Evans v Page
[2025] NZHC 1053
•6 May 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2024-485-604
[2025] NZHC 1053
BETWEEN SHERILYN JAYNE EVANS
Appellant
AND
MATTHEW JOHN PAGE
Respondent
Hearing: 30 April 2025 Counsel:
Appellant in person
C J Dellabarca for Respondent
Judgment:
6 May 2025
JUDGMENT OF GRAU J
Introduction and summary of decision
[1] Ms Evans has appealed against a decision of the Family Court in August 2024 which ordered the sale of two properties owned by her and her former partner,
Mr Page.1
[2] As I will go on to discuss, although the appeal was filed out of time, I am prepared to grant leave to appeal. I grant leave because the delay was not significant, the prejudice to Mr Page is limited, and the delay is at least partly explained by the fact that Ms Evans had to file the appeal herself, due to her difficulties in obtaining a grant of legal aid.
[3] The appeal was accompanied by an application to stay the sale orders. However, that application has been overtaken now that the (much delayed) appeal
1 Page v Evans [2024] NZFC 10130 [decision under appeal].
EVANS v PAGE [2025] NZHC 1053 [6 May 2025]
hearing has finally taken place, and it is unnecessary given Mr Page has not taken any steps to enforce the judgment under appeal. In those circumstances, the application has no utility, and it is dismissed.
[4] I also dismiss the appeal. I can find no error in the District Court’s decision. The Court does have sympathy for Ms Evans’ predicament, and it would clearly be in her best interests to be able to retain the status quo. However, the Court cannot countenance that status quo where Mr Page (now almost three years post-separation) would have to continue to pay all of the outgoings on the properties for a further indeterminate period until the former couple’s relationship property proceedings are finally determined and/or Ms Evans can buy him out.
[5] The position before the Family Court in August 2024 (where Ms Evans was represented by counsel) was that the parties had agreed to the sale of one of the properties (the Allington property). In respect of the other property (the Messines property), Ms Evans was seeking further time (until 31 January 2025) to confirm finance to enable her to purchase Mr Page’s share, absent which, she agreed it could then be sold. I consider the Judge was correct to find there was insufficient evidence that Ms Evans would be in a different position by that time and that Mr Page could not be expected to continue to bear the obligation of their joint outgoings. Now, several months later, in April 2025, the position has not changed, and I agree with the Family Court that Mr Page should be able to move on.
Background
The parties and the properties
[6] Ms Evans and Mr Page were in a de facto relationship from 2004 until 23 June 2022.
[7]Mr Page is a radiologist who now lives in Auckland in rental accommodation.
[8] Ms Evans, who is not working, lives at one of the two properties the couple purchased during their relationship.
[9] A property at Allington Road, Karori (the Allington property) was purchased on 29 March 2018 for $575,000. The decision on appeal described that it was rented out, for $680 per week. The registered valuation of the property as at October 2023 was $770,000. Ms Evans confirmed at the hearing that it is no longer tenanted.2
[10] The second property at Messines Road, Karori (the Messines Property) was purchased on 28 September 2020 for $1,462,000. Its October 2023 registered valuation was $1,385,000. This property contains two houses on one title. Ms Evans currently lives in the smaller rear house. The front house, a six-bedroom home, was tenanted briefly between September and December 2022, but has not been tenanted since that time.
[11] At the time of the Family Court hearing in August 2024, there was a $1,150,000 mortgage to BNZ against the Messines property, a $650,000 mortgage to Westpac against the Allington property, and an outstanding (unsecured) debt of $114,121 plus interest owed to Ms Evans’ sister.
[12] In terms of assets other than the properties, the decision on appeal records the parties have combined KiwiSaver balances of around $120,000, vehicles worth approximately $18,000, chattels, various bank accounts and funds, and shares with a modest value of between $2,000–$4,000.
[13] There are relationship property proceedings between Ms Page and Mr Evans in the Family Court. As yet there is no hearing date.
Events leading up to Family Court hearing
[14] According to Mr Page, following the parties’ separation, there was agreement for Ms Evans to have the opportunity to purchase either or both properties. On Mr Page’s version, Ms Evans had until the end of 2023 (or 18 months post separation) to purchase the properties, provided she met all the outgoings on both properties from the beginning of 2023. In return she had the exclusive possession of the Messines property. Mr Page says Ms Evans failed to honour that agreement. Ms Evans’ version
2 Ms Evans explained that, in accordance with the Family Court orders, she gave notice to the tenants, and they moved out.
is that the deadline for her purchase of the properties was February 2024, rather than the end of 2023.
