Yeo (Trustee), in the matter of Burhala (Bankrupt) v Burhala
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1137
•4 November 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Yeo (Trustee), in the matter of Burhala (Bankrupt) v Burhala [2024] FedCFamC2G 1137
File number(s): MLG 117 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE MANSINI Date of judgment: 4 November 2024 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – letter of request to foreign court exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy to act in aid of and be auxiliary to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia – directions made for assistance of foreign court. Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss. 27, 29, 30, 54C, 90-15, 149.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss. 90C
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr. 1.06, 13.06.
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr. 10.43B
Cases cited: El-Saafin & Anor v Franek & Ors (No 2) [2018] VSC 683
Lane v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 953
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75
Mclean (Trustee) v Kurene, in the matter of Kurene [2020] FCA 464
Re Ayres; Ex parte Evans (1981) 34 ALR 582
Re Clunies-Ross; Ex parte Totterdell (1981) 82 ALR 475
Van Eps v Child Support Registrar [2024] FCAFC 127
Warner (Trustee), in the matter of Barnes and Barnes [2018] FCA 1784
Warner, in the matter of Rivkin [2007] FCA 2020
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 70 Date of hearing: 10 October 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicants: Mr Fary SC and Mr Silver Solicitor for the Applicants: McInnis Wilson Lawyers The Respondents: No appearance ORDERS
MLG 117 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
IN THE MATTER OF FLORIN BURHALA AND TANIA BURHALA, BANKRUPTS
BETWEEN: ANDREW REGINALD YEO
First Applicant
GESS MICHAEL RAMBALDI
Second Applicant
AND: FLORIN BURHALA
First Respondent
TANIA LOUISE BURHALA
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE MANSINI
DATE OF ORDER:
4 NOVEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A letter of request be issued requesting the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania to act in aid of and auxiliary to this Court in the following manner:
(i)Recognise the bankruptcy of Ms Tania Louise Burhala, the Second Respondent;
(ii)Take whatever steps are necessary to vest in the Applicants as trustees of the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent (save for any property that she may have acquired on or after 2 November 2021), and grant the Applicants possession and control of that property, with liberty to sell and lease it and receive the proceeds of such sale or leasing and with authority to take such steps and do such acts and things as may be necessary for those purposes;
(iii)Grant such orders on application by the Applicants as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of implementing the requests in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Order 2 and ancillary to those requests.
2.The letter of request referred to at Order 1 be in the form of Annexure A.
3.The costs of the application be costs in the bankrupt estates of the First Respondent and Second Respondent.
AND THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
4.On 10 August 2016, the First Respondent became bankrupt under a sequestration order made by the then Federal Circuit Court in proceeding number MLG 160 of 2016.
5.On 10 August 2016, the Applicants were appointed the trustees of the bankrupt estate of the First Respondent.
6.On 1 November 2018, upon the acceptance of her debtor’s petition by the Official Receiver under s.55 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the Second Respondent became bankrupt.
7.On 6 March 2019, the Applicants were appointed the trustees of the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent.
8.The Applicants in their capacity as trustees of the bankrupt estate of the First Respondent may apply the First Respondent’s assets that are vested in them in payment of the amount of $8,921,081.22.
9.The Applicants in their capacity as trustees of the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent may apply the Second Respondent’s assets that are vested in them in payment of the amount of $6,122,244.09.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
ANNEXURE A
TO: BUCHAREST TRIBUNAL, 6TH CIVIL SECTION
319L Splaiul Independenţei Boulevard, B Building, Sema Park
District 6, Bucharest
ROMANIA
RE: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)
At Melbourne No MLG 117 of 2024
In the Bankrupt Estate of Florin Burhala; and
In the Bankrupt Estate of Tania Burhala, VIC 2456/18/8
WHEREAS:
1.On 1 November 2018, Tania Burhala became bankrupt upon the acceptance of her debtor’s petition by the Official Receiver under section 55 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).
2.On 6 March 2019, Andrew Reginald Yeo and Gess Michael Rambaldi were appointed as the trustees of Mrs Burhala’s estate (the Trustees).
3. On 2 November 2021, Mrs Burhala was discharged from bankruptcy by operation of s 149 of the Act.
4. Under Australian law and pursuant to sections 58(1) and 116 of the Act, if a person becomes bankrupt in Australia (and with certain exceptions) the following property vests in the person’s trustee in bankruptcy:
a. that person’s real and personal property at the time of the bankruptcy; and
b. any property acquired by the bankrupt from the time of bankruptcy until his or her discharge from bankruptcy.
5. A reference to property includes all real estate property, cash at bank, shares in companies, a beneficially vested interest in a trust and any income derived from those assets, located both within Australia and outside of Australia’s external territories.
6. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the trustee in bankruptcy is authorised to take possession of that property and to realise it (by sale or otherwise) for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt estate.
7. The property remains vested in the trustee in bankruptcy, and the trustee retains the power to sell that property and distribute its proceeds, after the bankrupt is discharged from bankruptcy.
8. For those reasons, as a matter of Australian law, any of Mrs Burhala’s real property situated in Romania which she acquired prior to 1 November 2021, is currently vested in the Trustees.
9. In an application to this court, the Trustees gave evidence that the debts owing to the creditors of the Bankrupt’s estate exceed AU $6.1 million.
10. The Trustees have represented to this court that it is necessary for the purposes of justice and the due administration in bankruptcy of Mrs Burhala’s bankrupt estate, that Mrs Burhala’s property should be made available to the Trustees in their capacity as trustees of the bankrupt estate, so that it may be dealt with by them under the Act for the purpose of realising it for the benefit of the creditors of the estate.
11. Pursuant to section 27 of the Act, the Federal Court of Australia has jurisdiction in bankruptcy. Further, under:
a. section 29 of the Act, this court can request a court outside Australia that has jurisdiction in bankruptcy to assist it in any matter of bankruptcy; and
b. article 25(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency, which forms part of the law of the Commonwealth of Australia by reason of the Cross-borderInsolvency Act 2008 (Cth), this court can communicate directly with and request assistance directly from a foreign court.
