Fane v R

Case [2015] NZCA 561


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA62/2015
[2015] NZCA 561

BETWEEN

CODY JAMES FANE
Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN
Respondent

Hearing:

13 October 2015 (further submissions received 3 November 2015)

Court:

Ellen France P, Asher and Collins JJ

Counsel:

A T Sykes and R N Zwaan for Appellant
I Murray and S Graham for Respondent

Judgment:

23 November 2015 at 2.15 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for an extension of time to appeal is granted.

B        The appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Asher J)

Introduction

  1. On 20 June 2012 Cody James Fane pleaded guilty in the High Court at Rotorua to charges of causing grievous bodily harm, unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of cannabis for the purpose of sale.  He was sentenced by Heath J to 10 years’ imprisonment for that offending, with a minimum period of imprisonment of five years.[1]

    [1]R v Fane [2012] NZHC 1807 [sentencing notes].

  2. Mr Fane’s notice of appeal was filed on 11 February 2015.  He applies for an extension of time to appeal.  He raises the following issues in respect of the sentence:

    (a)There was a failure of the High Court to take into account Mr Fane’s personal, family, whānau, community and cultural background under s 8(i) of the Sentencing Act 2002.

    (b)The Judge erred by not asking under s 27 of the Sentencing Act if there were any family or community members that wished to speak on Mr Fane’s behalf.

    (c)There were other mitigating factors, in particular the remorse of the appellant and provocation, which should have been taken into account.

Relevant background

  1. At the time of the offending Mr Fane was 21 years old.  Through his mother he is of Te Arawa and Tainui heritage.  He had been living with the victim’s stepdaughter for approximately four years.  She was of the same age and also identifies as Māori.  They have two children.

  2. Their first child, a daughter, was born prematurely while Mr Fane was in prison.  Not long after the child had come home from Starship Hospital she was taken to emergency services with breathing problems.  It was decided that the child had received a non-accidental head injury.  This was always denied by Mr Fane and his partner.

  3. The child was then placed with Mr Fane’s partner’s parents.  His partner’s stepfather, the child’s step-grandfather, is the victim.  Under a Child Youth and Family (CYF) care and custody arrangement Mr Fane and his partner maintained close contact with the child while she was with the grandparents.  Their second child was removed by CYF at birth and was being raised in a separate household by Mr Fane’s aunt.

  4. On the day of the offending Mr Fane and his partner were visiting his partner’s parents’ home in Rotorua.  Their daughter was present.  The victim wanted to take her with him to hospital to visit his other daughter who had just given birth to her second child.  Mr Fane did not want the victim to…

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AGLC
Fane v R [2015] NZCA 561
Case
[2015] NZCA 561
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Mr Fane, was convicted and sentenced for a crime and appealed the sentence, raising two primary grounds. The first ground was that the sentencing judge should have suggested that the court hear from persons on Mr Fane's personal, family, whānau, community, and cultural background, pursuant to section 27(5). The second ground was that the sentencing judge failed to take into account the element of provocation adequately. The appeal was heard in the High Court.

The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the sentencing judge had an obligation to suggest that the court hear from persons under section 27(5), and whether the sentencing judge had properly considered the element of provocation. The court needed to interpret section 27(5) and determine if it imposed a mandatory duty on the judge, and assess if the judge had correctly applied the provocation principle in sentencing.

The court found that section 27(5) did not impose a mandatory duty on the judge to suggest that the court hear from persons. The court held that the provision was discretionary, and there was no requirement for the judge to exercise this discretion if no request was made by the offender. In this case, neither Mr Fane nor his counsel had made such a request, and there was no indication that further information would have been beneficial. The court also found that the sentencing judge had adequately considered the element of provocation but had concluded that it did not sufficiently mitigate the offence to warrant a lower sentence. The court concluded that the sentencing judge was not obligated to suggest that the court hear from persons under section 27(5) and that the judge had correctly assessed the provocation element.

The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld. The court did not find merit in the grounds of appeal presented by Mr Fane.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Section 27(5) provides: 27Offender may request court to hear person on personal, family, whanau, community, and cultural background of offender…(5)If an offender does not make a request under this section, the court may suggest to the offender that it may be of assistance to the court to hear a person or persons called by the offender on any of the matters specified in subsection (1). We have asked for and obtained submissions presented to the High Court at the time of sentence. It is clear that no request was made by Mr Fane’s then counsel, or by Mr Fane, for the court to hear any persons under s 27. Notwithstanding this it is suggested on behalf of Mr Fane that the Court should have of its own initiative suggested to Mr Fane that it might be of assistance to the Court to hear from persons in relation to the matters specified in s 27(1). We are not able to accept this submission. Mr Fane was represented by experienced and responsible counsel, who made no such suggestion. The Judge had an unusual quantity of material before him, as in addition to the sentencing submissions for the Crown and defence he had a full pre-sentence report and a comprehensive psychiatric report commissioned under s 38(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003. The pre-sentence report set out in some detail Mr Fane’s cultural background. The probation officer had spoken to his mother and one of his whāngai parents, who both described the pain Mr Fane experienced in having his children taken from him. There was no suggestion to the probation officer that there would be any benefit in the officer or the Judge speaking to anyone else. In addition, the psychiatric report had been prepared by a senior and respected consultant psychiatrist, Dr Rees Tapsell. He recorded in detail Mr Fane’s feelings about the loss of custody of his children, his developmental history and his mental state. Further, Mr Fane had presented his own three-page handwritten statement to the Judge in which he took responsibility for what had happened and expressed his sorrow and shame. He did not ask that anyone else be allowed to speak for him. While there will be cases where the particular context makes it appropriate to invoke the discretion to hear a person or persons, s 27(5) does not place a duty on a judge. The court, if it takes the view that it “may” be of assistance to hear from the person or persons mentioned at s 27(1), “may” suggest that the offender call these persons. As we have set out, there was nothing before the Judge to suggest that he would have benefitted from further material of the type that has now been provided on appeal.[12] He would not have learned more of relevance to the sentencing than he already had before him. [12]RS (CA21/2014) v R [2014] NZCA 484 at [18]. This ground of appeal fails. It is established that where the offender has been provoked that may justify a lower starting point. The sentencing judge will need to be satisfied that there was serious provocation and that it was an operative cause of the violence inflicted by the offender, remaining an operative cause throughout the commission of the offence.[13] [13]R v Taueki, above n 6, at [32](a).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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