WORRALL and BARTLEY
[2019] FCWA 10
•22 JANUARY 2019
JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ACT: FAMILY COURT ACT 1997
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: WORRALL and BARTLEY [2019] FCWA 10
CORAM: O'BRIEN J
HEARD: 31 OCTOBER 2018
DELIVERED : 22 JANUARY 2019
FILE NO/S: PTW 4789 of 2010
BETWEEN: MR WORRALL
Applicant
AND
MS BARTLEY
Respondent
Catchwords:
PARENTING - where child is nine years old and parents have been litigating for eight years – where after a lengthy trial interim orders only for the child to spend time with the mother were made, with provision for a review by the single expert witness – where mother contends that interim orders should be varied immediately to increase the child’s time with her and that the orders should then be subject to still further review – where father contends that final orders should be made in terms of the interim orders, and the proceedings brought to an end - where the interim orders were made to allow for the possibility of substantial positive change in the mother’s attitudes and beliefs such that additional time with her might be in the child’s best interests – where only minimal such change has been achieved and child continues to be exposed to an inappropriate level of knowledge of the court proceedings – where continuation of the existing arrangement is in the child’s best interests – conclusion that the proceedings should be brought to an end.
Legislation:
Family Court Act 1997 (WA)
Category: Not Reportable
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | Mr Penglis |
| Respondent | : | Mr Rodda |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Clairs Keeley |
| Respondent | : | Ferrier Athanasiou & Kakulas |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637
Bondelmonte & Bondelmonte (2016) 91 ALJR 402
Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725
Worrall & Bartley [2018] FCWA 132
Worrall & Bartley [2016] FCWA 57
WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT - PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED
1These proceedings relate to the parenting arrangements to be made for [Child A], born [in] 2009. While Child A has only just turned nine years old, her parents have been involved in litigation about her care for over eight years, with only short periods of respite.
Background
2Both parties are 49 years of age. They met in or around March 2008 and had a short relationship. They did not marry. While their perceptions of the duration of the relationship differ, on any view, the relationship had completely broken down by no later than April 2010, when Child A was seven months old.
3The father commenced proceedings in August 2010 and orders were made at an early stage for Child A to spend time with him. The proceedings continued as described in the reasons for decision published by Crisford AJ on 19 July 2016 (Worrall & Bartley [2016] FCWA 57 – “the 2016 judgment”).
4The matter was initially listed for trial to commence on 14 January 2013. After lengthy negotiations over five days, orders were pronounced on 18 January 2013 and all outstanding applications and responses were dismissed.
5In the middle of 2013 the mother raised allegations of harm. In April 2014, she unilaterally suspended Child A’s time with the father; he commenced further proceedings on 1 May 2014. [The Single Expert Witness], who had been involved in the earlier proceedings as single expert witness (“SEW”) since early 2012, was re-appointed.
6Those proceedings went to trial before Crisford J over nine days in November 2014. Her Honour made interim orders and adjourned the proceedings for a period of one year. She noted the opinion of the SEW that “the most important change needed to be the mothers acceptance that the child was not being abused by the father”. The SEW did not suggest changing residence, and [Dr B], Child A’s Clinical Psychologist, had a “strong view the mother could be amenable to therapy” and that “there was time for [her] to change.”
7In the 2016 judgment, her Honour explained that those interim orders were made to “fulfil two main objectives. Firstly, to allow the father to address what was considered to be an avoidant attachment with the child and, secondly, to allow the mother to deal with her severe anxiety and what was considered to be a disorganised attachment with the child.”
8The trial resumed in December 2015, extending into January and February 2016, over a further 14 hearing days. On 25 February 2016, Crisford J made final orders for the father to have sole parental responsibility for Child A, and for Child A to live with him. Her Honour made interim orders for Child A to spend time with the mother and very detailed injunctions regulating the mother's conduct.
