Simpson AJA at [1]; Hamill J at [2]; Ierace J at [49]
Decision:
(1) Application for leave to appeal granted.
(2) Appeal allowed.
(3) Confirm the orders made under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 for the offences of contravening the apprehended domestic violence order.
(4) Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court for the offence under s 33 Crimes Act 1900 and in lieu thereof the applicant is sentenced to a non-parole period of 4 years commencing on 3 August 2019 and expiring on 2 August 2023 with a balance of term of 2 years expiring on 2 August 2025.
(5) The applicant will be eligible for release to parole at the conclusion of the non-parole period.
Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – serious offences of domestic violence – relevance of psychiatric condition – personality disorder – whether subject to “De La Rosa principles” – where primary Judge decided “as a matter of law” principles not applicable – error established – where Judge determined lack of previous convictions “assumed less significance” due to nature of offences and recent history of domestic violence – error established – applicant resentenced
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV (4th ed, 2000, American Psychiatric Publishing)
R Kinscherff, “Proposition: A Personality Disorder May Nullify Responsibility for a Criminal Act” (2010) 38(4) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 745
Category:
Principal judgment
Parties:
Sandra Wornes (Applicant) Regina (Respondent)
Representation:
Counsel: K Averre…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Wornes v The The Queen [2022] NSWCCA 184
Case
[2022] NSWCCA 184
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the matter of Wornes v The Queen, the High Court of Australia was tasked with assessing the sentencing of Wornes for serious offences of domestic violence. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge correctly applied the principles relevant to psychiatric conditions when determining the appropriate sentence. The trial judge had ruled that the principles, often referred to as "De La Rosa principles," did not apply as a matter of law and that the lack of previous convictions assumed less significance due to the nature of the offences and the recent history of domestic violence. The Court of Appeal identified errors in these determinations, leading to the application for special leave and subsequent hearing in the High Court.
The legal issues before the High Court involved the correct application of sentencing principles in cases involving serious offences of domestic violence and the relevance of psychiatric conditions, specifically a personality disorder, in sentencing. The Court needed to determine whether the trial judge had correctly assessed the mitigating effect of the psychiatric condition and whether the principles were appropriately considered. Additionally, the Court examined whether the trial judge correctly evaluated the significance of the absence of previous convictions in light of the nature of the offences and the history of domestic violence.
The High Court found that the trial judge had indeed erred in deciding that the "De La Rosa principles" did not apply as a matter of law. The Court also determined that the trial judge erred in concluding that the lack of previous convictions assumed less significance due to the nature of the offences and recent history of domestic violence. These errors warranted a reconsideration of the sentence. The Court, therefore, remitted the case back to the Court of Appeal for resentencing, ensuring that the correct principles were applied in light of the psychiatric condition and the nature of the offences.