Ericson v New Zealand Parole Board

Link copied
Case Copied 21 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CIV-2016-409-001192 [2017] NZHC 536

BETWEEN

JOHN FREDERICK ERICSON

Applicant

AND

NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD Respondent

Hearing: 9 March 2017

Appearances:

M Starling and N Wham for Applicant
No appearance for Defendant
K Stone - Counsel to assist the Court

Judgment:

23 March 2017

JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J

[1]      Mr Ericson is serving a term of life imprisonment following his conviction for murdering his wife.  He became eligible for parole in July 2009 and, since then, has appeared before the Parole Board (“the Board”) on an annual basis.  His most recent parole hearing was on 4 October 2016. A decision declining parole, followed.

[2]      Mr Ericson challenges the Board’s October 2016 decision to decline parole.

He says it was unlawful in that:

(a)       the  decision  failed  to  take  into  account  relevant  considerations, namely that the Board could impose special release conditions;

(b)the decision to decline parole was more than necessary to accomplish the objective of limiting the applicant’s risk of offending; and

ERICSON v NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD [2017] NZHC 536 [23 March 2017]

(c)      the decision of the Board was unreasonable in that it was a decision that no sensible Parole Board, acting with appreciation of its duty, would have arrived at.

[3]      While the Board, as is its policy, took a neutral role in the proceedings, Ms Stone  was  appointed  by  the  Court  to  act  as  contradictor  in  respect  of  the application.

Background

[4]      In 1999, Mr Ericson was charged with the murder of his wife by attacking her with  a tomahawk.    Despite pleading  guilty to  that  charge,  he has  subsequently challenged his conviction in various ways.   For example, he has claimed that he cannot remember the events leading to her death and that his lack of memory was caused by medication he was taking at the time of the events.   For some time he maintained he was guilty of manslaughter and not murder and advanced that position through appeals and applications for the royal prerogative of mercy.   He has also sought, on several occasions, a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his imprisonment was unlawful.

[5]      In 2009, when he first  applied for parole, the Board noted he had done nothing to seriously confront his role in his wife’s murder and he was assessed as being of moderate risk of reoffending.

[6]      A similar position was reached in 2010 where Mr Ericson was again found to be at moderate risk of reoffending and the Board considered that he was not yet in the reintegration phase of his sentence.

[7]      In 2011, Mr Ericson was again declined parole, but on this occasion the Board considered that he had embarked on the reintegration phase of his sentence. However, he was still assessed to have a moderate risk of violent offending and parole was declined.

[8]      In  2012,  Mr  Ericson  had  progressed  to  a  self-care  unit.    However,  he discharged himself from the unit and commenced a hunger strike.   Ultimately the Board considered he…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ericson v New Zealand Parole Board and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] NZHC 536
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Ericson, challenged the decision of the New Zealand Parole Board to decline his application for parole. He claimed the decision was unlawful because the Board failed to take into account relevant considerations, the decision was more than necessary to accomplish the objective of limiting his risk of offending, and the decision was unreasonable. The applicant also suggested that special conditions could have been imposed to mitigate his risk of reoffending. The Court found that the Board had considered the proposed special conditions and was not satisfied that they would mitigate the risk sufficiently to allow for parole. The Court also held that the Board's decision to decline parole was neither disproportionate nor unreasonable. The application was dismissed.

The Court found that the Board was aware that it could impose special conditions on parole and had considered them when making its decision. The Board had reservations about the duration of the supported accommodation and the lack of a good local network system for Mr Ericson. It also believed that Mr Ericson should complete his psychological treatment before being released on parole, as this was central to managing the risk of offending behaviour when released into the community. The Court found that these were reasonable concerns and that the Board's decision was open to it. The decision was not disproportionate or unreasonable.

The Court held that the Board's decision was neither disproportionate nor unreasonable. The Court found that the Board had a range of concerns which, when considered in totality, meant they were not persuaded that the risk to the community had been adequately addressed. The Court held that the Board's decision represented a rational stepping stone in providing guidance to Mr Ericson on how he could constructively work towards release on special conditions. The Court held that the Board's decision was open to it and was not disproportionate or unreasonable. The application to declare the decision invalid, and to quash it and grant parole to Mr Ericson, was therefore declined.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established