Dela Rosa v Accident Compensation Corporation

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2019-485-404

[2019] NZHC 2657

UNDER the Accident Compensation Act 2001

IN THE MATTER

of an application for special leave to appeal under s 162(3) of the Act

BETWEEN

JOANNA DELA ROSA

Applicant

AND

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

Respondent

Hearing: 16 October 2019

Appearances:

B J Peck and E M Bransgrove for the Applicant

E J Rushbrook and N J Fenton for the Respondent

Judgment:

17 October 2019


JUDGMENT OF DOOGUE J

(Special leave to appeal)


Introduction

[1]                  Jia Dela Rosa was delivered by emergency caesarean section at 3:24 am on 20 August 2013. She is the first-born child of Joanna Dela Rosa, the applicant in these proceedings.

[2]                  Due to various concerns held by medical professionals at National Women’s Health Hospital (Hospital), Mrs Dela Rosa was administered with prostaglandin gel in order to induce her labour. During the subsequent birthing process, Jia suffered prolonged bradycardia (a slower-than-expected heart rate) which resulted in Hypoxic-

DELA ROSA v ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION [2019] NZHC 2657 [17 October 2019]

Ischemic Encephalopathy (HIE), injury to the brain due to a reduced supply of blood and oxygen. Jia’s injury has gone on to manifest as cerebral palsy and she will require life-long care.

[3]                  This is an application for special leave1  to  appeal  from  a  decision  of  Judge J H Walker, allowing an appeal by the Accident Compensation Corporation (the Corporation) resulting in cover under the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (the Act) being declined for Jia’s injury.2

[4]                  The issue before the District Court was whether Jia’s HIE was covered by the Act’s treatment injury regime as a personal injury caused either by:

(a)the giving of treatment (being the administration of the prostaglandin gel); or

(b)a failure to provide treatment (being a failure to either deliver Jia on an earlier date or at an earlier time on the same date).

[5]  Leave to appeal was declined by Judge G M Harrison on 4 July 2019 on the basis the proposed appeal advanced no question of law warranting consideration by this Court.3

[6]                  Special leave to appeal is now sought on the following questions of law (the Leave Questions):

(a)Was the law in respect of causation under s 33(1)(a) of the Act correctly applied?

(b)Was the law in respect of causation under s 33(1)(d) of the Act correctly applied?


1      Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 162(3).

2      Dela Rosa v Accident Compensation Corporation [2018] NZACC 195 [Substantive Decision].

3      Dela Rosa v Accident Compensation Corporation [2019] NZACC 73 [Leave Decision].

(c)Did Judge Walker err in failing to give adequate reasons for preferring the evidence of a particular medical expert over Mrs Dela Rosa’s evidence?

[7]For the reasons that follow, special leave to appeal is not granted.

Factual background

[8]                  The background to these proceedings was set out by Judge Walker in her decision of 19 December 2018.4 However, the parties have filed an agreed chronology for…

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Details
Case
[2019] NZHC 2657
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court was asked to determine whether it should grant special leave to appeal from the District Court's decision that Jia Dela Rosa's birth injury was not covered by the Accident Compensation Act 2001. Joanna Dela Rosa, Jia's mother, sought to appeal on three questions of law. The High Court held that the questions of law proposed by Mrs Dela Rosa were not seriously arguable and were more appropriately characterised as questions of fact. The Court considered whether the law in respect of causation under s 33(1)(a) of the Act was correctly applied. The Court held that the Judge applied the correct causation test and the Leave Question becomes one of fact; that the Judge ought not to have preferred the evidence of Associate Professor Westgate. The Court also considered whether the law in respect of causation under s 33(1)(d) of the Act was correctly applied and held that the proposed question of appeal focusing on s 33(1)(d) of the Act is predominantly one of fact. Finally, the Court considered whether Judge Walker erred in failing to give adequate reasons for preferring the evidence of a particular medical expert over the others. The Court held that this proposed question of appeal raises no seriously arguable question of law. Accordingly, the application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

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