9In the 2016 judgment, her Honour acknowledged that the mother had been Child A’s primary caregiver until the orders of 25 January 2016 were made, and that initially the father had not sought to change that position. She set out in detail the history of the dynamic between the parties and the lack of any progress on the part of the mother in the period following the making of the interim orders in November 2014. Crisford J found that there was no real change in the mother’s view about the father hurting Child A, despite extensive therapy. The SEW expressed the opinion that Child A was not yet alienated from the father, but was “showing all the signs of it”. He predicted that if a change in primary care was not made there might later be significant consequences. Her Honour summarised the position as follows:
“At this time I do not find the mother is capable of any change. She had an opportunity to modify her behaviour but this is currently beyond her. As a result I find that if there is no change in the primary care arrangements for the child, the child will lose the benefits of having a meaningful relationship with her father and all that entails, including a loss of contact with her siblings. The reduction in time with the mother, whilst distressing, will not have the effect of destroying or diminishing her relationship with the mother. It will simply be a loss of time. It is a harsh action to take, but one which is necessary to preserve the child’s ability to maintain a relationship with each of her parents. To remain with the mother vitiates against that”.
10Self-evidently, her Honour did not consider Child A to be at risk in the care of the father. Informing the orders which her Honour made for Child A to spend time with the mother was the following finding:
“The mother’s unshakeable views about the father and her actions stemming from these are likely to pose an unacceptable risk of psychological and emotional harm to the child. It is for this reason that I have made the orders minimising the time the mother spends with the child. If the mother’s behaviour continues and impacts on the child further as she develops and grows, it is likely there will be further changes to the mother’s involvement in the child’s life. However, the cessation of a relationship with a parent is an option of last resort for a court……”
11Orders were made for the mother to continue her attendance upon her psychiatrist, and for the provision 12 months later of a report from the psychiatrist for the purpose of providing feedback about her progress in addressing her anxiety and beliefs about the father. Orders were also made to facilitate continuing therapy for Child A, and requiring the father to continue to attend for therapeutic counselling with [Dr C] as directed by him.
12Centrally to matters in issue before me, the following further order was made:
“In 12 months’ time from the making of these orders, [the SEW] undertake a review of the parties and [Child A] and provide recommendations to the court as to whether it would be in [Child A]’s best interests to further progress the time she spends with the [mother]”.
13That order was made against the background of the following observation by her Honour:
“I made no orders for the child to spend extended holiday time with the mother at this stage. Rather than having a six month cessation of any contact at all, it appeared to the Court to minimise the time the child spent with the mother was all that was required in the present circumstances. This curtailment of time extended to holiday periods. In the short term I consider this to be appropriate. With the effluxion of time and hopefully some shift in the mother’s view there is room for change in the future. The orders made in relation to the time between the mother and child are interim orders and do not signal what might be appropriate in the medium to long term.”
14The SEW conducted his review as anticipated and published a report which was distributed to the parties on 31 March 2017. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was then considerable dispute between the parties as to what was to happen from that point. The proposals of the parties in that regard are set out in more detail below. In short, the father sought to bring the proceedings to an end and the mother sought orders which would involve a continuing review of Child A’s circumstances and ongoing modification of the orders.
15At a hearing on 26 June 2018, I ordered that the proceedings progress to a short further hearing to determine:
(a)whether, as proposed by the father, final orders should now be made in terms of the interim orders made on 25 February 2016;
(b)whether, as proposed by the mother, orders should be made extending her time with Child A on an interim basis only; and
(c)whether, again as proposed by the mother, orders should be made whereby that issue should be still further reviewed.
16The parties agreed that for the purposes of that hearing I should adopt the findings and judgment of Crisford J contained in the 2016 judgment, as permitted by s 202L(3)(b) of the Family Court Act 1997 (WA) (“the Act”). I made specific orders as to the material to be in evidence at the hearing before me and as to the examination of the SEW and Child A’s therapist, [Ms G].
17I incorporate my extempore reasons delivered on 26 June 2018 Worrall & Bartley [2018] FCWA 132 into these reasons.
18The hearing proceeded on 31 October 2018. Both parties were represented by experienced counsel.
Relief sought by the parties
19The father sought orders in the following terms:
1The interim orders of 25 February 2016 are made final.
2All outstanding applications are dismissed.