12. On 18 January 2024 the Trustees applied to this court for an order that a letter of request be issued to the Bucharest Tribunal, to assist in the realising of the Bankrupt’s property for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt.
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
13. This court requests, for the reasons given above and for the assistance of this court in the matter of the bankrupt estate of Mrs Tania Burhala, that the Bucharest Tribunal:
a. recognise the bankruptcy of Tania Burhala;
b. take whatever steps are necessary to vest in the Trustees all real property of Mrs Burhala (save for any property that she might have acquired on or after 2 November 2021), and grant the Trustees possession and control of that property, with liberty to sell and lease it and receive the proceeds of such sale or leasing and with authority to take such steps and do such acts and things as may be necessary for those purposes; and
c.grant such orders on application by the Trustees as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of implementing the requests in paragraphs (a) and (b) above and ancillary to those requests.
SIGNED: __________________________
DATE:
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
DISTRICT REGISTRY OF VICTORIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Mansini
IN SUMMARY
Before the Court is an application for a letter of request to a foreign court to act in aid of and be auxiliary to the Court in relation to the bankruptcy of the Second Respondent and related declarations to assist the foreign court in relation to enforcement of the bankruptcies of the Second Respondent and her spouse, the First Respondent.
At the heart of the matter are Australian tax (among other) debts accrued by the First Respondent, whilst practising as a migration lawyer in Australia before he and his wife were declared bankrupt and departed the jurisdiction to Romania - where, it is claimed, that they transferred substantial assets to their children. It is alleged that in excess of $8.9 million is owed in the bankrupt estate of the First Respondent and in excess of $6.1 million is owed in the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent - litigation for and in opposition to the recovery of which has extended for many years.
The following reasons explain the orders made in resolution of the present application.
CONTEXT
The Applicants, Mr Andrew Reginald Yeo and Mr Gess Michael Rambaldi (also referred to in these reasons as the Trustees), are the trustees of the bankrupt estates of Mr Florin Burhala (the First Respondent) and Ms Tania Burhala (the Second Respondent). There is a prolonged and complex history of litigation between them, in the Australian and Romanian jurisdictions. The following procedural and factual context is a summary of the relevant facts on the evidence and materials before the Court as at 10 October 2024.
Procedural
On 18 January 2024, application was made commencing the present proceedings accompanied by:
(a)An affidavit of Mr Yeo on behalf of the Trustees, sworn 13 December 2023 which annexed various documents (referred to as relevant in factual context below); and
(b)An affidavit of a Mr Ioan Roman in his capacity as an “expert witness”, an Attorney at Law in Romania sworn 13 January 2024 which annexed a document titled “Memorandum related to the jurisdiction of Romanian Courts recognizing a foreign bankruptcy”, prepared by Mr Roman and dated 15 November 2023 (the First Report of Mr Roman).
The Court received evidence of service of the originating application and accompanying affidavits of Mr Yeo and Mr Roman on the First Respondent and Second Respondent, as follows:
(a)An affidavit of a Mr Giuseppe (Joe) Domenico Giacco (Australian legal practitioner) sworn 19 February 2024, evidencing service of the originating application and accompanying affidavits on the First Respondent by email at a @protonmail.com email address and on the Second Respondent by email at a @protonmail.com email address (according to documents before the Court respectively, addresses by which they have been known to communicate and nominate for communications in various bankruptcy proceedings); and
(b)An affidavit of Mr Roman, sworn 20 February 2025, evidencing service of the originating application and accompanying affidavits on the First Respondent and Second Respondent by post and through a Romanian Court Enforcement Officer at their domiciled address in Bucharest, Romania. Mr Roman further deposed this to be the Respondents’ known address for service according to his searches of public information available and affirmations made by the Respondents themselves in legal proceedings in which he had attended against both of them. Further, Mr Roman deposed to the process for service in Romania and steps taken to have been sufficient to comply with the laws of Romania in his opinion.
While the Applicants did not necessarily concede it was required, the Court also received evidence of service of a Form 26A Notice (Notice to person served outside Australia pursuant to r.10.43B of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Federal Court Rules) as may be applied in these proceedings pursuant to r.1.06(3) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Rules)) on the First Respondent and Second Respondent. Specifically, an affidavit of Mr Giacco sworn 15 March 2024, evidencing service of a Form 26A Notice and other documents commencing and in these proceedings, on the First Respondent and the Second Respondent at the email addresses referred to at paragraph 6(a) of these reasons and at a second email address for the First Respondent.
On 29 February 2024, the Applicants filed submissions in support of their substantive application in the matter.
On 27 March 2024, a notice of address for service was filed by the First Respondent.
On 9 April 2024, a further affidavit of Mr Roman sworn 9 April 2024 was filed and annexed a document titled “Reply to McInnes Wilson Lawyers’ Letter no. 16912 of 28 March 2024”, prepared by Mr Roman and dated 5 April 2024 (the Second Report of Mr Roman).
On 24 April 2024, the First Respondent filed a notice stating grounds of opposition (by which he sought that the application in the matter be dismissed with orders as to costs and such further orders as may be deemed appropriate) accompanied by:
(a)an affidavit of the First Respondent sworn 23 April 2024; and
(b)an affidavit of a Ms Nicoleta Mirela Nastasie sworn 12 April 2024, in her capacity as an “expert witness”, as a lawyer in Romania and insolvency practitioner which annexed a document titled “Memorandum Expert Report” dated 12 April 2024 (the Report of Ms Nastasie).
On 31 May 2024, the Applicants filed a further affidavit of Mr Roman sworn 31 May 2024 which (among other documents) annexed a document titled “Supplementary Memorandum – in relation to McInnes Wilson Lawyers’ Letter no. 169012 of 30 April 2024” (the Third Report of Mr Roman).