[15] Mr Page says the rental income generated from the Allington property was initially being applied to a BNZ revolving credit facility secured against the Messines property. However, he claims that since February 2023, Ms Evans has been retaining that rental income, and has failed to account for it, despite repeated requests for her to do so. He says while Ms Evans has had the benefit of the rental income, he was left to service all of the $1.8 million mortgage on both properties, as well as the other outgoings; for example, rates and insurance. At the Family Court hearing, Ms Evans said she had contributed $56,000 towards the joint outgoings. Ms Evans’ position is that she had put the rental income into her account, rather than a joint account, to ensure that outgoings would be paid when they fell due.
[16] In June 2023, Mr Page filed an application for division of property. Mr Page says he made significant efforts to resolve matters between the parties, but Ms Evans failed to take any meaningful steps to show whether she was able to purchase either or both properties. Subsequently, on 2 May 2024, Mr Page filed an interlocutory application for the sale of the properties.
Decision on appeal
[17]Judge Montague set out the positions of the parties as follows:
(a)Mr Page was seeking a sale of both properties as soon as possible, because he was unwilling to continue paying the outgoings. He wanted to clear the debt and move on with his life. He had no confidence that Ms Evans would work with him to achieve a common goal or effect division of the property any time soon.
(b)Ms Evans had, at the date of the hearing, now agreed to the sale of the Allington property, with the only dispute being whether remedial work should be done to it before sale. Ms Evans asked the Court to give her until 31 January 2025 to confirm sufficient finance to purchase
Mr Page’s share in the Messines property, and if she could not do so by then, the property could be marketed for sale in February 2025.
[18] The Judge commented that Ms Evans was effectively asking the Court to extend the term of the agreement she reached with Mr Page for another year without making any contribution to the outgoings. Her Honour observed that the difficulty with Ms Evans’ position was the uncertainty and lack of evidence to support what she described as “[Ms Evans’] wish list”. She found there was no independent evidence that Ms Evans would be in a different position at the end of January 2025, with no evidence of any prospective employment. She therefore doubted whether Ms Evans would be able to purchase Mr Page’s share in the Messines property, as Ms Evans hoped to. Her Honour considered that the “iniquitous situation” would simply be prolonged into the following year, where Mr Page would be expected to continue to pay Ms Evans’ share of outgoings while she had the use of the property and his equity.
[19] The Judge acknowledged that Ms Evans would be prejudiced by the sale of the properties, by having to find alternative accommodation. However, once the Messines property was sold, she would receive her share of the proceeds which would assist her to secure alternative accommodation. The capital released to her could potentially be applied towards the purchase of another property, including either of the couple’s properties, if she was in a position to do so prior to their sale.
[20] Judge Montague considered the various criteria for making an order under s 25 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA), as set out in SM v LFDB.3 Overall, the Judge found that an order for sale was appropriate, for the following reasons:
(a)the order was sought for a valid purpose, namely an interim division of the relationship property within a reasonable timeframe;
(b)the lack of evidence that Ms Evans could, or was, taking active steps to purchase the Messines property or meet the outgoings in the meantime;
3 SM v LFDB [2013] NZHC 1056.
(c)Mr Page could not be expected to continue bearing the obligation of their joint outgoings, which deprive him of a discretionary income and impact his ability to make future life decisions or enter into financial arrangements;
(d)the continued delay, with the substantive relationship property hearing unlikely to be heard until well into 2025, meant a clear financial disadvantage to Mr Page, and potential disadvantage for both of them given the real estate market slump;
(e)in terms of the need for the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages to the partners, over the prior 12 months only Mr Page had been identifiably disadvantaged by the lack of progress toward a division;
(f)Ms Evans’ personal hopes and her emotional attachment to the property were an insufficient reason to delay sale;
(g)the sale of the properties would clear the outstanding mortgage liabilities as well as the outstanding loan to Ms Evans’ sister;
(h)although Ms Evans would face some prejudice in having to find alternative accommodation, the amount agreed between the parties to be released upon sale would assist Ms Evans to secure alternative accommodation;
(i)the sale of both properties was consistent with the purposes and principles of the PRA, particularly the principle in s 1N(d); and
(j)the modesty of the relationship pool meant that even if Ms Evans received adjustments to the division of property in her favour, it remains uncertain that she would be able to purchase Mr Page’s share of the Messines property.