20In the event that I was not prepared to make those orders, the father proposed that orders be made in the terms of an alternative minute filed by him on 21 November 2017, which was in the following terms:
1.Orders 4.1 and 4.2 made on 25 February 2016 be amended as follows:
(a)by deleting the words in brackets in Orders 4.1 and 4.2; and
(b)by adding the following Order:
4.2.1During school holidays:
(a)if pursuant to Orders 4.1 and 4.2, [Child A] is spending time with the Respondent during the first weekend of the school holidays, [Child A] spend time with the Respondent from 12 noon the following Wednesday until 4pm Saturday; and
(b)if pursuant to Orders 4.1 and 4.2, [Child A] is spending time with the Applicant during the first weekend of the school holidays, [Child A] spend time with the Respondent from 12 noon the following Thursday until 4pm Sunday;
subject to the Applicant’s decision as to whether or not such extended periods cause problems for [Child A].
2.The interim Orders of 25 February 2016 otherwise be made final.
21The mother sought orders in terms of a minute filed by her on 27 March 2018, with certain amendments proposed at trial to reflect the effluxion of time since that document was filed.
22She sought the discharge of paragraph 4 of the orders made on 25 February 2016, which set out the detailed orders for [Child A] to spend time with her.
23In summary, the mother proposed :
(a)that [Child A]’s time with her each alternate weekend, which presently ends at 5pm on Sunday, be extended to the conclusion of school or 4pm on Monday;
(b)that [Child A]’s time with her on such weekends, which presently commences after school on Friday, be further extended from the commencement of Term 1 in 2019 to start at 12 noon or the conclusion of school on Thursday;
(c)that [Child A]’s time with her on intervening weeks during school term remain unchanged; and
(d)that the present order whereby the term time arrangements for [Child A] to spend time with her do not alter during school holidays be replaced by an order providing for more extended time from the commencement of the 2020 school year, progressing to 6 nights per fortnight in the summer holidays.
24In addition, she proposed that the orders for Child A to spend time with her both during school term and during school holidays “be the subject of further review by the Court in January 2020, with [Child A]’s views about the ongoing care arrangement being ascertained by way of a Family Report” to be prepared either by a family consultant or the SEW, Dr W.
The law
25The Court’s power is to make such parenting order as it thinks proper.
26When making a parenting order in relation to a child, the Court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child has engaged in abuse of the child or another relevant child, or family violence.
27Even if the statutory presumption applies, it can be rebutted by evidence that satisfies the Court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility.
28The orders presently sought by each party meet the definition of “parenting orders”. Somewhat curiously in the circumstances, therefore, the statutory presumption arguably applies. It is, however, clearly rebutted by evidence and by my adoption, with the consent of the parties, of the findings and judgment of Crisford J. Neither party suggested that the existing final orders in relation to parental responsibility should be revisited.
29In determining what parenting orders are to be made, the child’s best interests are the paramount, but not the only, consideration. The interests of the parties may appropriately be taken into account, provided that the child’s interests remain paramount.
30In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the Court is required to consider the matters set out in s 66C of the Act. While those matters are divided in the legislation into “primary” and “additional” considerations, the primary considerations do not necessarily outweigh any combination of the additional considerations.
31The issues that are joined between the parties will dictate which s 66C factors are relevant. The requirement to “consider” each factor does not mean that each factor must be expressly discussed in a judgment where the factor in question has no sufficient relevance in the particular circumstances of the individual case to displace the determinative significance of factors specifically discussed: Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637.
32The agreed adoption of the findings and judgment of Crisford J, and the narrowing of the issues presently in dispute by the process set out above, renders a recital and analysis of the various s 66C factors redundant other than as set out below.
33The court has long recognised the potential detriment to children of “continual and seemingly endless and inconclusive” litigation.[1] That recognition has, since June 2006, extended to specific inclusion in s 66C of a requirement for the court to consider whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child.
[1] Freeman & Freeman (1987) FLC 91-857; Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725
34As the High Court observed in Bondelmonte & Bondelmonte (2016) 91 ALJR 402, the making of a parenting order involves the exercise of judicial discretion. The assessment of the considerations set out in the legislation by reference to the circumstances of the case involves value judgments in respect of which there may be room for reasonable differences of opinion, as does the overall assessment of what is in the best interests of the child.
