WORRALL and BARTLEY

[2023] FCWA 2

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ACT: FAMILY COURT ACT 1997

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: WORRALL and BARTLEY [2023] FCWA 2

CORAM: O'BRIEN J

HEARD: 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 MARCH, 18 NOVEMBER 2022 - FINAL SUBMISSIONS 23 DECEMBER 2022

DELIVERED : 13 JANUARY 2023

FILE NO/S: 4789 of 2010

BETWEEN: MR WORRALL

Applicant

AND

MS BARTLEY

Respondent

Catchwords:

PARENTING - Where the only child of the relationship was born [in] 2009 and the parties have been involved in litigation about parenting issues since September 2010 – Where the child has lived with the father since February 2016 and has spent no time with the mother since April 2019 – Where the mother declined to engage with ordered supervisor and the Single Expert Witness – Where the mother retains beliefs that the father poses a risk of harm to the child notwithstanding previous findings to the contrary and her professed acceptance of those findings – Where during the currency of the proceedings, the mother has engaged in surreptitious and manipulative communication with the child which is harmful to her – Where the risk to the child arising from the mother's maintained beliefs and ongoing behaviours is unacceptable – Where there are no steps which could be taken to ameliorate or mitigate that risk while permitting the mother to spend time and communicate with the child – Consideration of the need to explain the Court's decision to the child in an age-appropriate manner and in a therapeutic context, and the means by which that might be achieved – Turns on its own facts.

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906 (WA)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Family Court Act 1997 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)

Category: Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Mr S Penglis SC & Mr F Robertson
Respondent	:	Mrs T Farmer & Mr R Worth / Self-Represented Litigant
Independent Children's Lawyer	:	Mr A Spashett

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	O'Sullivan Davies Lawyers
Respondent	:	ASB Law / Self-Represented Litigant
Independent Children's Lawyer	:	Legal Aid WA

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

AK v V [2021] WASCA 31
AK v V [No 2] [2021] WASCA 74
Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637
Beryl and Beryl [2020] FCWA 116
Bielen & Kozma [2022] FedCFamC1A 221
Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte and Anor (2016) 259 CLR 662
CDW & LVE (2015) FLC 93-683
Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564
Craig and Ors v Silverbrook and Ors [2013] NSWSC 1687
Dorajay Pty Limited v Aristocrat Leisure Limited [2005] FCA 588
Durban Roodeport Deep Ltd v Reilly & Ors [2004] WASC 269
Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
H and K [2001] FamCA 687
Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock [2013] WASC 290
Hatton v Attorney-General of Commonwealth of Australia & Ors (2000) FLC 93-038
Helbig & Rowe and Ors [2016] FamCAFC 117
Holborow & Ors v Macdonald Rudder [2002] WASC 265
Kallinicos and Anor v Hun and Orst (2005) 64 NSWLR 561
Keane v Keane and Anor (2021) 62 FamLR 190
Kemsley and Kemsley (1984) FLC 91-567
L v P [2022] WASCA 40
MacDonald Estate v Martin (1990) 77 DLR (4th) 249
Mancini v Mancini [1999] NSWSC 800
Mandic v Phillis (2005) 225 ALR 760
McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405
Moose & Moose (2008) FLC 93-375
Nash & Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) (2019) 137 ACSR 189
National Employers’ Mutual General Association Ltd v Waind and Hill [1978] 1 NSWLR 372
Newman v Phillips Fox (1999) 21 WAR 309
Osferatu & Osferatu (2015) FLC 93-666
Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 1 All ER 517
R and R Children's wishes (2000) FLC 93-000
Re LC (children) [2014] 1 All ER 1181
Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725
Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434
Ryan v Zekas [2020] WASC 124
Santos Ltd & Ors v Pipelines Authority of SA (1996) 66 SASR 38
Slater v Light (2013) 48 FamLR 573
Stott & Holgar and Anor [2017] FamCAFC 152
Unioil International Pty Ltd and Ors v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and Anor (1997) 17 WAR 98
Worrall and Bartley [2019] FCWA 10
Yunghanns v Elfic Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 3 July 1998)
Zalfen & Anor v Gates & Anor [2006] WASC 296
Zani v Lawfirst Pty Ltd trading as Bennett + Co [2014] WASC 75

WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT – PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym [Worrall and Bartley] has been approved by the Family Court of Western Australia pursuant to s 243(8)(g) of the Family Court Act 1997 (WA).

This copy of the Court’s Reason for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 312(b) Family Court Rules 2021 (WA)), or to record a variation to the orders pursuant to r 311 Family Court Rules 2021 (WA).

A copy of the precis that was drafted and provided to Child A pursuant to paragraph 9 of the orders pronounced in this judgment can be found at Annexure “A”.

Introduction

1[Child A] ("Child A") was born [in] 2009. The proceedings between her parents [Mr Worrall] ("the father") and [Ms Bartley] ("the mother") first came before the Court on 1 September 2010, when Crisford J observed that the case "had all the hallmarks of long-term court involvement which needed to be avoided". By 19 July 2016, Crisford J reluctantly said that it was "highly unlikely the parties will ever be able to successfully regulate their relationship with [Child A] without some continuing court involvement" and that the tentative prediction she had made in 2010 had come to pass.

2As will be seen, her Honour's predictions have proven regrettably accurate, to the detriment of both the parties and Child A.

Background

3While the long history of the disputes between the parties is of course familiar to them, it is necessary to set it out in some detail to give context to the determinations presently required. Statements of fact in what follows represent findings adopted from earlier judgments, or my findings, unless indicated to the contrary.

The parties, initial proceedings and the first trial

4The father was born in March 1969 and the mother in December 1969. They met in or around March 2008. While they each describe the relationship in different terms, it is common ground that it ended no later than April 2010.

5The father commenced proceedings on 27 August 2010. Orders were made in September 2010, whereby Child A started to spend time with him. [In] December 2010, interim orders were made for equal shared parental responsibility and for Child A to spend increased time with the father. Final orders were made by consent for Child A to live with the mother.

6In November 2011, orders were made for Child A to spend time with the father each week for two periods of six hours, and a further period of three and a half hours.

7In 2012, the father commenced a relationship with [Ms D]. They began living together in May 2014. They have two children together [Child B], born [in] 2014, and [Child C], born [in] 2016.

8On 12 March 2012, orders were made for Child A to spend overnight time with the father; the mother failed to comply with those orders for several months. [Dr E] was appointed as the Single Expert Witness ("SEW") and provided his first report on 16 May 2012. The matter proceeded towards trial and the SEW provided an updated report on 12 January 2013.

9The first trial between the parties was listed to commence on 14 January 2013. After negotiations over five days, orders were made by consent on 18 January 2013 and the outstanding applications and responses were otherwise dismissed.