[21]As a result, her Honour ordered:
(a)(by consent) the sale of the Allington property, which was to be placed on the market no later than 21 days following the tenants vacating the property (no later than 90 days from the date of the decision); and
(b)the sale of the Messines property, which was to be placed on the market no later than 30 September 2024.
[22] The net sale proceeds, after associated expenses and debts were paid, were to be retained in a solicitor’s trust account pending the resolution of the substantive proceedings or agreement between the parties. There was to be a $40,000 interim distribution to the parties.
Events following the decision
[23] Counsel for Mr Page reports that he made efforts to commence the sale process, including the filing of a sealed order, which was sealed on 3 September 2024. He says Ms Evans sought to vary the terms of that order. The variation was not agreed to, and so the order was made final on the terms made by the Court.
[24] In her affidavit dated 1 October 2024, Ms Evans says that following the judgment, she gave notice to the tenants of the Allington property and arranged access for real estate agents. She says she also made efforts to find alternative accommodation, but she had significant difficulty finding a suitable property, because she has two large dogs. Ms Evans has also explained that it has not been feasible for her to return to employment and reach a position where she can buy out Mr Page following the Family Court’s decision. This is because she has had to deal with the appeal, as well as the issue of alternative accommodation.
[25] Mr Page has continued to pay the outgoings on the properties in order to protect his credit rating. His position is that some eight months has now elapsed since the Family Court’s decision and nothing has changed. In his view, the purpose of the appeal has been for Ms Evans to “buy more time” to purchase the Messines property.
Leave to appeal out of time
[26] As noted above, Ms Evans filed her appeal out of time. Section 39 of the PRA provides that a party may appeal a Family Court decision under that Act to the High Court, with the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) applying. Under those rules, unless the Act under which the appeal is brought specifies otherwise, an appeal must be brought within 20 working days after the decision is given.4 As counsel for Mr Page, Mr Dellabarca, notes in his submissions, the decision under appeal was an oral judgment delivered on 7 August 2024. Twenty (20) working days after that date is 4 September 2024. Given Ms Evans filed her notice of appeal on 1 October 2024, the appeal was brought 19 working days out of time.
[27] The relevant factors to consider when determining whether the time to appeal should be extended include the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the conduct of the parties, any prejudice or hardship to the respondent or others, the significance of the issues raised by the proposed appeal, and in some cases the merits of the proposed appeal.5 The ultimate question is what the interests of justice require.6
[28] Ms Evans did not file an application for leave to appeal out of time, nor did she address the issue in her notice of appeal. She did note in her supporting affidavit that “delays in confirming legal aid funding have prevented my lawyer from preparing this appeal or answering my questions about it”. At the hearing she explained that she had cooperated with the sale orders before she knew it was possible to appeal and she had spent the period looking for alternative accommodation.
[29] Mr Dellabarca, for Mr Page, submits that, although the length of delay is not significant, Ms Evans’ failure to explain the delay adequately, her conduct in initially complying with the orders, the prejudice to Mr Page from having to continue payment of outgoings, and the lack of merit in the appeal, means leave should not be granted. It is Mr Page’s position that Ms Evans, who was initially compliant with the Sale Orders, simply changed her mind.
4 High Court Rules 2016 (HCR), r 20.4(2).
5 Almond v Read [2017] NZSC 80, [2017] 1 NZLR 801 at [38]–[39]; and My Noodle Ltd v Queenstown-Lakes District Council [2009] NZCA 224, (2009) 19 PRNZ 518 at [19] and [22].
6 Almond v Read, above n 5, at [38].
[30] I accept that Ms Evans’ explanation for the delay is unsatisfactory, when it appears she was initially acting in accordance with the Family Court orders, including by giving notice to tenants and by retaining a real estate agent. That suggests a change of heart, rather than a lack of knowledge of further legal steps, in circumstances where she was represented in the Family Court. As will be discussed below, the merits of the appeal are not particularly strong either. However, the short delay of only 19 days, the fact that Ms Evans lacked counsel and so was acting without proper legal advice, and the limited additional prejudice arising from a 19-day delay, means I am willing to grant leave.
Application for stay
[31] Rule 20.10 of the HCR provides that, although the bringing of an appeal does not operate as a stay of the judgment appealed against, the Court may order a stay of enforcement of any judgment or order appealed against.
