IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-005218 [2016] NZHC 210
BETWEEN MATTHEW JOHN BLOMFIELD
Plaintiff
AND
CAMERON JOHN SLATER Defendant
Hearing: 16 February 2016 Counsel:
BG Beresford for Plaintiff
Defendant in personJudgment:
18 February 2016
JUDGMENT (No 4) OF ASHER J
This judgment was delivered by me on Thursday, 18 February 2016 at 3 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors/Counsel:
MG Beresford, Auckland.
Copy to: Defendant
BLOMFIELD v SLATER [2016] NZHC 210 [18 February 2016]
Introduction
[1] This judgment must be read in conjunction with my judgment of 10 February
2016, in which I found that four articles published by Mr Slater constituted breaches of the undertaking provided to the District Court on 1 October 2012.1 I adjourned the proceeding to give Mr Slater an opportunity to take action to make his publications compliant with the undertaking, as I had interpreted it. It is now necessary to give my final judgment on the contempt application, and to rule on costs.
[2] Mr Blomfield succeeded in establishing that Mr Slater had breached the undertaking; firstly in continuing to host on his website the first article, which had been the subject of an earlier judgment finding it in contempt,2 and second by referring to Mr Blomfield, albeit without naming him, in the three more recently published articles. He failed, however, in the submission that the three other articles which principally concerned third parties, constituted contempts. I found that the
bulk of those three articles, being written about persons other than Mr Blomfield, were not a breach of the undertaking.
[3] Given that Mr Slater has now removed all material that I have found to be in breach of the undertaking (which Mr Blomfield accepts), and given my finding that the three other articles were not in total a breach of the undertaking, Mr Beresford on Mr Blomfield’s behalf has withdrawn his submission that Mr Slater should be imprisoned. He submits that the appropriate penalty is a fine of $2,000.
The first article
[4] In relation to the first article Mr Slater submits that this was an understandable error of judgment on his part, based on his interpretation of my earlier judgment, and the ambit of the undertaking.
[5] In my view, continuing to publish the first article was plainly a breach of the undertaking in that it was pejorative and concerned Mr Blomfield. Although I
previously found the publication to be a “minor” contempt, it was a contempt nevertheless. This was clear from my judgment. It was also a contempt of Court not to comply with the terms of my earlier judgment (regardless of the undertaking), since my earlier judgment ordered him to remove the article.
[6] Mr Blomfield has submitted variously that Mr Slater deliberately breaches Court undertakings or pushes publications as far as they can go, to test the boundaries of orders made.
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court reasoned that there had to be an element of wilfulness or recklessness in the disobedience of a court order before the contempt jurisdiction would be invoked. The court found that Slater's conduct in continuing to publish the first article was reckless, and that the references to Blomfield in the three new articles were also reckless, given the prolonged campaign Slater had run against Blomfield. However, the court found that the unnamed references to Blomfield in the three articles were not sufficiently serious to be contempt. The court ordered that the offending paragraphs be removed and fined Slater $1,500 for the publication of the first article.
The court also considered the costs of the proceedings. The court found that Blomfield had succeeded in his application to the extent that he had obtained orders resulting in the removal of material adverse to him. However, the court found that Blomfield had failed in a significant aspect of his application, which took a considerable portion of the hearing time. The court proposed reducing the standard scale 2B costs that would otherwise be ordered by 40 per cent. The court ordered Slater to pay 60 per cent of scale costs, calculated on a 2B basis, together with reasonable disbursements.
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