On 1 August 2024, the First Respondent filed submissions in opposition to the substantive application.
On 15 August 2024, the Applicants filed submissions in reply.
On 29 September 2024, the First Respondent sent an email correspondence to chambers which said that the First Respondent would not oppose the matter proceeding against the Second Respondent in his absence.
On 3 October 2024, there was no appearance for or by the First Respondent and Second Respondent at the final hearing set down to proceed on that day which was adjourned. Also on that day, the Applicant sought to amend the precise form of relief sought to include an order which permitted them leave to proceed against the Second Respondent pursuant to r.10.43D of the Federal Court Rules.
Throughout the proceedings, the Court received affidavits evidencing service of orders of the Court on the Second Respondent to attend hearings, including, most relevantly:
(a)An affidavit of service of Mr Giacco sworn on 11 March 2024 which evidenced service on Second Respondent of:
(i)The originating application filed on 18 January 2024;
(ii)An application in a proceeding accepted for filing on 4 March 2024;
(iii)The Court’s orders of 21 February 2024 wherein the proceeding was listed for hearing on 8 May 2024; and
(iv)The Court’s orders of 4 March 2024 wherein the proceeding was listed for interlocutory hearing on 12 March 2024 and included a notation regarding the potential consequences of non-compliance
(b)An affidavit of service of Mr Giacco sworn on 15 March 2024 and an affidavit of service of Mr Roman sworn on 2 October 2024, which respectively evidenced service on the Second Respondent of the Court’s orders of 13 March 2024 wherein the proceeding was listed for interlocutory hearing on 19 March 2024 and included a notation regarding the potential consequences of non-compliance or non-attendance.
(c)An affidavit of service of Mr Giacco sworn on 21 March 2024 which evidenced service on the Second Respondent of the Court’s orders of 19 March 2024 wherein the substantive proceeding remained listed for hearing on 8 May 2024 and included a notation regarding the potential consequences of non-compliance.
(d)An affidavit of service of Mr Roman sworn on 9 October 2024 and an affidavit of service of a Mr David Wayne Thorpe-Jones (Australian legal practitioner) sworn on 9 October 2024, which respectively evidenced service on the Second Respondent of the Court’s orders of 3 October 2024 wherein the substantive proceeding was adjourned for final hearing to 10 October 2024.
On 10 October 2024, the matter proceeded to final hearing absent an appearance by or on behalf of the First Respondent and the Second Respondent pursuant to r.13.06(1)(e) of the FCFCOA Rules. In this respect:
(a)The First Respondent had not filed an application in a proceeding (seeking an adjournment) with supporting affidavit evidence in accordance with the Court’s procedural rules and the directions of the Court. Even if there were such application properly made, a further adjournment would not have been granted when regard was had to the following factors:
(b)The Court could be satisfied that the First Respondent, having entered an appearance and engaged with the Applicants and the Court, and the Court having received evidence of service on the First Respondent of the Court’s orders of 3 October 2024 adjourning the hearing to 10 October 2024, was plainly aware and on notice of the proceedings and the hearing of 10 October 2024.
(c)The First Respondent had not satisfied the evidentiary burden with respect to adjournment requests as established by various authorities: the Court was taken, in particular, to Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ) at [48] –[50] and Van Eps v Child Support Registrar [2024] FCAFC 127 (Rangiah, Goodman and McElwaine JJ) at [25].
(d)The First Respondent, having previously worked as an Australian legal practitioner, would be well familiar with the processes of the Court with respect to adjournments.
(e)An adjournment is not required for the Applicant to agitate any particular issue.
(f)There was no suggestion that the First Respondent could not have briefed an Australian practitioner to attend the hearing and represent his interests.
(g)A lengthy period of time had elapsed since the First Respondent was made bankrupt and in which time considerable efforts taken by the Applicants in order to try and enforce the First Respondent’s bankruptcy.
(h)Although they contended it was of no assistance to the Court, there was no opposition on the part of the Applicants to the Court receiving the materials filed by the Respondent’s in this proceeding, albeit with appropriately limited weight able to be attributed to those materials.
(i)The final hearing had previously been adjourned and there would be significant cost implications on the part of the Applicants if the final hearing was adjourned again.
The Court received evidence sufficient to be satisfied that service of the originating process was effected on the Second Respondent at an address known to be her address for service in accordance with the Court’s rules and Romanian law and also received evidence of subsequent steps taken to provide the Second Respondent with the various materials filed by the Applicants and orders of the Court including to attend the final hearing on 10 October 2024. No communication was received for or by the Second Respondent. Having been afforded substantial opportunity to participate, the Second Respondent is taken to have elected not to do so.
Accordingly, the Applicants’ evidence filed in these proceedings was received as unchallenged and the First Respondent’s materials were received and taken into account in terms of identifying the First Respondent’s grounds of opposition but able to be given no more than limited weight from an evidentiary perspective given the evidence of the First Respondent and the Report of Ms Nastasie were not able to be tested.
After judgement was reserved in the matter, the Applicants filed an affidavit of service of Mr Thorpe-Jones sworn on 14 October 2024 and an affidavit of service of Mr Roman sworn on 22 October 2024, which respectively evidenced service of the Court’s orders of 10 October 2024 on the Second Respondent, wherein judgment in the matter was reserved. At the time of delivering these reasons, the Court had not received any correspondence from or materials filed in the proceedings by or on behalf of the Second Respondent.
Factual
On the materials before the Court, the following is a summary of the uncontentious facts of the matter.
The First Respondent and Second Respondent at the relevant times were husband and wife. According to the recitals of a “binding financial agreement” as between the First Respondent and Second Respondent, dated 1 October 2015 and purportedly made under s.90C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the First Respondent and Second Respondent separated on or about 10 August 2015 and recorded their agreement in respect of transfer of the First Respondent’s Romanian assets to the children of the marriage.