[32] Mr Dellabarca submits that given the stay application is being heard alongside the appeal, the issue of stay has been overtaken. He notes that Mr Page has taken no steps to enforce the judgment, and instead has focussed on having the matter brought before the Court at the earliest opportunity.
[33] I agree with Mr Dellabarca that the issue of stay has been overtaken by the appeal, given stays are made to prevent judgments from being enforced until the determination of an appeal. Granting the stay would be of no use to the appellant. The application is therefore declined.
The appeal
Approach on appeal
[34] Appeals from the Family Court to the High Court are general appeals by way of rehearing.7 The principles set out in Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar therefore apply.8 However, as Heath J observed in B v F, many Family Court decisions
7 Section 39(3); and District Court Act 2016, s 127.
8 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141 at [16].
under the PRA represent a mix of evaluative, factual and discretionary decisions, therefore the application of Austin, Nichols is “not altogether easy”.9 His Honour stated that the appellate court was free to reconsider the Family Court’s decision and substitute its own view on questions of fact and evaluation if it found the first instance decision to be wrong.10 However, any decisions involving an exercise of discretion need to be assessed as to whether or not those decisions were open to the Judge.11 The High Court can make any decisions it thinks should have been made or remit the proceedings back to the Family Court for reconsideration.12
Legal Principles
[35] Section 25(3) of the PRA empowers the Court to make any order or declaration at any time relating to the status, ownership, vesting, or possession of any specific property as it considers just. Section 25(4) further provides that, if proceedings under the PRA are pending, the Court may make an interim order under s 25(3) for the sale of any relationship property, and may give any directions it thinks fit with respect to the proceeds.
[36] As noted above, the leading case on interim sale and distribution orders under s 25 is SM v LFDB. In that case, Ellis J set out a number of factors for the Court to weigh in exercising “what is acknowledged to be a broad discretion”. Those factors included:13
(a)any possible prejudice that might arise from the making of the proposed order;
(b)the purpose and principles of the PRA including in particular the need to do justice between the parties;
(c)the needs and circumstances of the applicant;
9 B v F [2010] NZFLR 67 (HC) at [7].
10 At [8](c) citing Austin, Nichols & Co Inc, above n 8, at [16]–[17].
11 At [8](b) citing May v May (1982) 1 NZFLR 165 (CA) and Blackstone v Blackstone [2008] NZCA 312 at [8].
12 District Court Act 2016, s 128(1).
13 SM v LFDB, above n 3, at [30].
(d)the purpose for which the distribution is sought;
(e)the applicant’s likely share of the relationship property;
(f)the respondent’s ability to give effect to an order at that time;
(g)the length of time until the substantive claim is likely to be heard;
(h)any delays in proceedings to date and whether those delays are attributable to either of the parties; and
(i)whether an interim distribution will cause further delays in finally determining the relationship property claim.
Parties’ positions
[37] In her notice of appeal, Ms Evans contended that Judge Montague erred in the following ways:
(a)In stating that the sale of an asset pending the substantive hearing is a “matter of form rather than substance”, her Honour failed to account for the potential of the equity in the properties to increase over time if they were retained or if repairs and minor improvements were made instead of selling the properties “as is”.
(b)Ms Evans had only consented to the sale of the Allington property on the basis that repairs and minor improvements would be made prior to sale, and she would have an opportunity to retain the Messines property. Nor did she know the substantive hearing would not take place until well into 2025, or that Mr Page’s earnings were as high as became apparent. Those factors both significantly influenced what should happen with the Allington property.
(c)The Judge’s consideration of potential market changes was incomplete. There was no mention of the consequences of ordering a sale if the market subsequently increased prior to the substantive hearing.
(d)The Court failed to consider significant elements of prejudice to Ms Evans, including that the equity in the property was of far less use as cash, and the disruptive effects of arranging sales and having to find and move to new accommodation.
(e)Her Honour failed to properly consider obstacles to giving effect to the sale orders, such as the difficulty in finding and moving to new accommodation.
(f)Her Honour mischaracterised the financial disadvantage to Mr Page.
