Warner (Trustee), in the matter of Barnes and Barnes

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Warner (Trustee), in the matter of Barnes and Barnes [2018] FCA 1784

File number: NSD 1462 of 2018
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 19 November 2018
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Letter of Request to foreign Court exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy to act in aid of and be auxiliary to the Federal Court of Australia
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1914 (UK), s 96

Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 37A

Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (UK), Sch 1

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 29, 63, 121

Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), ss 423, 426

Insolvency Courts (Designation of Relevant Countries and Territories) Order 1986

UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency

Cases cited:

Clunies-Ross v Totterdell (1988) 20 FCR 358

Re Ayres; Ex parte Evans (1981) 51 FLR 395

Re Clunies-Ross; Ex parte Totterdell (1988) 82 ALR 475

Re Lyons [2000] FCA 1428; (2000) 104 FCR 486

Date of hearing: 14 November 2018
Date of last submissions: 15 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S A Wells with Mr J R Anderson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Breene & Breene Solicitors

ORDERS

NSD 1462 of 2018

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN ERIC BARNES AND JUDITH ANGELA BARNES

ANTHONY JOHN WARNER IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATES OF JOHN ERIC BARNES AND JUDITH ANGELA BARNES

Applicant

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to s 29(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), a Letter of Request be issued to the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in the form of Annexure “A” to these orders.

2.The costs of the application be costs in the bankrupt estates of John Eric Barnes and Judith Angela Barnes.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


Annexure “A”


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

YATES J:

Introduction

  1. The applicant, Mr Warner, is the trustee of the bankrupt estates of John Eric Barnes and his wife Angela Judith Barnes. He applies for an order, pursuant to s 29(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Bankruptcy Act), that the Court issue a Letter of Request to the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (the High Court) requesting it to act in aid of and be auxiliary to this Court in relation to certain identified matters concerning the two bankruptcies.  Mr Warner has made two affidavits in support of his application (10 August 2018 and 5 November 2018).

  2. In around July 1996, Mr and Mrs Barnes and their family emigrated to Australia.  They returned to England in around February 2007.  On 12 December 2008, sequestration orders were made against their respective estates on the application of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation.  On 22 October 2009, orders were made by the High Court recognising the bankruptcies in England and Wales as…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1784
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Warner (Trustee), in the matter of Barnes and Barnes involved an application by Mr Warner, a trustee in bankruptcy, to the Federal Court of Australia for a Letter of Request to be issued to the High Court of England and Wales. Mr Warner sought to set aside two pre-bankruptcy transactions related to two properties in England, which were transferred by Mr and Mrs Barnes to a company named Sanderstead Limited. The primary legal issue was whether the Federal Court had the jurisdiction to issue such a Letter of Request under section 29(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and if the High Court of England and Wales had the authority to act on the request. The court examined whether the High Court had jurisdiction in bankruptcy, whether it had the power to act on the request, and whether the Federal Court’s discretion to issue the Letter of Request was exercised appropriately.

The Federal Court found that the High Court of England and Wales had the requisite jurisdiction in bankruptcy, and the power to act on the request was supported by the Insolvency Act (UK). The discretionary power of the Federal Court under section 29(4) of the Bankruptcy Act was considered in terms of utility and comity, without a need to demonstrate that the High Court would honour the request. The court issued the Letter of Request as sought by Mr Warner, applying Australian insolvency law to the transactions in question. The costs of the application were ordered to be costs in the bankrupt estates of John Eric Barnes and Judith Angela Barnes.

The court's decision allowed the proceedings to continue despite Mr Barnes' passing, ensuring that the bankruptcy estate was protected against fraudulent transactions. The issuance of the Letter of Request facilitated the cooperation between the Australian and English courts, aiming to uphold the integrity of the bankruptcy process across jurisdictions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 29(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), a Letter of Request be issued to the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in the form of Annexure “A” to these orders.

2. The costs of the application be costs in the bankrupt estates of John Eric Barnes and Judith Angela Barnes.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Annexure “A”