10Those consent orders provided for equal shared parental responsibility and for Child A to live with the mother. They provided for a progression in Child A's time with the father. Initially, she was to spend time with him from 10.00 am Tuesday until 10.00 am Wednesday each week, from the start of school or 9.00 am until 6.00 pm each Friday, and from 9.00 am to 12.30 pm each Saturday. After incremental increases, from 1 February 2016 onwards Child A was to spend time with the father in a two-weekly cycle, from after school Thursday to 8.00 am Monday in one week, and overnight on Thursday in the other week i.e. five nights per fortnight. Orders were made as to communication between the parties, school holidays and special occasions, Child A's education, extracurricular activities, medical issues, and other specific issues.

Subsequent events and the second trial

11In July 2013, the mother raised allegations that Child A had been harmed by the father. The allegations were denied. The mother took Child A to multiple health professionals and took extensive photographs, videos and voice recordings of her. On 16 April 2014, she unilaterally suspended Child A's time with the father, having attended a police station with photographs of her. She alleged both physical and sexual harm to Child A in the care of the father. The police referred the mother's allegations to the Department of Child Protection and Family Services[1] ("the Department"), which investigated. During that investigation the mother provided the Department with her photographs, footage of handovers and other encounters, and letters of support she had gathered from various medical professionals. In its assessment, the Department noted that the mother was "unwavering in her belief that [Child A] has been abused by the father and this appears to be driving much of her contact with various professionals, in the process of which [Child A] is being regularly examined and observed and ‘pressured' to disclose." Child A did not make any disclosures to the Department when interviewed.

[1] As the Department of Communities was then known.

12The father filed an application for a recovery order and Child A's time with him resumed. He commenced substantive proceedings on 1 May 2014. On 8 May 2014, the mother filed a Form 4 Notice of Child Abuse or Family Violence.

13On or about 4 July 2014, the Department advised of its finding that there were reasonable grounds to substantiate the likelihood that because of the mother's actions Child A had experienced psychological and emotional harm. The allegations of physical and sexual harm were not substantiated.

14On 11 September 2014, the mother attended a Signs of Safety meeting with officers of the Department. The Department expressed concern that on two separate occasions she had unnecessarily taken Child A to the Children's Hospital to report bruising. Department officers were worried that "seeing doctors unnecessarily and taking multiple photos of [Child A] might make [Child A] feel that something is wrong with her or feel stressed or anxious", and that [Child A] might also start to believe that she is being physically harmed even if she is not". The Department advised the mother to stop presenting Child A to multiple medical practitioners and to stop taking photographs and videos of her in an attempt to record alleged evidence of harm.

15The parties entered into a Safety Plan with the Department to provide a transparent mechanism for dealing with any injury to Child A. Orders were made by consent on 18 September 2014 for Child A to attend with [Dr B] for reportable therapeutic counselling.

16A trial ("the second trial") commenced before Crisford J and ran initially for nine days in [late] 2014. During that part of the trial, her Honour "became aware of the real possibility that [Child A's] best interests may be served by her living predominantly in the father's household". Up to that point, the father's position had always been that Child A should live primarily with the mother. Her Honour adjourned the trial for a period of 12 months for two reasons; to give the mother the opportunity to make good on her professed acceptance of a need to change her behaviour, and to allow Child A to spend increased time with the father to develop a closer relationship, having noted a lack of emotional closeness between them at that stage.

17The interim orders made on the adjournment provided for equal shared parental responsibility, for Child A to live with the mother, and for a progression in her time with the father. Initially, Child A was to spend five nights per fortnight with him, with a progression to six nights per fortnight after six months, and a further extension to seven nights per fortnight in six months thereafter. During each phase of the progression, Child A’s time with the father was to be spent in two separate blocks each fortnight, rather than consecutively. Detailed orders were made regarding Child A's education and other specific issues. The mother was restrained by injunction from taking Child A to any health professional other than Dr B without the father's written consent, from questioning Child A in relation to the use of physical discipline by the father, and from removing Child A from school without the father's consent other than in the case of a medical emergency. The father was assigned sole parental responsibility for the management and treatment of all of Child A's medical needs unless in the case of a serious emergency. Both parties were ordered to attend separately for therapy in relation to attachment issues; as a result the mother began seeing a psychiatrist [Dr F] in December 2014.

18As will be seen, the mother's beliefs and behaviours did not change in any meaningful way.

Events during the period in which the second trial was adjourned part heard

19In early 2015, Child A was observed by a school psychologist to be engaging in unusual movements, which the parties describe as "flapping". Child A was referred to [Dr H] for a comprehensive developmental and educational assessment. Prior to Child A's first appointment with Dr H on 22 July 2015, the mother sent an extensive email to the clinic saying that Child A had disclosed that current marks on her arms and legs were caused by the father biting her. The email described other earlier disclosures and indicated that the mother had taken photographs.

20On the day of Child A's first appointment with Dr H, the mother contacted the police expressing extreme concern about disclosures she alleged Child A had made, including of the father punching her in the throat and kicking her in the head. She took Child A to the police station late that afternoon, where Child A met with a member of the Sexual Assault Team. On 31 July 2015, Dr B noted a regression in Child A's behaviour.

21On 27 October 2015, the Child Protection Unit at the Children's Hospital advised that it had received a notification from a general practitioner after the mother attended at her surgery and showed her "over six kilos of photographs noting bruising and injuries on [Child A]."

The resumption of the second trial

22The trial before Crisford J resumed on 21 December 2015 and ran for a further 12 days into January 2016. After those 12 days, the mother subsequently sought to reopen her case and there were a further two days of hearing on 11 and 25 February 2016.

23On 25 February 2016, Crisford J discharged all previous orders and made final orders for the father to have sole parental responsibility and for Child A to live with him.

24Her Honour then made a number of interim orders. In summary, those orders provided:

(a)for Child A to spend time with the mother on alternate weekends from Friday afternoon until Sunday afternoon, and in intervening weeks from Wednesday afternoon until Friday afternoon, with those arrangements to continue with only slight variations during school holidays;

(b)for various specific arrangements on special occasions such as Father's Day, Mother's Day, birthdays, Christmas and the like;

(c)for the mother's time with Child A to be suspended, pending any relisting, if she did not comply with the times set out above or breached any of the injunctions made the same day and detailed below ("the 2016 injunctions");

(d)for handovers which did not take place at school to be facilitated by [Ms I] unless otherwise agreed, with the father to meet the relevant costs;

(e)for the mother to continue her attendance on Dr F, and provide a written report from him to the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL") and solicitor for the father in 12 months' time, for the purpose of providing feedback about her progress in addressing her anxiety and beliefs about the father;

(f)for Child A to continue her therapy with Dr B for a period of three months, after which the father was to be at liberty to engage a different therapist of his nomination, subject to the approval of the ICL;

