Sinclair v Accident Compensation Corporation - [2012] NZHC 2564

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2011-485-1715 [2012] NZHC 2564

IN THE MATTER OF an appeal under section 162 of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001

BETWEEN HAZEL SINCLAIR Appellant

ANDACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent

Hearing: 17 September 2012

Counsel: A C Beck for appellant
I G Hunt for respondent

Judgment: 4 October 2012

RESERVED JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J

[1] This decision deals with Ms Sinclair’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against my decision which dismissed her appeal from a District Court decision.

[2] The appeal before me turned on the argument for Ms Sinclair that a claim she had made in 2006 was or ought to have been treated by the respondent (the Corporation) as one for cover for a mental injury following a physical injury under the accident compensation scheme. Her argument was that because the Corporation had not made a decision on a claim of that type, she was entitled to the benefit of the default provisions in s 58 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (the Act), which
deems the Corporation to have made a decision as to cover in favour of a claimant,

SINCLAIR v ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION HC WN CIV-2011-485-1715 [4 October 2012]

where the Corporation has not made an actual decision within relevant statutory time limits.

[3] My decision, consistent with the outcome in the District Court, was that no claim had been made by or on behalf of Ms Sinclair for cover for a mental injury consequent upon a physical injury for which cover had been granted, so that hers was not a situation to which the “deemed decision” provision applied.

[4] On behalf of Ms Sinclair, Mr Beck wishes to challenge my interpretation of the provisions of s 48 of the Act that specify what is required for a claimant to lodge a claim for cover and/or entitlements. He wishes to argue that my judgment adopts an unduly literal approach to the requirements of that section, and that a more liberal approach is warranted in the statutory context where the Corporation is charged with assisting claimants, and doing all that is reasonably appropriate to ensure that claimants are assisted to qualify for all appropriate benefits to which they are entitled. I concluded that Ms Sinclair’s actions did not qualify as a claim under s 48 that would require the Corporation to consider it and produce a decision on her entitlement to cover. However, Mr Beck would argue that, irrespective of the form and terms on which Ms Sinclair applied, the Corporation should have treated it as an application for cover, triggering its obligation to make a timely and reasonable decision.

[5] The scope of any further appeal to the Court of Appeal is limited to questions of law. Notwithstanding that, Mr Beck argued that the reasoning in my judgment was affected by two factual findings or inferences that are incorrect. First, that subsequent to the dealings between the Corporation and Ms Sinclair…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2012] NZHC 2564
Decision Date: 4 October 2012

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Sinclair v Accident Compensation Corporation was a case in which the appellant, Hazel Sinclair, sought leave to appeal against the respondent, Accident Compensation Corporation, who had dismissed her appeal against a decision of the District Court. Sinclair's appeal was based on her contention that her 2006 claim should have been treated as one for cover for a mental injury following a physical injury under the accident compensation scheme. She argued that the Corporation's failure to make a decision on the claim entitled her to the benefit of the default provisions in section 58 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001, which deems the Corporation to have made a decision in favour of the claimant when the Corporation has not made a decision within the statutory time limits.

The legal issue before the court was whether the High Court had adopted the correct test to determine whether a claim for cover had been made by Sinclair. The court considered whether the reasoning in the judgment was affected by incorrect factual findings or inferences, particularly whether Sinclair had made a separate application for cover for mental injury after her initial dealings with the Corporation and whether her chronic pain syndrome could be considered a mental injury. The court also assessed whether the issue was capable of serious argument and of sufficient importance to justify a further appeal.

The court concluded that there was an issue of general importance in defining the minimum requirements for a claim to either or both of cover or entitlements under the Act. The court was persuaded that the question of law retained a requisite level of importance, and granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the first aspect of the questions of law on which leave was sought. The court did not make an order as to costs.

Orders