Ericson v New Zealand Parole Board

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CIV2014-409-000837 [2015] NZHC 375

BETWEEN

JOHN FREDERICK ERICSON

Applicant

AND

THE NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD First Respondent

AND

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Second Respondent

AND

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND

Third Respondent

Hearing: 4 March 2015

Appearances:

Applicant in person
V J Owen for First Respondent
K Muller for Second and Third Respondent

Judgment:

6 March 2015

RESERVED JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J

[1]      Mr Ericson is serving a life sentence for the murder of his wife in 1999.  He is aggrieved that on each occasion he has been before the New Zealand Parole Board (“the Board”), it has declined parole.  He has availed himself of all legal avenues to challenge the Parole Board’s decisions.  The most recently concluded legal challenge was an application for judicial review of the 2012 Board decision declining parole, and of the subsequent review decision confirming the Board’s decision.   That application was dismissed by His Honour, Justice MacKenzie in a decision dated

19 July 2013.1

1      Ericson v New Zealand Parole Board [2013] NZHC 1790.

ERICSON v THE NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD AND ORS [2015] NZHC 375 [6 March 2015]

[2]      The present proceedings are also judicial review proceedings.  They do not seem to focus on a particular Board decision.   Rather they globally challenge the decisions of the Board because they have considered his suitability for parole under the provisions of the Parole Act 2002 (the 2002 Act).   Mr Ericson asserts that his conviction was under the Criminal Justice Act 1985 (the 1985 Act) and therefore parole should be considered under that Act and not under the 2002 Act which, he claims, applies “more punitive and onerous conditions” on obtaining parole.

[3]      The respondents have applied to strike-out the statement of claim on the grounds that:

(a)      it discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action because the effect of s 8 of the 2002 Act is that the applicant’s eligibility and consideration for release on parole must be determined under the 2002

Act ; and

(b)the  statement  of  claim  is  vexatious  and/or  otherwise  an  abuse  of process because the legal issues it raises have already been heard and determined  by  MacKenzie  J,  in  Ericson  v  New  Zealand  Parole Board.2

[4]      The Attorney-General also asserts that he was improperly joined as no right to relief is sought from him.

[5]      Ironically, contemporaneously with the hearing of the strike-out application, I heard a separate application for judicial review3 of the Board’s 2014 decision regarding Mr Ericson, which was argued by counsel.  In that case, it was expressly argued on behalf of Mr Ericson that the 2002 Act applied, and provided a simpler, and more easily satisfied test, than the test which applied under the 1985 Act.

[6]      Notwithstanding that submission, Mr Ericson maintains in these proceedings, that the Parole Board has been conducting assessments and hearings “in violation of

New Zealand Law” and seeks by way of relief:

2      Ericson v New Zealand Parole Board

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Details
Case
[2015] NZHC 375
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ericson v New Zealand Parole Board, heard in the High Court of New Zealand, Christchurch Registry, revolves around John Frederick Ericson, who is serving a life sentence for the murder of his wife in 1999. He is challenging the New Zealand Parole Board's repeated decisions to deny him parole, arguing that his parole eligibility should be assessed under the Criminal Justice Act 1985, rather than the Parole Act 2002, which he claims imposes more punitive and onerous conditions for obtaining parole.

The central legal issue in this case is whether the Parole Board's assessment of Ericson's eligibility for parole should be governed by the Criminal Justice Act 1985, the legislation in force at the time of his conviction, or the Parole Act 2002, which applies to all offenders regardless of when they were sentenced. The respondents, including the New Zealand Parole Board, the Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, and the Attorney-General of New Zealand, have applied to strike out Ericson's statement of claim on the grounds that it discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action and that it is an abuse of process, as the issue has already been determined by Justice MacKenzie in a previous case.

The court, after reviewing the provisions of the 2002 Act and considering the submissions of the respondents, concluded that the Parole Act 2002 governs the grant of parole for all offenders, including those sentenced before its enactment. The clear and unambiguous provisions of the 2002 Act, as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Morgan v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison, support this position. The court further determined that the proceedings should be struck out as an abuse of process because they re-litigate an issue that was fully addressed and determined by Justice MacKenzie in 2013. Therefore, the court struck out Ericson's application in its entirety under High Court Rule 15.1.

The court reserved the issue of costs, indicating that in normal circumstances, 2B costs would be awarded. Ericson has ten working days to file written submissions on the issue of costs if he wishes to address it, and the respondents have five working days to file submissions in reply.

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