(g)for a process whereby if the mother had information she wanted to provide to Child A's therapist, she was to do so in writing via the father and the ICL, and subject to their consideration;

(h)for the father to continue to attend for therapeutic counselling with Mr C, as directed by Mr C;

(i)for the father to arrange for Child A to be assessed by a developmental paediatrician and/or child psychiatrist, with the mother being restrained by injunction from providing that practitioner with any material;

(j)for each party to appropriately notify the other if Child A became ill in their care;

(k)for the parties to communicate by email except in case of emergency;

(l)for the father to consult with the mother in relation to his exercise of sole parental responsibility in relation to major long-term issues, by giving her notice of any decision he intended to make including his reasons, and considering any response she might provide;

(m)for the father to consult the mother in relation to the issue of a change in Child A's school, with the father to make the decision if no agreement was reached;

(n)for the parties to be at liberty to attend school functions involving Child A;

(o)for the father to retain Child A's passport;

(p)for various arrangements permitting the father only to travel with Child A; and

(q)for the SEW to undertake a review of the parties and Child A after 12 months and provide recommendations to the Court as to whether it would be in Child A's best interests to further progress the time she was to spend with the mother.

25The proceedings were otherwise adjourned generally with liberty to the parties to relist on an urgent basis in relation to implementation or compliance issues.

26In addition to the orders just set out, interim orders were made restraining both parties from physically disciplining Child A and from denigrating the other party or any member of the other party's family within Child A's hearing or permitting any third-party to do so.

27The 2016 injunctions were made, restraining the mother from:

(a)taking Child A to any medical practitioner, hospital, therapist or other health professional, save and except for Child A’s treating therapist, without first consulting the father and obtaining his consent;

(b)consulting any medical practitioner about issues relating to Child A without the prior written consent of the father;

(c)initiating discussion or carrying on a discussion with Child A about:

(i)the father's feelings for Child A;

(ii)Child A's feelings for the father;

(iii)the cause of any cuts, scrapes, bruises, alleged bites or other marks on Child A's body, other than any occurring during Child A's time with her; or

(iv)the father's treatment of Child A;

(d)initiating discussion or carrying on a discussion with Child A about Child A's living arrangements and the amount of time she spends with each of the parties;

(e)photographing or causing to be photographed any bruises, cuts, scratches or marks on Child A;

(f)making or causing anyone to make any audio and/or video recordings of Child A for the purposes of documenting her concerns about Child A's safety in the father's care;

(g)providing or showing to Child A or anyone else other than the father, the ICL, the Department, the mother's lawyer or the Court any such photograph, audio and/or video recording or transcript thereof, which was made for the purposes of documenting her concerns about Child A's safety in the father's care;

(h)attending at Child A's school for whatever reason, other than with the prior written consent of the father or as otherwise allowed for in the orders;

(i)removing Child A from school for whatever reason other than with the prior written consent of the father or as otherwise allowed for in the orders;

(j)enrolling Child A in any future extracurricular activities which were not part of her then current routine without first obtaining the prior written consent of the ICL; and

(k)initiating contact with Child A's therapist, attending at her office or providing information directly to her.

28Her Honour made findings summarised to the extent required throughout these reasons, including the following:

"The mother's unshakeable views about the father and her actions stemming from these are likely to pose an unacceptable risk of psychological and emotional harm to the child. It is for this reason that I have made the orders minimising the time the mother spends with the child. If the mother's behaviour continues and impacts on the child further as she develops and grows, it is likely there will be further changes to the mother's involvement in the child's life. However, the cessation of a relationship with a parent is an option of last resort for a court…"

29Dr B had expressed the strong view that the mother could be amenable to therapy and felt there was time for her to change. Nevertheless, in December 2015, notwithstanding that the mother had undertaken approximately 40 sessions with Dr F, Crisford J found that "there was no real change in her view about the father hurting [Child A]", and said:

"At this time I do not find the mother is capable of any change. She had an opportunity to modify her behaviour, but this is currently beyond her. As a result I find that if there is no change in the primary care arrangements for [Child A, she] will lose the benefits of having a meaningful relationship with her father and all that entails, including a loss of contact with her siblings."

30By way of example only, on the evidence of Dr F, the mother felt helpless about how she could proceed and protect Child A and thought that no one understood her. She continued to hold strong beliefs both that the father was punitive towards Child A and that he had kicked Child A in the face with his shoes on and punched her in the throat.

31The mother had said that she would accept the Court's decision and tailor her behaviour accordingly but was found to be "willing to say anything to persuade the Court that she [would] modify her actions". By the end of the second trial, she conceded that she would not be able to change her long held and strong views.

32As already noted, orders were made on 25 February 2016. On 2 March 2016, the father was notified by Child A's school that a parent of one of Child A's classmates had reported receiving in her letterbox "a wad" of court documents, photographs of Child A and a note which said "I want you to know I don't have custody of [Child A] anymore. Here are Court Orders, here are photos, when you see [Child A] give her a hug." The mother did not admit responsibility for that, but further injunctions were made without admission on 7 June 2016.

Subsequent events and the third trial

33Crisford J retired in 2016 and the matter was assigned to me.

34The SEW conducted the review ordered by Crisford J. He provided a report dated 11 March 2017. He noted that Child A appeared to be "doing better since the move" to the father's care, that her attachment to the father was "more stable" and "life is more predictable", to her benefit. He set out some difficulties, which had been reported shortly after Crisford J made her orders, arising from the mother's behaviour, but had gained the overall impression that the mother's "problematic behaviour has been contained and relatively minor and there is no evidence of the major areas of concern having re-occurred in the more recent times."

35The SEW recommended a continuation of the then existing structure of Child A's time with the mother, albeit with some possible extension during school holidays. He kept open the possibility that supervision of the mother's time might be required in the future. He did not see evidence suggesting there was a need to increase Child A's time with the mother, summarising his view by saying:

"To bring together my opinion in this section, to use a colloquial expression – if it isn't broken why try to fix it – therefore as far as I can see in the complex layers of psychological emotional and practical factors of this case, [Child A] appears to be doing better and not worse, therefore do not risk the situation by making an unnecessary change."

36The proceedings progressed to a third trial on 31 October 2018. The father proposed certain amendments to the interim orders made by Crisford J, effectively in accordance with the recommendations of the SEW. He otherwise proposed that those orders be made final and the proceedings be ended. The mother proposed that Child A's alternate weekend time with her be extended to the conclusion of school or 4.00 pm on Monday, before being further extended from the commencement of term one in 2019 to commence at 12.00 pm, or the conclusion of school, on Thursday. She sought extensions of Child A's time with her during school holidays progressing to six nights per fortnight, and that the arrangements for Child A's time with her be further reviewed in January 2020, with Child A's views "about the ongoing care arrangement being ascertained by way of a Family Report" to be prepared either by a family consultant or by the SEW.