On 10 August 2016, under a sequestration order made by another Judge of this Court (then the Federal Circuit Court), the First Respondent became bankrupt on a creditor’s petition issued on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. That same day, the Applicants were appointed as the joint and several trustees of the bankrupt estate of the First Respondent. A copy of the sequestration order dated 10 August 2016 and the certificate of appointment of the Trustees dated 15 August 2016 were in evidence before the Court.
On 1 November 2018, upon the acceptance of her debtor’s petition by the Official Receiver under s.54C of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act), the Second Respondent became bankrupt as recorded under bankruptcy administration no. VIC 2456 of 2018/8. A copy of a national personal insolvency index extract dated 3 March 2023 evidencing bankruptcy date of 1 November 2018 was in evidence, along with a certificate of appointment of Mr Sellers and Ms Ruhe as trustees in the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent dated 1 November 2018.
On 6 March 2019, the Applicants were appointed as trustees of the bankrupt estate of Tania Burhala. A copy of the certificate of appointment of Mr Yeo and Mr Rambaldi as Trustees in the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent dated 7 March 2019 was in evidence before the Court.
On 2 November 2021, the Second Respondent was automatically discharged under s.149 of the Act, as a period of three years had elapsed since she filed her statement of affairs. The national personal insolvency index extract in evidence reflected this discharge date pursuant to s.149 of the Act.
Costs and debts in the bankrupt estates
The Court received the following evidence of Mr Yeo in these proceedings that the total costs and debts of the First Respondent’s bankrupt estate exceed $8.9 million.
Specifically, Mr Yeo deposed to the total amount of creditor claims in the First Respondent’s bankrupt estate as admitted by the Trustees in accordance with Division 1 of Part VI of the Act:
(a)Proof of debt claimed by creditor in the amount of $917,866 related to a company Aspen Alpine (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liquidation), of which the First Respondent was director where liquidators have submitted a claim on behalf of the company for funds used by the First Respondent to pay his personal expenses;
(b)Proof of debt claimed by creditor in the amount of $1,098,689 related to a company BMA Lawyers Pty Ltd (in liquidation), of which the First Respondent was director where liquidators have submitted a claim on behalf of the company for funds used by the First Respondent to pay his personal expenses;
(c)Proof of debt claimed by creditor Citigroup Pty Limited in the amount of $13,857 (admitted by the Trustees);
(d)Proof of debt claimed by creditor Deputy Commissioner of Taxation in the amount of $4,737,623 being for judgement debt ordered by Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia on 14 October 2019 (admitted by the Trustees);
(e)Proof of debt claimed by creditor Macquarie Bank Limited in the amount of $11,713 (admitted by the Trustees);
(f)Proof of debt claimed by creditor National Australia Bank Limited in the amount of $7,422 (admitted by the Trustees); and
(g)Proof of debt claimed by creditor Westpac Banking Corporation Limited in the amount of $30,472 (admitted by the Trustees),
totalling $4,801,087 in admitted amounts and $7,627,642 in proof of debt amounts including not yet admitted amounts.
The evidence was that the First Respondent had indicated an intention to dispute the not yet admitted amounts but had not yet provided a formal response.
Mr Yeo also gave evidence of the Trustees’ costs and debts in the First Respondent’s bankrupt estate as at 2 March 2023 totalling $8,340,990.20 plus realisation charge calculated at 7% of the total amount of property to be realised in the bankrupt estate at $627,816.47 ($8,968,806.67). Further, of the known interest on interest bearing debts on the admitted amounts from date of bankruptcy to 2 March 2023 which totalled $2,557,876.68.
The Court received the following evidence of Mr Yeo in these proceedings that the total costs and debts of the Second Respondent’s bankrupt estate exceed $6.1 million.
Specifically, Mr Yeo deposed to the total amount of creditor claims in the Second Respondent’s bankrupt estate as admitted by the Trustees in accordance with Division 1 of Part VI of the Act:
(a)Proof of debt claimed by creditor Lion Finance Ltd in the amount of $661.64 (admitted by the Trustees at $661.00);
(b)Proof of debt claimed by creditor Deputy Commissioner of Taxation in the amount of $3,872,446.87 (admitted by the Trustees at $3,872,446.00),
totalling $3,873,107 in admitted amounts.
Mr Yeo also gave evidence of the Trustees’ costs and debts in the Second Respondent’s bankrupt estate as at 2 March 2023 totalling $5,693,687.00 plus realisation charge calculated at 7% of the total amount of property to be realised in the bankrupt estate at $428,557.09 ($6,122,244.09). Further, of the known interest on interest bearing debts on the admitted amounts from date of bankruptcy to 2 March 2023 which totalled $1,820,580.00.
Other relevant legal proceedings in Romania and Australia
In summary, the evidence on behalf of the Applicants in relation to the various foreign proceedings as at the time of hearing was:
(a)In case file no. 9882/3/2017, the Trustees commenced proceedings in the Romanian High Court of Cassation and Justice which jurisdiction made a finding on appeal on 7 December 2017 that recognised the bankruptcy procedure of Australia in Romania thereby allowing for the enforcement in Romania of the bankruptcy ruling issued in Australia (the Applicants defined as “the Recognition Case”). The First Respondent had appealed the initial determination on the basis that the Australian bankruptcy proceedings could not be recognised in Romania and levied against his property in Romania because the sequestration order did not quantify the amount owed to his petitioning creditor. It was in this context that an order was sought and obtained in the Federal Court of Australia (a copy of which order, dated 14 October 2019, was in evidence and provided that there be judgement for the Commissioner of Taxation against the First Respondent in the amount of $4,737,623.81).
(b)In case file no. 9877/3/2017 there was one appeal by the First Respondent determined in favour of the Applicants and one foreshadowed appeal in case file no. 1760/3/2023 which the Applicants intend to bring before the Bucharest Tribunal in the course of which declarations are sought to effectively prevent the First Respondent from donation of 6 real properties to his children in opposition to the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and the Trustees (translated copies of various Court documents related to which were in evidence) (the Applicants defined these proceedings as “the Actio Pauliana Proceeding No 1” and “the Actio Pauliana Proceeding No 2”).
