FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Zdziarski v Telstra Corporation Limited [2022] FCA 1296
Appeal from: Zdziarski v Telstra Corporation Limited [2022] AATA 145 File number: NSD 143 of 2022 Judgment of: RAPER J Date of judgment: 4 November 2022 Catchwords: WORKER’S COMPENSATION – appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal determined that the applicant’s entitlements under s 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) should be re-calculated (and reduced) having regard to the average weekly overtime hours worked by comparable employees – whether the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not determining objections made by the applicant to three of the first respondent’s statements – appeal dismissed EVIDENCE – whether an objection on the basis of “weight” is truly an objection – whether the Tribunal is required to specifically identify in its reasons the weight given to particular evidence Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 2A(b), 33(1), 33(1)(b), 33(1)(c), 33(1A), 33(2A), 40(1)(a), 40(3), 40(5), 40A(1), 43(2B), 44(1)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 8(10), 8(10)(b)(i), 19
Cases cited: Australian Postal Corporation v Hughes [2009] FCA 1057; 111 ALD 579
Bridges v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1647; 114 FCR 456
Brown v The Repatriation Commission [1985] FCA 236; 7 FCR 302
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 46 Date of hearing: 11 October 2022 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr I Roberts SC with Mr E O’Neill Solicitor for the Applicant: Cardillo Gray Partners Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Knowles SC with Mr B Kelly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 143 of 2022 BETWEEN: STEPHEN ZDZIARSKI
Applicant
AND: TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RAPER J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 NOVEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed pursuant to r 40.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RAPER J
Introduction
By notice of appeal filed on 4 March 2022, the applicant appeals a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Zdziarski v Telstra Corporation Limited [2022] AATA 145 (T)) pursuant to s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). In that decision, the Tribunal set aside and remitted to Telstra Corporation Limited, the first respondent, its reviewable decision dated 23 September 2019, with the direction that the applicant’s entitlements under s 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (SRC Act) be re-calculated.
In reaching its conclusion that the applicant’s entitlements needed to be recalculated (and reduced), the Tribunal accepted evidence from Mr Tony Considine, Telstra Field Manager, as to the…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1296
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In 2019, Telstra recalculated the applicant's NWE based on the average annual overtime hours worked by comparable employees. The Tribunal accepted evidence from Mr Tony Considine, Telstra Field Manager, regarding the reduced average weekly overtime hours worked by comparable employees after the applicant's injury. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's entitlements needed to be recalculated (and reduced) and set aside Telstra's reviewable decision, directing Telstra to recalculate the applicant's entitlements. The applicant appealed this decision, arguing that the Tribunal had failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not deciding objections made to three statements of Mr Considine, adduced by Telstra.
The court found that the Tribunal had not failed to exercise its jurisdiction, as the applicant had the opportunity to object to the evidence during the Tribunal hearing and had chosen to proceed without cross-examining Mr Considine or seeking an adjournment. The court also noted that the request for "particulars" associated with statements of evidence was not applicable in this context, as there were no pleadings and evidence is typically challenged by objection, cross-examination, or by bringing forward competing evidence. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the applicant to pay Telstra's costs as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed pursuant to r 40.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Notably, with respect to the unusual request for “particulars” associated with statements of evidence: There is no right for a party to these kinds of proceedings to request particulars at all: The provision of particulars relates to pleadings – there were no pleadings. In any event, the request for particulars was made in respect of evidence – however, there is never an entitlement to request “particulars” of evidence; in the ordinary course evidence is challenged by objection, or in cross-examination, or by bringing forward competing evidence. However, I do accept that care must be taken not to adopt adversarial procedure given the non-adversarial, inquisitorial nature of procedure in the Tribunal: s 2A of the AAT Act. As observed by Flick J in Australian Postal Corporation v Hughes [2009] FCA 1057; 111 ALD 579 (at [47]):…Even prior to the amendments to the 1975 Act which introduced ss 2A and 33(1AA), in Re Beigman and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 29 ALD 332 the Tribunal, comprised of the then President, a Deputy President and a Member, observed (at [24]): [24] Proceedings before this tribunal are not adversarial but are designed to enable the tribunal to reach the correct or preferable decision in the circumstances of the case. To this end the role of the parties is to assist the tribunal in reaching its decision. The tribunal expects departments and agencies involved in the review process to have an understanding of that role. It was open to the applicant, at any time during Tribunal proceedings, to: (a)request that the matter be listed for a directions hearing at which time he would make an application seeking that the Tribunal exercise its powers under the AAT Act and direct the first respondent to provide information which is relevant to the issues in dispute and which will assist the Tribunal to make the correct or preferable decision: ss 33(1A) and 33(2A)(a) of the AAT Act; and/or(b)apply for a summons: s 40A(1) of the AAT Act. The applicant did not require Mr Considine for cross-examination, a course which was available to him and to the extent that there was a change of position on the day of the Tribunal hearing (where the applicant (through his then counsel) wanted to ask Mr Considine some questions when he was no longer available), it was open to the applicant to seek an adjournment. As indicated by the transcript, a choice was made to proceed without cross-examination. The conduct of the Tribunal hearing The hearing was conducted on 7 May 2021. Documents were tendered, no oral evidence was adduced and oral submissions were made. When the first respondent tendered the third statement from Mr Considine, the Tribunal asked if there was an objection. It is appropriate to set out the exchange between the Tribunal and the applicant’s (then) counsel, as to the way in which the matter would proceed:[APPLICANT’S COUNSEL]: Yes, in the sense that it’s part of a more global objection to the evidence of Mr Considine that I take generally. That’s based upon – and I can articulate this further at a convenient point. It’s based upon particulars that we have sought previously and understand you’ve been provided with a bundle of material, Senior Member, with the request, the reply and then a subsequent request. So my submission will be that it’s patently unfair for the respondent to rely upon Mr Considine’s evidence at all in circumstances of the nature of replies or responses to those requests that we have made.SENIOR MEMBER: All right, can we deal with it this way? That if the evidence is taken in, but I note your objection, it can be dealt with by way of submissions as to what I can do with that evidence and what way it should be attributed to it.[APPLICANT’S COUNSEL]: I’d be content with that course, Senior Member, because the points that I would make about the deficiencies in the particulars, which flows into the effect that it gives on the evidence would really be almost the same in terms of the final submissions that I would make as to what the outcome should be. So I don’t have any difficulty with that, it seems to be probably a convenient course to avoid that repetition when you’re otherwise dealing with the matter on the papers as it were.(Emphasis added.)