37The Court had the benefit of evidence from the mother, the mother's therapist [Ms A], Child A’s therapist [Ms G], and a report from a consultant psychiatrist [Dr S].

38On 10 April 2017, Ms G had emailed the SEW raising several concerns, including that [Child A] reported that the mother had taken a photograph of a bruise which she had as a result of being bitten by Child B. When Ms G asked Child A why the mother would take that photograph Child A replied, "Mum has to take photos of my bruises to show the Court, because Dad sometimes hits me." When Ms G asked Child A when the father last hit her, she said "I don't want to talk about it. When I was a baby". Child A also volunteered that "Dad doesn't hate Mum, but Mum hates Dad."

39In a report dated 9 May 2018, Ms G said that Child A had been "settled emotionally in recent times", presenting as very happy and chatty, happy with her teacher at school, and settled in her friendship group. She had observed Child A to increase in confidence over the last two years and to have developed a very warm and affectionate relationship with the father. That said, she was concerned that Child A's presentation had sometimes varied. She gave an example of a session on 16 April 2018 when Child A's opening comment at the commencement of the session was that she wanted to live with the mother and see the father "sometimes". Child A had spent the previous night at the mother's home. She also noted that in recent times Child A had spoken a lot about the father hitting her, being mean, and similar. She was concerned that Child A was being exposed to inappropriate discussions.

40Ms G gave evidence that Child A was acutely aware of the court proceedings, saying that the "Family Court got it wrong" and that the mother had said that she had seen the father hitting Child A when she was "really little", asking Ms G to "just tell the court". On Ms G’s evidence, Child A had "said things increasingly about court since about June" 2018, with the most recent comments before trial occurring during a session on 15 October 2018.

41A hearing had taken place on 26 June 2018 to determine various matters as to the evidence to be adduced at the third trial. On 20 July 2018, the parties were advised that the third trial was listed to commence on 31 October 2018.

42Ms G had otherwise observed Child A engaging happily with, being relaxed with, and showing affection to the father in circumstances where she was not necessarily conscious of being observed.

43At the conclusion of evidence and submissions for the third trial, I reserved my decision. The parties were advised on 15 January 2019 that judgment would be delivered on 22 January 2019. On 16 January 2019, the mother made an entry in the electronic communications book used by the parties, at a time when Child A was not in her care, saying that Child A was "very upset" that she had not had extra time with her over the holidays, had been having recurring bad dreams, and quite often cried "for long periods on the morning she is due to leave [her]". She also made the following notation:

"Recently, [Child A] said things like she had a bad dream and mum was shot in the head but that she wanted to be the one shot in the head because she loves mum so much. Also, she has said things like, ‘I wish I wasn't alive', ‘I hate myself' and ‘I just want to kill myself'. These comments are concerning. I would like for [Child A] to be seen by her psychiatrist, [Dr S]."

44I published reasons on 22 January 2019[2] and made orders the same day. Apart from the matters already referred to, I found that the evidence did not demonstrate any meaningful positive change in the views or behaviours of the mother since the interim orders were made.

[2] Worrall and Bartley [2019] FCWA 10.

45I accepted the evidence of Ms A to the effect that her therapeutic engagement with the mother had proceeded on the basis that the mother's beliefs about the father were "long-held and, realistically, were unlikely to change radically". Ms A had therefore refrained from seeking to directly challenge the mother's beliefs, rather proceeding on the basis that the mother might accept that there was no purpose in continuing to express or promote them, and that it was "possible to choose not to allow the beliefs and the anxiety they generate to be the sole determinants of behaviour".

46I found that the mother had made some limited progress, but that it was in the nature of managing, to a limited degree, her own reactions to ongoing beliefs about the father, rather than any epiphany in relation to those beliefs or fundamental change in her own insight.

47I found that yet again Child A was acutely aware of the court proceedings and that the manifestation of that awareness had increased as the scheduled trial approached.

48I concluded that the risk to Child A of psychological and emotional harm arising from the mother's beliefs remained unacceptable. I concluded that there should be no increase in the mother's time with Child A, that the relevant orders of Crisford J (including the 2016 injunctions) should be made final, and that to the extent possible the proceedings should be brought to an end. I made orders accordingly ("the January 2019 orders").

Events after the January 2019 orders

49Child A spent her scheduled time with the mother from 23 to 25 January 2019.

50On 30 January 2019, the mother commenced proceedings against her former lawyers in the District Court, asserting among other things that were it not for the failure of those lawyers to adduce evidence to contradict the views expressed by the Department and by the SEW in the earlier proceedings, the orders of Crisford J for a change of residence would likely not have been made.

51In sessions with Ms G on 31 January 2019 on 5 February 2019, Child A began to discuss how much she was missing the mother, began to make negative comments in relation to the father, and began to express resentment that "no one listens to her".

52On 12 February 2019, the mother commenced an appeal against the final orders made on 22 January 2019 and sought to appeal out of time interim orders made on 26 June 2018 and 21 September 2018.[3]

[3] CACV 23 of 2019; AK v V [2021] WASCA 31.

53On Thursday 14 February 2019, Child A ran away from the father's home. In the opinion of the SEW, which I accept, Child A's actions were suggestive of some adult influence rather than being totally independent. Child A contacted the mother by telephone and was collected by her from [a local supermarket] in [Suburb A]. The mother did not contact the father, nor respond to his calls or to messages he sent her; instead, she contacted police and took Child A to the [Suburb B] police station. She returned Child A to the father on Sunday 17 February 2019.

54On being returned to the father's care Child A said words to the effect of "why can't I choose where I live?" and "Mum says I can live where I want, and I must show the court what I want".

55Over the following weeks, Child A was stressed and upset. The father and Ms D found various notes in Child A's room and schoolbag which included several phone numbers in adult handwriting. Ms G noted worrying signs in her sessions with Child A. As early as 15 February 2019 she advised the father to immediately suspend Child A's time with the mother. The father was reluctant to do so.

56On 12 March 2019, the paternal grandfather accompanied Child A to an evening school excursion at [a Western-Australian university] for which the mother had signed the necessary permission slip without the father's knowledge. At the conclusion of the event Child A sought to refuse to go home and the paternal grandfather engaged the help of a university staff member. When the father spoke to Child A on the phone she said, "this is my way of showing that I want to live with mum".

57On or around 14 March 2019, Ms D found a note in Child A's handwriting, addressed to the mother, expressing her love for her and saying "We can do it. I CAN DO IT!!!". When the father spoke with Child A her response was along the lines of "Mum has told me I must choose between you and her".