The evidence
35Pursuant to orders made by me on 26 June 2018, the following affidavits were in evidence:
(a)the affidavit of the mother filed 27 March 2018;
(b)the affidavits of [Ms A], filed on 27 March 2018 and 9 April 2018;
(c)the affidavit of [Ms W], filed 28 November 2017;
(d)the affidavit of [Ms K], filed 31 May 2018;
(e)the affidavit of the SEW, filed 13 April 2017 and his updated report; and
(f)the affidavit of Ms G, filed 14 May 2018.
36In her affidavit, the mother said that she had engaged in therapy with Ms A since July 2016. She summarised the information she had provided to the SEW. She said that Child A continues to ask to spend more time with her.
37She gave additional evidence as to negotiations with the father regarding extensions of Child A’s time with her. A limited number of those discussions led to agreements on specific occasions. She otherwise provided explanations of certain incidents, expressed the view that her ongoing therapy with Ms A was beneficial, and asserted that she is complying with the various injunctions in place.
38In her report dated 7 July 2017, Ms A said that she had undertaken 19 appointments with the mother to that point. When commencing therapy, she took the position that the mother’s beliefs about the father were “long-held and, realistically, were unlikely to change radically.” Accordingly, therapy had progressed “not on an assumption that [those] beliefs could change in the short term, but on a shared understanding that there was no purpose in continuing to express or promote those beliefs, and that it is possible to choose not to allow the beliefs and the anxiety they generate to be the sole determinants of behaviour.”
39Accordingly, Ms A did not seek to directly challenge the mother’s beliefs. She formed the impression that while some of those beliefs had not entirely altered, they had modified somewhat in that there was much less anxiety attached to them than previously noted, and much less of a perceived need to protect Child A. She saw the addressing of those beliefs as an ongoing and gradual process. She noted that some beliefs about mistreatment of Child A in the past may remain, but that the mother did not hold the same level of concern about Child A’s safety currently. She recommended ongoing therapy.
40In an updated report dated 26 March 2018, Ms A said that the therapeutic work had continued in much the same way and that she had discussed with the mother issues that would need to be addressed if she was to continue to seek that Child A have more time with her.
41The affidavit of Ms W annexed a report from a consultant psychiatrist, [Dr S], dated 15 September 2016. It also annexed an email from Child A’s therapist, Ms G, to the SEW dated 10 April 2017, raising a number of concerns, including the fact that Child A reported that the mother had taken a photograph of a bruise which she had as a result of being bitten by the father’s son from his new relationship. Ms G said:
“When I enquired why Mum would take a photo of it, she replied ‘Mum has to take photos of my bruises to show the court, because Dad sometimes hits me’. When I asked [w]hen he hit her last, she replied ‘I don’t want to talk about it. When I was a baby.’ She also volunteered the observation that ‘Dad doesn’t hate Mum, but Mum hates Dad’.”
42The adopted findings of Crisford J in the 2016 judgment about similar behaviours on the part of the mother, and the impact of those behaviours on Child A, do not require repetition.
43The report of the SEW dated 13 April 2017, arising from his ordered review, was in evidence. He noted that Child A appeared to be “doing better since the move” to the father’s care, that her attachment to the father was “more stable” and “life is more predictable”, to her benefit. He outlined some difficulties which had been reported shortly after the orders of 25 February 2016, arising from the mother’s behaviour. That said, he gained the overall impression that the mother’s “problematic behaviour has been contained and relatively minor and there is no evidence of the major areas of concern having re-occurred in the more recent times.”
44The SEW went on to consider whether Child A’s time with the mother should increase. He said:
“This would be particularly likely if [Child A] was doing worse and not better, or that there were some indicators that increased time would make the situation run better for the parties or [Child A]. I am not satisfied that there is evidence to suggest that there is a need to increase the time although I will make a suggestion for school holidays below.”
45He favoured a continuation of the structure involving two separate blocks of time with the mother, of two nights each, rather than an extension to one four-night block as then proposed by her.
46He then said the following:
“To bring together my opinion in this section, to use a colloquial expression – if it isn’t broken why try to fix it – therefore as far as I can see in the complex layers of psychological emotional and practical factors of this case, [Child A] appears to be doing better and not worse, therefore do not risk the situation by making an unnecessary change.
