IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2024-485-604 [2025] NZHC 1834
BETWEEN SHERILYN JAYNE EVANS
Appellant
AND MATTHEW JOHN PAGE
Respondent
On the papers:
Counsel: Appellant in person
C J Dellabarca for Respondent
Judgment: 4 July 2025
JUDGMENT OF GRAU J
[Costs]
Introduction
[1] On 6 May 2025, I dismissed Ms Evans’ appeal against the Family Court’s decision granting sale orders in respect of two properties co-owned by Ms Evans and her former partner, Mr Page. I noted that, as the successful party, Mr Page was entitled to costs. Although I encouraged the parties to agree as to costs, it appears this was unable to occur.
[2]Mr Page seeks $19,120 in schedule costs, and $264.04 in disbursements.
[3] Ms Evans asks the Court to defer the issue of costs until the outcome of her legal aid process is determined, so that she can be legally represented to present arguments about costs. She seeks leave to file a further memorandum after the final legal aid position is determined.
EVANS v PAGE (COSS) [2025] NZHC 1834 [4 July 2025]
Was Ms Evans an “aided person” and should the issue of costs be deferred?
[4] Ms Evans notes that she was granted interim legal aid in relation to her appeal on 21 November 2024, and her application for a full grant of legal aid is under review by the Legal Aid Tribunal after legal aid was declined. She submits it would be appropriate to defer judgment on costs until the legal aid determination is made, so that it is known to which period(s) the protections under s 45 of the Legal Services Act 2011 (LSA) apply. Section 45 provides that no order for costs may be made against an aided person in a civil proceeding unless the Court is satisfied there are exceptional circumstances. Ms Evans seeks to rely on Maheta v Skybus NZ Ltd to establish she was an aided person and therefore s 45 potentially applies.1
[5] Section 4(1) of the LSA provides that an “aided person” includes a person who is granted legal aid on an interim basis. Section 16(1)(b) specifies that a grant of legal aid on an interim basis continues until a decision is made to grant or decline an application for a full grant of legal aid. Although Ms Evans received an interim grant of legal aid, that grant only allowed her to receive legal assistance for her application for legal aid in these proceedings, but her application for legal aid was declined on 21 February 2025, and her application for reconsideration of this decision was also refused on 8 April 2025.
[6] As a consequence, Ms Evans was only an “aided person” from 21 November 2024 to 21 February 2025. She was not legally aided in respect of her appeal, or in respect of costs relating to that appeal. I therefore do not consider that Maheta is applicable to these circumstances. In that case, Mr…
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- Evans v Page [2025] NZHC 1834
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- [2025] NZHC 1834
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the court should defer the decision on costs until Evans' application for legal aid was finalised. Evans argued that she was an "aided person" under the Legal Services Act 2011, which would protect her from certain cost orders unless exceptional circumstances applied. Evans contended that she was entitled to defer the costs decision until her legal aid status was clarified. Additionally, she argued that deferring costs would not significantly prejudice Page and that she had insufficient time to prepare arguments due to legal aid-related tasks and health issues.
The court rejected Evans' arguments. It found that Evans was only an "aided person" for a brief period while her application for full legal aid was under review, and she did not qualify for aid during the appeal or for the costs associated with it. The court emphasised the principle of expeditious and predictable cost determinations and found no basis to defer the issue of costs. The court also noted that Evans had not provided sufficient evidence of health issues or compelling reasons for the delay in preparing her costs arguments.
The court then assessed Page's claim for costs, which included expenses for case management, memoranda, appearances, and counsel's fees. The court found that Page had not unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings and approved most of the claimed costs. However, considering Evans' financial hardship and the reasonable nature of some of her delays, the court reduced the total costs by 10 percent. The final order was for Page to receive $17,208 in costs plus $264.04 in disbursements, with an additional order that these costs would be deducted from Evans' share of the property proceeds if any.
Orders
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Background
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Ratio Decidendi
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