Zaltni v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zaltni v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 399

MIGRATION – application for protection visa – whether reasons of Refugee Review Tribunal failed to set out Tribunal’s “findings on … material questions of fact” as required by s. 430(1)(c) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – actual bias – duty of caution incumbent on appellate court before departing from its own earlier decisions.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 430(1), 476(1)(a), (f), (g)

Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212, cited
Xu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1741, cited
Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 62 FCR 402, cited
Abdalla v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 51 ALD 11, cited
Thevendram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 182, cited
Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 247, cited

Perampalam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 165, cited
Dertli v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 141, cited
Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sivarasa (1998) 160 ALR 24, cited
Logenthiran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1691, cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [1999] FCA 1681, cited

Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245, cited
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1994) 47 FCR 300, cited
Qantas Airways Ltd v Cornwall (1998) 84 FCR 483, cited

LARBI BEN MOHAMED DIT HAM ZALTNI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 675 of 1999

EINFELD, LINDGREN AND TAMBERLIN JJ

16 MAY 2000
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 675 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

LARBI BEN MOHAMED DIT HAM ZALTNI
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

EINFELD, LINDGREN AND TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 MAY 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.the appeal be dismissed

2.the appellant pay the respondent’s costs

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders are dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 675 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

LARBI BEN MOHAMED DIT HAM ZALTNI
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

EINFELD, LINDGREN AND TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE:

16 MAY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT
Introduction

  1. The appellant appeals from a judgment of a Judge of the Court dismissing his application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT).  The RRT had decided that it was not satisfied that the appellant and certain members of his family were refugees and it affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent (respectively “the Delegate” and “the Minister”) to refuse them…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 399
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Zaltni v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, a Tunisian national, appealed against the Federal Court's dismissal of his application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) to affirm the Delegate's decision to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant contended that he had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Tunisia due to his alleged association with the Al-Nahda, a Tunisian religio-political movement. The primary judge dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the RRT's decision or its process.

The legal issues in this case involved whether the RRT erred in its interpretation and application of the law, whether the RRT failed to observe procedural requirements, whether the RRT's decision was affected by actual bias, and whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the RRT's decision. The appellant argued that the RRT misunderstood the nature of his involvement with Al-Nahda, which he claimed was religious rather than political, and that this misunderstanding led to an improper assessment of his credibility.

The Court found that the RRT's decision was supported by ample evidence and that the appellant failed to satisfy the statutory criteria for a protection visa. The Court rejected the appellant's claims of error of law and procedural non-observance, noting that the RRT provided detailed reasons for its decision and considered the appellant's evidence. The Court also dismissed the claim of actual bias, finding no evidence of animus or prejudgment in the RRT's proceedings. Ultimately, the Court held that the primary judge correctly dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RRT's decision.

The orders of the Court were to dismiss the appeal and for the appellant to pay the respondent's costs. The settlement and entry of orders were dealt with under Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the appeal be dismissed