58On 21 March 2019, Child A's school contacted the father to advise that Child A had gone to the school office and asked to use the telephone to call the Kid's Helpline. At about the same time, Child A made comments to the father which led him to conclude that either the mother or her friend [Ms J] (whose daughter [Child D] is Child A's friend) had taken Child A to see an adult who was associated with Child D's school in a counselling or similar role. The father emailed the mother on 23 March 2019 raising those issues and asking for information. He sought an urgent response. The mother did not reply.

59On 28 March 2019, the father was informed by the school that Child A had again sought to use the school phone to call the Kid's Helpline. On the same day, Ms G provided written confirmation of her earlier advice that she had observed a "very noticeable and concerning deterioration in [Child A]'s emotional state" since the final orders were made. She described Child A as appearing very angry and non-repentant in a session on 8 March 2019, complaining that her "phone numbers to call Mum when I run away have been stolen" and seeking to insist that Ms G convey her views to the Court. Child A was even more agitated at her session on 19 March 2019, saying that she would "rather stab herself" than live with the father, and that if "they don't let me choose, I'll have to take action", which she confirmed to be running away again.

60Ms G recommended that the matter be listed before the Court again as a matter of urgency and that in the meantime "it would be prudent to minimise [Child A]'s emotional distress by making all contact with her mother supervised until such point that the Court can reengage with this family and determine how to proceed".

61The father's solicitors wrote to the mother the following day advising that pursuant to relevant provisions of the January 2019 orders, the mother's time with Child A was suspended. The letter conveyed the father's request that the mother not attend at Child A's school, home, or the father's office. The letter also conveyed the father's offer to facilitate and pay for Child A to spend up to four hours with the mother each alternate weekend under the supervision of Ms I until the matter could return to Court.

62The same day, the police visited the father's home having been requested to undertake a welfare check on Child A.

63Child A had a further session with Ms G on 3 April 2019, during school hours. At the end of the session, Ms G recommended that Child A not return to school that day. The father later attended at the school to pick up Child A's schoolbag. When the bag was checked by Ms D, she found a note in an unmarked envelope which had not been in Child A's bag at the start of the day. The note comprised a love heart emoji, four "running girl" emojis, and the word "NOW".

64There were further communications from the father to the mother in which he sought to arrange for Child A to spend time with her under the supervision of Ms I. The mother did not respond.

65On 12 April 2019, Child A would have been scheduled to go into the mother's care from the end of the school day were it not for the steps taken by the father to suspend time. The mother attended at the school early, just before 12.00 pm, to collect Child A. A teacher tried unsuccessfully to prevent her from removing Child A from the school grounds. The father was contacted and subsequently received a telephone call from the police to say that the mother had brought Child A to the Suburb B police station. He attended to collect Child A. On the evidence of [a Police Sergeant], which I accept, on the father's arrival at the police station the mother was taken out via the back door, the father spoke gently and appropriately to Child A, and Child A quickly calmed down and happily left with him.

66On 24 April 2019 the father's lawyers wrote to the mother's then lawyers confirming his proposal that Child A spend time with the mother supervised by Ms I and enquiring as to whether the mother sought to relist the proceedings. On 10 May 2019, the mother filed an application seeking the resumption of Child A's time with her in accordance with the January 2019 orders and additional orders whereby Child A would spend extra time with her in the upcoming July school holidays. In the meantime, correspondence between the lawyers continued, with the mother declining the father's proposal for time supervised by Ms I and putting alternative proposals which the father declined.

67The matter proceeded to a hearing on 24 June 2019 and was argued. An affidavit of Ms G filed 14 June 2019 was in evidence. Ms G reported that Child A had been "much more settled since she stopped seeing her mother", albeit she routinely commenced their sessions by saying that she "needs" to live with the mother and "hates" the father. She expressed the opinion that it was in Child A's best interests to see the mother supervised by "someone experienced in the family's dynamic, such as [Ms I]". She expressed concern at the prospect of supervision being "performed by an agency with multiple supervisors, who would not be aware of the family dynamic and may not pick up on subtle nuances of communication or non-verbal communication with [Child A]".

The suspension of time and subsequent events

68I delivered judgment and pronounced orders on 20 August 2019. Those orders suspended all existing orders for the mother to spend time with Child A and made provision for Child A to spend time with her on one occasion per week, for a period of no more than two hours, under the personal supervision of Ms I. The orders required the father to obtain an updated report from Ms G by 11 October 2019 and provide a copy to the mother, following which the parties were to confer as to what therapeutic options if any should be pursued for Child A. The proceedings were adjourned to 5 November 2019 for monitoring and further interim argument if required. The parties were given liberty to file further affidavits by 30 October 2019.

69The judgment expressly recorded that the purpose of ordering an updated report from Ms G was to monitor Child A's progress, and that I had reached "no conclusion, tentative or otherwise, as to whether upon receipt of such a report supervision might need to continue, the operation of the primary orders might simply resume, or other steps might need to be taken". It was against that background that the further hearing on 5 November 2019 was scheduled.

70Acting on advice from Ms G, and in consultation with Ms I, the father proposed that the first few supervised visits take place at Ms I's home. The mother would not agree and the visits did not proceed.

71The father obtained an updated report from Ms G as ordered. She reported a "very noticeable improvement in [Child A's] mood and behaviour", and that Child A had returned to be "the bright and engaging young girl that she was previously". Child A reported that school was going well and that the father and Ms D were "great". Child A was noted to engage warmly and affectionately with the father, and all negative talk about the father and his family had ceased. She stopped mentioning the Court and no longer spoke of running away. While she remained sad that she had not seen the mother, she had not cried during a session for months.

72Ms G reported that during their session on 25 September 2019 she had raised with Child A the topic of her mother. Child A said that she would really like to see the mother again, even if it had to be supervised, saying that she would "take anything". Ms G repeated her recommendation that supervised time commence as soon as practicable, and her earlier recommendation that the visits be as "closely supervised as possible, preferably by [Ms I]" stressing the importance of that so as to "minimise the possibility of a reoccurrence of the extreme distress and dangerous decisions" that occurred in early 2019.

73At the scheduled hearing on 5 November 2019, the mother sought an adjournment, having sought to commence an appeal against the orders of 20 August 2019.[4] Her counsel sought to raise the question of the location at which Child A should spend time with the mother supervised by Ms I in the interim. That matter could not properly be argued as the mother's affidavit material had been filed unacceptably late. I explained to her counsel (who had not previously appeared on the matter) some of the background and suggested that the mother should take up the opportunity of spending time with Child A on the basis offered in the short term, until the matter could be properly determined. The matter was adjourned to 28 January 2020.

[4] CACV 109 of 2019; AK v V [2021] WASCA 31.