Having said that, the mother put to me the suggestion of what about some more time in the school holidays. I would argue that given the absence of major problems being evident, that in the school holidays consideration should be given to the mother having a four-day block by increasing one of the existing stays. In working out how this would actually look it is important that it does not land immediately on top of the next two-day block, that there is a period of time in between her time periods to separate the periods, that it allows [the father] to have a reasonable period of school holiday time, and if possible make it in the first week so that there is time for [Child A] to settle into routine if there is any fallout before the school period.”
47The SEW did not “see any value in a further review in under 12 months.”
48A report dated 9 May 2018 from Ms G was in evidence. She reported continuing to see Child A on an as needs basis, at a frequency determined by her rather than by the father, currently approximately monthly. She said that Child A had been “settled emotionally in recent times”. She presented as very happy and chatty, was happy with her teacher at school, and settled in her friendship group.
49She said that over the course of working with Child A for the last two years, she had watched her increase in confidence to the point where she appeared to be a very happy, settled child. In the early days, she pined for her mother and expressed some complaints about the father but she was now observed to have developed a very warm and affectionate relationship with the father.
50Ms G’s only concern was that Child A’s presentation had sometimes varied during sessions with her. She gave an example of a session on 16 April 2018 where Child A’s opening comment, made right at the start of the session, was that she wanted to live with the mother and see the father “sometimes”. Child A had spent the previous night at the mother’s home.
51Ms G concluded by saying that she was “really pleased with the progress that [Child A] has made, and would be concerned at this stage that changing anything in relation to custodial arrangements may not be in [her] best interest”.
52Ms G gave updating evidence at trial. She said that Child A continued to appear happy during sessions, but that in the latter part of 2018 she had been talking a lot about the father hitting her, being mean, and similar. When asked for a timeframe, Child A said that the father had hit her when she was a baby in her cot and that “Mum knew he was mean before I knew he was mean”. Ms G was concerned that Child A was being exposed to inappropriate discussions.
53Under cross-examination by counsel for the mother, Ms G acknowledged that Child A had expressed a wish to live with the mother and had made various associated comments. In re-examination, referring to Child A she said:
“She often talks about missing her mum and clearly loves her mum very much, and I think it would be unnatural for her to not miss her mum at her age and in the situation she’s in. But she also appears to me to be a very happy, well-adjusted little girl who’s enjoying life. She doesn’t appear sad or withdrawn.”
54It was clear to Ms G that Child A was acutely aware of the court proceedings. She recounted Child A saying to her “I just want to live with mum. Mum says she saw dad hitting me when I was really little. Don’t tell dad I said he’s mean. Just tell the court. Then I might be able to live with my mum”. Child A said that the “Family Court got it wrong” in believing the father.
55The most recent occasion on which Child A had made comments along those lines was in Ms G’s session with her on 15 October 2018, some two weeks prior to the hearing before me. She had “said things increasingly about court since about June” 2018.
56That occurred against the background of Ms G’s observations of Child A engaging happily with, being relaxed with, and showing affection to, the father in circumstances where she was not necessarily conscious of being observed.
57The SEW had the benefit of hearing Ms G give her evidence. He confirmed the evidence set out in his reports. The evidence of Ms G did not cause him to change his views.
58He went on to say (emphasis added):
“I think I was predominantly asked through the court order to really see whether we should be progressing some of the time with the mother, and what I’m hearing in this particular case is there’s nothing changed which would give me the reassurance that things justify changing anything.”
“Ultimately [Child A] was placed with her dad and I think from some of the evidence we’ve just heard we’re still worried about some of those influences [from the mother] taking place.”
59The SEW also confirmed that the earlier quoted passage regarding the possibility of change during school holidays was put forward by him neutrally as an option, rather than as a positive recommendation.
60He expressed the view that what he described as “phase 1” of Child A’s transition into the primary care of the father had gone quite well, that the present circumstances could be described as “phase 2” and that it was to be anticipated that there would be a third phase when Child A reaches her mid-teenage years and would, in his view, be likely to “vote with her feet against one or other parent” because of the ongoing conflict.
61In the meantime, he described it as “possible but not likely” that longer blocks of time with the mother would be good for Child A. He regarded the mother’s proposed changes to school term arrangements as “hugely substantive” in circumstances where the mother sought to characterise them as relatively minor.