2. the appellant pay the respondent’s costs

Note: Settlement and entry of orders are dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant’s case before the RRT had been that owing to his well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of political opinion he was outside the country of his nationality, Tunisia, and was unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.Legal background The appellant arrived in Australia with his wife and children on 16 October 1997 and applied for a protection visa on 21 November 1997 by an application bearing the date 19 November 1997. On 16 December 1997 the Delegate refused to grant the application. The appellant applied to the RRT for review of that decision. The RRT conducted hearings on 1 July and 9 September 1998. On 25 February 1999 it affirmed the Delegate’s decision. The appellant’s application to this Court for review of the RRT’s decision was dismissed by the primary judge on 21 June 1999. His various specific claims were found in his application for the protection visa, various documents submitted on his behalf to the RRT and his oral evidence given to the RRT. The appellant relied on four grounds of appeal and was given leave at the hearing to amend his notice of appeal by adding a fifth ground in the circumstances described below. The first four grounds were as follows (we will discuss the fifth later):(1)the primary judge erred in finding that the RRT had not erred in its interpretation and application of the law by failing to consider and address properly the nature of the appellant’s claims in connection with his application for the protection visa (the “error of law” ground is found in s. 476(1)(e) of the Act);(2)the primary judge erred in failing to find that the RRT had not observed procedural requirements which the Act required it to observe in connection with the making of the decision (the “procedural requirements ground” is found in s. 476(1)(a) of the Act – the appellant relied on s. 430(1)(b), (c) and (d) of the Act as imposing procedural requirements which the RRT did not observe);(3)the primary judge erred in finding that the RRT’s decision was not affected by actual bias (the “actual bias” ground is provided by s. 476(1)(f) of the Act); and(4)the primary judge erred in failing to find that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision (the “no evidence” ground is provided by s. 476(1)(g) of the Act and is subject to the condition stipulated in, relevantly, s. 476(4)(b) of the Act). The appellant argued grounds 1 and 2 together. He submitted that the RRT had misconceived the nature of his claimed association with “Al-Nahda”, a Tunisian religio-political movement or sect based on Islam. According to his submission, his claimed involvement was religious, not political, but the RRT did not address his claim understood in that way or make any finding in respect of it. The submission was that, on the contrary, the RRT assessed his claims and evidence on the basis that his claimed involvement was political, or at least partly political. This approach led it to find that the appellant was not a creditworthy witness because he was not familiar with certain aspects of the political history, organisation and leadership of Al-Nahda. A finding as to the nature of the appellant’s involvement was, according to his submission to us, “logically anterior to any finding as to the level of knowledge that the Tribunal [might] expect of him [yet] no findings were made”. The RRT’s failure to make the finding referred to was, it was submitted, a failure to observe procedural requirements of s. 430(1)(c) and (d) of the Act that the RRT prepare a written statement that “sets out the reasons for the decision” and “sets out the findings on any material question of fact”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The RRT stated that it was “not satisfied that [the appellant] would be at risk of detention or other forms of serious harm if he returned … now because of his association with Al-Nahda”. It found that the appellant had “not been honest in the evidence he had provided” and that his wife “wished to avoid giving detailed evidence on some of the questions [the RRT] asked her because she was not sure of how she should respond”. The RRT’s Reasons for Decision included the following passage:Mr Zaltni’s knowledge of major events in the al-Nadha party prior to his arrest in 1992 falls well short of what I would have expected of someone who was a committed supporter of the group and closely following events of the period.Mr Zaltni claims that he first became interested in politics while living in Holland in late 1987 or early 1988. He claims that he followed developments relating to the group from this time until his arrest and that he was a committed supporter of the group. However, his account of major developments relating to the group during this period was confused and out of keeping with other information before the Tribunal regarding the period.The decision of the primary Judge Before the learned primary Judge, the appellant relied on grounds 1 to 4 referred to earlier. In relation to the grounds numbered 1, 2 and 4, his Honour thought that the rejection of the appellant’s evidence by the RRT “left no substratum at all” and that the RRT “simply did not accept that he [the appellant] was regarded by the Tunisian authorities as having any relevant connection with Al-Nahda” so that “there could be no legitimate fear of persecution on that account”. He thought that the appellant’s submissions were “in substance directed to the merits of the decision and [were] precluded by s. 476 as it [had] been construed by the High Court in Eshetu [a reference to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 162 ALR 577]”. His Honour said:Whilst there is force in some of the criticisms of the decision made on behalf of the applicant, they are criticisms of the merits of the decision. There was ample material before the Tribunal on which it could have made the decision it did, including its observations of the applicant and his wife in evidence. It was for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal of the statutory criterion and, despite giving and calling evidence, he failed to do so. I can detect no errors of the kind argued in the Tribunal decision, nor any failure to state reasons for decision.In relation to the ground numbered 3 earlier in these Reasons, the “actual bias” ground, the primary judge said:The claim [of actual bias] is based solely upon inference from the manner in which the Tribunal went about its task, including the reasons it gave. There is no evidence of actual animus or prejudgment. I have considered all of the matters relied upon in the written and oral submissions on behalf of the applicant to support this claim. The failings of natural justice to which I earlier referred, coupled with some of the Tribunal’s reasoning, gave me some concern as to whether the Tribunal had prejudged the issued and had a closed mind in the manner explained and applied in Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 151 ALR 505.The conclusion I have come to is that to approach the matter in this way would be to give impermissible weight to my view as to the reasonableness or otherwise of the procedures and reasoning of the Tribunal. There is nothing to indicate that such failings as there might have been in relation to natural justice were the result of any bias against the applicant. They are just as likely to have been the result of the way in which the Tribunal, rightly or wrongly, sees its statutory duty. More importantly, the Tribunal did not simply reject the applicant’s case on the basis of the first hearing, as it could have. It afforded him another chance to satisfy it by oral evidence and gave the applicant the later opportunity of dealing with some adverse material. This seems to me to answer the argument that the Tribunal had a mind closed against the applicant.Reasoning on the appealGround 1 (error of law) and ground 2 (non-observance of procedural requirements)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established