74The mother did not take up the suggestion made at the hearing on 5 November 2019. She was represented by different counsel at the hearing on 28 January 2020. Counsel indicated that, apart from dispensing with any requirement for Family Dispute Resolution, no orders were sought as the mother intended to file a fresh application within 21 days. The proceedings were adjourned generally on that basis.

75The mother did not file the foreshadowed application. Instead, on 16 March 2020 she sought to commence an appeal out of time against certain of the orders made on 5 November 2019.[5]

[5] CACV 146 of 2019; AK v V [2021] WASCA 31.

76No further steps were taken in this Court until new lawyers instructed by the mother filed an application in a case on 19 November 2020 seeking to vary the orders made on 20 August 2019, such that Child A would spend time with her each Saturday from 10.00 am to 4.00 pm supervised either by the maternal grandparents or a friend of the mother, and various other orders. The application was listed to 12 January 2021 before me.

77The mother filed a further application in a case on 11 December 2020 seeking to vary the supervision requirements of the orders made on 20 August 2019, orders for make-up time, and an urgent interim hearing the following day. The application was accompanied by a letter requesting that the matter not be listed before me given the pending appeal and foreshadowing an application for recusal. That application was also listed to 12 January 2021. The request for a listing for urgent determination within 24 hours was refused for obvious reasons.

78There was then further correspondence between the lawyers for the parties, with efforts being made to arrange supervised time. No agreement as to venue was reached. By this stage [Supervision Agency A], the employer of Ms I, required the parties to undertake intake interviews before the supervisory service would be provided. The father booked the first available intake interview, scheduled for 5 January 2021, and the mother similarly arranged for an interview on 6 January 2021.

79Following the intake interviews, [Ms L] (who at that time was the proprietor of Supervision Agency A) wrote to the father advising that the mother "would not feel comfortable" with supervision by Ms I and expressing her own view that there was "no reason why visits cannot be supervised by different supervisor" and in a community location. The letter indicated, at least by inference, that the services of Ms I would not be made available.

80No agreement was reached, and on 8 January 2021 the father filed responses to the two applications filed by the mother, seeking that they be dismissed.

81The mother represented herself at the hearing on 12 January 2021, as her then lawyer apparently became unavailable at short notice. She sought to proceed only with an oral application that I recuse myself, noting that her appeals were scheduled to be heard shortly. I reserved my decision on the recusal application, and otherwise adjourned the mother's applications generally as requested with liberty to seek a relisting following the determination of the appeals.

82On 19 January 2021, for reasons given that day, I dismissed the recusal application. The same day, the mother filed a further interim application again seeking to vary the orders made on 20 August 2019 and make up time. She also filed a contravention application. An urgent listing before the duty judge was sought. While the applications were accepted for filing, they were not allocated a hearing date given the orders made on 12 January 2021 entitling the parties to seek a relisting following determination of the appeals.

83The mother's lawyers wrote again to the Court on 27 January 2021 enquiring as to the listing of the applications and asking that their letter be brought to the urgent attention of Duncanson J as duty judge. They sought that the applications be urgently listed, but not before me. In response, the lawyers were advised as above that the applications had been accepted for filing, but not allocated a hearing date pending determination of the appeals.

84On 29 January 2021 the mother sought a review of the decision not to list the applications. That request was incompetent and was rejected. On 8 February 2021, she commenced an appeal against the order dismissing her recusal application.[6]

[6] CACV 9 of 2021; AK v V [2021] WASCA 31.

85On 12 February 2021, the mother filed a still further application seeking a review of the decision not to list the various applications and an urgent hearing date. On 2 March 2021, her solicitors wrote requesting a listing noting that on 25 February 2021 the Court of Appeal had dismissed her appeals against the orders made on 20 August 2019 and evidentiary orders made on 5 November 2019.[7] The other pending appeals had not yet been determined.[8] Again, in requesting the listing the mother's lawyers asserted that the matter should not be heard by me.

[7] CACV 109 of 2019, CACV 146 of 2019; AK v V [2021] WASCA 31.

[8] CACV 23 of 2019, CACV 2 of 2021, CACV 9 of 2021.

86In response to that request, the proceedings were listed before me for directions only on 18 March 2021. On being advised of the listing, the parties were informed that at that hearing counsel should be prepared to clearly advise the Court whether it was intended to commence fresh substantive parenting proceedings (as earlier foreshadowed) and, if so, within what timeframe.

The commencement of the present proceedings

87The father filed his application commencing the present proceedings on 12 March 2021. He did not particularise the final orders which he would seek but sought interim procedural orders for the reappointment of [Ms M] as the ICL and a review by the SEW. At the hearing on 18 March 2021, the mother was ordered to file a response and case information affidavit within 28 days, setting out with particularity the final, interim and interlocutory orders which she would seek. An interim hearing was scheduled for 5 May 2021.

88The mother filed her response on 16 April 2021. Notwithstanding the order made, she sought to be excused from particularising the final orders she sought. As will be seen, that assumed some importance by the time of trial.

89On an interim basis, she sought orders to vary the orders of 20 August 2019 so that Child A would spend time with her at times to be agreed and failing agreement each Saturday from 2.00 pm to 4.00 pm supervised by [Supervision Agency B]. She sought the appointment of a senior ICL, other than Ms M. She sought orders directing the ICL to make various enquiries with [an allied health centre] as to therapeutic options, including whether "it would be in [Child A]'s best interests" to receive therapy from a psychologist other than Ms G. She otherwise sought the dismissal of the various pending interim applications, and that the matter be listed for further directions on a date not before 1 August 2021 to allow for supervised time to commence and be reported upon. She sought the dismissal of various aspects of the interim relief sought by the father.

90On 19 April 2021, the mother's remaining appeals and related applications (which included an application filed some five years out of time seeking to appeal the orders made by Crisford J on 25 February 2016) were dismissed.[9]

[9] CACV 23 of 2019, CACV 2 of 2021, CACV 9 of 2021; AK v V [No 2] [2021] WASCA 74.

91At the hearing on 5 May 2021, counsel then appearing for the mother made it clear that she sought to reserve her position in relation to final orders in relation to all matters, including parental responsibility and with whom Child A should live. The parties agreed that the matter should be progressed towards trial. I was advised that the mother was content for me to make orders that day for the appointment of an ICL and that (notwithstanding the terms of her filed response) she raised no specific objection to Ms M being reappointed. Orders were made directed to an interim hearing on 8 June 2021 and the ICL if appointed was given liberty to seek an earlier listing if he or she formed the view that the interim determinations should await the provision of expert evidence.

92Ms M was reappointed as ICL. She wrote to the Court on 18 May 2021 seeking a relisting and a series of orders as to the material to be provided to the SEW. The matter was relisted to a hearing on 31 May 2021. Orders were made for the provision of a further report by the SEW and the hearing listed for 8 June 2021 was vacated. The orders required both parties to do all things necessary to facilitate the provision of that report, including making themselves available for appointments with the SEW. The parties and the ICL were given liberty to seek a relisting at short notice if no agreement could be reached as to the materials to be provided to the SEW.