(c)In case file no. 23974/299/2020, there was one extant appeal by the Applicants of a partial annulment of an enforcement proceeding (under the Romanian Civil Procedural Code, not in the insolvency jurisdiction) pending before the Bucharest Tribunal by which the First Respondent joined by the Second Respondent seeks to challenge enforcement action taken by the Applicants against the sole real estate property in Romania not subject of donation to the First Respondent’s children (translated copies of various Court documents related to which were in evidence) (the Applicants defined these proceedings as “the Enforcement Proceedings”).
There were prior proceedings of relevance in Australia. On 9 March 2023, the Applicants made application to this Court by which orders were sought that they as Trustees were acting reasonably in respect of seeking to recover sufficient assets through Romanian legal proceedings as to pay the First Respondent’s bankrupt estate and in seeking to recognise the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy in Romania (the prior application for declarations). On 24 April 2023, the Court as presently constituted determined to make declarations on application of the Trustees in resolution of those prior proceedings in the following terms:
In relation to the bankrupt estate of Florin Burhala and the bankrupt estate of Tania Burhala and pursuant to section 90-15 of Schedule 2 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.The Applicants as trustees of the bankrupt estate of Florin Burhala are acting reasonably and therefore justified in seeking to recover sufficient assets in order to pay not less than $8,921,081.22 in the bankrupt estate, in Romania.
2.The Applicants as trustees of the bankrupt estate of Tania Burhala are acting reasonably and therefore justified in seeking to recognise the bankruptcy, in Romania.
AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A. The Court has received evidence that the bankrupt Florin Burhala and the bankrupt Tania Louise Burhala (the Bankrupts) are husband and wife and the Applicants have been appointed trustees of their respective bankrupt estates.
B. The Court is satisfied that these orders are sought by the Applicants in their faithful performance of their duties to the Australian creditors of the Bankrupts’ respective estates.
C. Nothing in these orders alters the rights or interests of the Bankrupts in their respective bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) or other Australian law within the Court’s jurisdiction.
The First Respondent sought to appeal that decision but did not give costs security as ordered by the Federal Court of Australia and the appeal was dismissed.
In respect of the various Romanian proceedings and operation of Romanian law, Mr Roman (as earlier referenced, an Attorney at Law in Romania who specialises in the areas of commercial dispute resolution, bankruptcy and arbitration and is engaged by the Applicants) gave evidence to the Court by way of 3 affidavits which respectively met the necessary conditions of r.23.13 of the Federal Court Rules which apply pursuant to r.1.06 of the FCFCOA Rules. It is unnecessary to repeat the entirety of his evidence here. For present purposes, the expert opinion of Mr Roman included the following:
(a)Personal bankruptcy in Romania is regulated by law no. 151/2015 concerning the bankruptcy of individuals.
(b)Under law no. 151/2015, the Bucharest Tribunal does not have original jurisdiction in bankruptcy (that is conferred on a lower court at first instance or “judecatorie”) but the Bucharest Tribunal has appellate jurisdiction over personal bankruptcy matters and its decisions are final. The Bucharest Tribunal may receive or adduce additional evidence that was not before the court at first instance.
(c)The Romanian Civil Procedural Code provides for recognition in Romania of foreign judgements. In the case of the First Respondent and Second Respondent, the Bucharest Tribunal has jurisdiction to recognise foreign bankruptcy judgements and Romanian case law provides that the Bucharest Tribunal has jurisdiction to recognise an Australian personal bankruptcy.
(d)Mr Roman also responded to the “findings” made in the Report of Ms Anastasie (which, as earlier referenced, was not able to be tested and is therefore able to be afforded very limited weight).
In the affidavit supporting the originating application in these proceedings, Mr Yeo deposed that it was necessary to make the present application in respect of the First Respondent’s bankrupt estate because of submissions the First Respondent had made in legal proceedings in the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania, which submissions Mr Yeo was concerned may mislead the Bucharest Tribunal as to the manner in which Australian bankruptcy law operates. The evidence of Mr Yeo as to the submissions of the First Respondent was that they were to the effect that:
(a)The Trustees are unable to recover and realise any of his Romanian assets because the total costs and debts of his bankrupt estate (in excess of $8.9 million) has not been quantified under a court judgement and those costs and debts of his bankrupt estate are merely an arbitrary amount asserted by the Trustees without the sanction or control of an Australian court of law;
(b)The Romanian courts should not allow the recovery in Romania of any amounts that are not specifically stated in an Australian court judgement that has been recognised in Romania (the recognition of an Australian judgement in Romania being undertaken via a judicial process where the Romanian courts verify if the foreign ruling meets the standards of the Romanian and European Union laws);
(c)Whilst paragraph 1 of the reasons for decision of the Judge who made the sequestration order against the First Respondent’s estate referred to the debt alleged in the creditor’s petition in the sum of $3,794,093.91, that Judge did not verify and ascertain the existence and validity of the underlying debt; and
(d)The First Respondent officially denies that any amounts owed to his bankrupt estate can be realised from Romanian property.
Mr Yeo elaborated in evidence on his concern that the First Respondent’s submissions to the Bucharest Tribunal would mislead as to the manner in which Australian bankruptcy law operates as being, in particular, on account of the First Respondent’s omissions as to:
(a)The effect of s.82 of the Act and the entitlement of a creditor of a bankrupt estate under an Australian bankruptcy to prove their debts, present or future, certain or contingent, to which a bankrupt was subject at the date of bankruptcy - or to which a bankrupt may become subject before their discharge by reason of an obligation incurred before the date of the bankruptcy, because they are provable in a bankruptcy and are not dependent on a creditor obtaining judgement;
(b)The effect of s.83 of the Act and the manner in which a trustee in bankruptcy is required to deal with (and, where applicable, admit) proofs of debt claims received from creditors and that a debt not be considered proved until admitted, and the requirement for a creditor to lodge a proof of debt in order for the debt to be admitted;
(c)The effect of s.102 of the Act and the mechanism by which a Trustee in bankruptcy is required to adjudicate each debt claimed by a creditor in the bankrupt estate;
(d)The entitlement of a trustee in bankruptcy to payment of their lawfully approved remuneration and expenses incurred in administering the bankrupt estate until such time as it is finalised; and
(e)The realisation charge of 7% on the amount of any realisations made in the bankrupt estate.
