[1] In this long running defamation proceeding, the plaintiff Matthew Blomfield applies for an order that the defendant Cameron Slater be held in contempt of Court. It is claimed that Mr Slater has breached an undertaking to the Court and has breached the confidentiality of a settlement conference. Although he seeks no relief in his application, he asserted in his submissions that it would be appropriate for the Court to commit Mr Slater to a term of imprisonment. Mr Slater denies the contempt and in response seeks an order that an undertaking that he filed not to publish material relating to Mr Blomfield be revoked.

[2] The dispute has something of a history. The background facts to the defamation claim and the procedural steps up to 12 September 2014 are set out in a judgment of that date.1 In brief, Mr Slater is being sued for defamation by Mr Blomfield, originally in the District Court but now in the High Court following a transfer. The alleged defamation relates to 13 articles published on Mr Slater’s Whale Oil blog that refer to Mr Blomfield. One such blog post was entitled “Who really ripped off KidsCan?” It was alleged that business interests with which Mr Blomfield was associated had defrauded a charitable trust for children.
Mr Blomfield claims that the articles assert that he was a thief as well as dishonest, dishonourable, a party to fraud, involved in criminal conspiracy, bribery, deceit, perjury, conversion, the laying of false complaints, drug dealing and making pornography.

[3] Mr Slater admits publishing the articles in question, but says that they are not defamatory. He seeks to raise the defences of truth and honest opinion.

[4] When the matter was originally before the Manukau District Court, on

1 October 2012 at a conference before Judge Charles Blackie, Mr Slater’s counsel at

the time Mr Williams orally undertook:2

… that there would be no further publication concerning Mr Blomfield and/or his associates on the blog site or any other blog site under the control of Mr Slater or at the behest of Mr Slater, other than that might relate to information that is already in the public domain via a reputable media source, for example radio, television or radio or weekly newspapers.

1 Slater v Blomfield [2014] NZHC 2221, [2014] 3 NZLR 835 at [1]–[16].
2 Blomfield v Slater DC Manukau CIV-2012-092-001969, 1 October 2012 at [6].

[5] It was recorded by Judge Blackie in his minute that counsel had “indicated on behalf of his client”…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Blomfield v Slater

Details

AGLC: Blomfield v Slater [2015] NZHC 2239
Case: [2015] NZHC 2239
Decision Date: 17 September 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Blomfield v Slater is a defamation proceeding where the plaintiff, Matthew Blomfield, sought an order for the defendant, Cameron Slater, to be held in contempt of court. Slater had previously given an undertaking to the court to cease publishing defamatory material about Blomfield, but Blomfield alleged that Slater had breached this undertaking and also breached the confidentiality of a settlement conference. Slater denied the contempt and sought an order to revoke the undertaking. The High Court found Slater in contempt of court in seven instances, six of which involved breaches of the court undertaking and one involved a breach of the confidentiality of a settlement conference. The breaches of the undertaking were minor and the appropriate fine was $500. The breach of the confidentiality of the settlement conference was more serious and resulted in a fine of $1,000. The court ordered Slater to pay half the fine to Blomfield and the other half to the Crown. The application by Slater to be discharged from the undertaking was declined.

The court held that the High Court has a common law jurisdiction to punish conduct which risks undermining the administration of justice. The rationale for punishing this type of contempt is that the rule of law depends on court orders being obeyed. There is no doubt that an undertaking by a person given to and recorded by the court has the same force as an injunction, and a breach can be a contempt of court. The court found that Slater had breached the undertaking in six instances, but the breaches were minor and not intended to offend. The breach of the confidentiality of the settlement conference was more serious and was the result of significant carelessness on Slater's part. The court held that those who commit contempt must be denounced, and that deterrence is an important consideration. However, the objective seriousness of the relevant conduct and the defendant's personal culpability for the conduct must be assessed. In accordance with ordinary sentencing principles a defendant's means and any personal aggravating or mitigating factors will be taken into account. The court found that Slater's contempts were minor and not so trivial as to warrant a finding of no contempt. The appropriate fine for the breaches of the undertaking was $500 and for the breach of the confidentiality of the settlement conference was $1,000. Slater was ordered to pay half the fine to Blomfield and the other half to the Crown. The application by Slater to be discharged from the undertaking was declined.

Orders