Further developments

93Towards the end of the second school term in 2021, the father and Ms D became concerned at changes in Child A's demeanour and behaviour which bore some similarity to the changes exhibited before she ran away in February 2019. They also noted that on several occasions Child A was late when meeting them to be picked up from school, following which she appeared distracted, and sometimes sad and despondent.

94On 8 July 2021, Child A told Ms G that she wanted to "change psychs". Without Child A present, Ms G told the father that Child A appeared to be keeping a detailed record of complaints about life in his household, and that she specifically complained about her treatment by Ms D. She advised the father to monitor Child A's online activity, and to search her room for notes or letters. That evening, the father took Child A's iPad from her without warning and noted multiple public social media accounts.

95On 11 July 2021, Ms D located two notes in Child A's handwriting hidden in Child A's room. The content of the notes was disturbing. They increased the father's suspicions that Child A was communicating directly or indirectly with the mother.

96No agreement was reached in relation to the materials to be provided to the SEW and on 13 July 2021 the ICL wrote to the Court seeking a relisting. The matter was listed to 27 August 2021 to deal with those issues.

97On 6 August 2021, the mother and her father attended at Child A's school to watch Child A compete in a cross-country competition, without notice to the father. The mother interacted with Child A.

98On 11 August 2021, Ms D found further notes in Child A's room, including a telephone number which was unfamiliar to her and a "motivational message". On 13 August 2021, a teacher at Child A's school informed the father that [Ms N], who is a friend of the mother, had approached Child A after class and spoken with her. It transpired that was not the first such occasion. Child A told the father on 16 August 2021 that Ms N gave her messages from the mother, which made her happy. When he asked about the nature of the messages, Child A said words along the lines of "mum loves and misses me, and I must be strong". On 18 August 2021, the father was informed that Ms N appeared to be waiting at school to approach Child A again; on his instructions, his lawyers wrote to the mother's lawyers and the ICL.

99On 26 August 2021, the mother filed an application seeking, among other things, the discharge of the order made on 31 May 2021 for the provision of a further report by the SEW and the appointment of a different SEW. At the hearing on 27 August 2021, orders were made enabling the ICL to provide documents to the SEW pending determination of that application, to avoid delay. The application was adjourned for hearing on 15 September 2021.

100On 3 September 2021, the mother attended at Child A's school without notice to the father and gave her gifts for her birthday. They included three books with content the father regarded as inappropriate, including themes about eating disorders, sexuality, alcohol, and violence. On 8 September 2021, the father's lawyers wrote to the mother's lawyers about those matters and made clear his position that in circumstances where orders were in place for the mother's time with Child A to be supervised it was inappropriate for her to approach Child A directly at school.

101At the hearing on 15 September 2021, the mother initially appeared unrepresented. She tendered a minute of proposed orders, in which she proposed a variation of the orders of 20 August 2019 and sought orders enabling her to attend interviews with the SEW accompanied by a named support person. She said that the lawyers who filed her application on 26 August 2021 had recently withdrawn and that she intended to instruct new lawyers. Initially she declined to identify those lawyers, but eventually did so. The matter was stood down and her new lawyer attended the resumed hearing. Orders were then made permitting the mother to attend any appointment with the SEW with her nominated support person and permitting her to provide specified documents to a proposed shadow expert witness. The relevant application was adjourned generally with liberty to seek a relisting at short notice; no relisting of that application was subsequently sought. Orders were otherwise made for the filing of all necessary documents and listing the proceedings to a five-day trial to commence on 17 January 2022.

102On 7 October 2021, the ICL filed an application seeking to vacate that trial date, list the trial to a mutually convenient date in February or March 2022, and adjust the timetable for the filing of documents. That application was brought as the ICL was concerned that the delays to that point risked the report of the SEW not being available in time for trial. On 13 October 2021, orders were made broadly as sought by the ICL and the trial was listed to commence on 8 March 2022.

103The father facilitated Facetime communication between the mother and Child A on Christmas Day and the mother's birthday. During the Christmas Day communication, the mother made comments to Child A including words to the effect of "things will change – you have rights you know. You have always made the right decisions and I know you will continue to do so." Before the next communication, the father made it clear to the mother that he would terminate the call if comments of that nature continued. They did not.

104Notwithstanding the orders made at her request on 15 September 2021, the mother declined to engage with the SEW for the purpose of the preparation of his report. She went to the extent of blocking communications from his office on her phone. The report was published to the parties on 25 January 2022.

105On 27 January 2022, the mother filed a further application in a case seeking that the trial be vacated, and that a trial date after 2 June 2022 be allocated. In her affidavit in support of that application, she said that in the previous year she had experienced difficulty in obtaining legal representation and set out an incomplete history of the firms she had instructed. She said that she met with a new solicitor on 14 December 2021 and outlined the work that had been done on her behalf since. She indicated that her preferred counsel Dr Brasch QC[10] (who was based in Queensland and had no previous involvement in the matter) was unavailable for the trial as then listed and that her solicitors were "making enquiries" as to the availability of Mrs Farmer[11] to appear at trial. I was not advised of the result of those enquiries either in the mother's affidavit, or at the hearing of the application on 11 February 2022, at which Mrs Farmer appeared for the mother on a limited brief.

[10] As her Honour then was, prior to her appointment to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 1) on 6 April 2022.

[11] An experienced counsel, who had previously appeared on the mother’s behalf.

106The father opposed the primary application for the trial to be vacated. For reasons given extemporaneously, I dismissed the primary application, and extended the time for filing of the mother's materials. The trial commenced as scheduled on 8 March 2022. Mrs Farmer appeared as counsel for the mother, with Mr Worth as co‑counsel.

9.In 2014, not long after you had turned 5 years old, a big Trial started before Judge Crisford. After many days of listening to everyone, the Judge worried that your Mum still thought your Dad was harming you when the Judge did not think he was. So, Judge Crisford put things on hold for 1 year to give Mum a chance to show she could change her behaviour about these things (which your Mum said she would do) and so you could spend more time with Dad to get to know him better. At that time, you were still living mostly with Mum.

10.About a year later the Judge heard the rest of the trial and decided that you would start living mostly with your Dad and spend time with your Mum on weekends and on some weekdays. She did not think your Mum had changed her thinking about Dad or her actions in that way she treated you. For example, Mum had again taken many more photos and videos of you and gone to professional people to tell them her worries about you being hurt by Dad, even though the Judge had warned her not to do this and had found that you had not been harmed by your Dad.