[38] Ms Evans did not file written submissions in support of her appeal, but she made comprehensive oral submissions at the hearing. Her submissions were of a very high standard. The thrust of her case is that sale orders should not be made until the substantive property relationship proceedings have been determined. If sale orders are made now, the prejudice to her is very high, as it would preclude the possibility of her retaining a stable and irreplaceable home that would give her the future security of a rental income. Selling the properties now, in what Ms Evans described as a “fire sale”—with the properties in an “as is where is” state in an adverse market—would also reduce the pool of relationship property that will later be divided. This would cause prejudice to her, in terms of the amount of any award to recognise economic disparity (and would also prejudice Mr Page). In practice, the Family Court orders would mean that there would be a small amount of sale proceeds sitting in a trust account earning little interest.
[39] In contrast, retaining the properties would allow the parties to reap the benefit of the likely future improvement in the property market, and it would provide an opportunity for Ms Evans to undertake improvements which would also increase the value of the properties. It would also make it easier for her to borrow later, either to buy out Mr Page, or to buy another property. In terms of Mr Page’s position, Ms Evans
says Mr Page’s earnings have skyrocketed, and the property outgoings can be significantly reduced now, for example, by obtaining a fixed (and much lower) mortgage interest rate and tenanting the properties. She does not accept Mr Page is prevented from buying a home in Auckland. The debt owed to her sister can be paid via a withdrawal from the KiwiSaver accounts, which are accepted as being relationship property.
[40] Mr Page’s position is that the Judge applied the relevant legal principles and correctly found, after weighing the competing factors, that it was appropriate to grant the sale order application.
Discussion
[41] I do not consider that the Family Court Judge erred. Her Honour correctly identified the lack of evidence supporting Ms Evans’ proposal to delay the sale of the Messines property in order for her to raise funds and secure employment so that she could acquire Mr Page’s share of that property. The Judge’s doubts about the feasibility of Ms Evans’ plans have been confirmed by the fact that Ms Evans’ proposed date of 31 January 2025 to secure finance has long since passed, with no offer to purchase made. Further, the proposal now has no end date, but rather relies on the hopes of an improved property market, tenanted properties, an ability to improve the properties, and future employment.
[42] While it may be arguable that the Court’s description of the sale of assets as “a matter of form rather than substance” oversimplified matters, the Judge correctly (at the time) assessed that the downward trend of the market meant the properties were likely to lose rather than gain value. As Mr Dellabarca has pointed out, the rateable values for the properties have substantially decreased.14 When the most recent registered valuations of the properties as at October 2024 were already significantly lower than the rateable valuations at that time, I agree it may mean that the current market valuations will also be lower. Ms Evans’ argument that her Honour failed to account for the potential of the properties to increase in value if retained is therefore
14 The Allington property’s rateable value was assessed as $1,090,000 on 1 September 2021. This has fallen to $830,000 in its most recent valuation on 1 September 2024. The Messines property rateable value fell from $1,890,000 to $1,480,000 over the same period.
theoretical only. Certainly, it is possible that the value of the properties may increase. But there is no evidence before the Court that they will. The Court cannot make decisions based on hope and/or speculation. And the risk remains that the equity in the two properties may continue to decrease if they are not sold now. I agree with Mr Dellabarca that the Family Court Judge’s decision was a realistic and pragmatic one. That remains the case. It would not be appropriate to delay sale for an indefinite period in the hope that the properties will increase in value. It would be irreconcilable with the principle in the PRA that questions about relationship property should be resolved inexpensively, simply and speedily as is consistent with justice.15
[43] It may be the case that Ms Evans intended to consent to the Allington property being sold only on the basis that remedial works were undertaken and she would be allowed an opportunity to purchase the Messines property. I note that was the basis of her proposal before the Family Court hearing. However, she was represented by counsel at the Family Court hearing and the decision sets out her counsel’s submissions as to why the Allington property should be sold, but more time should be given to Ms Evans to buy Mr Page out of the Messines property. There is no evidence that her counsel acted contrary to her instructions. I have already noted the high quality of Ms Evan’s submissions at the appeal hearing. She is clearly very intelligent and has a firm grasp of all of the circumstances of this case. I do not accept that she could have been under any misapprehension about what transpired at the hearing, nor that she did not discuss the result with her lawyer following the hearing.
[44] I also accept Mr Dellabarca’s submission that, even if the sale of the Allington property was not consented to, the Family Court would have ordered the sale nonetheless.
