JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED -v- HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED [No 11] [2011] WASC 74
CORAM: MURRAY J
HEARD: ON THE PAPERS
DELIVERED : 22 MARCH 2011
FILE NO/S: CIV 1279 of 2001
BETWEEN: WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED (ACN 69 008 676 417)
Plaintiff
AND
HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED (ACN 69 008 676 417)
Defendant
Catchwords:
Final orders - Form of orders settled - Whether orders should be suspended in operation
Costs - Special costs order - Whether lump sum costs order should be made
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Final orders to give effect to the judgment in Wright Prospecting Pty Limited v Hancock Prospecting Pty Limited [No 9] [2010] WASC 44
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr R M Smith SC & Mr R J Brender
Defendant: Mr S J Rushton SC & Mr S K Dharmananda
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Lavan Legal
Defendant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Bell Group Ltd (In liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [10] [2009] WASC 107
Brookvista Pty Ltd v Meloni [2009] WASCA 180
Bunnings Forest Products Pty Ltd v Bullen (1994) 54 FCR 342
Cifuentes v Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 316(S)
Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson [2003] WASCA 307; (2003) 28 WAR 308
Harrison v Schipp [2002] NSWCA 213; (2002) 54 NSWLR 738
Heartlink Ltd v Jones [2007] WASC 254(S)
Idoport v NAB [2005] NSWSC 1273
Permanent Building Society v Wheeler [No 2] (1993) 10 WAR 569
Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 2059
State Bank of Victoria v Parry [1989] WAR 240
Streeter v Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 214
Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd [No 9] [2010] WASC 44
MURRAY J:
Introduction
This judgment is supplementary to and should be read with the reasons for decision, Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd [No 9] [2010] WASC 44. After a long trial, followed by a lengthy period of debate between the parties by way of closing submissions, which the parties brought to an end in July 2008, I published my reasons for decision on 5 March 2010. I gave judgment for the plaintiff upon its contractual claim and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim.
I closed the judgment by saying:
I propose to publish my reasons without the need for attendance by the parties in open court. I give judgment for the plaintiff on its contractual claim. I will make an order in the nature of specific performance, and such ancillary declarations and orders as are necessary and as are discussed in the section of these reasons concerned with the making of a decree of specific performance. The defendant's counterclaim is dismissed.
I invite the parties to prepare and file an agreed minute of substantive orders to give effect to these reasons. That minute should deal with…
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- Case
- [2011] WASC 74
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether special circumstances existed that would warrant the suspension of the orders. This involved a consideration of whether the appeal had reasonable prospects of success, and whether the enforcement of the orders would compromise the appeal process or create practical difficulties that could not be alleviated by the terms of a suspension order.
The court found that there were no special circumstances that would justify the suspension of the orders. The respondent had not demonstrated that the appeal had reasonable prospects of success, nor had it shown that the enforcement of the orders would compromise the appeal process or create insurmountable practical difficulties. The court emphasised that the burden was on the respondent to establish such special circumstances, and in this case, it had not done so. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for a suspension order.
The final orders of the court were that the form of orders settled between the parties be implemented without any suspension, and that special costs be awarded against the respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is unnecessary for present purposes to be concerned with the question whether any part of the former jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction now needs to be relied upon by way of expansion of the express power contained in s 15 of the Act. But I note that it has been held that the principles which govern the exercise of the discretion under s 15 are not materially different from those which applied to an application for a stay of execution before the introduction of the Act: Streeter v Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 214 per Buss JA, Owen JA agreeing, at [17] ‑ [18]. In Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson [2003] WASCA 307; (2003) 28 WAR 308, the Full Court, Murray and Parker JJ, summarised the criteria for the exercise of the discretion to grant a stay at 311 [9]:In the light of the authorities, we may attempt to distil what we take to be the generally applicable relevant principles –•The successful litigant at first instance will ordinarily be entitled to enforce the judgment pending the determination of any appeal.•It is for the applicant for a stay to move the court to a favourable exercise of its discretion.•It will not do so unless special circumstances are shown justifying the departure from the ordinary rule.•The central issue will be whether the grant of a stay is perceived to be necessary to preserve the subject matter or the integrity of the litigation, or where refusal of a stay could create practical difficulties in respect of the relief which may be granted on appeal. It is often put shortly that it will first and foremost be necessary to establish that without the grant of a stay, the right of appeal, whether upon the grant of leave or special leave or not, will be rendered nugatory. •If that can be demonstrated, the stay will generally still be refused unless it can be established that the appeal process, whether upon the grant of leave or special leave or not, has ultimately reasonable prospects of success so as to result in the grant of relief to the appellant.•If that hurdle can be overcome, the stay may still be refused where it appears that the balance of convenience does not lie in favour of the applicant; where, for example, the grant of a stay will occasion hardship to the respondent which may not be alleviated by the terms upon which the stay may be granted. In this case, as in Whisson, the court is moved by the defendant for a suspension order to be made, pending the final determination of the appeal which the defendant firmly proposes to institute upon the making of final orders. Under s 15, special circumstances for the making of such an order must be shown, and the consideration whether such circumstances exist involves a discretionary judgment concerned to identify whether, absent such an order, the integrity of the process of the appeal may be compromised by reason of practical difficulties which may arise if the appeal should be successful, and in the meantime the orders of the primary judge are allowed to take effect.