Discussion and conclusion
62As already noted, none of the findings made by Crisford J were challenged or disputed by either party.
63The interim orders made by her Honour for Child A to spend time with the mother were, self-evidently, made based on her Honour’s findings as to the circumstances as they then existed. Her Honour’s decision to make those orders on an interim basis, and to include a mechanism for their review, was expressly based on an acceptance of the possibility that there might be significant change, most particularly in the mother’s behaviours, following the 2016 judgment and that any such change might in turn lead to a conclusion that it would be in Child A’s best interests to spend more time with her.
64While the mother’s focus was understandably on her Honour’s acceptance of the logical possibility of a positive outcome,[2] her Honour was also clearly alive to the possibility of what might be described as negative change.[3]
[2] Worrall & Bartley [2016] FCWA 57 at [276]
[3] Ibid at [311]
65In short, the evidence before me does not demonstrate any meaningful positive change in the views or behaviours of the mother since the interim orders were made. While I accept that with the assistance of Ms A the mother has made some limited progress, that is in the nature of managing, to a limited degree, her own reactions to ongoing beliefs about the father, rather than any epiphany in relation to those beliefs or fundamental change in her own insight.
66Critically, the evidence of Ms G makes it clear that yet again Child A is acutely aware of the court proceedings, and that the manifestation of that awareness increased as the scheduled hearing before me approached.
67The absence of meaningful change on the part of the mother, and my acceptance of the evidence of Ms G and the SEW, lead me to conclude that no change should presently be made to the existing interim orders for Child A to spend time with the mother.
68In considering, as I must, the likely effect of any changes in Child A’s circumstances, I place considerable weight on the independent evidence that she is doing well under the current orders, and on the evidence of the SEW in particular as to the potential risks associated with the increased time proposed by the mother.
69I have considered also the wishes and views expressed by Child A. In the context of the totality of the evidence, including the adopted findings of Crisford J and the observations of Ms G as to the circumstances in which those views were expressed to her, I place no weight on them.
70The present arrangements will continue to maintain Child A’s relationship with the mother. The absence of change to those arrangements will best preserve and protect Child A’s relationship with the father.
71I bear in mind also the finding of Crisford J, which I adopt, as to the risk to Child A of psychological and emotional harm arising from the mother’s beliefs about the father, and her actions arising from them.[4] The evidence does not support a conclusion that the identified risk is no longer present. It remains unacceptable.
[4] Ibid.
72For those reasons, the conclusion that there should be no present increase in the mother’s time with Child A is readily reached.
73The remaining issue is whether the proceedings should now be brought to an end, as proposed by the father, or continued with an eye to ongoing review of the arrangements for Child A to spend time with the mother, as proposed by her.
74In short, I conclude that the proceedings should now be brought to an end.
75As Crisford J observed in the 2016 judgment, Child A “has been the subject of a barrage of legal proceedings for most of her life.” The impact on Child A of the ongoing conflict between her parents is well documented, and continuing, as is her acute awareness of the ongoing court process. While it would be naive to assume that the cessation of proceedings in this Court would be a panacea, bringing to a complete end that detrimental conflict, nevertheless it would remove at least one significant means by which it may be perpetuated.
76The principles reflected in Rice v Asplund,[5] and subsequent decisions already referred to, and to which the court is directed by s 66 C(3)(l), resonate in this case. That is so not because it could be suggested that the mother bears any onus to satisfy a so-called “test”, nor because any threshold finding is required if the orders sought by her are to be made. Rather, those principles resonate because the evidence accumulated over almost the entirety of Child A’s life shows clearly the terrible impact on her of not only the conflict between her parents, and her mother’s beliefs and actions, but of the ongoing pursuit of, and participation in, proceedings in this Court.
[5] Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725.
77I conclude that it is in Child A’s best interests for orders to be made in the terms sought by the father.
78Subject to any submission as to form, there will be the following orders:
1.There will be final orders in terms of the interim orders contained in paragraphs 4 to 8 inclusive and paragraphs 20 to 31 inclusive of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Crisford on 25 February 2016.
2.All outstanding applications and responses be and are hereby dismissed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Family Court of Western Australia.
KM
Associate to the Judge22 JANUARY 2019