[45] In terms of prejudice to Ms Evans, the Family Court Judge acknowledged that Ms Evans would face prejudice in having to sell the properties, vacate her current home, and find alternative accommodation. But she also noted the interim distribution of $40,000 would assist Ms Evans in these endeavours. It is correct that her Honour did not discuss that receiving cash that could be applied to purchase a new property
15 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA), s 1N(d).
would potentially mean Ms Evans would face more restrictive lending requirements than she would if she was taking over existing lending. However, there was, and is, no evidence that a lender would be more relaxed about lending requirements in such circumstances. I consider it more likely that the lender would be concerned to ensure the debt remained capable of repayment. In any case, the evidence from Ms Evans was that she had prospects of employment and finance to enable her to purchase property. I also accept Ms Evans’ concerns about finding new accommodation. However, there has been no further indication of any efforts to find alternative accommodation, and therefore there remains no evidence that she continues to face difficulties.
[46] I accept Ms Evans’ submission that there is little analysis of the obstacles she will face in giving effect to the sale orders, which include her health challenges, the impact on her ability to re-enter into employment and her difficulties in finding alternative accommodation. However, I do not consider that these obstacles, along with the other issues raised by Ms Evans, outweigh the factors in favour of granting the orders. Her Honour correctly noted the issue of delay, given that over two years had passed since the separation, with a substantive relationship property hearing not likely until later this year (at the earliest). I observe here that it appears there have been delays in progress towards the substantive proceedings, which may cause further delay. The result is a potential for the properties to lose further value in the meantime, while Mr Page continues to bear the burden of servicing the mortgage and paying all of the other outgoings.
[47] On that last point, I reject the contention of Ms Evans that the Judge mischaracterised the financial disadvantage to Mr Page. According to his counsel, Mr Page has contributed $325,000 to maintaining the properties since separation. Although he has a substantial income, it is nonetheless a significant burden to bear more than two years after separation in relation to properties he is not receiving any benefit (including rental income) from. Nor can I accept Ms Evans’ contention that Mr Page may simply purchase another property in Auckland, in circumstances when he already has a high level of existing mortgage debt that he is solely responsible for. Ms Evans’ proposal that sale orders should await the determination of the substantive proceedings would continue that position for an indeterminate time. Ms Evans’
position remains, as the Family Court Judge put it, a “wish list”. But Mr Page’s position worsens, when it is now likely that he will continue to pay the outgoings on the properties for at least a year after the Family Court ordered their sale. That situation cannot continue indefinitely, as it would, if the Sale Orders were not upheld and were left to await the determination of the property relationship proceedings between the parties. I also reject the suggestion made at the hearing for an order to release KiwiSaver funds now, to reduce debt. That is a matter for the substantive proceedings.
[48] Overall, in my view, her Honour correctly applied the relevant legal principles, particularly the principle in s 1N(d) that relationship property issues should be resolved as inexpensively, simply and speedily as is consistent with justice. Ms Evans said that the Court should not prioritise speed at the expense of justice. But it is now approaching three years since the parties separated. When the relationship property pool is modest,16 and continued delay is likely to continue to render that pool more modest still, it cannot be said to be in the interests of justice, or the parties, for the sale orders not to be made now and the holding pattern to be allowed to continue.
[49] Ms Evans has, for almost one year, been on notice that she faces the possibility of having to leave the Messines property. It is very unfortunate that she has been unable to reach a position where she can buy out Mr Page. But there is no error in the Family Court’s decision.
Result and orders
[50] Ms Evans has failed to demonstrate the Judge erred in her assessments and weighing of the relevant factors for making an order under s 25(3) and (4) of the PRA.
[51]The appeal is therefore dismissed.
[52] The Sale Orders and directions made by the Family Court stand. However, the dates for placing the properties on the market require amendment. Given that the
16 Based on the information in the decision on appeal at [12]–[15], around $382,879. This is likely to have decreased since.
Allington Road property is no longer tenanted, both properties can be placed on the market at the same time. That date is to be no later than 1 July 2025.
[53] Mr Page is entitled to costs. I ask the parties to endeavour to agree costs, as well as whether, as McHerron J has previously suggested, they can be deducted from Ms Evans’ share of the proceeds of sale of the properties.17 If that is not possible, Mr Dellabarca may file a memorandum setting out the costs that are claimed. Ms Page may file a memorandum in response, no later than five working days following receipt of Mr Dellabarca’s memorandum. I will then determine costs on the papers.
Grau J
Copies to:
S J Evans, Wellington
C J Dellabarca, Wellington for Respondent
17 Evans v Page CIV-2024-485-604: Minute of McHerron J, 10 April 2025.
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