Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
 SC 27/2013
[2014] NZSC 75
BETWEEN

EWAN ROBERT CARR
First Appellant

BROOKSIDE FARM TRUST LIMITED
Second Appellant

AND

GALLAWAY COOK ALLAN
Respondent

Hearing:

28 November 2013

Court:

Elias CJ, McGrath, William Young, Glazebrook and Arnold JJ 

Counsel:

D J Goddard QC, P J Dale and A J Wicks for Appellants
C A McLachlan QC, A V Foote and J L W Wass for Respondent
D A R Williams QC and S E Fitzgerald for Intervener

Judgment:

20 June 2014

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court setting aside the award of 9 May 2011 is reinstated.

B         The respondent must pay to the appellants costs in this court of $25,000 together with reasonable disbursements. 

CThe order for costs in the Court of Appeal is set aside and the respondent is to pay the appellants’ costs in that Court and the High Court to be fixed by those courts.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Para No
Elias CJ, McGrath, William Young and Glazebrook JJ [1]
Arnold J [89]

ELIAS CJ, McGRATH, WILLIAM YOUNG AND GLAZEBROOK JJ

(Given by McGrath J)

Table of Contents

Para No
Introduction [1]
Background [4]
The agreement to arbitrate [8]
Recourse to the courts under the Arbitration Act [10]
The present proceeding [15]
High Court decision [19]
Court of Appeal decision [24]
Purposes and principles of the Arbitration Act [29]
The “arbitration agreement” [33]

The parties’ submissions

Our evaluation

Severance of void contractual provisions

[35]
[38]
[47]
Introduction [47]
The approach in Carney v Herbert [50]
The Humphries approach [55]
The United States approach [56]
Summary of principles [62]
A subjective inquiry? [63]
Application of principles to the present case [67]
Exercise of the art 34 discretion [73]
The parties’ submissions [73]

Our evaluation

The relevance of art 34(2)(a)(iv)

Exercise of the discretion in this case

[76]
[81]
[86]
Conclusion [87]

Introduction

  1. The appellants were in dispute with the respondent, a firm of solicitors, which they had instructed to act for them on the settlement of a commercial transaction.  The settlement did not take place on the due date and the other party to the transaction cancelled the contract.  The appellants contended that this outcome was the fault of the member of the respondent firm who had acted on the settlement and claimed that the respondent was liable for damages for professional negligence. 

  2. The parties agreed to arbitrate this claim.  It was a term of their agreement that each should have a right of appeal to the High Court on any question of law or fact arising out of the arbitrator’s award.  The applicable rules for the conduct of arbitration under the Arbitration Act 1996 include an optional provision that permits an appeal to the High Court on any question of law arising out of an award.  In their agreement, the parties purported to amend this provision by extending the right of appeal to apply to questions of fact as well as of law.  It…

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Details
Case
[2014] NZSC 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the High Court in Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan involved a dispute between the parties regarding the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within a broader submission agreement. The case required the Court to consider the scope and effect of the doctrine of separability in the context of arbitration agreements, specifically whether the arbitration clause was independent of the broader agreement and could be enforced notwithstanding any defects in the underlying contract. The primary issue was whether the arbitration clause in the submission agreement constituted a valid and independent arbitration agreement, separate from the rest of the agreement, and whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction.

The Court considered the definition of “arbitration agreement” under the Arbitration Act, which includes an agreement to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes between parties in respect of a defined legal relationship. The Court noted that an arbitration clause, if part of a contract, has effect independently of the contract itself, and the doctrine of separability ensures that defects in the broader contractual arrangements do not affect the arbitration agreement. The Court examined the arguments from both sides, with the respondent and intervener supporting the view that the arbitration clause should be treated as a separate agreement. The Court also highlighted the distinction between the law governing the arbitration agreement and the procedural laws that may govern the arbitration process. Ultimately, the Court held that the arbitration clause was indeed a separate agreement and that the arbitral tribunal had the jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction.

In conclusion, the Court found in favour of the respondent, upholding the separability of the arbitration agreement from the broader submission agreement. The Court emphasised that the doctrine of separability is a well-established principle that ensures the enforceability of arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any issues with the underlying contract. The final orders of the Court affirmed the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction and to proceed with the arbitration of the disputes as outlined in the arbitration clause.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In that context, we consider the respondent’s submission in relation to the meaning of “arbitration agreement”. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act defines “arbitration agreement” as follows:arbitration agreement means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not … An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract.[29] If it takes that form, it has effect independently of the contract. Its separate status is affirmed by art 16(1) of schedule 1 to the Act.[30] Art 16(1) provides for the competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction in these terms:16 Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction(1)The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure (necessarily) the invalidity of the arbitration clause. Mr McLachlan QC for the respondent, in support of his submission that in this case the arbitration agreement was confined to the words in cl 1.1, argued that the purpose and effect of the doctrine of separability is to ensure that defects in parties’ contractual arrangements outside of an arbitration agreement do not affect their consent to arbitration, and accordingly do not displace the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to resolve disputes coming within the clause. Treating cl 1.1 as separate from the remainder of the submission agreement was in accordance with that purpose. Mr McLachlan cited the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman[31] as an instance of a New Zealand Court treating an arbitration agreement within a settlement agreement as being a separate agreement, suggesting that the position in the present case was analogous. [31]Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman, above n 2, at [49]–[56]. Counsel for the intervener, the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand, supported this submission, drawing a distinction in their written submissions between the “arbitration agreement”, which refers the dispute to arbitration, and collateral matters concerning the procedure and outcome of the arbitration that may be included in the broader “submission agreement”. Mr Williams QC and Mr McLachlan, in developing that submission, argued that the procedural provisions, including those for an appeal, are not a part of an arbitration agreement. It was submitted that this position has gained wide international acceptance. As well, to support the separation of the arbitration agreement from the procedure governing it, Mr McLachlan emphasised that the law governing the material validity, scope and interpretation of an arbitration agreement may be different from the ‘curial law’ that governs the parties’ rights of recourse.[32] [32]See Lord Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012) at 829.