On the night of 15 November 2008, Matiu Pahau fatally stabbed Peri Niwa. As a result, Pahau and three other men, Rangi Brown, Adrian Fenton and the appellant, were charged with murder, participating in an organised criminal group with the objective of committing serious violent offences and committing a crime with a firearm. At the conclusion of their trial before Asher J and a jury, Pahau was found guilty of murder, and the appellant and the other two men were found guilty of manslaughter. They all either pleaded guilty to, or were convicted of, the other offences. A fifth man who was involved was not able to be charged by the police as he was outside New Zealand.
All four men appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal against conviction and sentence.[1] The appellant’s further appeal to this Court is confined to his conviction for manslaughter and is based on a single challenge to the trial Judge’s jury directions which arises in this way. The appellant was found guilty of manslaughter on the basis of party liability under s 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961. The Crown alleged that the appellant and the other four men had formed the common purpose of inflicting serious violence on a group of people of whom the deceased was one and that Pahau had killed him in the course of prosecuting that common purpose. The appellant’s complaint is that the Judge was required to, but did not, direct the jury that they could only find the appellant guilty of manslaughter if sure that the appellant had known that Pahau was carrying the specific weapon used – a knife. The issue raised by this appeal is of the same kind as those addressed in a line of decisions which are sometimes referred to as the “knowledge-of-the-weapon” cases. We will discuss these decisions later in these reasons.

The key facts

[1] Pahau v R [2011] NZCA 147.

In November 2008, the deceased was working in New Plymouth with a group of scaffolders who came from out of town. They had Mongrel Mob connections[2] and their presence in New Plymouth displeased local members of the Black Power gang, including the appellant and the other four men who were to be involved in the offending.
[2]In his sentencing remarks, Asher J noted that the deceased himself was neither a Mongrel Mob member nor an associate of that gang. See R v Pahau HC New Plymouth CRI-2008-043-4555, 16 August 2010 at [2]…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Edmonds v R

Details

AGLC: Edmonds v R [2011] NZSC 159
Case: [2011] NZSC 159
Decision Date: 20 December 2011

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mahana Makarini Edmonds was convicted by the High Court at New Plymouth of manslaughter and other related charges in connection with a fatal stabbing in November 2008. Edmonds appealed against his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, and that Court dismissed the appeal. Edmonds then appealed to the Supreme Court of New Zealand. The appeal to the Supreme Court was confined to the conviction of manslaughter. The basis of the appeal was that the trial Judge had not directed the jury that the appellant would only be guilty of manslaughter if he had known that one of his co-defendants had a knife. The Supreme Court held that the appeal should be dismissed. The Court held that there was no legal requirement for a knowledge-of-the-weapon direction in a section 66(2) case. Whether such a direction was practically required would depend very much on the particular circumstances of the case and the particular charge which the alleged party faced. In the present case, the Crown case was that the appellant put in train a sequence of events with the purpose of inflicting serious violence and an associated substantial risk of death. It was open to the jury to conclude that the appellant and the other members of his group envisaged sufficiently serious violence to justify the inference that they appreciated that there was a substantial risk of death. The Crown contention that the appellant appreciated there was a substantial risk of death did not rest on his being aware that one of his co-defendants was armed. There was thus in this case no practical requirement for any weapons direction. The direction given by the trial Judge in note 2 was, as the Supreme Court had said, unduly favourable to the appellant.

Orders