Also in the affidavit supporting the originating application in these proceedings, Mr Yeo deposed that it was necessary to make the present application in respect of the Second Respondent’s bankrupt estate because of advice received from Mr Yeo’s Romanian lawyer, to the effect that:
(a)It would be beneficial for the Trustees to apply for recognition of the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy, as they had done for the First Respondent’s bankruptcy;
(b)There being no court (sequestration) order that can be produced to a Romanian Court confirming the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy given that the Second Respondent had voluntarily presented her own debtor’s petition for bankruptcy;
(c)By operation of Romanian bankruptcy law, it being necessary for a Romanian court to consider whether the legal conditions are met for an individual to be declared bankrupt and the recognition of a foreign bankruptcy outside the European Union necessarily being undertaken via a judicial process;
(d)In order for a Romanian court to adjudicate in respect of recognising the Second Respondent’s Australian bankruptcy, it would require an Australian court to declare or order that the Second Respondent became bankrupt under Australian legislation, the Trustees were appointed the Trustees of the bankrupt estate and as to the quantum of the costs in the Second Respondent’s bankrupt estate which payment she is required to remit to the Trustees; and
(e)It would also assist the foreign proceedings (earlier defined as the Actio Paulina Proceedings No 1 and No 2, the Enforcement Proceedings and proceedings for the recognition of the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy in Romania which would need to include the following information as to be recognised in Romania:
(i)Both the First Respondent and Second Respondent be named parties to the Australian Court proceeding;
(ii)That the First Respondent and Second Respondent were made bankrupt according to Australian legislation;
(iii)An “indication” of the amount owed by the First Respondent and Second Respondent to their creditors;
(iv)That the Trustees have an obligation to calculate and admit the debts of the bankrupt estates, noting the current costs of the bankrupt estate;
(v)That the bankrupt estates should be treated as a procedure where the costs of the bankrupt estate will vary over time; and
(vi)That Mr Yeo and Mr Rambaldi were appointed Trustees of the bankrupt estate.
Mr Yeo’s evidence was that, were this Court to make the orders sought in these proceedings, it was intended that they be provided to the Bucharest Tribunal in respect of the Actio Pauliana proceedings and also in the appeal against the partial annulment of the Enforcement Proceedings. Further, that the Trustees would use it for purposes of defending a claim by the Second Respondent to any Romanian property that she may make.
SHOULD THE COURT ISSUE A LETTER OF REQUEST
The Applicants seek an order pursuant to s.29(4) of the Act, in terms that the Court issue a letter of request to the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania to act in aid of and be auxiliary to this Court in the following manner:
(1)Recognise the bankruptcy of Tania Burhala, the Second Respondent;
(2)Take whatever steps are necessary to vest in the Applicants as Trustees of the bankrupt estate of Tania Burhala (save for any property that she might have acquired on or after 2 November 2021), and grant the Applicants possession and control of that property, with liberty to sell and lease it and receive the proceeds of such sale or leasing and with authority to take such steps and do such acts and things as may be necessary for those purposes; and
(3)Grant such orders on application by the Trustees as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of implementing the requests in paragraphs (a) and (b) above and ancillary to those requests.
The Applicants contended that the letter of request is essential in the performance of their statutory obligations as Trustees given the complexities that are specific to the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy (because, unlike the bankruptcy of the First Respondent, she has voluntarily presented her own debtors petition and therefore there is no existing court order as to the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy). Further, on the evidence of Mr Roman, a Romanian Court including the Bucharest Tribunal has the power to act on a letter of request issued by this Court for the purpose of having the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy recognised in Romania.
As earlier outlined, the Second Respondent did not participate in the proceedings notwithstanding substantial opportunity afforded. The First Respondent initially filed written submissions and some evidence which included points of opposition to the proposed letter of request. However, in his subsequent email to the Court of 29 September 2024, the First Respondent did not oppose an order made as against the Second Respondent and in this respect was understood to have withdrawn (or not press) his submissions and evidence to the extent that it otherwise indicated opposition to orders sought against the Second Respondent.
Powers to issue and act on the letter of request
Section 29 of the Act provides that courts are “to help each other”. Relevantly, s.29(4) of the Act provides as follows:
The Court may request a court of an external Territory, or of a country other than Australia, that has jurisdiction in bankruptcy to act in aid of and be auxiliary to it in any matter of bankruptcy.
The power to issue a letter of request is conditioned on this Court and the recipient court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy: Warner (Trustee), in the matter of Barnes and Barnes [2018] FCA 1784 (Yates J) at [19] as cited in Mclean (Trustee) v Kurene, in the matter of Kurene [2020] FCA 464 (O’Callaghan J) (Kurene).
Section 27 of the Act confers jurisdiction in bankruptcy upon the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2).
This Court is also conferred with the express power to make such orders, including declaratory orders and orders granting injunctions or other equitable remedies, as it considers necessary for the purposes of carrying out or giving effect to the Act: s.30(1)(b) of the Act.
The application nominated the recipient court as the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania.
The Court has received evidence of Mr Roman, a Romanian lawyer who specialises in bankruptcy and met the requirements of the rules of the Court as an expert witness, which was essentially unopposed. Mr Roman’s evidence supports a finding that the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania has jurisdiction in bankruptcy to recognise in Romania the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy as it were established under Australian law. Further, that the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania has the power to act on a letter of request issued by an Australian court of competent jurisdiction were it to so decide and, more specifically, that the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania has the powers to:
(a)declare the Trustees’ interests in 6 properties in Romania that were purportedly transferred to the children of the First (and Second) Respondent under a “contract of donation”; and
(b)permit the taking of measures and procedures in relation to the recovery of the property of the First Respondent or Second Respondent purportedly transferred by the First Respondent to the children under a “contract of donation”.