Background

Background to the litigation

Since filing the present application, Mr Warner has received information that Mr Barnes passed away in September 2018. Because of the extension of Mr Barnes’ bankruptcy, the proceedings in bankruptcy continue, so far as they are capable of being continued, as if he were alive: s 63 of the Bankruptcy Act.Background Mr Warner wishes to commence proceedings in the High Court to set aside two pre-bankruptcy transactions that were entered into by Mr and Mrs Barnes in 1997 in relation to two properties: (a)Rock Head Farm, Glaisdale, Whitby, North Yorkshire, England, registered at H.M. Land Registry under title number NYK110320 (Rock Head Farm); and(b)Field House, 19 Ryeland Lane, Ellerby, Scarborough, North Yorkshire, England, registered at H.M. Land Registry under title number NYK140730 (Field House). Up until 14 November 1997, Mr and Mrs Barnes were the registered proprietors of the two properties. Mr Warner’s investigations have led him to conclude that Mr and Mrs Barnes purposefully took steps to divest themselves of the two properties while continuing to remain in full control of them. In summary, on 14 November 1997, Mr and Mrs Barnes transferred their interests in Rock Head Farm and Field House to Sanderstead Limited (Sanderstead). Sanderstead is a company incorporated at Tortola in the British Virgin Islands on about 23 May 1997. The whole of its issued capital is an asset of the Pantheon Trust. The Pantheon Trust was created by Mr and Mrs Barnes by means of a Declaration of Trust dated 1 May 1997. The trustee is Roker Trustees (Switzerland) Limited. The beneficiary of the trust is stated to be UNICEF. In his examination, Mr Barnes stated his belief that the beneficiaries of the trust were his and Mrs Barnes’ three sons. Whilst UNICEF is identified as the beneficiary under the trust, cl 11(a) of the Declaration of Trust provides that the trustee has the power, in its absolute discretion, to add one or more persons to the class of beneficiaries. Moreover, under cl 5(a), the trustee has the power to apply the whole or part of the capital or income of the trust for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries to the exclusion of other beneficiaries. The sale of Rock Head Farm to Sanderstead was for a stated consideration of £415,000. The sale of Field House was for a stated consideration of £85,000. The evidence suggests that Sanderstead was put in funds by the Pantheon Trust in order to make the purchases and that the Pantheon Trust received its funds from a members’ voluntary liquidation of a company called Rock Head Development Limited (Rock Head Development). Mr and Mrs Barnes were the members of Rock Head Development. The evidence suggests that all these arrangements—the incorporation of Sanderstead, the establishment of the Pantheon Trust, and the transfer of the two properties to Sanderstead—were put in place on the advice of Strachan Management Services Ltd (Strachan), a company providing company and trust administration services. At the time of these events, Strachan was located in Guernsey. One of its employees was Mr Egglishaw, who was also appointed as the Protector of the Pantheon Trust, an office created under the terms of the Declaration of Trust. Under cl 25 of the Declaration of Trust, certain powers of the trustee can only be exercised with the consent of the Protector. These include the power to apply income and capital under cl 5, and the power of addition under cl 11, to which I have referred. The Protector can also remove a trustee and appoint a new trustee, as well as appoint a new Protector. Mr Egglishaw has executed, but left undated, a letter resigning as Protector. He has also executed, but left undated, a letter appointing a new Protector. The name of the new Protector has been left blank.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 37A of the Conveyancing Act (NSW) provides: (1) Save as provided in this section, every alienation of property, made whether before or after the commencement of the Conveyancing (Amendment) Act 1930, with intent to defraud creditors, shall be voidable at the instance of any person thereby prejudiced. (2) This section does not affect the law of bankruptcy for the time being in force. (3) This section does not extend to any estate or interest in property alienated to a purchaser in good faith not having, at the time of the alienation, notice of the intent to defraud creditors.Consideration Section 29(4) of the Bankruptcy Act confers power on this Court to request a foreign court that has jurisdiction in bankruptcy to act in aid of and be auxiliary to it in any matter of bankruptcy. In Re Clunies-Ross; Ex parte Totterdell (1988) 82 ALR 475 (Clunies-Ross) at 483, French J identified three issues that arise for determination in such an application. First, the Court must have power to issue the letter of request. In this connection, the power conferred by s 29(4) is conditioned on the requirement that the foreign court, as receiving court, has jurisdiction in bankruptcy. That requirement is satisfied in the present case because s 96(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 (UK) confers that jurisdiction on the High Court. Secondly, the foreign court, as receiving court, must have power to act on the proposed letter of request. This requirement is satisfied in the present case because s 426(4) of the Insolvency Act (UK) provides that the courts having jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law in any part of the United Kingdom shall assist the courts having the corresponding jurisdiction in “any relevant country or territory”. As defined in s 426(11), “any relevant country or territory” includes any country or territory designated for the purposes of the section by the Secretary of State by order made by statutory instrument. Australia is such a country or territory: The Co-operation of Insolvency Courts (Designation of Relevant Countries and Territories) Order 1986. Further, the draft Letter of Request sought by Mr Warner includes a request that the High Court render assistance by applying Australian insolvency law, specifically s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act and/or s 37A of the Conveyancing Act (NSW). Section 426(5) of the Insolvency Act (UK) provides that a request made to a court in any part of the United Kingdom by a court in a relevant country or territory is authority for the court (here, the High Court) to apply, in relation to any matters specified in the request, the insolvency law which is applicable by either court in relation to comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction. Thus, in the present case, s 426(5) contemplates that the High Court can apply (if it chooses to do so) s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act and/or s 37A of the Conveyancing Act (NSW). Thirdly, the power under s 29(4) of the Bankruptcy Act is a discretionary power. In Clunies-Ross, French J said that the discretion will be exercised with regard to considerations of utility and comity. It is not entirely clear to me what his Honour meant by his reference to “comity”. On appeal (Clunies-Ross v Totterdell (1988) 20 FCR 358), the Full Court said that it is not necessary for an applicant under s 29(4) to demonstrate that it is probable that the foreign court, as receiving court, will honour the request. Indeed, the Full Court stressed that, when a request to a foreign court is involved, it would be quite inappropriate to examine that question in advance.