reeves, William Patrick Jeffries, and Lawrence Roland Valpy Bryant, for offences related to misleading financial information in the context of a financial institution's liquidity and cash flow projections. The central piece of evidence in the case is the Peden schedule, a spreadsheet prepared by a Crown expert witness, Michelle Peden, comparing forecast loan repayments and drawdowns with actual repayments and drawdowns. The schedule was not produced as evidence but was used in the prosecutor's closing address. The applicants' convictions were based on their alleged failure to accurately disclose liquidity risks, particularly the discrepancy between forecast and actual loan repayments in the months of September to December 2007.

The forecast for these four months was $63.211 million, but the actual repayments amounted to $33.033 million, representing 52.26% of the forecast. The Peden schedule highlighted this discrepancy and was used by the Crown to argue that the applicants should have questioned the accuracy of the cash flow projections. The applicants contested the accuracy of the Peden schedule, particularly arguing that it involved double counting of loan repayments across different months. The trial judge stopped cross-examination of a defence witness on the schedule, ruling that any inaccuracies could be addressed by the defence. The judge later used the schedule to conclude that the repayments were significantly below forecast.

The applicants initially sought leave to appeal against their convictions, which was refused by the Supreme Court in a judgment delivered on 25 October 2013. They were, however, granted leave to appeal against their sentences, which was subsequently allowed. The applicants then made a recall application seeking to set aside the refusal of leave to appeal against their convictions, arguing that the Supreme Court would not have declined leave had it been aware of certain issues concerning the Peden schedule. The recall application was heard and subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court on 22 July 2015.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Supreme Court would have granted leave to appeal against conviction if it had been aware that the trial judge based the convictions on evidence that had not formally been proved (the Peden schedule).
2. Whether the Supreme Court would have declined leave to appeal if it had known that defence counsel never agreed to admit the Peden schedule under section 9 of the Evidence Act 2006.
3. Whether the Supreme Court would have declined leave if it had been aware that the trial judge ruled that it was for the Crown to apply to recall Ms Peden to prove the schedule if it wished to put it to further witnesses.
4. Whether the Supreme Court would have declined leave if it had known that the Court of Appeal judgment misrecorded the applicants' argument about procedural flaws at trial.

Held
1. The Supreme Court would not have granted leave to appeal against conviction if it had been aware that the trial judge based the convictions on evidence that had not formally been proved (the Peden schedule).
2. The Supreme Court would not have declined leave to appeal if it had known that defence counsel never agreed to admit the Peden schedule under section 9 of the Evidence Act 2006.
3. The Supreme Court would not have declined leave if it had been aware that the trial judge ruled that it was for the Crown to apply to recall Ms Peden to prove the schedule if it wished to put it to further witnesses.
4. The Supreme Court would not have declined leave if it had known that the Court of Appeal judgment misrecorded the applicants' argument about procedural flaws at trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants sought a recall of the Supreme Court's judgment refusing them leave to appeal against their convictions. The recall application was premised on several grounds, including the assertion that the trial judge based the convictions on evidence that had not been formally proved (the Peden schedule). The Supreme Court held that the Peden schedule was not independent evidence but rather a summary of, and calculations based on, evidence that had been otherwise established. The Court was aware that the Peden schedule had not been produced as a Crown exhibit or proved in evidence, which disposed of the first two grounds of the recall application.

The applicants further argued that the trial judge ruled that the Peden schedule could not be put to defence witnesses unless the Crown applied to recall Ms Peden to prove it. However, the Supreme Court found that the applicants' assertion as to the reasons why the judge stopped cross-examination was incomplete and did not affect the decision not to grant leave to appeal against conviction. Regarding the fourth ground, the Court noted that the applicants' counsel did not firmly press the argument about procedural flaws before the Court of Appeal, despite some scepticism from the bench. The Supreme Court found all four grounds misconceived and dismissed the recall application.

In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court examined the legal principles applicable to recall applications and the status of the Peden schedule in the context of the evidence presented at trial. The Court concluded that the Peden schedule was not independent evidence and that the applicants' arguments did not warrant a recall of the original judgment. The binding legal principle in this case is that a recall application will only be granted if the applicant can demonstrate that the original judgment was obtained through a miscarriage of justice or procedural flaw that materially affected the outcome of the case.