On the established authorities, this Court need not be satisfied that the foreign court will as a matter of any certainty allow the request before deciding to act under s.29(4) of the Act: Warner, in the matter of Rivkin [2007] FCA 2020 (Gyles J). That circumstance is apt to the present case.
Whether to exercise the discretion
The power of this Court to make a request for aid of a court of an external territory or another country under s.29(4) of the Act is discretionary.
In Re Ayres; Ex parte Evans (1981) 34 ALR 582 Lockhart J described the object in context, at 589-591:
The object of s 29 is to enable all courts having jurisdiction under the Act, the courts of prescribed countries (including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada) and the courts of other countries having jurisdiction in bankruptcy to act in aid of and be auxiliary to each other in bankruptcy matters.
The section ‘does not create any new rights, but only creates new remedies for enforcing existing rights’ per Griffith CJ who delivered the judgment of the High Court in Hall v Woolf (1908) 7 CLR 207 at 212. His Honour was speaking of s 118 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 … but what he said applies also to s 29 of the Act.
The discretion is to be “exercised with regard to considerations of utility and comity”: Re Clunies-Ross; Ex parte Totterdell (1981) 82 ALR 475 at 486 (French J as he then was).
In the present case, there is no opposition to the orders made as against the Second Respondent. Nonetheless, it falls to consider whether to exercise the discretion having regard to the established principles.
As earlier referenced the Court has received unopposed expert evidence that the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania has jurisdiction. The Court also received evidence of the necessity of such a letter of request where the Australian bankruptcy procedure did not (in the case of the Second Respondent’s bankruptcy) involve a judgement or sequestration order that would otherwise be recognised in Romania (as was the case for the First Respondent’s bankruptcy).
On the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied that the form of the request is appropriately focussed and directed and that the quantum identified in the request in respect of the bankruptcy of the Second Respondent is the subject of evidence (namely, that of Mr Yeo in his initial affidavit filed with the originating application).
Further, there was evidence of a complex history of litigation as between the Trustees (in seeking to administer their obligation to creditors of the First Respondent and the Second Respondent) and the First Respondent (on occasion joined by the Second Respondent) in defending those attempts. The Applicants, in their role as Trustees of the Second Respondent’s bankrupt estate, are obliged to administer the estate in the interests of the creditors and the bankrupt and seek to recover the accepted provable debts and have gone to significant efforts for the recognition of bankruptcy and recovery of assets in Romania.
Moreover, when regard is had to the evidence of advice of the Applicants’ Romanian lawyer and history of the litigation to date, the Applicants reasonably anticipate that the Second Respondent will seek to lay claim against the First Respondent’s properties (rescinding or seeking to set aside the terms of the “binding financial agreement” and contending joint ownership) in the proceedings that continue in Romania against the First Respondent and that she may resist efforts to have her bankruptcy recognised in Romania and further enforcement action directed at recovery of her assets.
Resolution
Having regard to all of the relevant factors, the requisite powers exist and it is appropriate for this Court to issue a letter of request to the Bucharest Tribunal of Romania to act in aid of and be auxiliary to this court in the administration of the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent in the form of Annexure A.
SHOULD THE COURT MAKE FURTHER DECLARATIONS?
The Applicants sought declarations said to be for their assistance as Trustees in administration of the bankrupt estates of the First Respondent and Second Respondent in Romania, in the following form:
1.On 1 November 2018, upon the acceptance of her debtor’s petition by the Official Receiver under s 55 of the Act, the Second Respondent became bankrupt.
2.On 6 March 2019, the Applicants were appointed the trustees of the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent.
3.On 10 August 2016, the First Respondent became bankrupt under a sequestration order made by Judge Burchardt in the then Federal Circuit Court (proceeding number MLG 160 of 2016).
4.On 10 August 2016, the Applicants were appointed the trustees of the bankrupt estate of the First Respondent.
5.The Applicants in their capacity as trustees of the bankrupt estate of the First Respondent may apply the First Respondent’s assets that are vested in them in payment of the amount of $8,921,081.22 referred to in the Orders made by Judge Mansini on 28 March 2023 in proceeding No. MLG427/2023.
6.The Applicants in their capacity as trustees of the bankrupt estate of the Second Respondent may apply the Second Respondent’s assets that are vested in them in payment of the amount of $6,122,244.09 referred to in paragraph 65 of the affidavit of Andrew Yeo sworn 13 December 2023.
By the written submissions and evidence filed in support of the First Respondent’s opposition to the declaratory relief sought in these proceedings, the First Respondent contended that the Applicants have not made a case that the sequestration order in his case required clarification by way of declarations. In this respect, the First Respondent contended that the declarations sought against him do not address a legal uncertainty or seek to clarify any of the rights and obligations of the parties that are not adequately covered by the existing orders and/or declarations. Rather, the relief sought in relation to the First Respondent was a mere reformulation of orders and declarations previously made by this Court (then the Federal Circuit Court, the sequestration order of Judge Riethmuller in matter MLG 160 of 2016 and the declarations I have made in matter MLG 427 of 2023), the facts and issues pertinent to the declaration have already been determined. The First Respondent acknowledged that the Court has a broad discretion to grant declaratory relief however contended that the present application calls into question principles of res judicata or issue estoppel, being matters for consideration in the exercise of the Court’s discretion.