11.The Judge was still worried that Mum’s feelings about Dad and the things she might do because of those feelings could continue to be harmful to your mind and your feelings, but she did not want to stop you seeing Mum. So, she put in place some strict rules for your Mum to follow. For example, she was not allowed to talk to you about changing which parent you lived with, or about how you had got any bruises at Dad’s house or about things that might make you think Dad was hurting you or about things that were not okay for a kid to know that might make you feel stressed or upset. Your Mum did not follow these rules and she continued to do these things.

12.Judge Crisford did not end Court totally. She asked Dr E to check up on things after a year of you living with Dad to see if the time that you were spending with Mum should change. Dr E did that and he though things should pretty much stay the same as you seemed to be going well.

13.This takes us up to when you were 10 years old and by then Judge O’Brien had taken over as your Judge. Your Dad agreed with Dr E that things should stay the same. Mum agreed to you living with Dad but was asking to spend more time with you. There were some worried (which were ultimately found to be true) that your Mum had broken some of the Court’s rules and started to talk to you again about your Dad harming you and about things to do with Court which she was not meant to do. However, Judge O’Brien decided that things should stay pretty much the same and Court finished.

14.Soon after that however, in 2019, everyone became super worried about how you were doing. There was a big worry that Mum might be saying things to make you feel like you had to choose between Mum and Dad (which you did not need to do) and telling you that you should run away. This was not okay and was breaking the Court’s rules. There were big worries about you being safe and worries that you seemed sad and stressed out by all of this.

15.The Court had to held again. Judge O’Brien decided that thing should change for a while and that you should only see your Mum for short visits with [Ms I]. Your Dad tried to get the visits to start with Ms I. However, your Mum was not happy with the Court’s decision. Also, she did not want Ms I to supervise the visits. So, all visits stopped because Mum didn’t want Ms I involved, and a new Court case started. The Court asked Ms M to be the ICL again.

The Big Trial

16.The final big Trial happened last year in 2022. By then Ms M was not working as an ICL anymore and [Ms W] became the new ICL. Both your Mum, Dad and Ms W all had lawyers working for them at the Trial.

17.Judge O’Brien heard everyone talk over many days, including Mum, Dad, the lawyers and Dr E. He also read hundreds of pages of documents to help him figure out what was best for you.

18.Everyone, including your Mum, told the Judge that they agreed for you to keep living with your Dad. Your Mum asked to spend some additional time with you on weekends and holidays. Dad wanted someone like Ms G to be able to talk with you about everything that has happened. For a long time both Dad and Ms D were unable to answer some of your questions about what was going on. Your Dad (and ultimately the Court) believed you had a right to know what everyone had been worried about and the reasons why you now live with Dad, Ms D, Child B and Child C. At the time your Mum told the court she did not want you to know these things. Everyone wanted what they thought was best for you, The Judge had to make the difficult final decision.

19.Please know Child A that everyone at the trial, especially the Judge, knew how very much you love your Mum. They all knew that you adore your Mum and want to be with her. Your feelings about Mum and what you had clearly said you wanted to Dr E and Ms M and others, were heard loud and clear and were in the Judge’s mind when he made the decision.

20.An important thing the Judge also had to think about was if you had been or might be harmed in any way. Remember, harm can be physical, like hitting someone or harm to our mind and feelings, like making someone believe something that is not true.

21.You said to some people your Dad was mean at times, and he hit you a long time ago. The Court understands you feel these things but there was no evidence that this was more than what normally happens when parents have rules and boundaries. No-one at Court thought that you had been really harmed or hurt in any way by your Dad. Your Mum even told the Court that she agreed that Dad did not harm you. However, the Judge was worried that even though your Mum said this, her actions did not match her words to show this was her true belief. For example, sending the secret messages to you last year, telling you to tell people that your Dad had harmed you.

22.Once again, the Court did not think Mum had or could get over her feelings about Dad and was worried about that being harmful to you. For example, it would be bad if she said things that made you do unsafe things like running away (because you love Mum and want to do what will make her happy) or that made you think there was something wrong at Dad’s place or that you should be scared of him.

23.You should be aware that the Court gave your Mum many opportunities to change her ways and follow the rules. For whatever reason, she was unable to do this. This is something you can discuss with Ms G.

24.For all the reasons above, the Judge was worried that seeing or speaking with Mum could lead to you being sad, angry and unsettled in life and make it harder for you to be happy and calm at home. He was also worried that it might hurt the good relationship you have with Dad, Ms D, Child B and Child C.

What the Judge Decided

25.So, because of all these things, the Judge said that, sadly, he did not think it was best for you to have a relationship with Mum until you finish school and are an adult. He knows that you love Mum, and you think your relationship with her is good, however that does not mean that some of the things your Mum does are healthy or in your best interests. Your Dad and the ICL Ms W agreed with the Judge about this.

26.The Judge totally gets that you will miss your Mum very much and that you will find it difficult and hard to understand why decisions have been made by adults that are different to what you have clearly said you want.

27.The Judge also had to decide when you will be old enough to make these decisions for yourself. He decided that when you turn 18 and have finished High School would be the best time. That way, you can stay living with Dad and you can focus on doing well at school, hanging out with your friends, playing sport, music and all the cool things that you enjoy doing as a teenager. Then, when you turn 18, you can decide for yourself.

28.Some of the important final “Court Orders” made by the Judge, which are the rules everyone must follow are –

a.You will stay living with your Dad.

b.Dad will be the one to make all decisions about you that parents would normally make for kids.

c.You will continue to see Ms G (or someone like Ms G if Dad and Ms G agree it should be someone else) and she can discuss the Court stuff with you in more detail if you like.

d.You won’t be spending time with Mum or communicating with her unless Dad and Ms G agree at some point that it might be best for you or until you are 18 and can decide for yourself.

e.There are some very strict rules in place for Mum, including a rule that Mum must not try to see you or communicate with you herself or get another person to do that for her.

f.If Mum breaks the rules, there can be serious consequences for her.

What Next?

29.Reading this will be a lot to take in and some of it will be confusing and sad. You will probably have questions! Ms G is the best person for you to ask first, as she is allowed to give you more information and show you some more stuff about Court if she thinks that is a good idea. You might want to ask Dad or Ms D (and you now can) but the Court thinks it is best that you initially discuss this document and get your answers from Ms G. Previous the Court said Dad could not talk to you about these matters but if you want to talk to him about it now – you can.

30.All the people involved in helping your family at Court really hope that Court is now finished. They all think you are an amazing person. They want you to have a great life, a wonderful future and to get on with being a teenager, while knowing that a final decision has been made. Even though you may not like some of the things said in this letter, the Judge hopes you can now understand things a bit better. He also hopes that you will learn to be okay with how things are for now and not have to worry about Court being a thing in your life anymore.

Dated: [Redacted] 2023