For their part, the Applicants asked the Court to find that the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel have no application where a party seeks declarations consistent with pre-existing orders or directions and, in any event, applications for assistance by trustees in administration of a bankrupt estate are not conducive to such restrictions: citing the form of orders made in the matter of Kurene which gave the applicant in that case liberty to apply if any further direction or request was required. Further, that the First Respondent’s assertion that there was no useful purpose for the declarations:
(a)Ignored that he and his children have opposed the Applicants’ claims over property on the grounds that no Australian court had made orders as to the amounts owed by him;
(b)Also ignored that both he and his children have opposed the Applicants’ claims over property on grounds that there is no obligation to remit property without an order expressly requiring payment; and
(c)Is diminished by the fact that he ultimately conceded there was no “incorrectness” in the proposed declarations.
The source of the Court’s power sought to be exercised in this respect is derived from s.90-15 of Schedule 2 of the Act, which relevantly states that:
90‑15 Court may make orders in relation to estate administration
Court may make orders
(1) The Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the administration of a regulated debtor’s estate.
In Lane v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 953 at [19], Derrington J noted the broad discretion conferred by s.90-15:
The power conferred by this section is wide and obviously intended to facilitate the resolution of contentious matters as they arise in the course of the administration of a bankrupt’s estate. It is not limited to the making of directions as was the former s 134(4) which was encumbered with various inherent limitations (See Bufalo v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2011] FCAFC 111 and the cases cited therein). The power granted by s 90-15 is sufficiently wide to make the directions or give the relief which is sought in the Application.
In El-Saafin & Anor v Franek & Ors (No 2) [2018] VSC 683, Lyons J similarly characterised the power conferred by s.90-15 as being broad in scope at [108]-[115]:
[108] Section 90-20(1) of Schedule 2 to the Act came into effect on 1 March 2017. Part 3 is headed ‘General rules relating to external administration’. External administration is defined to include liquidation and administration.
[109] Section 90-20(1) permits a range of interested persons (relevantly, an officer of a company, which includes administrators of a company) to apply to the Court for orders under s 90-15(1). Under s 90-15(1), the Court may make ‘such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company’.
[110] The Court’s power under s 90-15 is broad. However, the principles to be applied to the exercise of this power have been very much informed by those that applied to the exercise of the Court’s power to give directions to external administrators under the former analogous provisions of the Act, namely s 447D(1), in the case of administration, and ss 479(3) and 511, in the case of liquidation.
[111] The ability of administrators or liquidators to approach the Court for directions is intended to facilitate their respective functions and so the provision should be interpreted widely to give effect to that intention. This is in a context where one of the effects of seeking such advice or directions is to provide protection to the administrator or liquidator from liability in respect of actions they seek to take. However the authorities state that the directions sought must be just and beneficial to the liquidation or administration.
[112] As a result, particular principles have developed where an administrator or liquidator applies to the Court for directions. In Ansett No. 2, Goldberg J said:
... the prevailing principle adopted by the courts, when asked by liquidators and administrators to give directions, is to refrain from doing so where the direction sought relates to the making and implementation of a business or commercial decision, either committed specifically to the liquidator or administrator or well within his or her discretion, in circumstances where there is no particular legal issue raised for consideration or attack on the propriety or reasonableness of the decision in respect of which the directions are sought. There must be something more than the making of a business or commercial decision before a court will give directions in relation to, or approving of, the decision. It may be a legal issue of substance or procedure, it may be an issue of power, propriety or reasonableness, but some issue of this nature is required to be raised.... A court should not give its imprimatur to a business decision simply to alleviate a liquidator or administrator’s own ease. There must be an issue calling for the exercise of legal judgement.
[113] The cases in which directions may properly be given by the Court fall into four principal categories (although these categories are not closed):
(1) guidance on matters of law;
(2) guidance on questions of legal procedure;
(3) whether a liquidator should postpone a sale in order to achieve a better price; and
(4) where there are two competing offers for assets and a liquidator wishes to gain the Court’s directions in order to avoid a subsequent allegation that he or she has acted improperly in choosing one over the other.
[114] Other restrictions are imposed by courts as to when relief will be granted where a liquidator or administrator seeks directions. First, the jurisdiction ‘is concerned with affording protection ... in connection with proposed future action, not with ratifying action ... already taken’. Second, a court will not ordinarily give a direction that a liquidator or administrator would be acting ‘properly’ in a particular transaction, distinct from a direction that the liquidator would be justified in taking a particular course of action.
[115] Finally, as noted by Brereton J in One.Tel, the Court should not make a direction in respect of a commercial judgement which may prove contentious, unless satisfied that the decision ‘is in all the circumstances a proper one’. He concluded:
While the court’s function under s 511 does not involve it in reconsidering every factor that has informed the liquidator’s decision, let alone developing alternatives or deciding whether the court would have made the same decision, the court needs to be satisfied, before making a direction, that the decision is proper and reasonable; at least usually, this will necessitate consideration of the liquidator’s reasons, and the process by which the decision has been reached.
In all of the circumstances, and on the evidence before the Court particularly that of Mr Roman about the various Romanian proceedings and operation of Romanian laws, I am persuaded that there is utility and that it is proper to make orders pursuant to s.90-15 of the Act, by way of guidance to the Romanian courts as to matters of Australian law and procedure. That is especially the case where the First Respondent has in various legal proceedings sought to rely on the differences between the Australian and Romanian legal procedures and law to resist the Applicants’ efforts to recover sufficient assets to at least pay the costs in the First Respondent’s bankrupt estate. And, it may reasonably be anticipated on the evidence of Mr Roman, that without clarity of the Australian courts the Second Respondent would seek to avail of similar argument and continue to frustrate the Applicants’ legitimate efforts in this respect.
Resolution
It is appropriate that the orders are made in the form sought and as a declaration being a written statement or direction for assistance of the Romanian courts.
DISPOSITION
For the above reasons, I am satisfied it is appropriate to exercise the discretion vested in the Court to make the orders as sought by the Applicants with orders that their costs be paid by the estates of the First Respondent and Second Respondent.
I certify that the preceding seventy (70) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Mansini. Associate:
Dated: 4 November 2024
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